

Understanding the Existence and Latent Threat of Islamist Terrorism Through a Multi-Dimensional Analysis: The Case of Republic of Indonesia.

Volume 1 of 1

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that encompasses elements of politics, economics, social, and ideology, driving people to commit violent acts and become involved in such activity. As of today, the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism still inflict global society with formidable challenges, and one way to overcome such challenges is by leveraging our knowledge on the multi-dimensional, determining factors/elements that lead people to commit terrorist attacks and other radical-related activities.

In other words, as our struggle against terrorism is a global endeavour that may last a generation or more, leveraging our knowledge on such multi-dimensional, determining factors/elements will increase our understanding of the underlying causes and patterns that continue to inspire jihadist terrorism. However, it is wrong to equate the religion of Islam with terrorism. Perhaps most importantly, the Islamic tradition is all-encompassing, combining religious and secular life and law. This surely complicates attempts to understand the Islamist ideology and counter-measures to it solely through the lens of traditional Western political science. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the religion of Islam and a set of often-conflicting political ideologies known as Islamism, where many forms of them are non-radical, reformists or gradualists. That is why, Islamist extremists who advocate acts of terrorism may be properly termed Islamist terrorists, who seek to cloth their acts in the trappings of the Islamic religion. In this case, they use their own religious-based arguments to justify their violent acts.

This Ph.D. thesis examines the multi-dimensional factors that lead to the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia by focusing on the individuals who committed series of deadly terrorist attacks from 2002 – 2009 and some other radical-related activities in Indonesia until 2017. Such factors encompass at least the economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression (“stick”), and government incentive (“carrot”), all which are the key variables in determining the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism. Through a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis using qualitative and quantitative research methodologies (including the social network analysis), this Ph.D. thesis will

specifically examine *what factors drove people with the association to Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and radical-Islamist movements to commit and become involved in terrorist attacks? and why and how might such factors/elements influence these people to commit terrorist attacks in the future?* The combined qualitative, quantitative, and social network analysis in this Ph.D. thesis has proven and confirmed the main hypothesis, where the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia are indeed caused by the intertwining interaction of these multi-dimensional factors instead of being otherwise.

The ideological-related variables followed by the social network-related ones are proven as the two most significant factors in the pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. In other words, the set of economic, social, and political grievances will not cause Islamist terrorism in Indonesia to occur if there are no intervening variables: the social network and radical ideology being involved in the equation. Subsequently, the other two moderating variables also play its own role, namely the state repression and the government incentive. According to various examinations of multivariate statistical analysis in this Ph.D. thesis, these two variables on their own will not cause the Islamist terrorism to occur in Indonesia, but when combined with the existence of social network and radical ideology, these two variables are proven as the moderating variables to exacerbate the occurrence of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia.

In conclusion, by looking at this current pattern, it could be predicted that Indonesia herself is still likely to become both the producer and battlefield of global-Islamist terrorism in near future. Therefore, the Indonesian national counterterrorism policy and strategy need to be updated and well integrated with the Indonesian national policy and grand strategy to better address the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in the archipelago.

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2. The Attachment #2: The Profiling of Opinions from 15 Key State/Security Officials and Experts in the Field (the first and second stage's materials for the discourse analysis in chapter 4.1.c).
3. The Attachment #3: The Quantitative Data of 40 Former Prisoners (the first, second and third stage's materials for the quantitative analysis in chapter 4.2).
4. The Attachment #4: The Social Network Analysis Papers (the materials for the social network analysis in chapter 4.3).
5. The Attachment #5: The *Piagam Jakarta*.
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7. The Attachment #7: The Four Major Caliphates of Islamic History.

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

This Ph.D. thesis is a personal, academic work to serve its sole purpose as a requirement for the completion of Ph.D. study with the College of Social Sciences and International Studies at the University of Exeter, United Kingdom. The author also sincerely expresses his gratitude towards any persons/parties in the academic, policy, governmental, professional, business, and familial community that have lent their hands to the author for the completion process of this Ph.D. study. They are the extension of GOD's hand to help the author completing this miraculous academic journey.

SELECT DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARIES, AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (In English: Indonesian Armed Forces).

Abu Sayyaf: A Jihadist terror group based in and around Jolo and Basilan islands in the southwestern part of the Philippines. It is in this area that Moro groups (e.g., the Moro National Liberation Front) have been engaged in the insurgency seeking for an independent province in the Philippines. *Abu Sayyaf* is considered violent and has been designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, United Arab Emirates, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

A.H: “After *hijra*.” The Islamic calendar starts in the year that Muhammad made the *hijra* from Mecca to Medina.

Al-Jaz’ara: An Islamist trend that is limited to Algeria and inspired by the thoughts of a French-educated Algerian intellectual, Malek Bennabi. The ideology of *al-Jaz’ara* is characterized by its nationalist-Islamist agenda and its rejection of any forms of non-Algerian Islamist interpretations of Islam and/or influences in Algeria.²

Al-Qaeda: A militant Sunni Islamist multi-national organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden and several other Arab volunteers who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The meaning of *al-Qaeda* in English is the “base”, the “foundation” or the “fundament” and alternatively spelled *al-Qaida*, *al-Qæda* and sometimes *al-Qa’ida*. *Al-Qaeda* operates as a network made up of Islamist extremists, mainly the Salafi jihadist ones. Likewise, *Al-Qaeda* has also been designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, the United States, Russia, India, and various other countries including Indonesia.

² For more, see (Ashour 2009), 10.

Antiterrorism: Defensive counterterrorism.

AQAM: *Al-Qaeda* and its associated movements.

AQAP: *Al-Qaeda* in Arabian Peninsula.

AQIM: *Al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb.

Archipelago: Another popular call for Republic of Indonesia.

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika: The national motto of Republic of Indonesia. It means the unity in diversity.

BIN: Badan Intelijen Negara (In English: State Intelligence Agency).

BNPT: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Teror Republik Indonesia. (In English: Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency).

Boko Haram: An Islamist extremist group based in northeastern Nigeria that has also been active in Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon. Whilst the group had alleged links to *al-Qaeda*, in March 2015 it announced its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). *Boko Haram* was ranked as the world's deadliest terror group by the Global Terrorism Index in 2015.

Caliph: An Arabic word that means "leader." The term *caliph* specifically refers to the successors of Muhammad who served as the political and spiritual heads of Islam.

Caliphate: The "office or dominion" of the caliph. The last caliphate was based in Turkey until its fall in 1924.

Counterterrorism: Deterrent, offensive, and defensive measures, both active and passive, which are designed to deter, diminish the effects of, or defeat terrorism.

DI: Darul Islam.

DI/TII: Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia.

Densus 88: Detasemen Khusus Anti Teror 88 Polri (In English: Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Detachment 88).³

Deradicalization: A process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, whilst also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political, and economic changes within a pluralist context.⁴

Extreme/Extremism in Islam: Essentially extremism is any political theories that favor uncompromising policies or actions. For this Ph.D. thesis project, extremism in Islam refers to the selective and extreme interpretation of Islamic texts that are used for advancing certain (radical) political agenda.

Hadith: The record of Muhammad's words and actions. This material was committed to memory for several generations and then collected and recorded by Muslim scholars. The most reliable/valid collections were the ones put together by al-Bukhari (A.H. 194 – 256) and Muslim (A.h. 202 – 261).

Five Pillars of Radical Islamist Philosophy: The guiding principles of radical Muslims as determined by a content analysis of key writings by Islamist radicals (particularly Sayyid Qutb, Abdul Salam Faraj, Dr. Salah Sariah, and Al-Jihad leaders who wrote

³ The Indonesian National Police uses the terminology “antiterrorism” instead of “counterterrorism” although the meaning of Indonesian government definition of “overcoming terrorism” is more leaning towards “counterterrorism” instead of “antiterrorism.”

⁴ For more, see (Ashour 2009), 5.

Constitution of Al-Jihad). These pillars are to obey no law but Islamic law, infidels are all around, Islam must rule, jihad is the only way to win, and faith is the reason.

Ijma'ah: Other than Quran and Hadith as the main sources of Islamic law, there is *ijma'ah* that means “a group in agreement.” It refers to the practice in Islamic law whereby new law is established for situations not specifically covered in the Quran or sunnah.

Ikhwanism: The term that literally means “Brother-y.” This term is used to describe a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group or individual. Correspondingly, the term also refers to a set of ideological and behavioural characteristics that were established between the early 1970s and the late 1980s. These characteristics include the non-violence movements against national regimes, the acceptance of electoral democracy, and the relative pragmatism. Ikhwanism transcends the organizational ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or any of its autonomous branches in Jordan, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, Kuwait, and other countries. Since the 1990s *Ikhwanism* become popular within several Muslim-majority countries, including Indonesia.⁵

Insurgency: An insurgency at very least can be defined as an armed political effort with a specific aim to overthrow a constituted ruling authority or the political status-quo. Correspondingly, an insurgent is someone who violently rebels against a “recognized” ruling authority or the political status-quo.

ISIS: A Salafi Jihadist unrecognized state and militant group that follows a fundamentalist, Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam. This group has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations and many individual countries including Indonesia. ISIS is also known widely as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

⁵ For more, see Ibid., 7.

Jabhat al-Nusra: A Sunni Islamist terrorist organization that has been fighting against Syrian Government forces in the Syrian Civil War, with the specific aim to establish an Islamist state in Syria. *Jabhat al-Nusra* was the Syrian branch of *al-Qaeda* until 2016, and it also operates in Lebanon. It is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United Nations Security Council and many other countries including Indonesia.

Jl: *Jemaah Islamiya* a.k.a. *Jemaa Islamiyah*; *Jema'a Islamiyah*; *Jemaa Islamiyya*; *Jema'a Islamiyya*; *Jemaa Islamiyyah*; *Jema'a Islamiyyah*; *Jemaah Islamiyah*; *Jemaah Islamiyah*; *Jema'ah Islamiyah*; *Jemaah Islamiyyah*; *Jema'ah Islamiyyah* is a terrorist group seeking for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate spanning over Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines.

Jihad: A noun whose meaning is the act of striving, applying oneself, struggling, persevering. Grammatically, an individual involved in jihad can also sometimes be called a *mujahid* (Arabic: مجاهد), the plural of which is *mujahideen* (مجاهدين). However, *mujahidin* and *jihadists* are still two very different terms. The word *jihad* appears frequently in the Quran, often in the idiomatic expression of striving in the way of God (*al-jihad fi sabil Allah*). There is no single clear-cut consensus among Muslims and scholars pertaining to the definition and meaning of jihad. However, it is also generally believed that jihad has two meanings: an inner and spiritual struggle (the greater jihad) and an outer physical struggle against the enemies of Islam (the lesser jihad) that can take either a violent or non-violent (peaceful) manifestation.

Jihadism: A radical ideology within Islamism that stresses the use of violence as a legitimate, and in some versions the legitimate method of political and social change. Jihadists mostly use selective and literal Salafi interpretations of Islamic sources, hence the term "Salafi Jihadist."⁶

⁶ For more, see *Ibid.*, 8 – 9.

Lemhannas R.I.: *Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia* (In English: The National Resilience Institute of Republic of Indonesia).

LDK: *Lembaga Da'wah Kampus*. (In English: Campus Islamic *Da'wah* Fellowship).

MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

MMI: *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (In English: The Mujahidin Council of Indonesia)

MMIB: *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Barat* (In English: The Mujahidin Council of Western Indonesia).

MMIT: *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Timur* (In English: The Mujahidin Council of Eastern Indonesia).

Moderation: A process of relative change within Islamist movements that is mainly concerned with the attitudes of these movements towards democracy. Moderation can take place on two levels: on the ideological level, the key transformation is the acceptance of democratic principles, most importantly the legitimacy of pluralism and the peaceful alternation of power. On the behavioural level, the key transformation is participation in electoral politics (if allowed). Different levels of moderation can occur within both non-violent radical and moderate Islamist movements unevenly and across issues areas.⁷

Muhammadiyah: A major Islamist non-governmental organization in Indonesia. The organization was founded in 1912 by Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan in the city of Yogyakarta as a reformist socio-religious movement, advocating *ijtihad* (the individual interpretation of Quran and *Sunnah*) as opposed to *taqlid* (the acceptance of traditional interpretations by the ulama). Since its establishment, *Muhammadiyah* has adopted a reformist platform by mixing religious and secular education, primarily as a way to promote the

⁷ For more, see *Ibid.*, 6 – 7.

upward mobility of Muslims towards a modern community and to purify Indonesian Islam of local syncretism via a quasi-Wahhabi movement. *Muhammadiyah* has been well known for its educational system, as it continues to support the local culture and to promote religious tolerance in Indonesia. Some of its higher educational institutions are attended mostly by non-Muslims, especially in East Nusa Tenggara and Papua provinces. The group also runs a large chain of charity hospitals, and operated 128 universities as of the late 1990s. According to various sources, as of 2008 *Muhammadiyah* was deemed the second largest Islamist organization in Indonesia with the approximate 29 million of members.

NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*): A traditionalist Sunni Islam movement in Indonesia following the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence. NU was established on January 31, 1926 in Surabaya as a response to the rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Islamist modernism in Indonesia. Some sources indicate that NU is the largest independent Islamist organization in the world with 40 million of membership in 2003. NU also serves its function as a charitable body providing funding for schools, as well as hospitals and many other organizing communities to help alleviating the poverty. In addition to its adherence to the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, NU follows the ideology of *Ahl as-Sunna Wa al-Jama'ah*, which takes the middle sect between the extreme *aqli* (rationalist) and the extreme *naqli* (scripturalist). NU believes that the source of ideas is not only the Quran and the Sunnah, but also the ability of the human mind to couple with empirical realities. NU has been described by the international media and the Western world as a progressive, liberal, and pluralistic Islamist movement.

NI: Negara Islam Indonesia (In English: The Islamist State of Indonesia).

NKRI: Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (In English: The Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia).

Pancasila: The national and state ideology of Republic of Indonesia.

PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Note: An Islamist party in Indonesia).

PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Note: An Islamist party in Indonesia).

PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Note: An Islamist party in Indonesia).

Polri: Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (In English: Indonesian National Police).

Quran: The words of Allah (the Arabic word of God) according to the Islamic theology that was revealed to Muhammad in seventh century Arabia. The Quran is 114 chapters long.

Radical/Radicalism: Essentially radicalism is the advocacy of extreme forms of change to achieve political means or refers to beliefs that constitute a considerable departure from traditional and established beliefs. For the purpose of this Ph.D. thesis project, it refers to the most fundamental roots of certain phenomena, including the Islamist belief system (e.g., the ideology) that are not shared in/by the most social streams, and implemented through non-gradual, radical, extreme, or revolutionary ways.⁸ Radicalism is also about the opinions and behaviour of people who favor extreme changes especially in the government (e.g., radical political ideas and behaviour). Radicalism becomes problematic when its manifestation conflicts with social norms and violates the positive law enacted in the society.

Radicalization: A process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and

⁸ The term *belief system* is usually used to refer to something that is broader than what is meant by the term *ideology*. A belief system is usually defined as a set of principles and ideas shared by a group of people, and which tend to influence their actions. Meanwhile, an ideology is defined as the set of ideas that underlie the belief system itself. Therefore, an ideology is less broad than a belief system. Although it can be difficult to differentiate between the two, it is usually acceptable to say that ideologies are less broad than belief systems.

political pluralism) and possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political goals.⁹

Radical-Islamist groups: Groups that aim for revolutionary social, political, and economic changes and refuse to work within the established state institutions. Radical-Islamist movements can use violent and/or non-violent methods to achieve their goals. Radical-Islamists could also be called revolutionaries, jihadists, extremists or exclusivists. In order to reach the stage of being radical, they have gone through a process of relative change in which such groups undergo ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, in order to achieve political goals.¹⁰

Salafism: This is a derivative of the word *salaf* (predecessors or ancestors). Salafism is also a school of thought in Sunni Islam attributing its beliefs to the first three generations of Muslims: the *sahaba* (companions of Muhammad) and the two succeeding generations (the seventh and eighth century). Literally, the term Salafi means a follower of the *salaf* and Salafism believes that pure Islam was practiced by these three generations. “Innovations” in religious matters are unacceptable to Salafists. Vaguely and broadly defined, those “innovations” could range from modern ideas like democracy to different understandings of Islam like mystical-Islam (Sufism) or Shi’ite Islam. The words “Salafism, Salafi, and Salafist” are used interchangeably in this Ph.D. thesis.¹¹

Shari’a Law: The body of divine law in Islam that governs the religious and secular life of Muslims. Some Muslims argue that the *Shari’a* is the only legitimate basis for law. The *Shari’a* is also called the Islamic law.

⁹ For more, see Ibid., 5.

¹⁰ For more, see Ibid., 4 – 5.

¹¹ For more, see Ibid., 7 – 8.

SO-LIC: Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflicts

Sufism: Islamic sect that was most popular during the time of ibn Taymiyyah. It focuses on the inner, personal life of Muslims and rejects jihad as a physical battle in favour of jihad as a battle within oneself to follow the teachings of Islam. It was Rabi'a al-adawiya (death in A.H. 801), a Muslim woman who proposed that Muslims should focus on the love of Allah, not the fear of Allah. This was a major philosophical step for Sufism.

Sunnah: The words and actions of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam. The record of these words and actions are called hadith.

Taymiyyah, Ibn (1263 – 1328): A conservative Islamic scholar who is often quoted by radicals. He called for Muslims to fight jihad against the Mongols who had conquered the Islamic caliphate.

Terrorism: As a form of political violence, terrorism can be interpreted as a violent act taking place outside the normal bounds of civil law and conventional military conduct. Terrorism is often linked to an insurgency or guerrilla warfare but is not necessarily a tactic or technique required of an insurgency or guerrilla campaign. Conceptually and practically, insurgency and guerrilla warfare can also overlap. However, the guerrilla warfare is one mean/method by which the insurgency is conducted. In other words, an insurgency is usually a bigger phenomenon than guerrilla warfare in terms of tactics, operations or strategy. Although these forms of conflict may often have similar goals, differences exist among insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. Therefore, the common denominator of terrorism is the use of violence towards civilians to send the message to achieve political goals. In other words, at the very least, terrorism can be defined as a criminal violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve political goals via targeting civilians.

Takfirism: An ideology that in some respects overlaps with jihadism and Salafism. Etymologically it derives from the word *takfir* (excommunication), and it is also the act of

accusing a Muslim of abandoning Islam and becoming an infidel or an apostate (*murtadd*). Therefore, it has the basic assumption that the whole Muslim community (a village, a city, a country or the global Muslim community) is infidels/apostates, unless proven otherwise.¹²

Togut or Taghut: In general, this is an Islamic concept that refers to any voluntary allegiances other than to Allah and His commands. However, in another perspective *taghut* is more complex than that. As an Islamist/jihadist literature, *taghut* is understood as anything/anyone being worshipped or anything/anyone that rules but non-*Shari'a* conforming laws.

TNI: *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (In English: Indonesian National Military)

TNI-AD: *Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat* (In English: Indonesian Army)

TNI-AL: *Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut* (In English: Indonesian Navy)

TNI-AU: *Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Udara* (In English: Indonesian Air Force)

U.K.: The United Kingdom

U.S.: The United States

UUD 1945: *Undang Undang Dasar 1945* (the constitution of Republic of Indonesia)

Violence: The use of physical force of great magnitude to attack and destroy certain targets.

¹² For more, see *Ibid.*, 9 – 10.

CHAPTER 1: THE INTRODUCTION

1. The Outline of Thesis

1.1.1 The Outline of Statement of Aims and Objectives

Terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that encompasses elements of politics, economics, social, and ideology, driving people to commit violent acts and become involved in such activity. As of today, the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism still inflict global society with formidable challenges, and one way to overcome such challenges is by leveraging our knowledge on the multi-dimensional, determining factors/elements that lead people to commit terrorist attacks and other radical-related activities. In other words, as our struggle against terrorism is a global endeavour that may last a generation or more, leveraging our knowledge on such multi-dimensional aspects, determining factors/elements will increase our understanding of the underlying causes that continue to inspire jihadist terrorism. Correspondingly, according to Hamed El-Said, it is fundamental for us to address the underlying problem of violent religious extremism/terrorism to better formulate and implement more effective counter-radicalization efforts.¹³

However, it is wrong to equate the religion of Islam with terrorism. Perhaps most importantly, the Islamic tradition is all-encompassing, combining religious and secular life and law.¹⁴ According to John Kelsay (2009), Islam can be described from a Salafi perspective (a deep understanding of prophet Mohammed's intent, purpose, and politics aside), whilst at the same time, Islam can also be studied theologically or politically. This surely complicates attempts to understand the Islamist ideology and counter-measures to it solely through the lens of traditional Western political science.¹⁵

Therefore, a distinction must be made between the religion of Islam and a set of often-conflicting political ideologies known as Islamism, where many forms of them are

¹³ For more, see (El-Said n.d.).

¹⁴ For more, see (Sauter and Carafano 2012), 291 – 292.

¹⁵ Ibid., 292.

non-radical, reformists or gradualists. That is why, Islamist extremists who advocate acts of terrorism may be properly termed Islamist terrorists, who seek to cloth their acts in the trappings of the Islamic religion.¹⁶ In this case, they use their own religious-based arguments to justify their violent acts. According to Ashour (2009), radical-Islamist groups aim for revolutionary social, political, and economic changes and refuse to work within the established state institutions. Radical-Islamist movements can use violent and/or non-violent methods to achieve their goals. Radical-Islamists could also be called revolutionaries, jihadists, extremists or exclusivists.¹⁷ In order to reach the stage of being radical, they have gone through a process of relative change in which such groups undergo ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, in order to achieve political goals.

Correspondingly, one way to understand why people commit terrorist attacks or are involved in such activity is by exploring these factors/elements and the interplay among them including to how they correlate with and affect each other. Specifically, such multi-dimensional factors/elements and their interplay encompass at least economic grievances, social grievances, and political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive, all which are the key variables in determining the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism.

¹⁶ Ibid., 291.

¹⁷ For more discussion on definitions and typology, see (Ashour 2009), 4 – 11.

H0: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is not caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive.

Ha: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive.

Therefore, by referring to Omar Ashour's definition in his book, *The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements* (2009), the working definition of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia throughout this academic research is a form of political violence that is partly manifested in the form of terrorism as a criminal armed tactic that rejects democracy and pluralism whilst aiming to make non-gradual, sudden, deep socio-politico-economic changes. In other words, what it means by the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia (as the dependent variable in this Ph.D. thesis) is the ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).

The Islamist terrorism in Indonesia can also be defined as one form of armed Islamism and a part of larger radical-Islamist movements that is legitimating the violent action by selective and extreme interpretation of Islamic texts. However, it does not suggest that the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is a part of only one movement. The different objective, organizational structures, leadership, scopes, and scales of various Islamist terrorist groups in Indonesia, reflect the reality that Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is not a monolithic entity.


Consistent with Ashour's definition of radical-Islamist movements that can use violent and/or non-violent methods to achieve their goals, Islamist terrorism in Indonesia also engages in violent and non-violent ways (e.g., the hatred speech/*da'wah* inciting or glorifying terrorism). The injustice terrorists seek to address may be social or economic,

but it is nonetheless blamed on a political authority.¹⁸ Throughout this academic research, the word *extremism/extremist*, *radicalism/radical*, *violence/violent*, and *jihadism/jihadist* will be used interchangeably to describe the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia along with its associated movements, networks, groups, and individuals.¹⁹

¹⁸ For further examining that the main element of terrorism is indeed the politics as opposed to other dimensions, see (Long 1990), 4 and 5.

¹⁹ The terms mean different things in the literature. So, their meanings depend on the social context. Extremists can be violent and non-violent. Political Violence can be terrorism or a different type (coups, insurgencies, etc). Radicalism can be non-jihadist (Marxist, liberal, ethno-nationalist, and non-jihadi Islamists). So, we must careful when using these terms, and instead using the qualifier when we are in doubt to give us the precise meaning of such words, thus making them in line with certain social phenomena we are trying to understand and explain.

Figure 1.1 An Overlapping Visualization of Radicalism, Extremism, Jihadism, and Terrorism.²⁰



Source: Self-made.

²⁰ See (A. P. Schmid, Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin? 2014)

Table 1.1 The Definition and Meaning of Related Terminologies

Definition	Meaning
Radical/ Radicalism	Essentially, radicalism is the advocacy of extreme forms of change to achieve political means or refers to beliefs that constitute a considerable departure from traditional and established beliefs. For this Ph.D. thesis project, it refers to the most fundamental roots of certain phenomena, including the ideology (and belief) system that is not shared in/by the most social streams, and implemented through non-gradual, radical, extreme, or revolutionary ways. In other words, radicalism is also about the opinions and behaviour of people who favor extreme changes especially in government (e.g., radical political ideas and behaviour). Radicalism becomes problematic when its manifestation conflicts with most social norms and violates the positive law enacted in the society.
Extreme/ Extremism in Islamism.	Essentially, extremism is any political theories that favor uncompromising policies or actions. For this Ph.D. thesis project, extremism in Islam refers to the selective and extreme interpretation of Islamic texts that are used for advancing certain (radical) political agenda.
Violence.	The use of physical force of great magnitude to attack and destroy certain targets.
Jihad/Jihadism.	Referring to the religious duty of Muslim believer to maintain and spread the religion of Islam. In Arabic, the word <i>jihād</i> is a noun whose meaning is the act of “striving, applying oneself, struggling, persevering.” Grammatically, an individual involved in jihad can also sometimes be called a <i>mujahid</i> (Arabic: مجاهد), the plural of

	<p>which is <i>mujahideen</i> (مجاهدين). However, mujahidin and jihadists are still two very different terms, and indeed their interpretation of jihad are not necessarily same. The word <i>jihad</i> appears frequently in the Quran, often in the idiomatic expression of “striving in the way of God (<i>al-jihad fi sabil Allah</i>).” The striving in the way of God can also be interpreted as the act to serve the God’s purposes on this earth.</p> <p>There is no a clear-cut consensus among Muslims and scholars pertaining to the definition and meaning of jihad. However, it is also generally believed that jihad has two meanings: an inner and spiritual struggle (the greater jihad) and an outer physical struggle against the enemies of Islam (the lesser jihad) that can take either a violent or non-violent (peaceful) manifestation. Jihad is also often translated as the Holy War although this term is still controversial and debatable. According to Professor Benard Lewis, most classical theologians, jurists, and specialists in the Hadith understood and defined the obligation of jihad in the war and military sense. Meanwhile, according to Javed Ahmad Ghamidi there is a consensus among Islamic scholars to define the concept of jihad as something that always includes the armed struggle against wrongdoers.</p>
Terrorism.	<p>The common denominator of terrorism is the use of violence towards civilians to send the message to achieve political goals. In other words, at the very least we can define terrorism as a criminal violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve political goals via targeting civilians.</p>

Source: Self-made, articulated from various sources.²¹

²¹ For more, see (Ashour 2009) 4 – 11.

Figure 1.2 A View of Islamism by Referring to Major Trends in Islamism (Ashour 2009) and an Indonesian View (Wahid, ed. 2011)

	Towards Moderation		Towards Extremism	
End-State	Maintaining the democratic and pluralistic Indonesia that is based on <i>Pancasila</i> .	Establishing the Islamic <i>Shari'a</i> law in Indonesia as a milestone before the establishment of the (Salafi) Islamist state of Indonesia.	First establishing the Islamic <i>Shari'a</i> law in Indonesia as a milestone before the establishment of the (Salafi) Islamist state of Indonesia.	Directly establishing the Salafi Islamist State of Indonesia as a part of wider international-Islamist caliphate (<i>al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah</i>).
Scope of Engagement	Envisioning the Indonesian version of Islam as a role-model at the local, national, and global level.	Engaging gradually from local to provincial and national level. The efforts are supported internationally.	Engaging radically from local to provincial and national level. The efforts are supported internationally.	Engaging radically from local to provincial and national level. The efforts are supported internationally.
Ways	Gradual.	Gradual.	Mixed (the Combination of Radical and Gradual).	Radical.
Means	The current state of civilization and existing political establishment.	The current state of civilization and existing political establishment.	Although publicly denying violent means, sometimes using violent means, but mostly using non-violent means (e.g., the hatred speech/ <i>da'wah</i> inciting or glorifying terrorism).	Violence (e.g., terrorism) is permitted. Also engaged with non-violent means (e.g., the hatred speech/ <i>da'wah</i> inciting or glorifying terrorism).
View	Accepting democracy and pluralism.	Partially and pragmatically accepting democracy and pluralism.	Not accepting democracy and pluralism.	Not accepting democracy and pluralism.
Ideology	<i>Pancasila</i> -based Islamism. Tend to be pluralistic and inclusive.	Transnational-Islamist movements that partially accepting <i>Pancasila</i> -based Islamism (e.g., Ikhwanism).	Transnational-Islamist movements (e.g., Hizbut Tahrir).	Transnational-Islamist movements (e.g., Salafism, Jihadism, and Takfirism).
Main Bases in Indonesia	Nahdlatul Ulama and <i>Muhammadiyah</i>	Mixed (e.g., the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood/ <i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i>).	Although Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is not a Salafist, it fully rejects democracy and thus falls under this category.	Jl and its other related affiliations.
Country of Origin	Indonesia.	Indonesia for the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood/ <i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> and Egypt for Ikhwanism.	Palestine.	Saudi Arabia (Najd Province) for Salafism and Egypt for Jihadism and Takfirism.

As the greatest test of any theories is not its conceptual precision or volume of data and cases but its ability to provide plausible explanations of social processes, this Ph.D. thesis presents a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis that attempts to analyze why operatives committed series of deadly terrorist attacks from 2002 – 2009 and some other radical-related activities in Indonesia until 2017. Since 2002 until the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2016, there were at least around 1,100 Islamist individuals in Indonesia who had been convicted in the radicalism and terrorism case, whilst around 4,000 – 5,000 individuals had been detected as radicals but not being convicted (Karnavian, 2016).²² Through a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis using qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, this Ph.D. thesis will specifically examine *what factors drove people with the association to Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and radical-Islamist movements to commit and become involved in terrorist attacks? and why and how might such factors/elements influence these people to commit terrorist attacks in the future?*

The focus of this research is the *Jemaah Islamiya (JI)*, the *al-Qaeda*-affiliated group that has been evolving, recruiting, and operating in Southeast Asia (including Indonesia) from early 1992 until today; as well as various other related radical-Islamist groups. The sample taken for this Ph.D. thesis is drawn from the JI-related former prisoners and activists who are now working actively with the government in deradicalization process and from key state/security officials as well as from experts in this field. In addition to that, any studied individuals who are now still serving in the prison are examined only through public documentation-archival evidence including legal court cases and published media documents where there are no interviews with prisoners. Having systematically examined such factors, this Ph.D. thesis aims to provide an original scholarly contribution to the fields related to terrorism studies, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, special operations and low-intensity conflicts (SO-LIC), and wider national security and public policy issues.

²² For more elaborate information on this matter, see (Police General Tito Karnavian 2016).

1.1.2 The Outline of Distinct Contribution to the Knowledge of the Subject

The entire analysis help develops both a foundation for future academic research and a series of recommendations for policymakers across all levels of government in assuring the security of human life, society, and civilization at both national and international levels.

First, it will significantly contribute to the scholarly work of this field that falls under the category of social science and international studies. Specifically, this academic research project will help contribute to terrorism studies, as the subfield of terrorism studies has not yet, and may never, become a “hard” science, but will always remain somewhere in between (Sinai 2007). As this Ph.D. thesis is to identifying patterns, which is not necessarily the unbreakable rules as in the “natural sciences,” it aims to contribute to the social science academic research efforts in this area of study that will upgrade our capabilities to better understand and respond with the most effective countermeasures against the magnitude of the terrorist challenge facing us.

Second, it will significantly contribute to the international and national security policy of which current strategic intelligence challenges impose us to reorient its focus to cover multiple new, specific targets including but not limited to rogue states, non-state group threats, the proliferation of mass destruction, international crime and narcotics, as well as terrorism (Imler 2004). This study will specifically contribute to the safety and security policies particularly in the development of counterstrategies (e.g., counterterrorism) of the Republic of Indonesia. The struggle against terrorism is actually more complex than simply a struggle within the Islamic world between secularism and old traditions that may last a generation or more, so that a struggle against terrorism will no longer be engaged with only a single national element of power, but instead be overcome by superior knowledge involving the combination of strong academic research and the entire spectrum of national elements of power (Harris 2004).

A special section will also be dedicated within this Ph.D. thesis to address the issues of counterterrorism policies, strategies and operations in

Indonesia. Therefore, by knowing more textured characteristics of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia through this academic research project, we will know the specific facts and findings that are strategically useful not only to the subfield of terrorism studies, but also to make the prediction/forecast about the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia and in the region. As Silke argues, constructing government policy without evidence is like building on the sand and if the result does not fail and collapse it is only because of luck and good fortune (Silke 2007).

Having said that, this Ph.D. thesis stands out as the research project which stress its originality by its engagement in the depth of the study, in terms of interviewing JI former operatives, examining other related but not fully analyzed documents, and interviewing select counterterrorist operatives who have first-hand experiences in dealing with such phenomenon by using both qualitative and quantitative analysis in rigorous ways.

1.1.3 The Outline of Thesis Structure

This Ph.D. thesis covers up to around 90,000 words that are systematically organized into six main chapters reflecting a series of primarily sequential research activities, albeit with periods of simultaneous processes. Chapter 1 (the introduction) is the engine for this Ph.D. thesis, and therefore is dedicated to addressing the seven sub-elements: the outline of thesis (consists of the statement of aims and objectives; the distinct contribution to the knowledge of subject; and the structure of thesis); the phenomenon of terrorism; the defining of terrorism; the causes of terrorism as the focus of this Ph.D. thesis; the research context; research goals; and thesis structure.

Chapter 2 (the literature review and research framework) will focus on the relevant literature/chief topics to demonstrate how this Ph.D. thesis fills the gap in the literature, and critically review the relevant existing research. Correspondingly, by based on the extensive relevant literature review in this field, the last part of chapter 2 addresses two more elements: research propositions and hypotheses: the theory building; as well as research framework and design: variables and methodology.

Subsequently, chapter 3 will focus on the descriptive analysis of JI and wider radical-Islamist history in Indonesia on which I base my analysis in chapters 4 and 5. Whilst the purpose of chapter 3 is to specifically describe JI, chapter 4 is where I analyze the causes behind the violent ideology and/or behaviour of JI and other related Islamist radicals in Indonesia. Chapter 3 is laid out according to the inter-linked development timeline of JI origins, historical development, and likely form in the future. Whilst the organization of this chapter is arranged accordingly in that way, it still reflects the determining variables of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that are examined in this Ph.D. thesis: economic grievances; social grievances; political grievances; radical ideology; social network; state repression; and government incentive. In this chapter we can see that these variables have become the inherent characteristic of JI and Islamist terrorism in Indonesia from time to time.

Subsequently, as all data collected in this Ph.D. thesis is displayed and analyzed in chapter 4, the direction of the entire research process in this Ph.D. thesis refers to the rigorous qualitative and quantitative research methods that are deemed suitable to best answer the research problems and questions in this Ph.D. thesis. As chapter 4.1 is specially dedicated for the qualitative research analysis (the discovering patterns analysis, the content analysis, and the discourse analysis); chapter 4.2 is for the quantitative ones (the multivariate statistical analysis mainly by using the chi-square test, the logistic regression, and the proportional test). Additionally, the discussion of social network analysis on the JI-related individuals are also made available in chapter 4.3. To complete the analysis package, chapter 4.4. is then specially dedicated to discussing the analysis warranty which consists of the general assessment of analysis and inputs/suggestions for the future research.

As we complete the analysis part, chapter 5, which is the synthesis of various analysis is specially dedicated to interpreting, comparing, reconciling, verifying, and discussing the findings at length by integrating three main components that have been well covered throughout chapter 2 to chapter 4: the literature review; the history and evolution of JI; and the analysis. Subsequently, chapter 6 is focused on discussing two main components: the thesis conclusion and policy relevance/recommendation, where some discussions on what can be done to enhance security policy in a

changing/evolving threat environment (e.g., some prescriptions on future counterterrorism policies) are made available.

1.2 The Phenomenon of Terrorism

As a starting point, we can approach terrorism from the etymology. Within the word *terrorism* lies the word *terror*. The word *terrorism* was first used in 1795, within a same period when a revolutionary government began to coin the word *terrorism* by instituting systematic state terror against its population in the 1790s, precisely reflecting the specific sense of “government intimidation” during the Reign of Terror in France that the Jacobins imposed from March 1793 – July 1794. Later, the general sense of the systematic use of terror as a policy was first recorded in English in 1798. At one time, a word for defining certain kind of mass-destruction was *dynamitism* (1883), and during World War I the word *frightfulness* (translated from the German word *schrecklichkeit*) was used in the Great Britain for reflecting a deliberate policy of terrorizing enemy non-combatants.²³

The word *terror* comes from the Latin “*terrere*,” which means “frighten” or “tremble.” When coupled with the French suffix “*isme*” (referencing “to practice”), it becomes akin to “practicing the trembling” or to “causing the frightening.” In English, the words *trembling*, and *frightening* are synonymous with the words *fear*, *panic*, and *anxiety* all of which we naturally call as terror.²⁴ Terrorism can be caused by multi-dimensional factors encompassing elements of politics, economics, social, and ideology, driving people to commit violent acts and become involved in such activity. Meanwhile, as a phenomenon, terrorism itself is more of an armed tactic with political or ideological motives. In this way, terrorism is understood as combining more elements of violence and politics as opposed to profit, financial, and economic-oriented motivation as we often find in the organized criminality. As a global phenomenon, it is indeed easy to recognize the manifestation of

²³ For more discussion on this etymological and historical investigation of word *terrorism*, see (Terrorism n.d.).

²⁴ For more discussion on this etymological investigation of word *terrorism*, see also (Matusitz 2012).

terrorism, but it is rather difficult to be clearly defined. Precisely crafting a commonly accepted definition of terrorism has been proven difficult, and consequently, it leads to various definitions of terrorism both in the academic and policy world (Garrison 2004, Maskaliunaite 2002).

Although the United States may have declared a new war against “terrorism,” it turns out that no one including the U.S. government itself is all that sure just what “terrorism” is, meaning that indeed each U.S. government agency has its own definition of terrorism.²⁵ In fact, the U.S. Department of State itself acknowledged that no one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance.²⁶ On the other hand, scholars all over the world also tend to describe terrorism according to their socio-economic and political conditions. Those influenced by social and economic problems tend to view and to conceptualize terrorism as a conflict in society between the haves and the have-nots, whilst those who view the use of terror as a tactic to gain a political mileage tend to view and to conceptualize terrorism as a political phenomenon. The word *terrorism* is apparently interpreted to suit and to reflect different interests (Prabha 2008).

All that said, the core problem of why the academic and policy community has never settled on a commonly accepted definition of terrorism is because scholars, policy experts, or government agencies may believe that there are cases where extreme actions are justified. But since academic and policy stakeholders, on the other hand, may also believe that terrorism is wrong, consequently, they could not agree on a common definition of terrorism. The explanation of why terrorism is almost wrong is detailed by Igor Primoratz in chapter 6 of his 2013 book, *Terrorism: A Philosophical Investigation*.²⁷

²⁵ Even inside the U.S. government itself such as Department of Defense, FBI, Department of State, and Federal Emergency Management Agency, they have various definitions of terrorism.

²⁶ The U.S. government in its various official documents acknowledges the non-universality of terrorism definition. See (U.S. Department of State 2003).

²⁷ This argument is supported by Professor Richard K. Betts. Richard K. Betts, Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, argues that many people believe there are cases where extreme actions are justified. However, these people also believe the terrorism is always wrong. See (How Do You Define Terrorism? 2001).

For example, when both the U.S. Army Air Force and British Royal Air Force bombed civilian targets in German and Japanese cities in World War II, few in the history of mankind would have called this narrative an act of terrorism. Those who planned the air operations and oversaw these strategic military campaigns never publicly described these tactics as “terror bombing”, but that was how they often referred to these tactics in their own internal communications (Lackey 2004).²⁸ The U.S. and the British decision to bomb civilian targets with the same result of killing innocent civilians in that particular time was indeed widely viewed and justified by the fact that the U.S and the British had previously been drawn into a war with aggressor nations. This loophole of defining a social phenomenon is where, according to Richard K. Betts, everybody can find an exception to any abstract definitions. In other words, when terror is applied to actors and acts in the real world of today, its meaning and intent can point in many directions. Part of this dilemma is due to the use of terror as tactics by various actors at all layers of socio-political interaction.²⁹

In addition to that, several critics in the academic and policy world have also argued that the word *terrorism* is often simply applied to pejoratively define and to label whatever violent groups the U.S. opposes, pointing to the often-cited statement that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” According to Boaz Ganor, this statement has become not only a cliché, but also one of the most difficult obstacles in coping with terrorism. The matter of definition and conceptualization is usually a purely theoretical issue—a mechanism for scholars to work out the appropriate set of parameters for the research they intend to undertake.³⁰

²⁸ For more discussion on this matter, see (Primoratz, Terrorism 2015).

²⁹ This is indeed another proof that terrorism is a socially constructed concept. For more discussion on this matter, see (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 2007), 1-1.

³⁰ In this matter, Boaz Ganor acknowledges that the purely theoretical definition of terrorism shall be differentiated with the practical meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism that indeed is socially constructed. For more, see (Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter? n.d.).

If there is no universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism, at least we may refer to the most universally accepted definition of it. One of the most widely acceptable definitions is the one offered by Yonah Alexander (1976) who defined terrorism as the use of violence against random civilian targets to intimidate or to create a generalized pervasive fear for achieving political goals. That said, in a nutshell, it can be synthesized that terrorism is the threat and use of both psychological and physical force in violation of international law, by state and sub-state agencies for strategic and political goals.³¹

However, out of many, at least 109 different definitions of terrorism in the academic and policy world, we can find that at least the key elements to terrorism are obvious: violence; civilians and non-combatant targets; the intention of spreading fear; and political aims that can be mixed with ideological and religious ones.³² Correspondingly, based on these elements we can conclude that the common denominator of terrorism is the use of violence towards civilians to send the message in order to achieve political goals. In other words, at the very least we can define terrorism as a criminal violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve political goals via targeting civilians.³³ This common denominator reflects the (tactical) utility of terror. Although there are differences between terrorists and waves of terror, the utility of terror as a tool of change used throughout history is not different (Garrison 2004).

As an old tactic, terrorism has been used by governments to suppress revolution as well as by revolutionaries who have sought to achieve power over a government. It has been employed by single-issue groups seeking to address a specific evil in the society and by revolutionary governments trying

³¹ For more, see (Best and Nocella 2004), 370.

³² Ideology and religion in this matter could become symbols that terrorism could be driven by a force of beyond merely the material world. For more, see (Matusitz 2012). See also the Table 2 where Alex Schmid (1988) made a summary of the twenty-two main elements appearing in 109 scholarly definitions.

Civilian and non-combatants are two different categories. However, someone can be armed or part of an armed forces, but he/she is still a non-combatant. The examples of non-combatants are the armed force's medical team, as well as any other reserve and regular soldiers who are not on duty.

³³ Omar Ashour, Ph.D. (professor and thesis supervisor) in a discussion with the author, April 12, 2016.

to maintain power. In the end, terrorists whether in possession of governmental power or in-want-of-governmental power, uses terror to achieve a political, social or religious goal. Modern terrorism is at least two hundred years old and it has not aged a day (Garrison 2004).

Correspondingly, in 2012, Audrey Cronin defined terrorism as an unpredicted, altruistic form of political violence that is carried out by non-state actors, although possible to receive state's support of means, at international and domestic levels where innocents, civilians, or non-combatants become random and intentional victims to instill fear and maximize the psychological effects of the attack to the audience. Terrorism is carried out by terrorists that do not abide by domestic and international laws or norms, and even if we refer to conventional just war theory, terrorism is not justifiable.³⁴

There are however five points to be critically commented on Cronin's definition. First, altruistic means that people committing terrorism, in their bounded rationality may think that they do it for the benefits of other people outside themselves. Second, since terrorism is a tactic, the state also can use terrorism as a tactic. For this particular point, there are generally two schools

³⁴ This elaborate examination of defining terrorism is compiled from the lectures of Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin in 2012. For more, see (A. K. Cronin, *Defining Terrorism and Its Grey Area with Other Forms of Political Violence* 2012)

However, Cronin's arguments on the just war theory of contemporary Islamist terrorism should be complemented by a deep historical understanding of the just war theory in Islam. The just war theory in Islam is naturally embedded in the *Shari'a* (the Islamic tradition of jurisprudence and reasoning) and ethical norms that covers three main aspects: the proper authority to wage war; the responsibility to wage war; and the proper targets in war.

The just war theory in Islam has been well developed since the seventh century as reflected by various interpretations in the different schools of thought: Shafi'i; Hanifi; Hanbali (mostly the works of Imam Ahmad Hanbal that was interpreted by ibn Taymiyyah); some of Maliki ideas; and very little Shi'ite input. The development of these schools of thought and concept of jihad were indeed influenced by their contextual circumstances.

According to John Kelsay in his book, *Arguing the Just War in Islam* (2009), jihad that is based on the *Shari'a* is the Islamic analogue of the Western "just" war. Kelsay traces the arguments of thinkers over the centuries who have debated the legitimacy of war through appeals to the *Shari'a* logic. Therefore, we cannot fully understand the range of phenomena in the Islamist violence without comprehending the internal reasoning and discourse that Kelsay examines in his synthesis work. According to many reviews, *Arguing the Just War in Islam* provides a systematic account of how Islam's central texts interpret jihad, guiding us through the historical precedents and Qur'anic sources upon which today's claims to the doctrinal truth and legitimate authority are made. This is an important reference for us to make sense the global armed Islamist movements in the today's context. By illuminating the broad spectrum of Islam's moral considerations of the just war, John Kelsay helps to enlighten Muslims and non-Muslims alike to make sense the possible war and peace in the future.

of thought where one of them, such as Bruce Hoffman's, views terrorism as something that is only carried out by non-state actors and if it is used by state actors it is called repression, whilst another school of thought can view terrorism as something that can be equally carried out by both state and non-state actors (Garrison 2004).

Third, there is also a debate in both academic and policy literature until today about what it means by civilian versus non-combatant (Jackson 2008, Watkin 2003). Fourth, attacking random and intentional victims is not necessarily the case where this point is also still highly contested in the scholarly and policy debate until today. Fifth, terrorism is not only aimed to cause the psychological impact to the audience but also to merely exert political pressure for a cause. In other words, most terrorism acts are also about pressuring a stronger enemy (state or non-state actors), and less about influencing the public.³⁵ To confirm this point it is also widely believed that terrorists decide to attack civilians in order to coerce their governments into granting concessions (Crenshaw 1998, DeNardo 1985, McCormick 2003).

1.3 The Defining of Terrorism

Terrorism is a social phenomenon; thus, its definitions would consequently vary depending upon the construction of social context by which certain phenomena could be defined as terrorism or otherwise. That said, we could say that there is neither an academic nor an accurate legal consensus regarding the definition of the term "terrorism." Even various legal systems and governmental institutions use different definitions. Moreover, governments have been reluctant to formulate an agreed upon, legally binding definition. These difficulties arise from the fact that the term is politically and emotionally charged (Hoffman 2006).

According to Bruce Hoffman (1998, 2006), terrorism is theatre. Terrorism is identical to a theatrical play that can be viewed as a deliberate presentation to a large audience to gain attention, spotlight a message, and seek a response favorable to the actor. Anxiety can increase as random or

³⁵ Omar Ashour, Ph.D. (professor and thesis supervisor) in a discussion with the author, April 12, 2016.

deliberate acts of terror often target civilians as victims. Like a play, the objective of the experience is to affect the feelings and attitudes of the audience. Actions deemed as terrorist activity could include but are not limited to political demonstration, criminal conduct, and possible links to paramilitary operations or low-intensity conflict.

Hoffman (2006) believes that it is possible to identify some key characteristics of terrorism. He proposes that by distinguishing terrorists from other types of criminals, and terrorism from other forms of crime, we come to appreciate that terrorism is ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent – or, equally important, threatens violence; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia; and perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.


Responding to the Hoffman's view, according to Richard Jackson (2007), in large part the silence on state terrorism in the discourse is due to the frequent practice by terrorism scholars of defining terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence, thereby excluding states a priori from being able to employ terrorism at all. In fact, in the past, we could see that there were instances where terrorism by the state actor was prevalent. Such terrorism by the state actor consists of two types: “terror from above” and “state-sponsored terror.”

“Terror from above” is where states (through their government) resort to violence to influence, control, and repress segments of their population, or rely on coercive aspects of state institutions. National governments can become involved in terrorism or utilize terror to accomplish the objectives of governments or individual rulers. Changes to legal codes can permit or encourage torture, killing, or property destruction in the pursuit of government policy. The examples of the twentieth century's state terror were Joseph Stalin's purges of the 1930s that terrorized the entire Soviet population, Nazi Germany during the 1930s – 1940s that aimed at the deliberate destruction of state's enemies and intimidation of nations and regional states, and several programs in South and Central American regimes during 1970s that terrorized their populations with death squads.

On the other hand, “state-sponsored terror” can also involve the state activity to sponsor terror taking place beyond their borders, where some governments provide supplies, training, and other forms of support to non-state terrorist organizations. During the Cold War era, state-sponsored terrorism was prevalently used by one state against another in a Cold War-type struggle.

After the Cold War, as mentioned above, such scholars as Bruce Hoffman, for example, argue that terrorism involves violence that is rather perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity (Hoffman 1998, 2006). This is in keeping with the U.S. Department of State’s highly influential definition of terrorism, a definition employed by a significant proportion of terrorism scholars today, which conceives of terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (Martin, 2003). In other words, terrorism is often equated with non-state actors or groups that are not responsible to a sovereign state, whilst in fact, internal security forces can use terror to aid in representing dissent, and intelligence or military organizations can perform acts of terror designed to further a state’s policy or diplomatic efforts abroad.

Figure 1.3 A New Typology of Terrorism



Source: Adapted from Schmid (1984) and taken from (J. M. Post, Political Psychologies of Terrorism 2017)

Thus, having examined the meaning of terrorism up to this point, and in our effort to synthesize the comparative views of non-state perpetrated terrorism and of state-sponsored terrorism, at the very least we can define the first as the use of violence by non-state actors against civilians in order to achieve a political goal; and the latter as the use of violence (e.g., genocide, war crimes, and torture) against civilians by a state as an instrument of domestic security and foreign policy. The reconciliation of both points of view is in line with the definition suggested by Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman (1988). By focusing on targets and objectives, they defined terrorism as an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine individual groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons. Therefore, in contrast to an assassination, the direct targets of violence in terrorism are not the main (ultimate) targets.

Based on this dilemma of clearly constructing a definition of terrorism that is universally accepted, Alex Schmid (2011) suggests that there are ten elements to be considered, which together provide a fair and good enough description of what, in the common academic view, can be said to constitute “terrorism.” These elements include the dual character of the term “terrorism,” the threefold context, the perpetrator as a source or agent of violence, political, the violent act, the threat-based communication, the differentiation between direct civilian victims and the ultimate target audience, the terror/fear/dread, the intent, and the campaign.³⁶ This is however in line with what is basically argued by Richard K. Betts, that the core problem of why academic and policy community has never settled on a commonly accepted definition of terrorism is because scholars, policy experts, or government agencies may believe that there are cases where extreme actions are justified. But since academic and policy stakeholders, on the other hand, may also believe that terrorism is always wrong, consequently, they could not agree on a common definition of terrorism. In other words, when terror is applied to actors and acts in the real world of today, meaning and intent can

³⁶ For more elaborate discussion on these ten elements, see (A. P. Schmid, *The Definition of Terrorism* 2011), 76 – 83.

point in many directions. Part of this dilemma is due to the use of terror as tactics by various actors at all layers of socio-political interaction.³⁷

That is why Alex Schmid (2011) in his attempt to sort out a clear definition of terrorism, he interviewed 91 respondents by asking four fundamental questions related to the one's definitions of terrorism: whose definition of terrorism do you utilize?; what is your comment/criticism on the 1988 academic consensus definition of terrorism?; what is your comment/criticism on the U.N. draft definition of terrorism?; and what is your comment/criticism on the U.S. Department of State's definition of terrorism? Moreover, Boaz Ganor even has fifteen reasons of why terrorism is difficult to be clearly defined.³⁸ Based on this set of parameters to define terrorism, Schmid discusses the problems related to the definitions of terrorism forwarded by the U.S. Department of State, the draft definition of the United Nations, and the academic consensus definition developed in the 1980s.³⁹

³⁷ For more discussion on this matter, see (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 2007), 1-1.

³⁸ For more elaborate discussion on these four fundamental questions, see (A. P. Schmid, *The Definition of Terrorism* 2011), 43 – 44.

³⁹ Terrorism according to the U.N. draft definition:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this (the present) Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this [the present] article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss; when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any acts. See also: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNODC/GEN/N05/460/57/PDF/N0546057.pdf?>

Terrorism according to the U.S. Department of State in 2006:

Terrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated violence that is perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (usually intended to influence an audience).

Terrorism according to the academic consensus in 1984:

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental target of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics, which form the basis for their selection for victimization. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence, other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). This group or class, whose members' sense of security is purposefully undermined, is the target of terror. The victimization of the target of violence is considered extra-normal by most observers from the witnessing audience based on its atrocity, the time (e.g., peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or the disregard for rules of combat accepted in the conventional warfare.

Consequently, due to major divergences at the international level on the question of the legitimacy of the use of violence for political purposes such as in terrorism, either by states or by self-determination and revolutionary groups, this has not yet been possible to formulate a comprehensive definition of terrorism. In this sense, M. Cherif Bassiouni (1988) argues that to define “terrorism” in a way that is both all-inclusive and unambiguous is very difficult, if not impossible. One of the principal difficulties lies in the fundamental values at stake in the acceptance or rejection of terror-inspiring violence as means of accomplishing a given goal. The obvious and well-known range of views on these issues is what makes an internationally accepted specific definition of what is loosely called “terrorism,” a largely impossible undertaking. That is why, according to Bassiouni the search for an internationally agreed upon definition may well be a futile and unnecessary effort.⁴⁰

The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (e.g., a government), or targets of attention (e.g., public opinion) to changes of attitudes or behaviour favouring the short or long-term interests of the users of this method of combat.

For more, see (Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism : A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases, and Literature 1984), 111.

In the second (1988) round, on the basis of some 50 responses to a questionnaire soliciting comments on the first version, the following text emerged: Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

For more, see (Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature 1988).

Terrorism according to the Indonesian government:

Every activity (performed by individuals), which intentionally threatens or uses the violent means to generate a terrorizing and fearful condition on the general society; or to cause the damage and loss on the human life, on strategic, key and critical infrastructures, to the environment, and at the wider public and international facilities. For more, see *Undang Undang Tindak Pidana Terorisme Nomor 15/2003* (In English: The Terrorism Criminal Act Number15/2003).

⁴⁰ For more discussion on this matter, see (Bassiouni 1988).

However, out of many, at least 109 different definitions of terrorism in the academic and policy world, we can find that at least the key elements to terrorism are obvious: violence; civilians and non-combatant targets; the intention of spreading fear; and political aims that can be mixed with ideological and religious ones.⁴¹ Correspondingly, based on these elements we can conclude that the common denominator of terrorism is the use of violence towards civilians to send the message in order to achieve political goals. In other words, at the very least we can define terrorism as a criminal violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve political goals via targeting civilians.⁴² This common denominator reflects the (tactical) utility of terror. Although there are differences between terrorists and waves of terror, the utility of terror as a tool of change used throughout history is not different (Garrison 2004).

⁴¹ For these 109 definitions that were investigated by Alex P. Schmid et al, see the breakdown in the following table 2.1.

⁴² Omar Ashour, Ph.D. (professor and thesis supervisor) in a discussion with the author, April 12, 2016.

Table 1.2 Twenty-Two Main Elements Used in the 109 Definitions of
Terrorism

No	Elements	Freq (%)
1	Violence, force.	83.5
2	Political.	65
3	Fear, terror emphasized.	51
4	Threat.	47
5	(Psych) effects and (anticipated) reactions.	41.5
6	Victim-target differentiation.	37.5
7	Purposive, plan, systematic, organized action.	32
8	Method of combat, strategy, tactic.	30.5
9	Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints.	30
10	Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance.	28
11	Publicity aspect.	21.5
12	Arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, indiscrimination.	21
13	Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims.	17.5
14	Intimidation.	17
15	Innocence of victims emphasized.	15.5
16	Group, movement, organization as the perpetrator.	14
17	Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others.	13.5
18	Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence.	9
19	Clandestine, covert nature.	9
20	Repetitiveness, serial or campaign character of violence.	7
21	Criminal.	6
22	Demands made on third parties.	4

Source: (Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism : A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases, and Literature 1984), 76 – 77.

1.4 The Causes of Terrorism as the Focus of this Ph.D. thesis

As of today, the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism still inflict global society with formidable challenges, and one way to overcome such challenges is by leveraging our knowledge on multi-dimensional aspects, determining factors/elements that lead people to commit terrorist attacks (Silke 2001, 2003). Correspondingly, one way to understand why people commit terrorist attacks or get involved in such activity is by exploring these factors/elements and the interplay among them including but not limited to how they correlate with and affect each other.

Specifically, these multi-dimensional factors/elements and their interplay encompass at least economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive, all of which are the key variables in determining the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism. Since Islamist terrorism continues to generate new cells, operate, and span globally with various level of severity, understanding the relationship between economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, government incentive, and Islamist terrorism has never been more important. However, as resources mobilization and logistical capacities are also critical, they are already becoming an integral part of all these examined variables.

As the greatest test of any theories is not its conceptual precision or volume of data and cases but its ability to provide plausible explanations of social processes, this Ph.D. thesis presents a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis that attempts to analyze why operatives committed series of deadly terrorist attacks from 2002 – 2009 and some other radical-related activities in Indonesia until 2017. Such attacks will continue to instill in Indonesian and global society a feeling of being threatened by a militant strain of radical-Islamist fundamentalism. Radical-Islamist fundamentalism in Indonesia, a home to a vast Muslim community and the World largest Muslim populated country, is likely to continue to be vociferous, disturbing the pluralistic and democratic polity, and creating violence and terror to achieve its ends. Although expected to remain a small minority, the radicals may cause much

trouble to the dominant majority, as they are motivated by fanatical perceptions, believing absolutely in the truth of their actions, demonizing their enemies, and enjoying some degree of operational capacity (Eliraz 2004).

Through a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis using qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, this Ph.D. thesis will specifically examine *what factors drove people with the association to JI and Islamist radicalism to commit and become involved in terrorist attacks? Why and how might such factors/elements influence these people to commit terrorist attacks in the future?* The focus of this research is the *Jemaah Islamiya* (JI), the *al-Qaeda*-affiliated terrorist group that has been evolving, recruiting, and operating in Southeast Asia (including Indonesia) from early 1992 until today; as well as various other related radical-Islamist groups. However, the unit of analysis of this Ph.D. thesis are the individuals related to these groups and not the groups themselves.

The focus of this research coupled by the direct access to the studied individuals, the key state/security officials and experts in the field, and the government documents will significantly add to the originality and scholarly contribution of this research.⁴³ The JI is important because it shares a relatively similar profile with other transnational-Islamist terrorist organizations in terms of its radical ideology, economic/social/political grievances, social network, their response towards state repression and government incentive, as well as their targets of terror.

Having systematically examined such factors, the thesis aims to provide an original scholarly contribution to the fields related to terrorism studies, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, special operations and low-intensity conflicts (SO-LIC), and wider national security and public policy issues. Moreover, this Ph.D. thesis offers the first ever in-depth documentation of the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism by using both qualitative and quantitative research methods in exploring the dynamic, multi-dimensional causes of emerging Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. The

⁴³ The leading expert in the field who becomes one of my important sources throughout this academic research is Sydney Jones. Sydney Jones, the Director of Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) is considered an internationally leading scholar on *Jemaah Islamiya*. She currently resides in Indonesia.

entire analysis helps develop both a foundation for future research and a series of recommendations for policymakers across all levels of government in assuring the security of human life, society, and civilization at both national and international level.

1.5 The Research Context

Recent Islamist terrorism is a part of a religious wave that uses a variety of sacred texts or revelations for legitimacy that started since 1979 in the Iranian revolution (Rapoport 2004). In addition to the 1979 revolution, this wave was also inspired by the success of driving the Red Army out of Muslim land, Afghanistan.⁴⁴ This era is characterized by not abiding by one's state law, bounded rationality that is not understandable by secular views, and having religious symbolic meaning in their commitment towards terrorism activities (e.g., scripture-based, involving religious figures as their leader, martyrdom driven by religion, sectarian violence, and determination to change the structure).

This era still relatively reflects the terrorists' perception of society as something that needs to be fixed and/or changed. According to Garrison (2004), terrorists, regardless of issue or cause, hold at least one of three basic concepts about society: society is sick and cannot be cured by half measures of reform; the state is itself violence and can be countered and overcome only by violence, and the truth of the terrorist cause justifies any actions that support it. Whilst some terrorists recognize no moral law they have their own "higher" morality." *Al-Qaeda* and its associated movements fit with this wave since it aims to kill as many people as possible, has a religious figure as their leader, "hijacks" Quranic scripts, exploits religiously symbolic concepts of martyrdom, has presence in the global landscape, involved in legal and illegal

⁴⁴ Abdullah Azzam, who was the creator of the *Maktab al-Khidamat* (MAK) or pre al-Qaeda, and served as bin Laden's former mentor and boss wrote a book titled *In Defense of Muslim Lands*. In this sense, what he said as an Islamic scholar was often deemed as a real fatwa. In his book, he argues that because Kemal Ataturk dissolved the Caliphate and there is no Caliph who can declare war, jihad is now *fard'ayn*, meaning holy war is now the individual obligation of every good Muslim. Abdullah Azzam has a Ph.D. in Islamic Jurisprudence from the prestigious al-Azhar University in Cairo.

activities, and has overarching, strategic aims of restoring the world under the Islamic caliphate.

The typical religious wave of terrorism can also be found in the Irish Republican Army (IRA). As an ethno-nationalist left-wing organization, the role of sectarianism within IRA was not major despite its major impact in the wider conflict. However, like their “religious” terrorist counterparts of *al-Qaeda* and *JI*, these IRA men, who were at first reviled for their participation in the Rising, were later starting to be reinvented and rehabilitated as “misguided” but brave and selfless. Their reinvention and rehabilitation were complete when this was combined with religious images of martyrdom and with their popular beatification since they died out like saints of their sense of moral rectitude (Githens-Mazer 2006).

In terms of religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments, whilst Jonathan Fine (2015) argues that there are differences between secular and religious political violence, on ideological, strategic, and tactical levels; Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) complements Fine’s argument by suggesting that there is a unique connection between religion and terrorism. His argument relies on two premises. The first premise is driven by his conviction that religion itself is not the inherent cause of violence or terrorism since violence might occur with or without religious context. However, religion provides mores and symbols which make horrific bloodshed easier to vindicate. Bruce Hoffman (2006) argues that Jews and Christians, as well as Muslims, have much to answer for as fomenters of religious terror. Hoffman reminds us of the enormities perpetrated by Rabbi Meir Kahane, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, and Yigal Amir as well as the threat in America posed by William Pierce-inspired Christian supremacist movements. Ayatollah Khomeini, Imam Sheikh Ahmad Ibrahim Yassin of Hamas, and Osama bin Laden have their counterparts in the Jewish and Christian worlds (Hoffman 2006).

Nevertheless, Hoffman acknowledges that the Islamist fanatics have a much greater opportunity for mayhem because of the alienated hordes in the Middle East who see no hope at all in the status quo. The opportunity created by despair and rage, not the intrinsic elements of the religion itself, gives Islam the edge over Christianity and Judaism as a force for terror. This is corresponding to what Mohammed Hafez (2003) argues by using the

frustration-aggression models that were based on Ted Robert Gurr's seminal work, *Why Men Rebel?* (1970). According to Hafez, the primary source of Islamist insurgencies lies in the repressive political environments within which the clear majority of Muslims find themselves.

Hafez's combination of sophisticated theoretical approach, ideological frames, and resources mobilization to explain his detailed case studies in his book, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* highlights when and how institutional exclusion and indiscriminate repression contribute to the large-scale rebellion. The basic question on Hafez's work is not, therefore, why Muslims revolt, but instead why states in these countries have the authoritarian character they do. He develops a case for analysis in terms of political context, particularly regarding the ability or failure of the state to provide the opening channels to Islamist movements for participation in the political process and the manner, in which it represses dissent. Moreover, according to Hafez, the espousal of anti-system worldviews by Islamists is a result less of an inherent ideological inclination, but more of political exclusion and repression.

Correspondingly, according to Hoffman, if the Old Testament and the Christendom Era are guides, Jews and Christians have also shown little aptitude for pacifism, except when they hold the upper hand. The first premise, however, leads to an important point that only religion that provides a moral justification to commit violence in the name of a cosmic war between good and evil. In each own way, every group committing such violence believes that their God is on their side and through them, the judgment is ready to be executed.⁴⁵

This premise also leads to the belief system (including the ideological conviction) that the war has already been going on, so that the perpetrators just need to continue on engaging in such war, and use that belief system (including the ideological conviction) as their justification of self-defence.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ However, estate and ideology (e.g., Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and various forms of ethno-nationalism/supra-nationalism) that have existed in the human history also generate a similar effect.

⁴⁶ The term *belief system* is usually used to refer to something that is broader than what is meant by the term *ideology*. A belief system is usually defined as a set of principles and ideas shared by a group of people, and which tend to influence their actions. Meanwhile, an

The involvement in such a way also gives the new illusion of power to the marginalized individuals who tend to be involved in such movements. It provides them with status, meaning, and identity in the world that no longer recognizes them. This act is called the performance violence. This performance violence is also deemed a ritual whilst sending a message to the audience. Victims are targeted not because they attack the perpetrators, but they are merely perceived and portrayed as symbols, tools, animals, or corrupt beings. That is why, moral disengagements are often used by religious terrorists to justify their attacks since the victims are not necessarily guilty against these perpetrators (Bandura 1990).

The second premise of Juergensmeyer is driven by his conviction that the cure for religion-inspired violence may ultimately lie in the renewed appreciation for religion itself and in the acknowledgement of religion in public life. Such an approach aims to generate a new kind of mind-set for individuals as the agents who apply their own ideological (and belief) system in their life. Through this premise he argues that the solution is not the secularization but the renewed/revived understanding of religion. The proponents of this arguments believe that human is the independent agent that has freedom in choosing what they think, believe, and act. In other words, humans should be independent in deciding what becomes their worldview and courses of action. Through a revived understanding of religion, they will not likely commit what Juergensmeyer calls religious violence, so that it supports the major premise that the cure to religious violence and terrorism is the revived and better appreciation of religion itself.

That said, by comparing and synthesizing general conclusions driven from both rigorous qualitative and quantitative research methods, this Ph.D. thesis aims to provide valuable original knowledge that is related to the multi-dimensional textures and new patterns of Islamist radicalism, particularly in Indonesia. The thorough academic research process in this Ph.D. thesis is to leverage our scholarly based knowledge on the existence and latent threat of

ideology is defined as the set of ideas that underlie the belief system itself. Therefore, an ideology is less broad than a belief system. Although it can be difficult to differentiate between the two, it is usually acceptable to say that ideologies are less broad than belief systems.

Islamist terrorism, so that we will be in a better position to formulate more contextual, better-shaped counterstrategies in dealing with this phenomenon. Our knowledge of terrorism most certainly is deficient, but the field shows no clear ability to improve this situation. After thirty years of study, we simply should know more about terrorism than we currently do (Silke 2001, 2003).

1.6 The Research Goals

Through a systematic and comprehensive multivariable analysis, the thesis aims to present the underpinnings of the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism by simplifying the complex relationships between economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, government incentive, and Islamist terrorism. The thesis rigorously aims to provide the first ever in-depth documentation of the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism by using both qualitative and quantitative research methods. There is an immediate need in scholarly and policy arenas to have current specific research that integrates both qualitative and quantitative approaches in exploring the dynamic causes of emerging Islamist terrorism in Indonesia and in the region. Moreover, it seeks to achieve two, primary objectives.

First, it will significantly contribute to the scholarly work of this field that falls under the category of social science and international studies. Specifically, this academic research project will help contribute to the subfield of terrorism studies, as the subfield of terrorism studies has not yet, and may never, become a “hard” science, but will always remain somewhere in between (Sinai 2007). This Ph.D. thesis aims to contribute to the social science academic research efforts in this area of study that will upgrade our capabilities to better understand and respond with the most effective countermeasures against the magnitude of the terrorist challenge facing us.

Second, it will significantly contribute to the international and national security policy of which current strategic intelligence challenges impose us to reorient its focus to cover multiple new, specific targets including but not limited to rogue states, non-state group threats, the proliferation of mass destruction, international crime and narcotics, as well as terrorism (Imler

2004). This study will specifically contribute to the safety and security policies particularly in the development of counterstrategies (e.g., counterterrorism) of the Republic of Indonesia. The struggle against terrorism is actually more complex than simply a struggle within the Islamic world between secularism and old traditions that may last a generation or more, so that a struggle against terrorism will no longer be engaged with only a single national element of power, but instead be overcome by superior knowledge involving the combination of strong academic research and the entire spectrum of national elements of power (Harris 2004).

Therefore, by knowing more characteristics of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia through this academic research project, we will know the specific facts and findings that are strategically useful not only to the subfield of terrorism studies, but also to make the prediction/forecast about the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia and in the region. As Silke argues, constructing government policy without evidence is like building on sand and if the result does not fail and collapse it is only because of luck and good fortune (Silke 2003).

1.7 The Thesis Structure

In line with the previous outline part (1.1.3) that lays out the overview of this thesis structure, the development of this Ph.D. thesis is indeed undertaken through a series of primarily sequential research activities, albeit with periods of simultaneous processes. The literature review and research framework (chapter 2) will focus on the relevant literature/chief topics to demonstrate how this Ph.D. thesis fills the gap in the literature, and critically review the relevant existing research. Correspondingly, by based on the extensive relevant literature review in this field, the last part of chapter 2 addresses two more elements: research propositions and hypotheses: the theory building; as well as research framework and design: variables and methodology.

Subsequently, chapter 3 will focus on the descriptive analysis of JI and wider radical-Islamist history in Indonesia on which I base my analysis in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 3 is laid out according to the inter-linked

development timeline of JI origins, historical development, and likely form in the future. Whilst the organization of this chapter is arranged accordingly in that way, it still reflects the determining variables of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that are examined in this Ph.D. thesis: economic grievances; social grievances; political grievances; radical ideology; social network; state repression; and government incentive. In this chapter we can see that these variables have inherently characterized the phenomena of JI from time to time.

Subsequently, chapter 4 is where I analyze the causes behind JI's violent ideology and/or behaviour. The direction of entire research process in this Ph.D. thesis refers to the rigorous qualitative and quantitative research methods that are deemed suitable to best answer the research problems and questions in this Ph.D. thesis. All data collected in this Ph.D. thesis is exploited/analyzed respectively in chapter 4. Whilst chapter 4a is especially dedicated for the qualitative research method, chapter 4b is for the quantitative one. That said, chapters 4.1 and 4.2 are especially dedicated places to exploit, display, and analyze the collected data through respectively qualitative and quantitative research methods. Whilst all data simulation using qualitative analysis (the discovering patterns analysis, the content analysis, and the discourse analysis) and quantitative analysis (the multivariate statistical analysis mainly by using the chi-square test, the logistic regression, and the proportional test) are situated in chapter 4; the discussion of social network analysis on the JI-related individuals are also made available on chapter 4.3. To complete the analysis package, chapter 4.4. is then especially dedicated to discussing the analysis warranty which consists of the general assessment of analysis and inputs/suggestions for the future research.

As we complete the analysis part, chapter 5, which is the synthesis of various analysis is specially dedicated to interpreting, comparing, reconciling, verifying, and discussing the findings at length by integrating three main components that have been well covered throughout chapter 2 to chapter 4: the literature review; the history and evolution of JI; and the analysis. Subsequently, chapter 6 is focused on discussing two main components: the thesis conclusion and policy relevance/recommendation, where some discussions on what can be done to enhance security policy in a

changing/evolving threat environment (e.g., some prescriptions on future counterterrorism policies) are made available.

The Summary

Terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that encompasses elements of politics, economics, social, and ideology, driving people to commit violent acts and become involved in such activity. Although it is difficult to clearly find a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism; in a nutshell, according to Yonah Alexander, terrorism is the threat and use of both psychological and physical force in violation of international law, by state and sub-state agencies for strategic and political goals. In other words, at the very least we can define terrorism as a criminal violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve political goals via targeting civilians. This common denominator reflects the (tactical) utility of terror. Although there are differences between terrorists and waves of terror, the utility of terror as a tool of change used throughout history is not different (Garrison 2004).

Terrorism is carried out by terrorists that do not abide by domestic and international laws or norms, and even if we refer to conventional just war theory, terrorism is not either justifiable (Cronin 2012).⁴⁹ As of today, the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism still inflict global society with formidable challenges, and one way to overcome such challenges is by leveraging our knowledge on multi-dimensional aspects, determining factors/elements that lead people to commit terrorist attacks (Silke 2001, 2003). One way to understand why people commit terrorist attacks or being involved in such activity is to explore these factors/elements and the interplay among them including but not limited to how they correlate with and affect each other. Specifically, these multi-dimensional factors/elements and their interplay encompass at least economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and

⁴⁹ See the previous footnote in this chapter 1 about this issue, which is based on John Kelsay's 2009 book, *Arguing the Just War in Islam*. For more, see (Kelsay 2009).

government incentive, all of which are the key variables in determining the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism.

As the greatest test of any theories is not its conceptual precision or volume of data and cases but its ability to provide plausible explanations of social processes, this Ph.D. thesis presents a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis that attempts to analyze why operatives committed a series of deadly terrorist attacks from 2002 – 2009 and some other radical-related activities in Indonesia until 2017. Through a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis, this Ph.D. thesis will specifically examine *what factors drove people with the association to JI and Islamist radicalism to commit and become involved in terrorist attacks*, and *why and how might such factors/elements influence these people to commit terrorist attacks in the future*. The focus of this research is the *Jemaah Islamiya* (JI), the *al-Qaeda*-affiliated terrorist group that has been evolving, recruiting, and operating in Southeast Asia (including Indonesia) from early 1992 until today; as well as various other related radical-Islamist groups. Having systematically examined such factors and by comparing and synthesizing general conclusions driven from both rigorous qualitative and quantitative research methods that are based on the standard criteria of modern research in terrorism studies, this Ph.D. thesis aims to provide valuable original knowledge that is related to terrorism studies and national security policy, particularly about multi-dimensional textures and new patterns of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia.

The thorough academic research process in this Ph.D. thesis is to leverage our scholarly based knowledge on the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism, so that we will be in a better position to formulate more contextual, better-shaped counterstrategies in dealing with this phenomenon. In other words, the entire analysis helps develop both a foundation for future research and a series of recommendations for policymakers across all levels of government in assuring the security of human life, society, and civilization at both national and international level.

The following chapter (the literature review) extensively covers the chief topics in this particular field that includes two sub-parts. The first part covers the discussion of terrorism: on defining terrorism; terrorism and other forms of political violence; and the angles of looking at terrorism. The second

part covers the body of theoretical framework used in this academic research: the social movements theory; towards the internationalization theory of Islamist terrorism; terrorism in three religious traditions; the social movements theory as applied in the case of Islamist terrorism; and the theoretical framework to examine the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. The reviews of this relevant academic literature in chapter 2 provides the basis for the development of theoretical frameworks, research questions, and entire research processes of this Ph.D. thesis.

CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

As chapter 1 preliminarily discusses the ontology of terrorism whose nature makes clearly defining terrorism with a universally agreed upon definition difficult (if not impossible), chapter 2 examines the common denominator of terrorism, its connections with other forms of political violence, the angles of looking at terrorism, and how the body of theoretical framework is developed to explain the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia.

The literature review of chapter 2 is precisely to serve as a solid literature basis to comprehend the pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. First, the literature review of this chapter aims to explain the phenomenon of terror/terrorism including terror/terrorism by the state and non-state actors. Second, the literature review of this chapter aims to explain the independent variables causing terrorism that are tested in the hypothesis of this Ph.D. thesis. The independent variables of economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive are all deeply examined in this literature review, and thus providing the subsequent chapters (chapter 3 – chapter 6) with a solid literature basis to prove that the causes of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia are indeed the intertwining interactions of these variables, instead of being otherwise. Third, in line with the focus of Ph.D. thesis, the literature review of this chapter also examines the phenomenon of Salafi jihadism in Indonesia from the perspective of how these independent variables have the impact upon the creation/occurrence of Salafi jihadism-based terrorism in Indonesia.

The literature review of chapter 2 fills the gap in the existing literature and complements the previous works in the field (e.g., works of Sydney Jones, Zachary Abuza, David Gordon and Samuel Lindo, as well as Wiphusana Klaimanee and Mariusz Nogaj) by the sense of its comprehensiveness in constructing the phenomenon of Salafi jihad terrorism in Indonesia that is elaborated in chapter 3 and rigorously tested by the qualitative, quantitative, and social network analysis in chapter 4.

Part 1

2.1.1 Terrorism (Terrorist) and Other Forms of Political Violence: Insurgency (Insurgent); Guerrilla Warfare (Guerrilla); Assassination (Assassin); and Crime (Criminal)

Terrorism as a Form of Political Violence

In one definition, politics is the struggle in any groups for power that will give one or more persons the ability to make decisions for the larger group. This group may range from a small organization to the entire world. Politics occurs wherever there are people and organizations. Political scientists concentrate on the struggle for leadership and power in a political community such as political party, elected office, city, region, or country. It is therefore hard to separate the idea of politics from the idea of power, which is the ability to influence others or impose one's will on them (O'Neil 2015). Since politics is about the competition for public power, and power is the ability to extend one's will, we can conclude that politics is identical with power relationships among individuals, societies, groups, and states.

On the other hand, the word violence has the essential meaning of the use of physical force or power to harm someone and to damage property by great destructive force or energy.⁶¹ Correspondingly, politics can manifest in the form of political violence, which itself has a broad meaning. By one definition, political violence is a type of violence taking place outside of state control that is politically motivated and driven. Some scholars view political violence as part of contentious politics or collective political struggle such as revolutions, civil war, riots and strikes, as well as peaceful protest movements (Tilly 2003, Zimmermann 2012). Political violence can be caused by institutional factors such as state, economic, or social systems; by ideational factors such as the effect of political and religious ideas; and by individual factors such as rational or psychological reasons (O'Neil 2015).

⁶¹ Based on its general definition, violence has these two inherent properties: a physical force and a destructive capacity. For more, see (Definition of Violence n.d.).

Another definition of political violence emphasizes it as a violence perpetrated by either individuals or state's governments to achieve certain political aims, since the perpetrators believe that the political system –from the stage #1 to the stage #3 on table 2.2 below, affecting their life and interests is incapable of responding to their demands. Consequently, this condition leads them to believe that violence is not only justified, but also both necessary and sufficient factors to achieve their political and religious aims (Fine 2015, Gupta 2008, Juergensmeyer 2003).

On the other side of the same coin, as previously discussed on how a state through its government performs “terror from above,” state governments committing political violence believe that using violence to intimidate their population is both necessary and sufficient factors to force them into acquiescence (Burt 2007, Killingsworth et al. 2015, Leebaw 2011). However, according to Sauter and Carafano (2012), the repression of populations by their own governments is usually not included in the modern definition of terrorism, especially by Western governments. In addition to that, state governments can also employ political violence to defend the nation and to deter against foreign threats (Collins 2001).

Table 2.1 The Spectrum and Gradual Manifestations of Political Action

Stage #1: The State of Peace		
	The State Actor	The Non-Regime/Non-State Actor
Stage #2: The Political Persuasion (Persuasive Politics)	Rule of Law (the routine rule legitimated by tradition; customs; constitutional procedure; and compromise politics of give-and-take).	Constitutional Opposition Politics (the formation of opposition presses and parties; rallies; electoral contests; and litigation/use of courts for political struggle).
Stage #3: The Political Pressure (Pressure Politics)	Oppression (the manipulation of competitive electoral process; censorship; surveillance; harassment; discrimination; infiltration of opposition; and misuse of emergency legislation).	Extra Parliamentary Action (the non-violent actions such as social protest for political persuasion of rulers and masses; demonstrations to show strength of public supports; strikes; boycotts; non-cooperative civil disobedience; and other forms of pressure politics short of violence).

<p>Stage #4:</p> <p>The Political Violence (Violent Politics)</p>	<p>Violent repression for control of state power that includes state terrorism (the torture, death squads, disappearances, and concentration camps); counterinsurgency; assassination; massacres; and political justice (the mass arrest, banning, and deportation).</p>	<p>Use of violence for challenging state power that correspondingly mirrors what state actor does. It includes terrorism (the de-individuated political murder); insurgency; assassination (the individuated political murder); indiscriminate massacres; and material destruction (e.g., the sabotage and arson).</p>
<p>Stage #5: The Civil War</p>		

Source: Self-made.⁶²

⁶² Adapted. See (Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature 1988), 58 – 59.

All that said, there are in fact various manifestations that could be categorized as political violence perpetrated by non-state and state actors. Such manifestations include but not limited to terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, assassination, and (extra-ordinary) crime. Scholars, however, generally suggest that an ordinary criminal violence should not be categorized as a political violence (O'Neil 2015).⁶³

Correspondingly, terrorism as a form of political violence according to Cronin (2012) can be defined as an unpredicted, altruistic form of political violence that is carried out by non-state actors (although it is still possible to receive state's support of means) at international and domestic levels where innocents, civilians, or non-combatants become random and intentional victims in order to instill fear and to maximize the psychological effects of the attack on the audience. Terrorism is carried out by terrorists that do not abide by domestic and international laws or norms, and if we refer to conventional just war theory, terrorism is not justifiable.⁶⁴

For example, although religious radical terrorism can use national liberation and liberation theology as the justification (*jus ad bellum*/the principle of just cause/right intention), from the *jus in bello* perspective (the law of waging war) the Islamist terrorism is less well developed, since they have no weapons restriction and tend to attack anybody.⁶⁵ In conclusion, they may emphasize the principle of *jus ad bellum* but totally ignore the principle of *jus in bello* that comprises primarily of discrimination, proportionality, and necessity. Terrorism (terrorist) is in the gray area with other forms of political violence such as insurgency (insurgent), guerrilla warfare (guerrilla), assassination (assassin), and crime (criminal), since although they are four different kinds of political violence they also share some similar characteristics and operational tactics (Cronin 2012).

⁶³ See also (Dumouchel n.d.)

⁶⁴ Audrey Cronin's view of terrorism as a political violence is more leaning towards Bruce Hoffman's that views terrorism as a political violence perpetrated by non-state actors.

⁶⁵ See the footnote in chapter 1.1 regarding the discussion on this issue.

Terrorism (Terrorist), Insurgency (Insurgent), and Guerrilla Warfare (Guerrilla)

As a political violence, terrorism can be interpreted as a violent act taking place outside the normal bounds of civil law and conventional military conduct. Terrorism is often linked to an insurgency or guerrilla warfare but is not necessarily a tactic or technique required of an insurgency or guerrilla campaign. Conceptually and practically, insurgency and guerrilla warfare can also overlap. However, the irregular warfare is one mean/method by which the insurgency is conducted. Insurgency is usually a bigger phenomenon than guerrilla warfare in terms of tactics, operations or strategy. Although these forms of conflict may often have similar goals, differences exist among insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism.⁶⁶

Insurgency is also difficult to be clearly defined as in our efforts to define a single, commonly agreed upon definition of terrorism. Insurgency is also a social phenomenon and therefore a product of the society from which it derives.⁶⁷ It is clear that there is no universally agreed set of definitions for the study and practice of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and we did not set one in the *Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (2012). Defining concepts is indeed a substantial act to any academic endeavors but also an act where the academic is at complete liberty. Therefore, as an ultimate consequence, we must accept the fact that this leaves open the possibility of concluding that these fundamental questions of clearly defining insurgency with a single, commonly accepted definition only lead to a potentially obsolete debate. Along similar lines, David Kilcullen argues in chapter 11 of *Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (2012) that the focus on faulty counterinsurgency concepts leads us completely astray.”⁶⁸

However, an insurgency at very least can be defined as an armed political effort with a specific aim to overthrow a constituted ruling authority or the political status-quo. Correspondingly, an insurgent is someone who violently rebels against a “recognized” ruling authority or the political status-

⁶⁶ For more, see (Crenshaw and Pimlott, *Theories of Insurgency and Terrorism: Introduction* 1997).

⁶⁷ For more, see (Duyvesteyn and Rich 2012).

⁶⁸ For more, see (Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency: The State of a Controversial Art* 2012).

quo. The Joint Publication 1-02-NATO defines insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government using subversion and armed conflict. Meanwhile, the Joint Publication 1-02-NATO defines guerilla warfare as military and paramilitary operations conducted in the enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.⁶⁹

Corresponding to these both definitions of insurgency and irregular warfare, the Joint Publication 1-02-NATO also defines a terrorist as an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.⁷⁰ This definition still reflects the substance of a terrorist whose target often include civilians and to weaken the resolve of what terrorists deem as “the enemy.” Both insurgency and guerilla warfare can use terrorism as a means to shape an environment.⁷¹ Adapting to counter superior military forces or technological capabilities, an insurgent or guerilla can create conditions that persuade or coerce a target audience to directly and indirectly support an insurgent or guerilla agenda.⁷²

According to Cronin (2012) insurgency at least can be defined as an organized resistance movement that has elements of subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict with the purpose of overthrowing the existing social order, in order to reallocate political power so that the follow-through events might occur: the overthrowing of existing government; the establishment of autonomous territory; the driving out of (foreign) forces from territory; the reallocation of political power; and the extraction of (political) resources that are unattainable by less violent means.

In other words, as an organized resistance movement, an insurgency is usually an armed political movement/armed rebellion with a specific aim and

⁶⁹ For more, see (Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, As Amended Through 22 March 2007 2015).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ For more, see (Army, Petraeus and Amos, Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency 2006), 1-3.

⁷² For more, see (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 2007), 1-5.

sustained by a significant level of support. This term of insurgency tells us something about its organizational dimension as opposed to the tactical dimension as we find in the phenomenon of terrorism. Therefore, this key difference/characteristic of insurgency set it apart from both terrorism and guerrilla warfare as they are both tactics and methods available to pursue the goals of the political movement. For example, by looking at the Mao Tse-Tung's insurgency from the angle of an organizational dimension we can see that Mao's insurgency organizationally and progressively used various, systematic tactics to achieve its political aim.⁷³

As terrorism is a tactic and is only one tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe, there is nothing inherent in either insurgency or guerrilla warfare that they must require the use of terror. Whilst some of the more successful insurgencies and guerrilla campaigns employed terrorism and terror tactics, and some developed into conflicts where terror tactics and terrorism became predominant; there have been others that effectively renounced the use of terrorism. The deliberate choice to use terrorism should calculate its effectiveness in three objectives that serve the overall aim of insurgency: how the use of terrorism can impact the further resistance; how the use of terrorism can destroy the government efficiency; and how the use of terrorism can impact the mobilizing of support.⁷⁴

This deliberate calculation of whether to use terrorism in the insurgency is logical since to survive and to be successful, insurgencies require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved. On the other hand, a terror group does not require and rarely has the active support of a large percentage of the population, since normally terrorism does not contend for actual control of territory.⁷⁵ All that said, the population support is indeed the centre of gravity for insurgency since the goal of an insurgency is to challenge

⁷³ For more, see (Tse-Tung 2007). See also (Fredman, *Guerrilla Warfare* 2013), 183 – 187.

Chairman Mao's insurgency tactics are also known by five lines of effort reflecting the employment of mass-base, united front, military wing, political warfare, and international support.

⁷⁴ For more, see (Reich 1998), 16 – 20.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or to force political concessions in sharing political power.

That is why, the key element in insurgent strategy is the effective control of influence over a relevant population. A supportive population provides security, intelligence, logistical support, and a recruiting base for each side in an insurgency and counter-insurgency struggle. If the insurgency gains control over an increasing percentage of the population, the government will correspondingly lose effective control over a larger percentage of the population. Without a focus on the relevant population, insurgent objectives are nil.⁷⁶

Whilst insurgents may describe themselves as insurgents or guerrillas, terrorists will not usually refer to themselves as terrorists. They may describe themselves using military or political terminology such as freedom fighters, soldiers, or activists. Terrorism relies on public impact, and is therefore conscious of the advantage of avoiding the negative connotations of the term terrorist in identifying themselves.⁷⁷ Terrorists do not usually attempt to challenge government forces directly, but act to create perceptions of an ineffectiveness or illegitimate government. Meanwhile, an insurgent or guerrilla force may clash with a government combat force to demonstrate that they can effectively challenge the military effectiveness of the government or to acquire military weapons and equipment. Terrorists use methods that attempt to neutralize the strengths of conventional forces. Bombings and mortar attacks on civilian targets where military or security spend off-duty time, ambushes of convoys, and assassinations of government individuals are common tactics.⁷⁸

However, depending upon the situation, insurgency and guerrilla warfare may also actively target non-combatants. Some insurgencies and guerrilla campaigns consider police and security personnel, in addition to military forces, as targets in an expanded definition of combatants. Examples

⁷⁶ For more discussion on the significance of population within the context of insurgency, see (Merari, *Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency* 1993).

⁷⁷ For more discussion on this matter, see (Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* 1998), 29 – 33.

⁷⁸ For more discussion on this matter, see (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 2007), 1-7 – 1-8.

exist of insurgents or guerrillas deliberately placing civilians on a target list. A Vietcong directive in 1965 detailed the types of people who must be “repressed,” and stated, “The targets of repression are counterrevolutionary elements who seek to impede the revolution and work actively for the enemy and for the destruction of the revolution... Elements who actively fight against the revolution in reactionary parties such as the Vietnamese Nationalist Party, Party for a Greater Viet Nam, Personality and Labour Party, and key reactionaries in organizations and associations founded by the reactionary parties and the U.S. imperialists and the puppet government.”⁷⁹ Insurgents may also use more than one form of violence to obtain their objectives with a combination of terrorism and insurgent or guerrilla warfare as common.⁸⁰

In other words, the use of terrorism in insurgency must be very calculative since the miscalculated, improper use of terrorism in the insurgency can be counter-productive. In addition to that, although it is not always required, external support, recognition or approval from other countries or political entities can also be useful to insurgents.⁸¹ If we refer to the general principles of guerrilla warfare by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, we can see how he distinguished the use of terrorism and sabotage as a tactic. It is necessary to clearly distinguish between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results.⁸²

Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s conviction about the advantage of sabotage might be influenced by Thomas Edward Lawrence who is widely known as Lawrence of Arabia. From his memoir of the insurgent campaign, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, we can see that the insurgent campaign against the Ottoman rule that had begun in 1916 with operations against the key supply

⁷⁹ For more discussion on this matter, see (Merari, *Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency* 1993), 216.

⁸⁰ See (O'Neill 1990), 26.

⁸¹ The use of terrorism within the context of insurgency cannot be separated from the impacts that a method of terrorism causes within that insurgency movement and the objectives of insurgency movement itself. For more, see (Differences between Terrorism and Insurgency n.d.)

⁸² For more, see (E. ". Guevara 2012). See also, (C. Guevara n.d.).

line on the long railroad between Medina and Damascus eventually turned into a full-scale Arab revolt and became a major distraction for the Turks.⁸³ This causal relationship between the failure of the Ottoman rule to secure the key supply line and a full-scale Arab revolt is also confirmed by the fact that insurgency is often founded on pragmatism and exploitation of the lack of delivery of coveted social goods by the central state (Kilcullen 2011).

William Reno (2012) distinguishes two ideal types of insurgency: a hierarchical Maoist variant and a network type of insurgency. For the individual logic of these two types of insurgency, they largely derive from the context in which they are formed and carried out. In a hierarchical Maoist variant, conducted in many post-colonial states, the insurgents aim at building up a shadow government in preparation for an eventual takeover of power. On the other hand, in the network variant that is displayed in a patronage predatory state, the access to resources and economic opportunity is used as a means of population control. Challengers in the Maoist variant need to have developed some measure of social autonomy for an ideologically infused struggle. Whilst in the network-centric insurgency, the challengers almost exclusively come from the ruling circles themselves.⁸⁴

Therefore, up to this point we can clearly see that the dominant political form of insurgency current in contemporary analysis, on the other hand, is one usually seeking to create a shadow government which will ultimately replace the pre-existing government of a state through a phased process of resistance (e.g., defined by strategic defence, stalemate, and eventual strategic offence). This important feature of many of insurgencies concerns the prevalence of a shadow government, not only in the cases of India, Hezbollah and Hamas, but also Iraq and Afghanistan. This could be interpreted as a sign of the strategic nature of insurgency, rather than the tactical. This organizational feature makes insurgency stand out from other expressions of political violence, such as terrorism.⁸⁵

⁸³ For more discussion on Lawrence of Arabia's experience in this matter, see (Freedman 2013), 181.

⁸⁴ For more, see (Duyvesteyn and Rich 2012).

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Meanwhile, terrorism, due to its secretive nature does not invest in building up structures capable of taking over political power and responsibility. Tools of the trade used in insurgency range from targeted killings (e.g., assassinations and executions), hit-and-run tactics, sabotage on critical infrastructures, booby traps and IEDs, propaganda, political education and mobilization at the heart of people's war, psychological warfare, and terrorism.⁸⁶ According to Lawrence of Arabia, as a form of irregular warfare "insurgency is more intellectual than a bayonet charge."⁸⁷

Since the defined end state of an insurgency is indeed the replacement of the government of a nation-state by a different governmental structure, the nature of the state ultimately remains the same with only its political leadership and structure changing. At its bottom line, the basis of an insurgency itself is thus political in nature and exists within the paradigm of the Westphalian state system established in 1648 and continues to define the modern world order.⁸⁸ Therefore, insurgency is usually considered illegal at the domestic level, but sometimes it is considered legal at the international level (Cronin 2012). The Libyan armed revolution turned Civil War against Mu'ammar Qaddafi is an example of an insurgency, as much as some scholars and policy experts may tend to interpret *al-Qaeda* and its association movements as a global insurgency with the intent to overthrow the current world order.

Subsequently, as we have examined the characteristics of terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla; at least now we can view guerrilla from three angles: as a person; as an entity; and as a guerrilla warfare. The word guerrilla itself in Spanish means "little war," a term originating in the resistance to Napoleon's occupation of Spain in the nineteenth-century combat, in which small, unconventional insurgent units challenged colonial governments backed by traditional military forces. In following decades, as an overt military arm of insurgency, guerrilla armies in different conflicts around the world often

⁸⁶ For more, see (Fredman, Guerrilla Warfare 2013), 178 – 192.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 182.

⁸⁸ For more discussion on this insurgency matter, see (Duyvesteyn and Rich 2012), 45.

portrayed themselves as legitimate military units fighting an enemy's army in order to establish a new political entity. In some cases, they may have qualified as such, under norms eventually incorporated into the Geneva Conventions, by carrying their weapons openly, wearing uniforms, maintaining a clear command structure, and following the law of war, along with other practices.⁸⁹

As a person, a guerrilla can be defined as a small group of combatants and a member of resistance fighters that use military tactics to fight a larger, often less-mobile traditional military. Guerrilla does not belong to a regular army and fighting in a war as an independent unit carrying out harassment and sabotage including against regular army and government targets.⁹⁰ In other words, at the very least, a guerrilla is someone who usually applies “irregular tactics” to attack an army.

Correspondingly, as an entity, guerrilla can also be defined as an overt military arm of insurgency, whilst as a tactic (method) of an insurgency, guerrilla can also be defined as an overt military arm of insurgency that operates with the irregular warfare style and sometimes exists along with auxiliary and its underground counterparts that come out of the population supporting them.⁹¹ In this manner guerrilla is often referred as guerrilla warfare, or in one interpretation it is the response of an enraged society to what is deemed as an “illegitimate” military force (Freedman 2013).

Guerrilla warfare was therefore defensive, fought on home territory with the advantages of in-depth popular support and local knowledge (in-depth, not in-face). It was geared to a strategy of exhaustion, gaining time in the hope that the enemy would tire or that something else would turn up. Though a strategically defensive concept, the tactics of guerrilla warfare had to be

⁸⁹ For more discussion on this matter, see (Sauter and Carafano 2012), 264.

⁹⁰ As a comparison, see also (Definition of Guerrilla n.d.).

⁹¹ The common denominator that defines something as a guerrilla warfare is where a small group of combatants that do not belong to the regular army uses military tactics such as ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility in order to fight a larger and less-mobile traditional military. Guerilla Warfare is a form of irregular warfare. At the very least, something can be defined as irregular warfare is where one or more combatants involved in such conflict are irregular military rather than the regular forces that belong to the state's government. See the table 2.3 below for more elaborated characteristics of guerilla warfare.

offensive, aiming to catch the enemy unawares. Lawrence of Arabia observed that the victory in guerrilla warfare depended on the use of “speed, concealment, accuracy of fire.”⁹² Guerrilla warfare would most likely be effective when conducted from rough and inaccessible terrain in a country’s interior.

However, Clausewitz did not see irregular militias as being of much value in the absence of regular forces. That is why, the history of Red Army had begun with “volunteers, rebels, primitive, inexperienced guerrilla” and turned them into “proper, trained, disciplined regiments and divisions.” According to Vladimir Lenin, guerrilla warfare as a part of insurgency could only be a subordinate form of struggle, not the main method, and would benefit from proper party discipline to keep it under control.⁹³

As with terrorism, in practice guerrilla can use it as one of their methods of action, where guerrillas generally operate in the military middle size, sometime with commando style with the intentional target is state apparatus and politicians. A guerrilla force may have something to gain from a clash with a government combat force, such as proving that they can effectively challenge the military effectiveness of the government.⁹⁴ If we refer to the common denominator of terrorism as a violence targeted against civilians, the key contrast between terrorism and guerrilla warfare lies in the fact that at the very least, guerrilla warfare (as part of insurgency) is the employment of violence targeted against the state or “recognized” government. As a component of insurgency, guerrilla warfare was therefore viewed as a lesser strategy, a defensive expedient but not a source of victory.⁹⁵ There is no legitimate basis of guerrillas at the domestic level, but if being conducted by certain rules it may have international legality (Cronin 2012).


⁹² For more discussion on this matter, see (Fredman, *Guerrilla Warfare* 2013), 182.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 179 – 180.

⁹⁴ On the other hand, a terrorist group relatively has nothing to gain from such a clash. This is not to say that they do not target military or security forces, but that they will likely not engage in anything resembling a “fair fight,” or even a “fight” at all. The 1983 terrorist attack against the U.S. Marines barrack in Beirut, Lebanon is the example of this “unfair fight.”

⁹⁵ For more discussion on this matter, see (Fredman, *Guerrilla Warfare* 2013), 180.

Figure 2.1 The Venn Diagram Reflecting the Overlap of Terrorist, Insurgent, and Guerrilla.



Source: Excerpt from (ProCon.org n.d.)

Table 2.2 The Characteristics of Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, and Conventional Warfare as Modes of Violent Struggle
(according to Ariel Merari).

Characteristics	Conventional Warfare	Guerilla Warfare	Terrorism
Unit size in battle.	Large (armies, corps, division).	Medium (platoons, companies, battalions).	Small (usually fewer than 10 personnel).
Weapons.	Full range of military hardware (air force, armor, artillery, etc).	Mostly infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces as well. Guerrilla warfare can rely significantly on IED's for ambushes.	Hand guns, hand grenades, assault rifles and specialized weapons, e.g., car bombs, barometric pressure bombs. Terrorists can rely significantly on IED's for urban bombings.
Tactics.	Usually joint operations involving several military branches.	Commando-type tactics. Note: Insurgents have been increasingly developing special forces capacity (Ashour 2016). ⁹⁶	Specialized tactics: kidnapping; assassinations; car-bombing; hijacking; barricade-hostages, etc.

⁹⁶ Omar Ashour, Ph.D. (professor and thesis supervisor) in a discussion with the author, April 12, 2016.

Targets.	Mostly military units, industrial and transportation infrastructure.	Mostly military, police, and administration staff, as well as political opponents.	State symbols, political opponents, and the public at large.
Intended impact.	Physical destruction.	Mainly physical attrition of the enemy.	Psychological coercion.
Control of territory.	Yes.	Yes.	No.
Uniform.	Wear uniform.	Often wear uniform.	Do not wear uniform.
Recognition of war zones.	War limited to the recognized geographical zones.	War limited to the country in strife.	No recognized war zones. Operations carried out worldwide. Note: However sometime terrorism is limited to geographical location. Please see the table 2.5 below.
International legality.	Yes, if conducted by rules.	Yes, if conducted by rules.	No.
Domestic legality.	Yes.	No.	No.


Source: Self-made.⁹⁷⁹⁷ Adapted. See (Garrison 2004).

Terrorism (Terrorist), Crime (Criminal) and Assassination (Assassin)

Crime at the very least can be defined as an illegal act that is against the law and can be punished by the government, whilst criminals are the actors who are engaged in the crime without altruistic purpose by which they aim at gaining a specific end for their own personal gain. Therefore, unlike in terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare that aim at changing social structure, there is no symbolic violence in the crime as they do not aim at destroying the state and are not interested in public opinion. In other words, criminals do not aim at changing social structure, to challenging state's authority, or in gaining popularity. Criminals even need and operate by taking advantage of state's structures and authority. To some degree, criminals need the state's infrastructure to stay alive. At the very least the main difference between criminal and terrorist or insurgent or conventional military is in its aims. Whilst the aim of criminal tends to be economic, the aim of terrorist or insurgent or conventional military tends to be socio-politico.

Meanwhile, according to John Collins (2001) assassination is generally defined as the premeditated, deliberate or intentional murder, usually of prominent individuals, by using a sudden or secret attack, for political, ideological, cultural, or religious reasons. Although assassination might have political nature, the political nature of assassination is not only the single reason. Other reasons may include economic, religious, ideological, psychological, or military motivations. The assassination of John Lennon is an example of psychological-driven assassination, and the assassination may also be carried out by the suicide attack.

Figure 2.2 Another Way of Looking at the Common Features of Terrorism, Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, Assassination, and Crime as Forms of Political Violence.



Source: Self-made.⁹⁸

2.1.3 The Angles of Looking at Terrorism

Putting into other words, terrorism can also be viewed from three different angles: terrorism as a logic of action; terrorism as a product of social or psychological forces; and terrorism as a method of action.

Terrorism as a logic of action refers to the use of violence by terrorists that within their bounded rationality they think that they deliberately plan, target, strike, or attack civilians, innocents, or non-combatants to achieve certain political demands. Martha Crenshaw (1998) argues that the terrorist behaviour is a product of strategic choice based on logical calculation and collective rationality (rather than merely on psychological reasons) among many other optional courses of action, and open to bargaining and negotiation if it serves their clearly defined cause and purpose (although terrorists are often unclear about their ultimate goals).

⁹⁸ Adapted. See (A. K. Cronin, Defining Terrorism and Its Grey Area with Other Forms of Political Violence 2012).

Nevertheless, there is a controversy in this definition. Although terrorism is logically planned and executed (at least five logical components exist in the logical calculation of terrorism: the cause itself is the end-state; agenda-setting is inherent in terrorism; the attacks are carefully planned and carried out to satisfy the symbolic meaning; group rationality; and cost-benefit analysis), miscalculation and uncertainty are still inherently unavoidable. For example, although terrorists logically aim to change a country's political system, terrorists, in fact, will find it extremely difficult to transform or annihilate a country's political system (Abrahms 2006). That said, terrorism is not actually always "logical and rational" as Crenshaw argues, but it could also be defined as a product of social and psychological forces.⁹⁹

Terrorism as a product of social or psychological forces, on the other hand, rather place emphasis on psychological factors to explain terrorism (Post 1998, 2007). According to him, the end-state of terrorism is violence. There is no cause being reflected as the end-state like in the Crenshaw's argument. The behaviour is influenced by individual traits such as childhood, upbringing, as well as other psychological and social factors affecting the related individual. They also tend to be action-oriented and act within their own bounded-rationality. They feel marginalized and feel that the act of terrorism they commit will give them the meaning. This approach consequently places emphasis on affecting the lifestyle of the related individual as one mechanism to prevent such acts.

Terrorism as the method of action refers to an armed political campaign which usually is used in the insurgency that exploits the mobilization of people to establish counter-state capabilities and activities for the purpose of challenging the state for certain political power (Marks 2006).¹⁰⁰ The example for this category is an insurgency using terrorism as one of its methods of action. The Indonesian experience in dealing

⁹⁹ In critical response to study of Robert Pape about logic of suicide terrorism, Max Abrahms (2006) produced an alternative study testing terrorism's effectiveness as an instrument of coercion. See also (Abrahms, *The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited* 2012).

¹⁰⁰ This argument is derived from the compilation of Professor Thomas A. Marks' lectures in 2006. For more, see (Marks 2006).

with the Aceh Separatist Movement (GAM), the Papua Separatist Movement (OPM), and the East Timor Separatist Movement (GPK) falls under this category.¹⁰¹

In one perspective, looking at terrorism as the method of action used in the insurgency is identical to view terrorism at a minimum as a supplement of insurgency or conventional warfare to keep the enemy off balance and distracted, principally by conducting strikes against vulnerable targets at the enemy's rear. The Afghan Taliban employs terrorism in this manner, as does the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. On the other hand, another perspective also views that the use of terrorism in the insurgency as the first step in an armed struggle. According to Stewart (2014), like Marxist, Maoist, and Focoist militant groups, *al-Qaeda* also followed this progressive strategy. It used terrorism to shape public opinion and to raise popular support for its cause, expecting to enhance its strength to a point where it could wage insurgency and then conventional warfare to establish an emirate and eventually a global caliphate. Once a group becomes more militarily capable, the group's leaders will often switch strategies, progressing from terrorist attacks to an insurgency.¹⁰² Whether the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia follows this strategy trend remains to be seen. This academic research is trying to find the answer for this puzzle.

The framework of viewing terrorism as the method of action employed in the insurgency can also be used to examine in which category the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) should be placed. Is it a terrorist organization or a militant insurgency?

As one tactical tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe, terrorism is often used to conduct armed conflict against a militarily stronger enemy when the organization launching the armed struggle is not yet at a stage where insurgent or conventional warfare is viable. If we refer to this particular definition of how terrorism as a tactic is used by the perpetrators whilst waiting for them to be ready to engage at the later stage of conflict (e.g., insurgency or conventional warfare), the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant should not be viewed merely as a terrorist group, but rather as a militant group using terrorism as one of its diverse

¹⁰¹ East Timor Separatist Movement (GPK) was applied until the East Timor's separation from Indonesia in 1999.

¹⁰² For more discussion on this matter, see (Stewart 2014).

military tools. According to Hafez (2007), the Salafi jihadists in Iraq indeed implement what is called “the system collapse strategy” which is the complete dismantlement of public order, governing political and economic institutions, and state security forces.

In addition to conducting terrorist attacks in its area of operations, the group in fact has displayed the ability to fight and to launch a protracted, complex insurgency campaigns across an expansive geography, has engaged in conventional military battles against the Syrian and Iraqi militaries, and has demonstrated the capacity to govern areas of territory, administer social services, and collect taxes. Given these developing characteristics, categorizing the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant solely as a terrorist organization underestimates the group’s capabilities (Stewart 2014).¹⁰³ This argument is nevertheless also in line with the view of Gareth Stansfield (2014) who argues about the expansion of ISIS and the miscalculation of the West on the growing importance of ISIS.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ For more discussion on this matter, see (Stansfield 2014).

Table 2.3 A Way to Comparatively View Self-Organized Terrorism (Non-State Actor Terrorism) and Conventional Military

Dimension	Conventional Military	Self-Organized Terrorism
Organization	Hierarchical, formal.	Flat, informal, networked.
Leadership	Concentrated, with an institutional authority.	Primarily symbolic, with role in fundraising.
Loyalty	A state and a polity.	A tradition.
Coalition Partners	Formal, perhaps shifting.	Informal, but likely enduring from conflict to conflict.
Command and Control	Centralized, and with clear power relationships.	Decentralized, and with no one fully in charge.
Role of Intelligence Gathering and Analysis	Powerful, and primarily defensive.	Weak, and primarily defensive.
Denial and Deception	Useful, but of secondary importance.	Well developed, critical to mission.
Doctrinal Development	Derived from formal study, historical experience, simulation, and gaming.	Evolutionary, trial and error.
Other Security Obligations	Numerous, including regional security, peacekeeping, and formal alliances.	None.
Weapons Arsenal	Built through formal acquisitions. Takes years, even decades. Resources are abundant.	Adaptable, evolves quickly via natural selection. Resources are constrained.
Financing Mechanism	Formal budget, funded by taxes.	Contributions from nongovernmental organizations, crime, and narcotics.

Source: (Harris 2004), 345.

Table 2.4 The Comparative Example of Contemporary Non-State Terrorist Groups

<i>Al-Qaeda</i>	ISIS	<i>Abu Sayyaf</i>	<i>Jabhat al-Nusra</i>	<i>Boko Haram (ISIS)</i>
Being established in 1988 by Osama Bin Laden.	Being declared in April 2013. as the caliphate by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Note: the Islamic State (IS) itself was declared in June 2014.	Being established in 1991 and affiliated with <i>al-Qaeda</i> and ISIS.	Being established in 2012 and affiliated with <i>al-Qaeda</i> .	Being affiliated with <i>al-Qaeda</i> and ISIS.
13 countries have terrorist groups that are affiliated with <i>al-Qaeda</i> .	The CIA estimation is between 20,000 – 31,500. However other sources estimated otherwise. That is why, as the maximum possibility, approximately up to between 80,000 -100, 000 militants have joined ISIS in Syria	Having experiences in kidnapping.	Approximately between 6,000 – 15,000 joined <i>al-Nusra</i> in Syria and Lebanon in 2014.	Being established in 2002.

	and Iraq. ¹⁰⁵			
Approximately around 5,000s militants have been trained since 1980s in Afghanistan.	Have the annual income of 960 million U.S. Dollar.	Operating in 2 countries: The Philippines and Malaysia.	30% of alNusra militants come from outside Syria and Lebanon. At least	Operating in 4 countries.
Approximately between 3,000 – 4,000 individuals have become the members of <i>al-Qaeda</i> .	20 countries have been attacked by ISIS and its supporters (in addition to Iraq and Syria). 10 million U.S. Dollar are rewarded to	Approximately 500 militants empower the <i>Abu Sayyaf</i> .	11 governorates are “controlled” by <i>al-Nusra</i> . ¹⁰⁶	Approximately between 15,000 – 20,000 individuals have become the <i>Boko Haram</i> militants.
Had annual income of 30		Approximately 1,000 people		Around 10,000 people have

¹⁰⁵ For more, see (Ioannou 2015).

¹⁰⁶ For the estimation of these 30% foreign fighters, see (Rosenberg 2016).

For its geographical coverage, see (Mapping Militant Organizations: Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) 2017).

In 2013 *al-Nusra* was active in 11 of Syria’s 13 governorates, including parts of Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir el Zour, Daraa, and Idlib.

By June 2015, the group had pushed the Syrian army out of the Idlib governorate after coordinating attacks against the Assad Regime with the *Jaysh al-Fatah* umbrella organization. In early August 2015, *al-Nusra* announced that it would withdraw from the frontline against the Islamic State in northern Syria due to increasing Turkish and U.S. involvement in the region. *Jabhat Fatah al-Sham* (formerly *Jabhat al-Nusra*) has also targeted Hezbollah in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon, which is near the border with Syria.

In February 25, 2017, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham fighters carried out a suicide attack in the city of Homs. The attack killed General Hassan Daabul, a senior military intelligence advisor who was close to Syrian President Bashar Assad, and critically wounded Ibrahim Darwish, the head of the State Security Branch (40 killed, 50+ wounded).

million U.S. Dollar (before the 9/11 attacks).	capture the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.	were kidnapped in 2015. This figure reflects 29 percents of increase compared to 2014.		been killed because of <i>Boko Haram</i> , and 1.5 million people have become the refugees.
25 million U.S. Dollar are rewarded to capture Ayman al-Zawahiri.		5 million U.S. Dollar are rewarded to capture the <i>Abu Sayyaf</i> leader, Isnilon Hapilon.		

Source: Self-made.¹⁰⁷


All that said, as we proceed to conduct the academic research on terrorism, according to Cronin (2004), we should view terrorism from four levels of analysis: individual; group; state; and global level. However, to better examine the phenomenon in depth, Cronin argues that we need to delve into one of the major levels of analysis (e.g., individual) whilst still acknowledging other levels of analysis (e.g., group, state, and global level). The using of four level of analysis is extremely important to comprehend the phenomenon of terrorism as well as to formulate the right counterterrorism policy, strategy, and operations.

For example, the focus on the individual level of analysis will be relevant to the following aspects of counterterrorism measures: psychological aspects; profiling of potential and real terrorists; and the removal of key leaders. Second, the focus on the group level of analysis will be relevant to the following aspects of counterterrorism

¹⁰⁷ Adapted and translated. For more, see (Majalah Tempo 2016). See also (Home Office 2016). According to this British government report, 66 international terrorist organizations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000, and 14 organisations in Northern Ireland were proscribed under previous legislation.

measures: social network; organizational structure; ideological (and belief) system; and wider dynamics of terrorist groups. Third, the focus on the state level of analysis will be relevant to the following aspects of counterterrorism measures: focus on fixing domestic problems that leads into the thriving of Islamist terrorism at national level and engaging sponsoring states behind the groups at international level. Fourth, the focus on the international level of analysis will be relevant to the following aspects of counterterrorism measures: focus on the state behind terrorist's movements; international regimes; the issue of globalization; and the challenge of clash of civilizations. For this academic research project, I will home in on the individual level and then incorporate the other levels of analysis to place the case study of JI (and its related Islamist radical groups) into a broader international context.

Figure 2.3 The Definition, Angles, and Major Level of Analysis in Terrorism.



Source: Self-made.

In addition to integrating various related social factors with the study of individuals, the social movements theory can be used as the basis to examine, comprehend, and explain the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism. One basic premise according to the social movements theory is that many terrorist organizations originate out of splinters, who break off from social movements and then decide to choose violence to catalyze a movement and achieve their goals, including but not limited to satisfying their absolutist cosmic views (Stark 2006).

Part 2

As in the first part of chapter 2 we have examined the definition of terrorism from various perspectives, this second part of chapter 2 is to explain the development of theoretical framework used in this Ph.D. thesis. This part is organized into 5 sections:

1. The social movements theory
2. Towards the internationalization theory of Islamist terrorism
3. Terrorism in three religious traditions
4. The social movement theory as applied in the case of Islamist terrorism
5. The theoretical framework to examine the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia

2.2.1 The Social Movements Theory

Etymologically, the word *social movement* consists of two independent words: social and movement. The word *social* means something that is related to activities or to people or to society in general. Meanwhile, the word *movement* indicates the act of process of moving from one position to another. The word *movement* can also be defined as a series of organized activities working towards an objective, or an organized effort to promote or to attain an end. Within the word *movement* there are elements of action, activity, tendency, and trend, all of which can be associated with the activity of moving and transmitting with vibrant/dynamic quality.¹⁰⁸

Given the fact that social movements serve their role in the history of humankind as the societal force that generates dynamics in the society and to make the society still alive, social movements can indeed be perceived as the integral part of social progression itself. That said, many social movements (e.g., the modern peace movements such as Gandhi's *Ahimsa* and many other forms of democratic movement that acknowledges people's participation within the context of citizen movement) are rather peaceful and progressive, thus not necessarily violent. In many cases of democratic society, social movements are indeed shaping modern democratic political life.

¹⁰⁸ For more, see (Definition of Movement n.d.).

Correspondingly, social movements have helped democratization in authoritarian regimes, and contributed to more participatory approaches in representative democracies (Della Porta and Diani 2006).¹⁰⁹ The “Occupy Wall Street” and related “Occupy” movements in the U.S. are the recent example of peaceful social movements. Triggerred by an internet-based blog post in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the movements immediately became a media sensation and later spread out relatively quickly to other regional hubs.¹¹⁰ Therefore, within the purpose of developing a theoretical framework for this Ph.D. thesis, the social movements theory is merely adapted to develop the understanding of Islamist terrorism phenomenon, particulary in the case of Republic of Indonesia.

As explained by Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani (2006), three scholars: Mayer Zald (1996); Anthony Oberschall (1973; 1980); and Charles Tilly (1978) defined social movements as rational, purposeful, and organized actions. Collective action as the essential element of any social movements derives from a calculation of the costs and benefits, influenced by the presence of resources – particularly by organization and by the strategic interactions necessary for the development of a social movement. In a historical situation in which feelings of unease, differences of opinion, conflicts of interest, and opposing ideologies are always present, the emergence of collective action cannot be explained simply as having been caused by these elements.

It is not enough to discover the existence of tensions and structural conflicts: we also must study the conditions which enable discontent to be transformed into mobilizations. The capacity for mobilization depends on the material resources (work, money, concrete benefits, services) and/or nonmaterial resources (authority, moral engagement, faith, friendship) available to the group. These resources are distributed across multiple objectives according to a rational calculation of costs and benefits. Beyond the existence of tensions, mobilization derives from the way in which social movements can organize discontent, reduce the costs of action, utilize and create solidarity networks, share incentives among members, and achieve external consensus.

¹⁰⁹ For more on the relationship between social movements and democratic theory, see (Della Porta and Diani 2006), 239 - 249.

¹¹⁰ For more discussion on the relationship between social movements and new communication technologies, see (Burcher 2017).

The type and nature of the resources available explain the tactical choices made by movements and the consequences of collective action on the social and political system (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Edwards and McCarthy 2004).¹¹¹

Cultural Anthropologist David F. Aberle identified four kinds of social movements: alternative; redemptive; reformatory; and revolutionary by based on “who is the movement attempting to change,” and “how much change is being advocated.” Alternative social movements are at individual level and advocate for minor changes; redemptive social movements are at the individual level and advocate for radical changes. Reformatory social movements occur at a broader group of societal level and advocate for minor changes; revolutionary social movements occur at a broader group or societal level and advocate for radical changes. Other ways to categorize social movements include scope (reform or radical), type of change (innovative or conservative), targets (group-focused or individual-focused), methods (violent or non-violent), and range (local or global).¹¹²

That said, in other words, a social movement at the very least can be defined as a large, often informal grouping of individuals or organizations that collectively focus and act on specific socio-political issues. Such specific socio-political issues can include but not limited to the carrying out, the resisting, and the undoing of a socio-political change. Systematically there are four requirements for a social movement to emerge and four required social conditions for it to succeed (Stark 2006).

The first requirement is the existence of grievances, which need to be addressed, whilst at the same time, those opposing such movement and preferring the status quo will prevent the movement and eventually will lead to the clash of wills between the two sides.¹¹³ This is in line with the thought of Western philosopher of war, Carl von

¹¹¹ For more on the collective action as the essential element of any social movements, see (Della Porta and Diani 2006), 14 – 15. For how resources and social movement mobilization are causally connected, see also (McCarthy and Zald, *Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory* 1977) and (Edwards and McCarthy 2004).

¹¹² For more discussion on social change and social movements and types of social movements according to David F. Aberle, see (Lumen Learning n.d.).

¹¹³ A theory that sophisticatedly examines the very importance of political grievances on Muslims turning into violence is well explained by Mohammed Hafez (2003). Hafez’s “political participation” approach to social movements accurately analyzes how three manifesting forms of political alienation: political exclusion; anti-system framing; and repression can drive peaceful political opposition into violent political

Clausewitz. According to him, war is a violent clash between opposing wills, each seeking to prevail over the others. According to Stark (2006), such grievances could emerge out of suppressed economic, social, and political conditions. The second requirement is the existence of individuals with shared belief, determination, and courage to sustain the movement and to achieve its goal. The third requirement is the existence of precipitating events that reflect people's limit of tolerance and endurance against certain unfavourable conditions. The fourth requirement is the existence of social network which enables the involved individuals and groups to recruit and to educate people for such movement.

Correspondingly, there are four conditions that determine the success of a social movement. The first condition is the capacity of a social movement to exploit, mobilize, and extract any necessary resources (financial and human resources) to sustain the movement. Such resources include the risk-taking individuals with commitment and motivation to succeed in that movement. There are three variables for this first condition to emerge: the skill/know how; the experience to plan, to manage and to carry out the movement under strong leadership; and the financial and economic resources (Stark 2006).

Subsequently, the second condition is the capacity and resilience of a social movement to withstand and to overcome any potential external oppositions, as a social movement, usually will generate responses or counter-movements by the status-quo (e.g., the government authority) that opposes the movement. That said, the third condition which is the capacity to gain politico-economic supports from significantly influential external allies, and the fourth condition which is the existence of separate organizations that share the same values and goals, are also critically required. Although these separate organizations may compete for same available resources, their collective existence cannot be more important for a social movement to be successful.

However, since social movements cannot meet all expectations of people involved, these disenchanted people (splinters) will break off and will continue their activities to achieve their unmet goals. When splinters further their action in regular

opposition including in the form of terrorism. For more, see (Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* 2003).

violent activities and operate independently in loose networks, such violent activities begin to break away from the broader social movements. Like Stark's model suggests, the violent activity can be irregularly and regularly used to express political discouragements and dissents.

According to Crenshaw (1998) and Della Porta and Diani (2006), the violent model through a legal structure (e.g., the Islamic Defender Front in Indonesia/*Front Pembela Islam*/FPI that often demonstrates against U.S. embassy and other Western entities in Indonesia, and often clash with the national police) is directed against the system (not people) as a response against the security forces at the tactical level, whilst the violent model through an illegal structure (e.g., JI) is directed against civilians and wider society. According to Crenshaw, Della Porta, and Diani, this violent model is strongly driven and motivated by the radicalization of ideology.

Subsequently, such illegal structures or organizations (e.g., JI) become the target of government authorities. Therefore, to survive, they must become covert and clandestine. Once they become covert and clandestine, they are separated from society and are joined within ties, bonds, and solidarity among people who share the same values and purposes. Under this condition, they reinforce each other to take certain collective actions and at the same time they begin to attack innocent people. At this stage, their activity can be categorized as terrorism. This corresponds to what Taylor and Horgan (2001) postulate that most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialization towards extreme behaviour.¹¹⁴

On Resource Mobilization

As is discussed in the previous part, since it is conclusive that the mobilization of resources is a significant conditional element in any social movements, it deserves a special attention of both theoretical and practical analysis in this Ph.D. thesis. We cannot comprehensively acknowledge the texture of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia if we have not examined the causal dynamics between a social movement that become its starting point, resource mobilization, and the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism itself.

¹¹⁴ For more discussion on this matter, see (Taylor and Horgan 2001), 37 – 71.

In a way, defining resources as anything that facilitates mobilization robs the concept of its analytic bite, so that it is better to define resources (including political opportunities) narrowly to determine their relative contribution to the emergence and fate of social movements (McAdam 1996). In other words, resources could be said as the function of multiple factors and processes that contribute directly or indirectly to the emergence, survivability, and success of social movements in the longer run.

In general, there are two main theories in the mobilization of resources.¹¹⁵ First. If institutionalized political systems shape the prospects of collective action and the forms of movements, their influence is not independent of various kinds of so-called “the mobilizing structures” through which groups seek to organize. In other words, “the mobilizing structures” are informal and formal collective vehicles through which individuals and groups will mobilize power and other necessary resources and engage in the collective action. As being formulated by its initial proponents, John McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (1973, 1977), resource mobilization sought to break with grievance-based conceptions of social movements and to focus instead on mobilization process and the formal organizational manifestations of these processes. For McCarthy and Zald, although social movements were perhaps not synonymous with formal organizations, they are nonetheless known by and became a force for social change, primarily through the social movement organizations (SMOs) they spawned. In some ways, theirs were less a theory about the emergence or development of social movements than it was an attempt to describe and to map out a new form of professional social movement that they saw as increasingly dominant in contemporary America (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).

Second, on the other hand, Charles Tilly and his other colleagues (1975, 1978) stress the importance of resource mobilization as an organizational dynamic of collective action and view it as a political process model. Unlike the proponents of the first theory, they do not equate the resource mobilization of a social movement with the formal organization, but specifically lays the theoretical foundation for this second approach by documenting the critical role of various grassroots settings (e.g., the

¹¹⁵ For more discussion on this matter, see (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing* 1996), 3 – 4.

volunteers' work at a neighbourhood level) in facilitating and structuring the collective action. For example, some scholars in this camp such as Aldon Morris (1981, 1984) and Doug McAdam (1982) analyze the critical role played by local black institutions (e.g., mainly church organizations) in the emergence of the American civil rights movement.

Comparatively, in the current digital era, counseling and *fatwas* in any religious rallies including in Islam that can become another main engine for resource mobilization are only a click away from a mouse (Chawki 2013, Lachow 2009). The internet offers a worldwide, near instantaneous communication link to exchange ideas, information, and lesson learned. Indoctrination and training of terrorists can be in a dispersed mode and greatly reduce a need for formal hierarchical organizational structure. The intention within an ideology can be placed into an action by individuals rather than depending on large networks with layers of coordination, control, and logistical support.¹¹⁶

Whilst some proponents of these two approaches initially treated the two models of movement organization as mutually exclusive, over time the profusion of empirical work inspired by both camps has led to a growing awareness among movement scholars pertaining to the diversity of collective settings in which movements develop as well as regarding the organizational forms to which they give rise (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). That is why, it is important to understand the historical patterns of resource mobilization of any social movements to predict where the future trajectory of such movements is likely to arise by assessing the relationship between types of movement, organizational forms, and organizational cultures in any given countries in which such movements take place.

2.2.2 Towards the Internationalization Theory of Islamist terrorism

In addition to the social movements theory discussed in part 1, by referring to the framework of internationalization of terrorism, the Islamist terrorism (Salafi jihad movements) in Indonesia is related with international networks. Correspondingly, this part will review the wave theory postulated by David Rapoport (2004).

¹¹⁶ For more discussion on this matter, see (Black 2006). See also (Lachow 2009).

The wave theory is important because first, it allows us, particularly the counterterrorist analysts to view and acknowledge the pattern in a greater depth or otherwise counterterrorist analysts will usually be focusing on terrorist's organizations or movements during their own era. Second, the wave theory can capture the energy behind terrorism movements. This energy includes ideology, inspiration, and opportunity that allow identical terrorist phenomena to occur in several countries and are well connected transnationally by their mutual respect. When the energy fails to create more organizations, the movement usually will decline and disappear. The movements themselves succeeding and overlapping from one to another that contains four waves: the anarchist; the national determination; the leftist; and the religious wave. Third, the wave theory also reflects the expansion and contraction of activity cycle in a given time period. The waves were overlapping and succeeding from one wave to another. Each wave produces major technical works that reflect special properties or energies (e.g., ideology, inspiration, and opportunity) of that wave and contribute to a common modern effort to formulate "the science of terror."

Ultimately, the wave theory is significant because it helps us to map out the movements in a more orderly manner by which we can comprehend the phenomena of terrorism and counterterrorism more thoroughly in the modern era and at an international level. The wave theory connects the international character such as similar activities occurring in several countries, mutual relationship, and similar energy behind the movement. When a wave's energy cannot inspire new organizations, the wave disappears. Otherwise, without understanding the wave theory, counterterrorism analysts will only be focused on the characteristics of terrorist movements in their own era. The wave theory also allows us to see the general pattern or characteristics linking identical terrorist organizations and movements in the single wave of terrorism. Knowing the waves will also help us to better formulate specific counterterrorism measures.

However, other than the categorization according to the wave theory, terrorism could also be categorized into four categorizations based on its types: the leftist-Marxist; the rightist/white supremacy/anti-governments such as the Neo-Nazi; the ethno-nationalist such as the LTTE and the Irish Republican Army; and the religious groups. These groups were globally prominent during their own era and survived over a long

span of time. For an example is the IRA. Preceded by Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) as a militant Irish republican organization that grew out of the *Fenian* movement in the mid-nineteenth century and being disbanded in 1924, IRA was formed in the early twentieth century to fight for Irish independence from the Great Britain. The “Old” IRA then split in late 1969 into “the Provisionals and the Officials.” The Provisionals soon became synonymous with IRA and waged a thirty-five-year-long violent campaign for Irish unity, until they called an end to their campaign in summer 2005.¹¹⁸

The Overlapping Waves according to Rapoport (2004)

a. The Anarchist (1880s – 1920s)

The First wave was initially about the anarchist who assassinated prominent officials. It started in the 1880s in Russia and lasted for a decade later in the Western Europe, Balkans, and Asia. This wave gave the examples of tactic and training for the successors, the second wave. The written manuals and approaches were well documented and allowing the next waves to tap and to develop such knowledge.

b. The National Determination (1920s – 1960s)

The Second wave was about the national determination/anti-colonial movements. Such movements were identical with the resisting power against the colonials that were often ambivalent whether to keep the colonies. Terrorist movements in Algeria that demanded the independence from France and Indonesian insurgency against Dutch in 1945 – 1949 marked this era.

c. The Leftist (1960s – 1990s)

The third wave was the leftist wave that displayed profoundly left-wing aspirations. This wave existed during the Cold-War with the purpose of furthering and advancing the Marxist agenda. This wave diminished greatly at the end of the twentieth century with some still existing in some countries such as Nepal and Columbia. During

¹¹⁸ For more references on ethno-nationalist terrorism that is combined with religious aspect like in the case of the IRA, see (Githens-Mazer 2006).

this era, Indonesia also dealt with various leftist terrorist activities including in the 1965 coup of PKI/Indonesian Communist Party (one of the biggest political parties in the world at that time) that killed six army generals including the Army Chief of Staff and all his assistants.

d. The Religious (1979 – Present)

The fourth wave is the religious wave that uses a variety of sacred texts or revelations for legitimacy that started since 1979 in the Iranian revolution. In addition to the 1979 revolution, this wave was also inspired by the success of driving the Red Army out of Muslim land, Afghanistan. This era is characterized by not abiding by one's state law, bounded rationality that is not understandable by secular views, and having religious symbol in their commitment towards terrorism activities (e.g., scripture-based, involving religious figure as their leader, martyrdom driven by religion, sectarian violence, and determination to change the structure). *Al-Qaeda* and its associated movements (AQAM) fit with this wave since it aims to kill as many people as possible, has religious figures as their leader, "hijacks" Quranic scripts, exploits religiously symbolic concept of martyrdom, presents in the global landscape, involves in the legal and illegal activities, and has overarching, strategic aims of restoring the world under the Islamic caliphate.

The religious wave of terrorism can also be found in the IRA. Like their "religious" terrorist counterparts of *al-Qaeda* and JI, these IRA men, who were at first reviled for their participation in the Rising, were later starting to be reinvented and rehabilitated as "misguided" but brave and selfless. Their reinvention and rehabilitation were complete when this was combined with religious images of martyrdom and with their popular beatification since they died out like saints of their sense of moral rectitude (Githens-Mazer 2006).¹¹⁹

In terms of religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments, Jonathan Fine (2015) argues that there are differences between secular and religious political violence, on ideological, strategic, and tactical levels, whilst Mark

¹¹⁹ For more, see *Ibid.*, 141 - 142.

Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that there is a unique connection between religion and terrorism. His argument relies on two premises.

The first premise is driven by his conviction that religion itself is not the inherent cause of violence or terrorism since violence might occur with or without religious context. However, religion provides mores and symbols which make horrific bloodshed easier to vindicate. Hoffman (2006) argues that Jews and Christians, as well as Muslims, have much to answer for as fomenters of religious terror. Hoffman reminds us of the enormities perpetrated by Rabbi Meir Kahane, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, and Yigal Amir as well as the threat in America posed by William Pierce-inspired Christian supremacist movements. Ayatollah Khomeini, Imam Sheikh Ahmad Ibrahim Yassin of Hamas, and Osama bin Laden have their counterparts in the Jewish and Christian worlds.

Nevertheless, Hoffman acknowledges that the Islamist fanatics have a much greater opportunity for mayhem because of the alienated hordes in the Middle East who see no hope at all in the status quo. The opportunity created by despair and rage, not the intrinsic elements of the religion itself, gives Islam the edge over Christianity and Judaism as a force for terror. This is corresponding to what Hafez (2003) argues by using the frustration-aggression models that were based on Ted Robert Gurr's seminal work, *Why Men Rebel?* (1970). According to Hafez, the primary source of Islamist insurgencies lies in the repressive political environments within which the clear majority of Muslims find themselves.

Hafez's combination of sophisticated theoretical approach, ideological frames, and resources mobilization to explain his detailed case studies in his book, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* highlights when and how institutional exclusion and indiscriminate repression contribute to the large-scale rebellion. The basic question on Hafez's work is not, therefore, why Muslims revolt, but instead why states in these countries have the authoritarian character they do. He develops a case for analysis in terms of political context, particularly regarding the ability or failure of the state to provide the opening channels to Islamist movements for participation in the political process and the way it represses dissent. Moreover,

according to Hafez, the espousal of anti-system worldviews by Islamists is a result less of an inherent ideological inclination, but more of political exclusion and repression.

Correspondingly, according to Hoffman, if the Old Testament and the Christendom era are guides, Jews and Christians have shown little aptitude for pacifism, except when they hold the upper hand. The first premise, however, leads to an important point that only religion that provides a moral justification to commit violence in the name of a cosmic war between good and evil. In his way, all groups committing such violence believe that their God is on their side and through them, the judgment is ready to be executed.

Subsequently, this premise also leads to the belief system (including the ideological conviction) that the war has already been going on so that the perpetrators just need to continue engaging in such war and use that belief system (including the ideological conviction) as their justification of self-defence. The involvement in this way also gives the new illusion of power to the marginalized individuals who tend to be involved in such movements. It provides them with status, meaning, and identity in the world that no longer recognize them. In short, this act is called the performance violence. This performance violence is also deemed the ritual whilst sending the message to the audience. Victims are targeted not because they attack the perpetrators, but they are merely perceived and portrayed as symbols, tools, animals, or corrupt beings.

That is why moral disengagements are often used by religious terrorists to justify their attacks since the victims are not necessarily guilty against these perpetrators. Such moral disengagements include the displacement of responsibility, the diffusion of responsibility, the dehumanization of targets, the euphemistic language, the advantageous comparisons, the distortion of sequence of events, and the attribution of blame (Bandura 1990). Bandura's theory of moral disengagement, although not developed specifically for terrorists, is a useful theory to analyze the rhetoric of terrorist propaganda (Weimann 2008). Terrorists, like criminals, attempt to disengage or to distance themselves from their horrific use of violence, and modern communications media undoubtedly created opportunities for the almost instantaneous transmission of dramatic and eloquent images, and to any modern-day Mikhail Bakunin there were

extraordinary opportunities for propaganda of the deed. Favourable images created by these perpetrators, let alone whole belief systems, could not be fired directly into the minds of the target audience as a form of precision weapon (Freedman 2013).

The Displacement of responsibility. This involves distorting the relationship between one's actions and the effects of those actions, and/or blaming the victim or circumstances for violent actions and innocent deaths.

The Diffusion of responsibility. This is performed by segmenting duties, where each individual action by itself is benign, but the totality is harmful. Correspondingly, in this case, the group decisions can be legally sued as they diffuse the individual responsibility for each separate action.

The Dehumanization of targets. Committing violence against innocents is easier if they are not perceived as fellow, individual humans. One can minimize the brutality imposed on others by focusing instead on the impersonal character of the attacks and the targets' symbolic meaning, and by naming and viewing the victims as less than human (e.g., vermin, dogs, and so forth). Osama bin Laden, for example, bestializes Americans as "lowly people" perpetrating acts that "the most ravenous of animals would not descend to."

The Euphemistic language. This includes making injurious conduct as something that is respectable and reducing personal responsibility by referring to it in impersonal terms. For example, *al-Qaeda* always refers to the 9/11 events as attacks on symbols of American power and consumerism, never to the murder of some 3,000 men, women, and children.

The Advantageous comparisons. Reprehensible conduct is masked by comparing it to other, more injurious behaviour. Again, the deaths of innocent people, including children, in the 9/11 attacks during peacetime are comparable to the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan to put the World War II to the end, in which hundreds of thousands were killed. However, in this narrative, the U.S. is never called the aggressor.

The Distortion of sequence of events and attribution of blame. Disregarding facts or distorting the consequences of a violent action on fellow citizens by arguing that a terrorist attack was only a retaliatory action or a defensive measure against a previous provocation of the enemy that allows terrorists to reduce personal feelings of guilt. The

victims are blamed, and others are accused of causing reprehensible actions. For example, the kidnapped hostages are beheaded not because of terrorists' cruelty, but because of their own governments that fail to meet terrorist's demands.

According to Weimann (2008), an analysis of the rhetoric used on Salafi jihad terrorist websites reveals that the most popular moral disengagement used is the displacement of responsibility. Violence is uniformly presented as a necessity to deal with an oppressive enemy, an all-ensuing murder and destruction are attributed to others. The prime agency for jihadists engaging in terror, for example, is displaced by Allah, thereby attempting to sanitize murder and mayhem whilst glorifying martyrdom. Another rhetorical structure found on the terrorist web pages is the attempt to legitimize any members of anti-establishment group as freedom fighters and anyone who speaks against them as the real terrorists. Finally, some of the sites of violent terrorist organizations are replete with the rhetoric of nonviolence, with messages claiming love of peace and support for a diplomatic solution. This mix of images and arguments are presented to reach all available target audiences.

Therefore, as ritual, the acts are timed, script-connected and involving activist, audience, and victims. In this way, religion transforms the brutality and bloodshed into something transcendent and holy. This holy war makes them more determined that the purpose of war itself is not to be achieved in short term but will take longer years to achieve. The religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments always involves religious figure as their leader, uses religious symbolism, and refers to the scripture.

The second premise of Juergensmeyer is driven by his conviction that the cure for religious violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation for religion itself and in the acknowledgment of religion in the public life. Such an approach aims to generate a new kind of mindset for individuals as the agents who refer to their own religion in their life. Based on this premise, he argues that the solution to religious violence is not the secularization but instead a renewed/revived understanding of religion. The proponents of this argument believe that human is the independent agent that has freedom in choosing what they think, believe, and act. Human is independent in choosing what becomes their worldview and courses of action. Through a revived

understanding of religion, they will not likely commit what Juergensmeyer calls as the religious violence. That is why, according to Juergensmeyer, the cure to religious violence and terrorism is the revived and better appreciation of religion itself.

2.2.3 The Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions

According to David Rapoport (1984), there are at least three categories of terrorist in the earliest religious tradition, out of which we could learn their goals, practices, targets, and historical significance.

The first one is the thugs, whose goals are to make their victims to experience terror and to express it visibly for the pleasure of *Kali*, the Hindu goddess of terror and destruction. They tend to avoid publicity and only to target travelers. Their motivation is rather to serve their religious needs than to be altruistic. Although they confiscate the property of their victims, they are not financially and economically driven. They believe that they have a positive role, which is to save humans' live. Without their sacred service, *Kali* may destroy all humankind. The thugs give the historical significance of understanding violent and murderous activities of the cult whose aim is to be purely religious. In conclusion, thugs focus on the assailants, victims, and their deity.

The second one is the assassins, whose goals are political, which is to purify Islam, a community whose political and religious institution is inseparable. During their presence in the past, they threatened the governments of several states especially those of the Turkish Seljuk Empire in Persia and Syria. At the operational level, they are engaged in the martyrdom concept of Islam, which dares to die as a religious sacrifice and as a direct route to the heaven. Unlike Thugs, the assassins aim at establishing the distinct Islamic state or community not only at the domestic level but also at international level. Exploring the Assassins is significant to understand the behavioural roots of Islamist terrorist movements (e.g., Salafi jihad movements) in the twentieth century.

The third one is the Zealots-Sicariis, which is rooted in the Judaism whose goals are apocalyptic and messianic-driven with the purpose to drive out the foreign occupation of the promising land. Their modus operandi is by assassination and

instigating people to engage in the mass uprising against the occupying force. Their main targets are mainly the Gentiles dwelling in the land and anyone considered the stumbling blocks to the redistribution of the land as described in the Old-Testament according to the Hebrew Bible.

2.2.4 The Social Movement Theory as Applied in the Case of Islamist terrorism

Omar Ashour (2009) clearly defines radical Islamist groups as those movements that ideologically reject democracy as well as the legitimacy of political and ideological pluralism. As a clear comparison, radical Islamist groups are different in some ways with their moderate Islamist counterparts. Moderate Islamist groups ideologically accept, at a minimum, electoral democracy as well as political and ideological pluralism, and aims for gradual social, political, and economic changes. Therefore, they accept the principle of working within the established state institutions and could be called Islamic reformists, pluralists, or modernists.

In contrast, radical Islamist groups aim for revolutionary social, political, and economic changes and refuse to work within the established state institutions. Radical Islamist movements, according to Ashour (2009), can use violent and/or non-violent methods to achieve their goals. Radical Islamists could also be called revolutionaries, extremists or exclusivists. In order to reach the stage of being radical, they have gone through a process of relative change in which such groups undergo ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an increase in the level of violence, in order to achieve political goals.

Therefore, by referring to Ashour's definitions we can use the theoretical framework of a social movement to explain the dynamics of Islamist terrorism. This approach will fill gaps in the academic and policy literature in terms of explaining Islamist terrorism, especially why it occurs and how variables of grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive relate to each other in generating Islamist terrorism. Later, through this academic research project, we

expect to see whether this theoretical framework is accurate to portray the case (the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia) under this study.

Table 2.5 The Major Trends in Islamism

Islamist Trend	Historical Origins	Geopolitical Scope	Stance on democracy	Stance on violence
Ikhwanism	Egypt	National, international (autonomous)	Acceptance	Rejection (against national regimes)
Salafism	Saudi Arabia (Najd Province)	International	Critical (but mixed)	Mixed
Jihadism	Egypt	International, national, secessionist/irredentist	Rejection	Upheld and promoted
Takfirism	Egypt	International	Rejection	Mixed
Al-Jaz'ara	Algeria	National	Acceptance	Pragmatic

Source: (Ashour 2009), 11.¹²⁰

As previously discussed, Rodney Stark (2006) argues that grievances are the root cause of a social movement and may subsequently develop into a radical movement, including violent terrorist acts. Many types of terrorism originate from economic, social, and political grievances that lead to the creation/occurrence of some sort of a social movement. Out of such a movement, splinters start breaking off to engage in violent ways that subsequently form the networks of individuals (through social networks) to further conduct violent actions that are susceptible to radical ideologies. The importance of such social networks in generating Islamist terrorism is

¹²⁰ The elaborate profile of the most influential modern radical leaders is available on the attachment #6 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis.

also convincingly argued by Marc Sageman (2004). Christopher Boucek (2008) also supports this argument by arguing that to deter the radicalization and recruitment of young men, activities have been created to keep them busy and away from social networks of radicals.¹²¹

On Grievances

A theory that sophisticatedly examines the very importance of political grievances on Muslims turning into violence is well explained by Mohammed Hafez (2003). Hafez's "political participation" approach to social movements accurately analyzes how political exclusion, anti-system framing, and repression can drive peaceful political opposition to violent political opposition including in the form of terrorism. Through his multinational coverage on case studies in the Islamic world such as Pakistan, Tunisia, Jordan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir, Chechnya, etc, he argues that economic and psychological approaches are not enough to explain the phenomenon of Islamic rebellions in many parts of the Islamic world. By rejecting several theories like economic impoverishment, ideology, or jihad as explanations of why Muslims turning into violence, Hafez argues that when people are excluded from politics and repressed brutally (political grievances), it makes sense that some will turn into violence.

In terms of grievances, according to Bernard Lewis, Islamist fundamentalists blame western civilization, modernization, and the U.S. for the backwardness of the Islamist Middle East. All of these have been the root cause of today's emerging radical terrorist movements (Lewis 1996, 2001, 2003). Lewis' arguments are also supported by Assaf Moghadam (2003) that examines the Shi'ite perception of Jihad. In other words, grievances in economic, social, and political aspects often become the starting point for religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments (Stern 1999, 2003). The interaction of grievances and shared beliefs among these people then

¹²¹ Similar programs of deradicalization designed to demobilize violent extremists and their supporters are increasing in popularity, with several countries adopting comparable counter-radicalization programs. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all established rehabilitation and engagement programs, as has the U.S. military through Task Force 134 in Iraq. As such, the importance of understanding the Saudi strategy, and counter-radicalization broadly, is increasing in relevance in the fight against violent radical-Islamist extremism. For more, see (Boucek 2008).

become the underlying reasons for why religious militants resort to violent terrorism in the name of their religious values (Pape 2003, 2005).

By providing a set of data from 315 identified acts of suicide terrorism from 1980 through 2003, Pape concludes that the source of their grievances is also politics, which is the imposed democracy by force. The occupying force seems always to be found where there are acts of suicide terrorism. Three factors are associated with nearly every suicide terrorism campaign: a territory is occupied by a foreign power; this foreign power is of a different religion; and this foreign power is a democracy (Pape 2003, 2005).

Pape then investigates what motivates and drives an individual to commit a suicide act of terrorism. Interestingly, his study is contrary to the conventional wisdom perceiving suicide terrorists as mostly poor, uneducated, and socially isolated religious fanatics. He instead found that the demography of suicide bombers shows that they are often secular, relatively well educated, and integrated into society. Many are venerated after their death and their acts might be best explained by altruism: the desire to do good for the community. Their posthumous status as martyrs provides a clear evidence to other potential suicide bombers that their final act would be highly valued by their community.

Subsequently, Pape argues that the U.S. is targeted by suicide terrorists not for what it is (its values and culture) but for what it does, specifically its maintenance of a large military presence in the Middle East. He clearly argues that the U.S. military policy in the Persian Gulf was the pivotal factor leading to the 9/11 attacks. He even posits that future terrorist recruits will not be dissuaded by heavy-handed Western attempts at remaking Muslim societies. His arguments are supported by Stern's argument that U.S. counterterrorism measures must be balanced by smart geopolitics which avoids actions that precipitate or inflame Islamist terrorism, such as the unquestioning support of Israel, economic sanctions that disproportionately punish Arab peoples, the support for corrupt Arab governments, and a high-profile U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Pape's findings also strengthen the hypothesis that the state

where (potential) radical terrorists live has the influence on the emergence of Islamist terrorists.¹²²

On Radical ideology

The crucial dates in the evolution of global jihad ideology in the twentieth century at least encompass five historically significant timelines: 1918 – 1924 (the end of Caliphate/Ottoman Empire); 1945 – 1948 (the creation of Israel state); 1979 (Iranian Revolution, the Siege of Mecca, and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan); 1988 (Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan); and 1990 – 1991 (Fall of USSR and Gulf War I).¹²³ Correspondingly, according to Sebastian Gorka (2012), there are at least four ideologues in the twentieth century whose works significantly influence the occurrence of Islamist terrorism (e.g., Salafi jihad) at the global level.¹²⁴ Their writings also reflect the five pillars of radical Islamist philosophy.¹²⁵

The first ideologue is Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1965), an Egyptian national who wrote *Milestones Along the Road*. The book is based upon his very short years (about two

¹²² Given the premises of Pape's argument that there is a close association between foreign military occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions, the policy implication should be not to "conquering countries in order to transform their political system" or "to get more energy independence to that region so that the need or interest to be present there will be less". The force presence in the foreign region may be effective in "disrupting" terrorism in the short term, but occupying more countries will create more terrorism in the longer run.

However, the critiques against his arguments include the oversimplification (correlation does not mean causation), *al-Qaeda* is a global caliphate movement, terrorists such as in Iraq were fighting for their right of shares rather than just for driving the foreign forces out of the region, terrorists are not altruistic, foreign fighters entered Iraq in order to exacerbate the conflict, and victims are civilian so that they are not attacking the foreign forces.

¹²³ For more, see (Gorka and Sookhdeo 2012), 198.

The four major caliphates of Islamic history: The Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar ibn Al-Khattib, Uthman bin-Affan, and Ali ibn Abu Talib) from A.H. 11 – 40 / A.D. 632 – 661 (29 years); Umayyad Dynasty from A.H. 41 – 132 / A.D. 661 – 751 (90 years); Abbasid State (defeated by Mongols in A.H. 656/A.D. 1258) from A.H. 132 – 656 / A.D. 750 – 1258 (508 years); and Ottoman Empire (dismantled by Kemal Ataturk in 1924) from A.D. 1301 – 1924 (623 years). Please the attachment #7 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 198 – 201.

¹²⁵ These pillars are to obey no law but Islamic law, infidels are all around, Islam must rule, jihad is the only way to win, and faith is the reason. See the early section of this Ph.D. thesis: select definitions, glossaries and abbreviations.

years) being in the United States on an exchange student program, during which Qutb perceived the United States was a godless, sex-obsessed, materialistic, heretic nation that must be destroyed. *Milestones Along the Road*'s message is clear-cut, which goes back to the pre-history of Islam. According Qutb, the current world is again a state of *jahiliyya*, mirroring the state of pagan ignorance of Allah that prophet Muhammad found in Mecca when the Quran was revealed to him. Mecca had been a site of pilgrimage for centuries before Muhammad was born, but it was indeed a site of pilgrimage for polytheist pagans to worship their multiple gods. Identical with the concept of *thagut*, that state of pagan ignorance and worshipping things that are not Allah is called *jahiliyya*. In this sense, Qutb reaches back to the seventh century and uses this word and wrenches it into the 1950s and states that we are again in a state of *jahiliyya* and must cleanse the world of its ignorance of Allah. For Qutb, the only way to deal with this challenge is through jihad that is understood as the holy war of Islam that is in the path of Allah. Even in a direct sense, Qutb bluntly states that "Islam is not a religion, but indeed it is a revolutionary party."¹²⁶ It is therefore not a coincidence that this book lifts heavily from Marxist, Leninist, and fascist doctrine. Qutb lifts whole concepts, such as the "vanguard" from Lenin and Marx, which will be used by Abdullah Azzam and bin Osama bin Laden years later. Looking at the Qutb's ideology, he built a whole new theology of Islamist jihad by exploiting Western totalitarian ideologies. Later in his life Qutb was eventually arrested by President Gamal Abdul Nasser's regime and being executed accordingly.

The second ideologue is Abdullah Azzam (1941 – 1989), who was the creator of the *Maktab al-Khidamat* (MAK) or pre-al-Qaeda and served as bin Laden's former mentor and boss. He was a Palestinian national from 1941 – 1948 and a Jordanian national from 1948 – 1989. As a Ph.D. in Islamic Jurisprudence from the prestigious al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt he wrote a book titled *In Defense of Muslim Lands*. In his book, he argues that because Kemal Ataturk dissolved the Caliphate and there is no Caliph who can declare war, jihad is now *fard'ayn*, meaning holy war is now the individual obligation of every good Muslim. This obligation is no longer a collective

¹²⁶ Ibid., 199.

responsibility that would be initiated by the Caliph; instead Muslims must take this responsibility upon themselves to self-deploy and defend Muslim lands. Azzam went on to say that a Muslim did not need permission from anyone to declare jihad; not parents, wife, or even husband (this last idea being very radical in the Arabic culture).

The third ideologue is the head of *al-Qaeda* after the death of Osama bin Laden (1957 – 2011).¹²⁷ He is Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951 -), a medical doctor and an Egyptian national from an influential Cairo-based family and thus clearly not a representative from the fringes of society. His grand father was, Rabia'a al-Zawahiri, was an imam at al-Azhar University in Cairo, whilst his great-uncle, Abdel Rahman Azzam, was the first secretary of the Arab League. Al-Zawahiri was also a founding member of the Islamic Egyptian Jihad or EIJ (originally referred to as *al-Jihad* and then the Jihad Group, or the Jihad Organization). Because he was considered a radical in Egypt, the government of Egypt arrested, tortured, and released him from prison in 1984. After the release he went on jihad by travelling to Pakistan both as a medical doctor and as a jihadist fighting the Soviets. It was in this opportunity he met Osama bin Laden and first encountered the puritanical Wahhabi jihadism of bin Laden. The combination of al-Zawahiri's previous Egyptian-based fundamentalism and bin Laden's puritanical Wahhabi jihadism produces what we know today as the *al-Qaeda*.

The fourth ideologue whose ideology of terror also influences Indonesian Islamist terrorism is Pakistani Brigadier (General) S.K. Malik. Through his book, *The Quranic Concept of Power* that was written in 1975 he showed himself as the equivalent of a Thomist theologian combined with two Western strategic thinkers: von Clausewitz or Jomini. Interestingly this book was endorsed by General Zia ul-Haq, the commander of all Pakistani forces, who, after a coup, became the President of Pakistan. General ul-Haq wrote an introduction of this book. In his book, General Malik delivers three messages. First, it repudiates the Clausewitzian concept of war as the continuation of politics by other means (e.g., when other tools such as economics or diplomacy are inadequate to protect the national interest one must use violence or war to achieve those ends). General Malik rejects this concept by saying that only does war have nothing to do with the national interest; in fact, it has nothing to do with the nation-state

¹²⁷ He was a Saudi Arabian national from 1957 until 1994 before became stateless since 1994 until 2011.

since the nation-state is a heretical Western invention. For him, war only ever has one purpose and that is the realization of Allah's sovereignty on this earth. It does not matter where one is fighting, or when you are fighting, because war can only ever serve the realization of Allah's sovereignty here on earth. Second, for him there is only one centre-of-gravity in war, which is the soul of your enemy (e.g., the faith system of the enemy). According to him, instead of finding the enemy's points of weakness, the soul of your enemy is what you must crush if you wish to win in war. Therefore, since the soul of your enemy is the only centre-of-gravity, thus the third message is clear: the best weapon in war is indeed a terror.

On Social Network

In addition to all these findings, Sageman (2004) shows the importance of social networks as the cause of radical terrorism, and the analysis on social network analysis as a new type of intelligence needed by homeland security (Ressler 2006). Originally the contemporary social network analysis can be traced back to the work of Stanley Milgram whose 1967 experiment researches leads to the famous phrase of "six degrees of separation" where most people were connected by six acquaintances.¹²⁸ The basis of social network analysis (also known as network science or network sociology) is that individual nodes (e.g., could be based on people, events, etc) are connected by complex yet understandable relationships that form networks.¹²⁹ These networks are ubiquitous, with an underlying order and simple laws. Networks form the structural basis of many natural events, organizations, and social processes.

That is why, Ressler (2006) argues that social network analysis is useful for studying terrorist organizations as they consist of networks of individuals that span countries, continents, and economic status, and form around specific ideology. Social network analysis can provide important information on the unique characteristics of terrorist organizations, ranging from issues of network recruitment, network evolution, and the diffusion of radical ideas, all of which form the basis of more effective counterstrategies to deal with network-based threats such as Islamist terrorism.

¹²⁸ For more, see (Ressler 2006).

¹²⁹ For more, see (Barabasi 2002).

Another important feature in the development of social network analysis is explained by Mark Granovetter (1973) who argues that “weak ties” (one’s relationships with acquaintances) are more important than “strong ties” (one’s relationships with family and close friends) when trying to find the employment. This finding becomes the basis for his extended argument by positing that more disperse, non-redundant, open networks have greater access to information and power than smaller, denser, and more interconnected networks because they supply more diversity of knowledge and information. Subsequently, it infers that most networks in the natural and man-made world are highly clustered yet far-reaching. These networks have a “clustered” centre, where most nodes are neighbours, tightly interconnected. In addition, each has weak ties that can connect it to any nodes in the network in a few short connections (Watts 1999).¹³⁰

The value of social network theory, however, is its focus on the value of the network structure rather than the characteristics of the individual as mostly found in the political science approaches. Whilst social network analysis leaves room for individuals to affect their fate, it argues that the structure of the network, relationships and ties with others in the network are more important. The network structure of a terrorist organization will affect its ability to access new ideas, recruit new individuals, and achieve sustainability. The network structure used by modern terrorist organizations build the power upon the idea of disintermediation whose definition is the removal of the intermediary role in a process or supply chain (a proverbial “cutting out the middleman”).

Through disintermediation, individuals can directly connect to each other especially with the advancements of modern telecommunications and the internet. Consequently, the power of loosely terrorist structured networks will enable them to move quickly and be adaptive, as they do not have to go through layers of a hierarchical chain. In other words, by cutting out layers of bureaucracy, individuals can join a network through weak ties and plan attacks through loose connections. Later in 2000, Malcolm Gladwell added important points to the social network analysis by describing the importance of three types of people: connectors; mavens; and salesman.

¹³⁰ For more, see (Watts 1999).

Connectors (those with wide social circles) is the hubs of human social network and responsible for the small world phenomenon (e.g., Salafi jihad terrorism in Indonesia).¹³¹

The importance of social network analysis in struggling against terrorism was recognized even before the 9/11 attacks. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt's work *Networks and Netwars* released in 2001 before the terrorist attacks, describes the increased network principles in modern criminal organizations. The premise of their argument is the reality that war is no longer solely a head-to-head battle of two powers, but indeed the war of "modern war" that is characterized by the *netwar* whose definition is a lower-intensity battle by terrorists, criminals, and extremists with a networked organizational structure. These networked structures are often leaderless and able to attack more quickly. Novel, asymmetric approaches are needed to combat a network-based criminal organization (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001).

It is after 9/11, social network experts in academia began to look explicitly at the use of network methodology in understanding and countering terrorism. Valdis Krebs is the one, among others, who begins to map out the *al-Qaeda* network by collecting publicly available data on the *al-Qaeda* hijackers and running basic network principles.¹³² Generally, researchers on social network analysis in the field of terrorism can be divided into two groups: the data collectors and the modellers. Whilst data collectors focus primarily on data collection of terrorist organizations (by based on open source or government intelligence data), and then analyzing the information through description and straightforward modelling; the modellers offer another insight on theoretical terrorist networks. The modellers usually look at how to model the shape of a covert network when little information is known, through predictive modelling techniques based on inherent network structures.¹³³

Using a computational tool created at Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) at Carnegie Mellon University, known as DyNet, they

¹³¹ For more, see (Gladwell 2000).

¹³² For more, see (Krebs 2001).

¹³³ For more, see (Dombroski, Fishback and Carley 2003).

look at ways to estimate the vulnerability of terrorist networks and to destabilize them.¹³⁴ However, as the modellers often do not have the best data, as they might have not collected individual biographies and who do not have access to classified data, their models also do not fully consider the human and data limitation. The implication of this lack is that the results can be potentially misleading, as they cannot consider behavioural and contextual issues that might affect the network structure and activity. That said, combining these two types of researchers will be of great contribution to understanding terrorist networks.

On the other hand, data collection is also difficult for any network analysis because it is hard to create a complete network. It is especially difficult to gain information on terrorist networks since they do not provide information on their members, and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data. Consequently, several academic researchers focus primarily on the data collection of terrorist organizations, and then analyzing the information through description and straightforward modelling. Based on Krebs (2001) and Jose A. Rodriguez (2005)'s social network analysis on respectively the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid bombing, it is found that many ties indeed exist between the hijackers of the four planes, where diffused networks also exist based on weak ties among the terrorists.¹³⁵

Another bright spot is the 2004 publication of *Understanding Terror Networks* by Marc Sageman. In his research, Sageman (a data collector) focuses not on grand ideas but on details of *al-Qaeda*'s recruitment and support networks. His findings may imply that grievances are necessary but not sufficient to generate radical terrorism. Social networks are needed to make radical terrorism emerges. Sageman uses the biographies of individual terrorists and obscure *al-Qaeda*-linked groups to explain the movement's evolving structure. By using data on 172 participants in the global Jihad, he provides a social explanation of the global wave of activity or the religious wave according to Rapoport (2004), where he traces its roots in Egypt, Afghanistan during Soviet-Afghan war, Sudan, and growth of branches worldwide, including the Hamburg and Montreal cells that planned the 9/11 attacks.

¹³⁴ For more, see (Carley 2004).

¹³⁵ For more, see (Rodriguez 2005).

Sageman's social network analysis specifically on *al-Qaeda* operatives since 1998 yields four large terrorist clusters. The first cluster resides in the Pakistan-Afghan border and consists of the central staff of *al-Qaeda* and the global Salafist jihad movement. The second cluster is a group of operatives located in core Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait. The third cluster is known as the Maghreb Arabs who, although they come from North African nations, currently reside in France and England. The fourth cluster is centred in Indonesia and Malaysia and is affiliated with *Jemaah Islamiya* (JI).

In his findings, Sageman also challenges the conventional understanding of terrorism causes: poverty; trauma; madness; and ignorance. He instead shows the proof that out of the sample taken from the clear majority of the mujahedin, it is the social bonds that predated the ideological commitment, and it was these social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. Social bonds among young volunteers, the sense of clandestine they develop, and their ability to make reinforcing contacts with *al-Qaeda* leaders or trainers making these young individuals to become effective terrorist cells through the psycho-ideological internal process: the mutual emotional and social support; the development of a common identity; and the encouragement to adopt a new faith.

These internal group's ties are more significant than external factors such as common hatred for an outside group. Being excluded from the rest of society, these men were then transformed into fanatics with a desire for martyrdom, and eager to kill. The tight social bonds of family and friendship, paradoxically enhanced by tenuous links among the cell groups, contribute to the jihadist movement's flexibility and longevity. These tenuous links among the cell groups make it difficult for authorities to trace their proliferating connections.

According to Sageman, a group of people or individuals indeed can be viewed as a network, which is a collection of nodes connected through links. As Sageman argues, some nodes are more popular and are attached to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. These more connected nodes, called hubs, are important components of a terrorist network and will not stay static but evolve over time. A few highly connected hubs dominate the architecture of global Salafist jihad. This kind of

social network gives global Salafist jihad flexibility since small-world networks have interesting properties.

Unlike a hierarchical network that can be eliminated through the decapitation of its leadership, a small-world network resists fragmentation because of its dense interconnectivity. A significant fraction of nodes can be randomly removed without much impact on its integrity (Barabasi 2003). Random attacks, such as stopping terrorists arbitrarily within one country's borders, will not affect the network's structure. These actions may stop individual terrorists from coming and operating in certain countries, but they will leave the network largely undisturbed.

As a concluding thought, we now could see that social network analysis is just one tool that can be used to understand the latent threats of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia and in the region and is just one piece of the puzzle. The network structure may impact the ability of an organization to endure over the years and to complete attacks. Therefore, it is important for counterterrorism experts and intelligence analysts to understand how to break up a network; they could potentially exploit the small world topology by eliminating weak ties to isolate the network and diminish its reach and power. That said, the removal of individuals in key network locations may be even more important than attacking the traditional leaders of a group (Ressler 2006).


On Agency-Structure Relationship

Structure is the recurrent patterned arrangements which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available, whilst *agency* is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. On the other hand, the structure versus agency debate may be understood as an issue of socialization against autonomy in determining whether an individual act as a free agent or in a manner dictated by social structure. The relationships between structure and agency that shape human behaviour are the dialectical one where society forms the individuals who create society, thus forming a continuous loop (Berger and Luckmann 1966).

Correspondingly, Sageman's argument on the strategic importance of social networks also corresponds to the fact that social networks become the basis for external and internal social interactions among any agents involved (Ashour 2009).

Although Sageman shows that social networks play the critical role in the success of terrorism movement, he also concludes that the level of commitment and choice to embrace such radical violence are entirely their own. In other words, Sageman still clearly states that social networks (structure-oriented/social logic) and personal choice (agent-focused/individual logic) become two determining factors of individuals to commit radical terrorism. The relationship between social structure, agency, process, and feedback effects is also systematically explained by Ashour (2009).

Figure 2.4 The Structure, Agency, Process, and Feedback Effects.



Source: (Ashour 2009), 12.

Therefore, it seems that Sageman's findings complement the assumption regarding the causes of terrorism: the combination of grievances; radical ideology; and social networks. It may be true that social networks and human choice can predate an ideological commitment, but it is not a complete explanation for the emergence of a violent terrorism movement. In fact, grievances should exist first before the embracement of radical ideology and social networks.

Grievances due to poverty, trauma, madness, and ignorance are still the inherent factors inside the jihadists' mind, and thus exacerbate the influence of radical ideology and social networks. Regarding the jihadists' mind, Jerrold Post (1998, 2007) argues that there is a multiplicity of individual motivations: the sense of power to the powerless;

the revenge; and the sense of significance. Post also argues, there is a broad spectrum of terrorist groups and organizations, each of which has a different psychology, motivation, and decision-making structure. Indeed, one should not speak of terrorist psychology in the singular, but rather of terrorist psychologies (Post 1998, 2007).

Putting all these together, the literature review provides the basis for building postulations in this proposed research by connecting the variables of grievances, radical ideology, social network, and Islamist terrorism.

2.2.5 The Theoretical Framework to Examine the Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia

According to Juergensmeyer (2003), the solution to the Islamist radicalization is not secularism but more religious approaches. Based on this argument, Wahid, ed., (2011) through their book, *The Illusion of an Islamic State: How an Alliance of Moderates Launches a Successful Jihad Against Radicalization and Terrorism in the World's Largest Muslim-Majority Country*, approaches the issue of Islamist radicalism in Indonesia with the perspective of former President Wahid's Sufism and his close encounter with Judaism and Christianity.

According to Wahid, there are two kinds of Muslim people from the Islamic perspective: people with the tranquil soul and people with the anxious soul. The first is associated with people who peacefully work with others to build the civilization. The latter is associated with people seeking the political power and domination over others through their religion and use of violence. Therefore, the clashing wills and interaction between moderate versus radical Muslims; as well as between the agents of moderate Muslim versus the agents of Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbut Tahrir have been predominantly taking place in Indonesia until today (Wahid, ed. 2011).

Indonesia as the World's most Muslim populated country, yet with the secular ideology, used to be a Buddhist, Hindu and Christian nation before Islam came. The coming of Islam to Indonesia in the fourteenth century was filtered by the preexisting culture, thus making Islam in Indonesia an Indonesian version of Islam as opposed to the Middle Eastern version of Islam. However, over the years the three streams of transnational Islamist movements from the Middle East: Wahhabism; Muslim

Brotherhood; and Hizbut Tahrir began to infiltrate Indonesia to change the Indonesian version of Islam into “pure”/the Middle-Eastern version of Islam (Wahid 2011).

This is corresponding to what is explained by Eliraz (2004) who observes similarities between radical fundamentalists in Indonesia and their brothers with the same ideology in the Islamic world. Out of his observation he founds that the Middle Eastern influence appears a profound one on Indonesian radical fundamentalists. The dissemination of ideas from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, according to Eliraz, is grounded in age-old cross-regional and global processes of the transference of ideas. New methods of communication (e.g., the internet and physical transportation) facilitate further the general process of the globalization of Islam, including dissemination of radical fundamentalist ideas to the Indonesian archipelago.¹³⁶

Consequently, the two multifaceted phenomena of Islamic modernism and radical-Islamist fundamentalism clearly illustrate the significant contemporary influence of the Middle East on the Indonesia archipelago, in an Islamic context (Eliraz 2004). Later in their development, some violent and political engagements of radical-Islamist fundamentalism were failed by the government, particularly during General Suharto's regime (1966 – 1998). The fundamentalist movements that consist of these three transnational movements (Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood, and Hizbut Tahrir) have similar characteristics which are a part of the international Sunni pan-Islamist political movements. They are commonly associated with a goal of unifying all Muslim countries under an Islamic caliphate ruled by Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and led by a caliph as the head of state elected by Muslims (Wahid, ed. 2011).

Historically, the original source of grievance for radical Islamist movements in Indonesia including *Darul Islam* (DI) as the origin of JI, was the Dutch and Japanese imperialism for more than three centuries coupled by global Islamic Salafist movements (also called as the Salafi jihadism) inspired by Hassan al-Banna (1906 – 1949), Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1965), both of which are Egyptian nationals, as well as an Indian national Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903 – 1979). Whilst Hassan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, Sayyid Qutb was becoming the member of it in 1950. On the other hand, Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi was the founder of *Jema'at e-Islami* in

¹³⁶ For more, see (Eliraz 2004), 26 – 66.

1941. This made the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, which is closely associated to the Salafi jihadism or Salafist jihadism a typical of religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments that historically originates out of the religious and national-determination wave (Rapoport 2004). In addition to that, since almost nearly JI associates and key leaders are the Javanese ethnics, there is a possibility that to some extents Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is also a typical of ethno-nationalist terrorism. I also view that the general pattern of Islamist radicalism in Indonesia reflects the strategic pattern outlined in the Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's strategy.¹³⁷ According to Honorable Robert Blake, the U.S. ambassador to Republic of Indonesia, the Salafist jihad ideology is still among the most significant factors that drive the existence and latent threats of radical terrorism in Indonesia.¹³⁸

This is also corresponding to the definition by Ashour (2009) that clearly defines jihadism as a radical ideology within Islamism that stresses the use of violence as a legitimate, and in some versions the legitimate method of political and social change. Jihadists mostly use selective and literal Salafi interpretations of Islamic sources, hence the term "Salafi jihadist or Salafist jihadist." To be specific, Salafism is a school of thought in Sunni Islam (a majority of Islam in Indonesia) that attributes its beliefs to the first three generations of Muslims: the *sahaba* (companions of Muhammad) and the two succeeding generations (the seventh and eighth century). Literally, the term Salafi means a follower of the *salaf* and Salafism believes that pure Islam was practiced by these three generations. "Innovations" in religious matters are unacceptable to Salafis. Vaguely and broadly defined, those "innovations" could range from modern ideas like democracy to different understandings of Islam like mystical-Islam (Sufism) or Shi'ite Islam (Ashour 2009).


By the same token, jihadism in this manner is also characterized by the rejection of democracy, whether electoral or liberal, as well as by the intolerance and the frequent use of violence against political rivals. Some researchers classify jihadists into global (internationalists), internal (mainly concerned with toppling nationalist regimes) or

¹³⁷ For a detailed history of *Darul Islam*, see (Solahudin 2013).

¹³⁸ Robert Blake (the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia from 2014 until 2016) in a discussion with the author, May 13, 2016.

irredentists/secessionists. That said, in general the activities of jihadist movements can usually fit into more than one of these categories (Ashour 2009).


Figure 2.5 A Visualization of Islamist Transnational Movement to Indonesia



Source: Self-made.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ Adapted. This visualization reflects a main framework of Islamism in Indonesia according to the view of Indonesian Islamist mainstream, as also argued by Rahmat M. Imdadun (The Deputy Secretary General of Nahdlatul Ulama and Deputy Chairman of National Human Rights Commission). For more discussion on this matter, see (Imdadun n.d.).

Figure 2.6 Another Look at the Islamist Transnational Movement to Indonesia

Source: Self-made.¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

On Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's Strategy: How Does It Reflect the Strategic Pattern of the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia?

Based on the detailed explanation by Brynjar Lia (2008), I can conclude that Al-Suri is a typical strategic planner and his strategy reflects the strategic pattern of the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. So often when we read about a key terrorist writing, it is a religious treatise justifying the terrorist tactic as part of jihad and hyperbolizing the greatness of the holy war. Indeed, with Al Suri's writings, he proves to be a simply devoted pragmatist. Although he is uncompromising in his principals or his belief in the global jihad, he is willing to take a realist viewpoint to examine strategy and tactics. He does not claim to be a religious authority (e.g., Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri). Instead, he claims to be a historian, strategist, and tactician. He is one of the only jihadist authors who is very critical of jihadist movements. By being critical, he can identify what went wrong in numerous case studies, rather than simply waxing about how great the martyrs were.

Similarly, it is good to see a strategist who is not power-hunger and self aggrandizing. Unlike Osama bin Laden, Al-Suri thoroughly believes in the cause of global jihad, but never visioning himself to lead it or becoming the Caliph on some day. This also reminds us of great strategists of the past (e.g., Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli) who studied and understood strategy but were happy to serve princes rather than insisting on becoming one.

Al-Suri studies three different formations for operations in the global jihad and evaluates each formation according to a set of criteria by using case studies. The ideal formations according to him are secret military organizations, open fronts and covert confrontations, and individual jihad; whilst his criteria of measurement are military success/failure, security success/failure, agitation success/failure, educational success/failure, and political success/failure. He defines secret military organizations as like those of combat vanguard of the Muslim Brotherhood and concludes that these types of organizational formations worked at one time in the past but are doomed for failure in the current state. He cites many organizations that were crushed by the governments of the Arab states, often before they were able to even form.

He defines open fronts and covert confrontations as primarily guerrilla tactics. Through his evaluation, he concludes that they work, but only under certain favourable conditions. The most favourable example was the overthrow of the Soviet and then the Afghan Communist regime, and the final installation of the Taliban regime. Finally, he defines the individual jihad as the lone member or cell conducting purely terrorist acts (as opposed to insurgency). He claims that this is by far the best formation, but it is still not a perfect one. Each of these individuals and cells requires guidance, both militarily (e.g., the knowledge of bomb-making and of the identification of strategic targets), as well as religiously in order to ensure that the members remain devoted to one common cause. Here, he argues that by promulgating such guidance to these members, all devout followers could take up the cause of jihad from anywhere they live.

As even more evidence of his strategic thinking, he illustrates the so-called light guerilla warfare mixed with the civilian terror (*al-irhab al-madani*). This mixed strategy occurs where the global resistance movement should focus, along with secret methods, especially on the level of individual operations and small resistance units that are totally separated from each other. However, he adds, that if the opportunity presents, for open warfare to liberating a land and to imposing the *Shari'a* law (e.g., Taliban Afghanistan), then it should be taken.

He also encourages all Sunni Muslims to view themselves belonging to the *ummah*, and not to the colonial-imposed boundaries of nation-states. He hates the definition and use of word *terrorism* according to the Western world. He instead defines the two types of terrorism: the blameworthy terrorism (*irhab madhmum*) such as action, speech, behaviour, etc, which inflicts harm and fear among the innocents without a true cause; and praiseworthy terrorism (*irhab mahmud*), which he defines as terrorism by the righteous that have been unjustly treated, thus removing injustice from the oppressed by repelling the oppressor. Terrorism, therefore, is a religious duty, and assassination is a prophetic tradition. He goes on to prioritize targets according to their strategic value, whilst justifying the Western economic resources as the valid target to attack. In terms of resource mobilization, he also highlights the importance of fundraising and the self-sustaining movement (e.g., not having to rely on the government and state-sponsorship).

Uprooting and Seeking the Pattern of Islamist Radicalism in Indonesia

As we previously examined, the radical Islamist movements in Indonesia historically fitted into the category of religious and ethno-nationalist where such movements struggling for self-determination against the two main occupying and illegitimate forces: the Dutch and Japanese imperialism until 1945. Later in the recent era, I view that the general pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia fits into three characteristics of modern religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments as defined by Bruce Hoffman (1999) and John Arquilla, et al. (1999): the perpetrators must use religious scriptures to justify or explain their violent acts or to gain recruits; clerical figures must be involved in leadership roles; apocalyptic images (e.g., martyrdom and a better place in the heaven) of destruction are seen by the perpetrators as a necessity. In this part, I will examine, uproot, and seek the pattern of Islamist radicalism in Indonesia by referring to the theoretical framework and literature review explained in the previous parts.

Until today, the critical underlying factor leading to Islamist terrorism or Salafi jihadism or Salafist jihadism in Indonesia is the huge population that exacerbates the imbalance in economic development, poverty, and corruption in the government and nongovernment sectors. Until 2013, out of around 245 million Indonesians, at least 30 million earn less than \$1 per day and 100 million earn less than \$2 per day.¹⁴¹ The proponents of this argument believe that the tendency of Indonesia becoming a potential pool of recruitment is still significantly high until today.

At this stage, the radical (religious) ideology enters as the key intervening variable and source of courage. According to Juergensmeyer (2003), religion is not the inherent cause of violence or terrorism, as violence might happen even without the religious context. Nevertheless, religion provides *the mores and symbols* which make horrific bloodshed easier to vindicate. Only religion provides the moral justification to commit violence in the name of a cosmic war between good and evil.

¹⁴¹ Despite Indonesia's efforts to eliminate statistical poverty, the facts are clear — 100 million out of 245 million Indonesians still live under \$2 per day. Considering the World Bank sets the poverty line at \$1.25 a day, the Indonesian government's insistence that only 30 million are living in the poverty becomes clouded. For more elaborate information, see (Jumlah Penduduk Miskin Turun 1 Juta n.d.) and (Mortara 2011).

After being radicalized, splinters further their action in regular violent activities and operate independently in loose networks. This is the critical stage where these splinters begin to break away from the social movement. Once they become clandestine, they are separated from the society and joined by the bonds of solidarity with people who share similar values and purposes, one of which is to establish the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. Under such conditions, they reinforce each other to take certain collective actions, whilst at the same time, they begin to attack the innocents, civilians, and non-combatants. At this stage, their activity can be called terrorism.

However, based on the nature of fighting against terrorism, any forms of state repression including repressive counterterrorism measures taken by state's authorities (e.g., some decapitations/attacking the leadership and raids by the Indonesian government) would ironically open up the possibility of adverse reactions in which terrorists to some extent would have more courage, supporters, and capabilities to continue fighting back, thus creating more terrorism. This is corresponding to what has been argued by Hafez (2003). According to him, economic and psychological approaches are not enough to explain Islamic rebellions in places like Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir, Chechnya, Indonesia, etc. All these violent places suffer from political exclusion and indiscriminate repression, which are the main factors for violent dissent.

To be more precise, the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia also shares the grievances of radical Muslims at the international level that blame the Western civilization and the U.S. for the backwardness of Middle East; democratic imposition; economic, social, and political ills of the third world countries; Israeli-Palestinian conflicts; and the high-profile U.S. military presence in Muslim nations especially in the Arabian peninsula. As Jessica Stern (1999, 2003) emphasizes on general grievances and ideological radicalization as the source of terrorism, Robert Pape (2003, 2005) emphasizes on specific political grievances such as foreign occupation, democratic imposition, and foreign military presence as the cause of radical terrorism and suicide bombing in the Arab peninsula and Islamist nations. As previously discussed, he convincingly argues that nearly every suicide terrorism campaign occurs in the

territories that are occupied by foreign forces whose political system is a democracy and whose religion is different.¹⁴²

These grievances are subsequently coupled by economic, social, and political grievances in their daily life at the local level so that returning to Islamic *Shari'a* law and establishment of an Indonesian Salafi Islamist state become their utopian solution.¹⁴³ That said, Islamist terrorism movements in Indonesia are inseparable with their utopian and global vision. Like their ideological founding fathers: Hassan al-Banna (1906 – 1949); Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1965); and Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903 – 1979), they strive to ensure that Islam will define the political, legal and public space everywhere.

To achieve this goal, like their international counterparts Islamist terrorism movements in Indonesia also seek the Islamization of entire social and political system of their societies, their states, the whole Muslim world, and ultimately the entire globe (Sidahmed and Ehteshami, ed. 1996). The Islamization in this case involves bringing everything under Allah's sovereignty, rule and law (as perceived by them), and its integration within a total-Islamic system in which implementation of *Shari'a* is the crucial element.

The proponents of such movements emphasize on *Tawhid*, the traditional doctrine of the unity of Allah. In their interpretation, this becomes a unitary and uniform vision of Allah, universe and society: one God, one people, one law. Just as Allah's physical laws are imposed on the universe, so Allah's religious law (*Shari'a*) must be imposed too on society. Correspondingly, the radical Islamists in Indonesia have been shaped by three assumptions: the narrow understanding between us and them; the defensive character viewing outsiders as the enemy so that their actions are justified as a self-defence; and the conspiracy-inspired narrative viewing the outside world as organized groups under Jewish and Western civilization to destroy Islam (Liddle 1996).

¹⁴² However, although Pape's finding is useful, his data and methods have been subject to criticism by some other scholars.

¹⁴³ Particularly important in this aspect is Hafez's theory (2003) that emphasizes on political grievances as the main causes of Muslims turn into violence. Hafez rejects several theories like economic impoverishment, ideology, or jihad as explanations of why Muslims turn into violence. When people are excluded from politics and repressed brutally, it makes sense that some will turn into violence. See (Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* 2003).

For the *Jemaah Islamiya* (JI), since its inception as the *Darul Islam*/DI (1945 – 1965) until its transformation into Structural JI (1992 – 2002), Non-Structural JI (2002 – 2011), the *Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid*/JAT (2008 – 2010), ISIS-associated cells in 2014, and most recently into the neo-JI in 2016, the end-state is still clear, which is to win the worldwide unfinished battle, which is the struggle to create a global caliphate by transforming Indonesia into a Salafi Islamist state.¹⁴⁴

To achieve this ultimate and hard-won goal, they must survive, and to survive and remain effective they must continuously adapt to the changing circumstances. Over the years (2002 – 2009 and 2009 – 2017), the organizational patterns of JI and its associated groups have followed the pattern of organizational dynamics as they evolved from the more “traditional” hierarchical organization types such as Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), to increasingly cellular and network-based structures that are part of a “solar” network of linked groupings, that are typical in the case of *al-Qaeda* and its affiliates. This adoption of the “leaderless resistance” organizational model, in which operational cells deny that they are part of larger units with identifiable leaders has enabled JI as a movement or as an organization to survive and remain the formidable latent threats in Indonesia and in the region.¹⁴⁵

By the same token, we also can see the operational pattern of JI that involves five lines of operation reflecting Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s strategy. This operational pattern is also inspired by guerilla war theories of Mao Tse-Tung, Fidel Castro, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara: mass base (independent fighters, Muslim communities particularly those of unemployed and radicalized by JI radical ideology); united front (e.g., JI, the JAT, and some other radical-Islamist groups); armed wing (violent arms/group of people who dare to commit terrorist acts); political warfare (receiving indirect supports from some Islamist political hardliners who also aim at establishing the *Shari’a* law); and international support (e.g., non state or possible state actors).¹⁴⁶

Whilst Bin Laden has been killed, JI and JAT still receive international support from *al-Qaeda* (although they were not operating as an *al-Qaeda* subordinate).

¹⁴⁴ For a detailed history of *Darul Islam*, see (Solahudin 2013).

¹⁴⁵ For more, see (Sinai 2007), 41.

¹⁴⁶ For more, see (Lia 2008), 347-484 and (Zabel 2007).

According to Abuza (2003, 2006, 2009, 2011), the JI's support system is nimble, autonomous in decision-making, and self-funded by committing criminal activities, although their sources of financial support have been successfully disrupted. Given the JI's setbacks from their efforts to establish an Indonesian Salafi Islamist state for more than a decade, JI regroupes and builds upon the experience of terrorist groups in the Middle East. Even JI adopts philosophical underpinnings that guide its dual strategy. From Hamas and Hezbollah, it borrows what is called an inverse triangle model in which a broad network of social services supports a smaller jihadist core, and from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf emirates, it adopts a model of charities and NGOs that help JI advance its jihadist goals.¹⁴⁷

According to Abuza (2003), JI used to raise and transfer funds by using Islamic charities (many of which are associated with charities based in Saudi Arabia) and front companies to raise funds and move money around the region. This scheme has taken place in Indonesia as it secures pledges from its members and supporters, as well as diverts legitimate donations away from mosques and charities to its coffers. Abuza also explains how JI uses the *hawala* (underground banking) system and personal couriers to transfer funds across borders almost without a trace; some cells are engaged in resorting to petty criminal activities, such as bank robberies, to support their operations.

Their linkage to *al-Qaeda* is the result of the identical ideological bondage of global Salafist doctrine envisaged to create a caliphate in Southeast Asia. This ideological bondage is multiplied by other historical factors and cultural forces intermingling between them and *al-Qaeda* since their common struggle against the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan. Ultimately, they tie themselves in the implementation of the purest Islam that according to them was practiced by the Prophet Mohammad in the seventh century through all forms of jihad, including the violent one. Like networks of radical Muslim in other countries, as of today, the JI and its related loose networks have been designed to survive against national and international counterterrorism measures.

¹⁴⁷ For more, see (Abuza, Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model: Assessing Hezbollah's Influence 2009). According to Zachary Abuza (2011), following the raid on terrorists' camp in Aceh in 2010 and the arrest of Umar Patek in 2011, terrorism in near future will likely be perpetrated by smaller, more diffuse groups, without any real centralized command and control. See (Abuza, JI Operative Umar Patek Arrested in Pakistan 2011).

The thriving and survivability of these social networks are mainly influenced by four factors: The lack of political will in deradicalization and counter-radicalization efforts even by the government since fighting against terrorism is linked to Islam and therefore a very sensitive issue in Indonesia (Rabasa et al. 2010); Indonesian society in the lower strata that is reluctant to deal with Islamist radicalism as doing so would be portrayed by their society as opposing Islamic values; the economic, social and political hardship; and the infiltration of radical and Salafist ideology into various Islamic religious activities, not only in the lower strata of Indonesian society but also the infiltration at all levels from primary schools to higher educational institutions.¹⁴⁸ As previously discussed, the importance of social networks as the cause of radical terrorism is convincingly argued by Marc Sageman (2004). His framework of examining social networks of Islamist terrorism is useful to comprehend similar phenomena found in Indonesia (the pattern is hypothetically identical).

This implies that social networks coupled by grievances and radical ideology that has serious anger towards Western civilization are a set of determining factors for the (re)emergence of the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia with or without the presence of Bin Laden and the current JI or other related radical-Islamist groups' leaders. Simply stated, Indonesian struggles towards radical Islamist grievances and networks have existed long before the U.S. struggles against the Islamist terrorism. Although Indonesian struggle against radical Islamist fundamentalists have taken a long period of time, according to Eliraz (2004), it appears unlikely that radical Islamist fundamentalism, in near future, would evolve into a real political option in the Indonesian archipelago, either by way of democratic politics, or as a political player acting outside the conventions and rules of the democratic political system. Nor does it appear poised to become a significant cultural and ideological force in the Indonesian "Islamic space."¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Saudi officials often assert that the greatest source of extremist radicalization within the educational system comes from "deviant teachers" who abuse their time with students by discussing extracurricular issues such as politics and religion and by advocating extremist positions. For more, see (Boucek 2008).

¹⁴⁹ For more, see (Eliraz 2004), 93.

On Resource Mobilization of JI

Based on the extensive review in the previous parts, it is conclusive that JI is effectively supported by a series of resource mobilization, including political opportunities and other tangible means that spans over a long period of time.¹⁵⁰ In terms of networking, the war and subsequent safe haven in Afghanistan (1985 – October 2002) provided JI with the opportunity to establish a partnership with *al-Qaeda* and Southeast Asian militant groups, who in fact provided critical training, resources, and guidance. Simultaneously the 1998 political transition that led to the stepping down of President Suharto attenuated government pressure on Islamists, creating a more permissive environment for JI. This turmoil transition also led to local sectarian conflicts that became an important cause célèbre and combat venue for the organization.

During this period, the *al-Qaeda* core as defined by Marc Sageman in his social network analysis acted as a terrorist patron that encouraged and enabled the JI members to strike Western targets independently of the group's central leadership. In addition to encouraging JI members to strike the West, *al-Qaeda* core subsidized operations against Western targets. *Al-Qaeda* core sent no less than \$30,000 to the cell that carried out the first Bali attacks and helped underwrite the 2003 Marriott hotel bombing in the capital city of Jakarta. In addition to that, *al-Qaeda*-linked individuals in Pakistan provided \$50,000 to Hambali, a portion of which went towards the Australian embassy bombing. *Al-Qaeda*'s financial contribution ensured that these operations could take place without the permission and resource of JI's leadership.

Subsequently, there have been two political opportunities that simultaneously occur within JI that impacts its resource mobilization: the realignment and fragmentation of JI (October 2002 – present) where in terms of leadership, fundamental disagreements among senior JI leaders catalyzed the group's realignment and fragmentation, so that violent hard-liners formed new and active splinter groups whilst the group's remaining leadership temporarily shifted away from violence to emphasizing religious approach. The second one is the rise and decline of JI splinters (2004 –

¹⁵⁰ For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011). This study is a part of initiative that will produce a series of alternative futures regarding the state of AQAM (*Al-Qaeda* and its associated movements) in the year 2025.

present), where the charismatic leadership, connections, and operational experience of Non-Structural JI operatives provide coherence and direction to radicalized militants who are eager for the action but lack an adequate platform.

In terms of local support, although JI relatively never enjoys the widespread support in Indonesia, Indonesians tolerated the organization until one of its splinters detonated bombs on the island of Bali in 2005. Such simultaneous attacks culminating in 2005 eventually galvanized public opposition to the group, thus empowering Indonesian leaders to aggressively dismantle the infrastructure of JI. To more disrupting the conditional resource of JI, global counterterrorism operations have relatively severed the JI's links with *al-Qaeda* core and deepened the split between its factions. By the time of 2005 Bali bombing attacks, the domestic opposition to terrorism had grown as well, and local governments began to have the political backing from public and politicians to exert counterterrorism pressure, thus further weakening the group.

However, referring to Zachary Abuza's assessment of JI (2009), like many Middle Eastern Islamist groups, Jemaah Islamiyah has embraced the inverse triangle in which a broad range of charities and nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) serve as a cover for a narrower terrorist mission. And like many Islamist groups in the Middle East, as JI regroup, it shows no intention of abandoning its core ideology even as some Indonesian officials wishfully see moderation where none exists. As the organization seeks to rebuild, it becomes an example of how *al-Qaeda* affiliates, beaten back by successful counterterrorism strategies, regroup using both the democratic process they simultaneously fight, and the legitimacy naively bestowed by the international community on any organizations that call itself a nongovernmental organization.

According to Abuza (2009) who pays a serious attention to the resource mobilization of JI, the United States and Western governments should have a strong interest in Indonesian political-Islam and its growing radicalism. Any Islamist gains in the archipelago, according to him, will have profound repercussions on the United States and wider Western security interests. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, and according to Abuza the United States should not cede the Indonesian population to the same Saudi-funded Islamists who radicalized their Arab brethren, recruited unencumbered for years in Afghan and Pakistani refugee camps, and

professed an inflexible hatred of the United States, Israel, and the West. By paying a strong attention to the potential resource mobilization of JI, he also calls for the United States to put pressure on Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to uproot the JI's overt presence and cede them no political space where they can recruit and indoctrinate anew. Targeting their financial and social networks is essential to the long-term struggle against terrorism.

Table 2.6 The General Pattern of JI Resource Mobilization Over the Years

Sources of Resource Mobilization	1985 – 2011	In the Future (towards 2025)
Ideology	Establishing the Islamic (<i>Shari'a</i>) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia and in the Southeast Asia.	The ideological resonance necessary for violent action will persist, even if the organizational structures behind such attacks have atrophied.
Networking	War against the Red Army in Afghanistan and Pakistan providing them with international networks of militants (including <i>al-Qaeda</i> , MILF, <i>Abu Sayyaf</i> Group, among others).	JI will be taking advantage of Indonesian government's tacit tolerance of non-violent Islamist organizations to allow militants to use those groups as a platform for recruitment and radicalization.
Political Transition and Taking Advantage of Occurring Conflict	Taking advantage of Indonesian political transition to a newly democratic era in 1998 (the stepping down of President Suharto). JI was also empowered in terms of recruitment, training, and radicalization through various local conflicts in Indonesia following the 1998 national reform era.	The most likely combat opportunities for JI operatives in the future are the insurgencies in the southern Philippines, southern Thailand, and Burma or a fresh round of sectarian bloodshed in Indonesia.

Terrorist Patron	Mainly <i>al-Qaeda</i> core. Funds from the patron or other contributors were also distributed discreetly through the <i>hawala</i> system.	Possibly through Pakistan-based <i>Lashkar-e-Taiba</i> (LeT) and other militants from outside the region.
Leadership	Structural (emphasis on religious preaching) and Non-Structural JI leadership (violence oriented), nearly all of them was charismatic, well connected, and experienced on the battle field.	The rise of a charismatic leader could breathe new life into Structural or Non-Structural JI. There is a serious concern where incarcerated militants could reengage in violent activities.
Local Support	Population that was reluctant to address or acknowledge the threat of terrorism in their midst.	Structural JI is also best positioned for long-term survival. Although Structural JI has been degraded, critical portions of the group's infrastructure remain intact. 50 schools affiliated with Structural JI are still open, as is the network of publishing houses run by the organization. These platforms have enabled JI to continue recruiting new members, spreading propaganda, and maintaining its social network. Their current use of internet and social media for openly

		conducting recruitments, fundraising, and propagation are very concerning for the long-run (see the JAT website http://ansharuttauhid.com).
Strategic Calculus	Structurally JI focused on religious preaching// <i>da'wah</i> (Islamic proselytization) in an effort to boost its strength, which its leaders saw as a prerequisite for armed resistance. If and when JI's commanders believed that their organization was powerful and popular enough to reengage in violence, they could resume terrorist attacks.	Structural JI's tactical decision to abandon terrorist attacks is not a renunciation of violence. The group remains committed to its long-term objective of creating Salafi Islamist state and WILL continue to pose a terrorist threat until it formally rejects violence, abandon its struggle, or comprehensively dismantled.
Adaptability and Continuous Transformation of Organization	<p>#1 <i>Darul Islam</i>: Since 1950s. Rebounded in 1970s.</p> <p>#2 Structural JI: since 1992.</p> <p>#3 <i>Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia</i> (MMI) Since 1998-1999.</p> <p>#4 Non-Structural/loose networks of JI splinters since 2002.</p> <p>#5 <i>Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid</i> (JAT) since 2008.</p>	Non-Structural and other JI-associated movements? or ISIS?

Source: Self-made.¹⁵¹¹⁵¹ Adapted. See (Gordon and Lindo 2011).

On Two Control Variables (State Repression and Government Incentive)

Examining the impact of grievances, radical ideology, and social networks on the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is not enough to satisfy the requirement of content validity if we do not examine the impact of state repression and government incentive on the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. Corresponding to Ashour's argument that these two variables are significant on dealing with Islamist radicalism, indeed these two variables play important roles in counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia. Based on the examination of deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe, it could be concluded that the best-designed programs leverage local cultural patterns to achieve their objectives. Such programs cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another country but need to be developed organically in a specific country and culture (Rabasa et al. 2010).

That said, if we want to know the specific variables that have significant impacts on the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, we should refer to the organic localities that have a strong impact on Islamist radicalism in Indonesia. Two of such localities are at least the impact of state repression and the government incentive on the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. According to Police Inspector General (Ret) Ansyad Mbai (the former head of Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency), when Islamist terrorists are arrested, very few of them are willing to talk. They will speak only to those they trust, and, in their minds, everyone connected to the government is their enemy. Even the most prestigious religious scholars have little credibility with the extremists because they are seen as having failed to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law in Indonesia (Rabasa et al. 2010). Given this reality, the role of government incentive including but not limited to the approach and treatment of Indonesian security apparatus towards Islamist terrorists are critical.

For example, the methodology developed by Indonesia in dealing with convicted radicals is called the cultural interrogation. It requires the interrogator to become the ethnomethodologist by immersing in the culture of the detainee, understanding his hopes and fears, and speaking his language. According to the police consulting psychologist Sarlito Sarwono, the militants speak a jargon heavily laden with Arabic terms. That is why the Indonesian approach towards these Islamist terrorists requires

the Indonesian security apparatus to treat the prisoners with a selective inducement (government incentive) which is to treat them in a humane way and to develop bonds of trust. This argument is convincingly proven by Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma, a former commander of the Indonesian police's Bali Bombing Task Force and a devout Muslim. Corresponding to Juergensmeyer's argument on dealing with religious terrorists, he believes that the government has the religious obligation to help these men find true Islam (Martin 2007). Driven by this philosophy, certain programs are designed to provide these radicals with certain, selective inducements (government incentive). A critical part of the program is by reuniting the inmates with their families, to remind them of their earthly responsibilities as husbands and fathers and to approach them personally. After Indonesian security apparatus gains their trust through this way, some of these men are released back to the society to become the double-agent for the government or to publicly renounce Islamist terrorism itself.

However, such approach works on some and does not work on some others. A notoriously unremorseful terrorist was Imam Samudra, executed for his role in the first Bali bombing. He wrote two books, *Aku Melawan Terroris (I Fight the Terrorists)*, published by a JI-linked publisher in 2004 and a best-seller with more than 12,000 copies sold, and *Satu Jihad Sejuta Vonis: Mengungkap Al Haq Menghalau Al-Batil (One Jihad, One Million Verdicts: Revealing the Truth and Banishing the Wrong)* in 2008. For several months before their execution, Imam Samudra and other convicted fellows (Mukhlis and Amrozi) urged their followers to avenge their death by killing the president, vice president, minister of justice, prosecutors, and others (Arianti 2008). Another unremorseful terrorist, Iwan Darmawan (a.k.a. Rois) and Abu Syaukat, on the death row for his role in the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy, also wrote and published in 2009 a book, *Apa itu Jihad?: Kupas Tuntas Kewajiban dan Pelaksanaan Jihad (What is Jihad?: Responsibility and Implementation)*, in which he stated that legitimate targets for jihad must include non-believers, Muslims abandoning their beliefs, hypocrites, those who disobey the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law, and despotic governments.¹⁵²

¹⁵² The book can be obtained from National Library of Australia (<http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/4556194>). See also (Convicted Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Writes Book 2009).

There are two prominent figures in JI that experience the significant impact of state repression and government incentive. One of them is Nasir Abas, the best-known figure who was born a Malaysian citizen but residing in Indonesia. He has been removed from the United Nations terrorist list. Abas has gone through several international battles with his global radical fellows such as the war along with Afghan mujahidin in Afghanistan and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) before his rise as one of the regional chiefs of JI overseeing the Philippines, the Eastern Malaysia, and Sulawesi. It is, however, his arrest by the Indonesian government (a form of state repression) that made him repent.

Personally, he felt that his arrest was God's will and there was something that God wanted him to do. Later, this conviction was confirmed by his unprecedented expectation that his first interrogator, a Christian policeman, never used abusive language and treated him with respect (a form of selective inducement or government incentive). Precisely, Abas made it very clear that it was his capture and the unexpectedly decent treatment that he received from the police that crystallized his decision to leave JI (Rabasa et al. 2010). After going through a series of personal and respective engagement by the Indonesian security apparatus, Abas began to work with the government to reveal and crack down the JI networks.

Another remorseful extremist and Bali perpetrator include Ali Imron whose two of his brothers (Mukhlas and Amrozi) were executed under the death sentence. Ali Imron is serving a life sentence and works with the government by preaching a non-violent interpretation of jihad as a spiritual struggle in God's name on audiocassette recordings that he sends to his family's Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) in the East Java. Based on this experience, we can indeed conclude that state repression and government incentive play the important role in dealing with the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, and the inclusion of these two control variables into the equation is significant to comprehend and make sense the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ According to the Indonesian Minister of Defense, General TNI (Ret) Ryamizard Ryacudu in a discussion with the author in August 2015, if the Indonesian government can afford to give more sufficient attention (e.g., proper government incentives) towards the Islamist radicals, it would become a strategic instrument to winning their heart and mind. The similar view was also expressed by the Vice Chief of

Part 3

2.3.1 The Research Propositions and Hypotheses: Theory Building

The reviews of relevant academic literature and exploratory multi-dimensional analysis provide several hypotheses (out of two main propositions) which are tested throughout this Ph.D. thesis. The first proposition argues that there is a significant impact of economic-social-political grievances, radical ideology, social network, and two other control variables (state repression and government incentive) on the Islamist terrorism.

Second, alternatively, the Islamist terrorism is not caused by the intertwining factors of economic-social-political grievances, radical ideology, social network, and two other control variables (state repression and government incentive). Instead, according to Pape (2003, 2005), it can be caused by other factors such as psychological reasons (e.g., altruism). In this case, they want to be perceived as doing something good for the community at a net welfare loss to oneself (Elster 2007). Suicide bombers are often secular, relatively well educated, and integrated into society. Many of them are venerated after their death (Pape 2003, 2005).

Specifically, out of these two propositions, there are two sets of hypotheses that will be evaluated:

H0: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is not caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive.

Therefore, hypothesis H0 will be proven if in the analysis we eventually find that the main explanatory variables (or along with the two control variables) will partially or entirely have a negative relationship on people committing Islamist terrorism. That said, I will assume that their decision to commit Islamist terrorism is simply caused by another

Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (2015 – 2017) Lieutenant General TNI (Ret) Torry Djohar in a discussion with the author in October 2015.

factor other than economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, as well as state repression and government incentive.

Ha: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive.

Hypothesis Ha1 (Causal Relationship with Mediating Variables): Economic, social, and political grievances are the necessary factors for people committing Islamist terrorism. However, it will only lead people to commit Islamist terrorism if the mediating variables (radical ideology and social network) take part in transforming people with such grievances to commit Islamist terrorism. Economic, social, and political grievances along with radical ideology and social network are the significant factors leading people to commit Islamist terrorism, where the higher the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them to commit Islamist terrorism.

Hypothesis Ha2 (Multi-Chain Relationship): Economic, social, and political grievances along with radical ideology and social network all together form the multi-chain relationship with people's decision on committing Islamist terrorism. Economic, social, and political grievances along with radical ideology and social network are the significant factors leading people to commit Islamist terrorism, where the higher the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them to commit Islamist terrorism.


Hypothesis Ha3 (The Significant Role of Control Variables): When included as control variables in the equation, state repression and government incentive will be proven significant in leading people to be either more willing or less willing in committing Islamist terrorism. The higher the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them to commit Islamist terrorism.

2.3.2 The Research Framework and Design: Variables and Methodology

Given the purpose of this Ph.D. thesis which is to explore the multi-dimensional factors/elements leading people to commit Islamist terrorism, this Ph.D. thesis is specifically aimed at providing us with a better understanding of the characteristics of the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism, where the social network and ideology are proven as the facilitators in the Indonesian context.

The research framework of this Ph.D. thesis consists of two major approaches. The first framework approach is to examine the effects of grievances, radical ideology, and social network on people committing Islamist terrorism; and the second framework approach is to examine the multi-dimensional causes of Islamist terrorism after two control variables (state repression and government incentive) are placed into the equation.

Figure 2.7 The Thesis Main Research Framework



Source: Thomas Marks, 2006.

The unit of analysis in this Ph.D. thesis is individual. As discussed earlier, according to Audrey Cronin (2004) we should view terrorism from four levels of analysis: individual; group; state; and global level. However, to better examine the phenomenon in depth, Cronin argues that we need to delve into one level of analysis (e.g., individual) whilst still acknowledging other levels of analysis (e.g., group, state, and global level). The use of the individual as the unit of analysis in the study of terrorism and counterterrorism is common, since it enables us to understand the violent Islamist society and almost anything laying within that society including but not limited to their radical ideology. Society is a human/individual product, society is an objective reality, and man is a social product. When a definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology (Berger and Luckmann 1966).

This Ph.D. thesis rigorously uses qualitative (interpretivism) and quantitative (multivariate statistical analysis) research methods in terms of data collection and analysis. There are three clusters of samples for this thesis: 22 individuals of convicted Islamist terrorists serving in the prison (6 of them have recently been released); 15 Key state/security officials and experts in the field; and 40 former convicted Islamist terrorists living outside prisons but currently supporting the government in the deradicalization efforts. This overall sample that is chosen based on the purposive method has its own strength and weakness.

First, for the specific sample of 22 individuals of convicted Islamist terrorists serving in the prison (6 of them have recently been released) is chosen by based on the purposive method. Although this method has its own strength since they are the key individuals involved in the violent Islamist movement under study, this choice is limited only to those who are incarcerated in the Indonesian jurisdiction and whose documents are available to be further examined. Correspondingly, the examination on them is also based on the documentation-archival evidence, so that there is no direct interaction with them that can be used to double-check their current opinions about the issue being studied. However, the examination of the documents related to them is also based on the ethical aspects and nothing done jeopardizes them.

Second, for the specific sample of 15 key state/security officials and experts in the field is chosen by based on the purposive method. Although this method has its own

strength if we look at from their special expertise and deep insight of the field, it has its own limitation. It may only represent the view of officials and experts who are against the ideology and/or behaviour of violent Islamist movement (e.g., salafi jihadism) and who are available to be interviewed. The opinions of these officials and experts are also limited by their bounded rationality and subjectivity. However, all these 15 individuals are given the University of Exeter-approved consent form and have agreed on that form before they are involved in this survey.

Third, for the specific sample of 40 former convicted Islamist terrorists living outside prisons, but currently supporting the government in the deradicalization efforts is also chosen by based on the purposive method. Although this method has its own strength since they are the key individuals involved in the violent Islamist movement under study, this choice is limited only to those who are living in the Indonesian jurisdiction and to those who are willing to be involved in this survey. The survey of these individuals is designed in such a way to minimize any ethical issues to the lowest possible level. Correspondingly all these 40 individuals are given the University of Exeter-approved consent form and have agreed on that form before they are involved in this survey.

In addition to the qualitative and quantitative methods, this Ph.D. thesis also performs some discussions and reinterpretations on the social network analysis of the 79 JI-related individuals (chapter 4.3). The reference for this part is the work of Wiphusana Klaimanee and Mariusz Nogaj (2008) that is based on the work of International Crisis Group (2006).¹⁵⁴ Social network analysis is useful for studying terrorist organizations as they consist of networks of individuals that span countries, continents, and economic status, and form around specific ideologies. Social network analysis can provide important information on the unique characteristics of terrorist organizations, ranging from issues of network recruitment, network evolution, and the diffusion of radical ideas, all which form the basis of more effective counterstrategies to deal with network-based threats such as Islamist terrorism (Ressler 2006).

The combination of these various, complementary research methodological approaches will provide more comprehensive answers to the research questions, whilst decreasing the risk of bias in this research. Subsequently, to assure the research quality of this study, prove hypotheses, and address skepticism, the research design is arranged to satisfy five criteria: face validity; content validity; external validity; internal validity; and reliability. Strictly speaking, the thesis is made up of its compliance with the standard criteria of modern research in terrorism studies (Sinai 2007).

First, the research in this Ph.D. thesis gathers data from multiple layers of the JI networks outside and inside prisons (total of 22 and 40 individuals) whilst establishing the chain of evidence in this terrorist organization. Additionally, this Ph.D. thesis also includes 15 key state/security officials and experts in the field. The choice of the sample size of total 77 individuals is based on purposive (judgmental) sample rather than on probabilistic sampling.¹⁵⁵ The purposive sampling is a type of non-probability sampling in which the units to be observed are selected based on researchers' judgment about which ones will be the most useful representative (Singleton and Straits 2010).

¹⁵⁴ See (Klaimanee and Nogaj 2008) and (International Crisis Group 5 May 2006). For these two works, see the attachment #4 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis.


¹⁵⁵ This is considered a normal sample size for this kind of study. As a comparison, the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change's Centre for Religion and Geopolitics' most recent work used the sample size of 100 jihadists, Omar Ashour's previous work used the sample size of 63 individuals, and John Horgan's seminal work on deradicalisation of IRA factions used 16 individuals. For more, see (Ahmed, Comerford and El-Badawy 2016).

The total of 62 individuals (22 and 40 individuals) are taken from the four layers of pyramid-style JI structure: sympathizers; foot soldiers (e.g., bombers); field leaders/planners; and ideological patrons (e.g., radical clerics). Radical clerics are on the top of the pyramid because they use radical *da'wah* (radical-Islamic proselytization) that led people on the path towards radicalization. This factor cannot be understated: detainees do not sit down with religious figures who lack credibility in the eyes of fundamentalists and their admirers (Boucek 2008). Such clerics represent the leadership that is perceived by most of the followers as credible, pious, and theologically knowledgeable (Ashour 2009). To satisfy the requirement of external validity, based on records of government intelligence agencies their background indicates that the composition of these 62 individuals relatively reflects the typical variations in the real population of JI's entire organization and networks.

Second, the thesis seeks to see whether the relationships between grievances, radical ideology, social network, and Islamist terrorism exist in this case. The effect of the two control variables, state repression and government incentive, on this theoretical framework is also examined. A rival postulation is also used in this proposed research project. Key informants will also be tasked to review the research draft.

Third, the theoretical model is expected to be modified after finding a new pattern in this Ph.D. thesis, and then to be tested in other case studies and samples.

Figure 2.8 The Illustration of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods



Source: Self-made.

CHAPTER 3: THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF JI

The purpose of this chapter is to describe JI that is laid out according to the timeline of its origins, historical development, and likely form in the future. Whilst the organization of this chapter is arranged accordingly by based on the inter-linked development timeline, it still reflects the determining variables of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that are examined in this Ph.D. thesis: economic grievances; social grievances; political grievances; radical ideology; social networks; state repression; and government incentive. In this chapter, we can see that these variables have inherently characterized the phenomena of JI from time to time.

As previously examined in chapter 2 pertaining to the origin and existence of radical-Islamist movements in Indonesia, historically such radical movements fitted into a category of religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments that were also affected by the national-determination wave. They were initially a form of struggling for a self-determination against the two main occupying forces: the Dutch and Japanese imperialism until 1945. Later in its development, the general pattern of radical-Islamist movements in Indonesia have turned into Islamist terrorist movements influenced by the Salafi jihadism that reflect three distinct characteristics of modern terrorism justified by religious-based arguments: the use of religious scriptures to justify or to explain perpetrators' violent acts or in order to gain recruits; the involvement of clerical figures in the leadership role; and apocalyptic images of destruction where martyrdom and a better place in the heaven are seen by the perpetrators as a necessity (Hoffman, 1999; Arquilla, et al, 1999).

For the *Jemaah Islamiya* (JI), since its inception as the *Darul Islam/DI* (1945 – 1965) until its transformation into Structural JI (1992 – 2002), Non-Structural JI (2002 – 2011), the *Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid/JAT* (2008 – 2010), ISIS-associated cells in 2014, and most recently into the neo-JI in 2016; the end-state is still clear, which is to win the worldwide unfinished battle: the struggle to create a global caliphate, by transforming Indonesia into a Salafi Islamist state by using violent tactics.¹⁵⁶ That said, throughout

¹⁵⁶ For a detailed history of Darul Islam, see (Solahudin 2013). The first leader, commander, and imam of *Darul Islam/DI* (The Indonesian Islamist State) was Raden Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo.

their existence, they emphasize on three distinct features of radicalism: *takfirism* that accuses others without similar ideologies and behavioural conducts of apostasy or infidel; the implementation of violent jihad; and the persistent struggle to establish a khilafah *Islamiyah* in Indonesia and southeast Asia.¹⁵⁷

3.1 The General Overview of JI

Jemaah Islamiya a.k.a. Jemaa Islamiyah; Jema'a Islamiyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; Jema'a Islamiyya; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jema'a Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiah; Jemaah Islamiyah; Jema'ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema'ah Islamiyyah; and JI is a terrorist group seeking for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate spanning over Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines.¹⁵⁸

In December 2000, JI coordinated bombing attacks at numerous Christian churches in Indonesia and was involved in the bombings of several targets in Manila. In December 2001, Singaporean authorities unveiled a JI plot to attack the U.S., Israeli, British, and Australian diplomatic facilities in Singapore. Other significant JI attacks included the October 2002 Bali bombing attack, which killed more than 200 people, the August 2003 bombing attack of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, and the September 2004 bombing attack outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. Later, JI's October 2005 suicide bombing attack in Bali left 26 dead, including the 3 suicide bombers. On July 17, 2009, a Non-Structural JI faction led by a Malaysian citizen, Noordin Mohammad Top, also conducted the subsequent high-profile bombing attack at the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta when 2 suicide bombers detonated explosive devices. In total this bombing attack killed 7 people and critically injured more than 50, including 7 United States and European Union citizens.

¹⁵⁷ Police Senior Commissioner/Colonel Ibnu Suhendra (the Head of Intelligence Section at the Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) in interview with the author, October 17, 2016. The accusation itself is called *takfir*, derived from the word *kafir* (unbeliever). When *takfirism* applies this word to define other Muslim fellows, it means that for them such Muslim fellows are deemed as the "impure" Muslim (apostate or infidel).

¹⁵⁸ For more, see (Sauter and Carafano 2012), 568 – 569.

According to Sauter and Carafano (2012), up to 2012, there were at least more than 400 JI operatives, including the operational chief and *al-Qaeda* associate, Hambali, who has been captured since 2002. JI capabilities were subsequently degraded after a series of high-profile arrests and killings between 2005 and 2008 by the Indonesian government. These high-profile arrests and killings included the 2006 arrests of several JI members connected to JI's 2005 suicide attack in Bali, the 2007 arrests of former acting JI *Amir*, Muhammad Naim alias Zarkasih, and JI military commander, Abu Dujana; the 2008 arrests of 2 senior JI operatives in Malaysia; the mid-2008 arrest of a JI-linked cell in the Sumatra island; and the September 2009 death of JI-splinter group leader, Noordin Mohammad Top.

The progress of counterterrorism campaigns against JI continued in 2010 when a crackdown on JI's base in the province of Aceh, Indonesia resulted in the capture of over 60 militants. This capture led to the killing of a Non-Structural JI leader Dulmatin. Dulmatin, a mastermind of the 2002 Bali bombing was killed in the outskirts of Indonesian capital city of Jakarta during a counterterrorism raid in March 2010. Another blow to JI happened in June 2010 when Abdullah Sunata, a wanted JI commander was captured whilst planning to detonate a bomb at the Danish Embassy in Jakarta. In August 2010 the JI co-founder Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was also arrested whilst planning multiple attacks in Jakarta. In December 2010, the JI weapons expert Abu Tholut was also captured by the Indonesian counterterrorism forces.


With the estimates of total JI members vary from 500 to several thousand, JI is based in Indonesia and is also believed to have elements in Malaysia and the Philippines (Sauter and Carafano, 2012).¹⁵⁹ Based on investigations by many, JI is fully capable of its own fundraising efforts through membership donations (*infaq*) as well as criminal and business activities. JI has also received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and non-governmental organizations. According to the official statement of the Chief of Indonesian National Police in January 2016, JI is still considered the most dangerous terrorist organization in Indonesia whose members and other support networks have become the stronghold for any other Islamist violent

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 569.

radicalism.¹⁶⁰ The terrorist attack in Jakarta on January 14, 2016, broke the silence of JI and other related Islamist violent movements where it was the first terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2009. Gordon and Lindo (2011) predicted that some manifestation of JI or its offshoots will probably exist in 2025.¹⁶¹

The strategic importance of JI in the academic and policy arena gained its global prominence since JI was specifically mentioned by the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2002. That is why, the purpose of the following graph is to emphasize the fact that JI has been part of *al-Qaeda* networks since 2002, and this is in line with the time frame of this study (2002 – 2017). The NSS specifically mentions that JI is linked with the *al-Qaeda* by the factors of ideology, resources, common enemy, mutual support, and sponsorship. These linking factors are still the important strategic tools for JI's resource mobilization efforts until today.


Figure 3.1 JI within the Transnational Terrorist Networks According to the U.S. National Security Strategy



Source: (President of the United States of America 2002)

¹⁶⁰ For more, see (Hermawan 2016), (Waluyo 2016), (Sofwan 2016).

¹⁶¹ For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011).

Figure 3.2 A View of Looking at *Al-Qaeda* and Its Global Affiliates

Source: Self-made, adapted from many sources.

(AQAP: *Al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula, AQIM: *Al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb)

3.2 The Emergence of JI (1950s – 1992)

Historically JI grew out of *Darul Islam* (DI), an insurgent movement based in the western part of Java island that struggled to impose the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law during the Indonesian transition from the Dutch rule in the 1940s. Later in the mid-1950s, DI movements also spread to the northwestern part (Aceh) and to the southeastern part of Indonesia (South Sulawesi). During this period, the Indonesian army under President Sukarno's era successfully crushed all three rebellions.¹⁶²

As the national leadership transitioned from President Sukarno to President Suharto in the second half of the 1960s, DI rebounded in the 1970s. The most significant factor for this rebound was indeed the Indonesian government's support for DI. As the world during that era was in the Cold War, the Indonesian government which at that time "in-facto" siding with the Western block expected that DI would become a strategic partner to fight against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).¹⁶³ Ironically this pragmatic effort would not last long, and soon DI was once again becoming an enemy of the state.¹⁶⁴

On November 10, 1978, the two Indonesian citizens of Yemeni descent, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (1938 -) and Abdullah Sungkar (1937 – 1999), were arrested for their ties to DI. Later in 1982 they received the nine-year prison sentence but were released on appeal. In 1985 the Indonesian Supreme Court reversed that decision, and the two immediately fled to Malaysia.¹⁶⁵ By using Malaysia as their home-base, it was during their exile they began to expand their network, recruit men, and send them away for waging the guerilla war against the Soviet army in Afghanistan.

Consequently, the exposure of Afghan conflict significantly transformed Ba'asyir and Sungkar's radical network. Those traveling to the training camps in Pakistan and in the battlefields of Afghanistan gained important military skills, including tactical

¹⁶² For more, see "Indonesia Conflict History," International Crisis Group, February 16, 2016; quoted in (Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 2.


¹⁶³ For more, see Sydney Jones, "Darul Islam's Ongoing Appeal," *Tempo Magazine*, August 18, 2010; quoted in (Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 2.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ For more, see "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia," International Crisis Group, August 8, 2002, 11; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 2.

instruction on explosives, mines, maps, and other infantry skills.¹⁶⁶ Not only were they exposed to various military skills but also were they exposed to new ideologies, especially through their contact with Abdullah Azzam and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.¹⁶⁷ Whilst the first was the man responsible for catalyzing the foreign fighters migration to Afghanistan, the latter was a fundamentalist Afghan insurgent leader. Most importantly, they built lasting relationships with Osama bin Laden and other “Afghan Arabs” who later formed the backbone of *al-Qaeda* and associated movements (AQAM). Many Indonesians, for example, who would take a top leadership position in JI had participated in the battle of Jaji in April 1987 along with Azzam, bin Laden, Sayyaf, 9/11 mastermind Khaled Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), and Samer al-Suwailam, who would later become a key commander in Chechnya (Jones, 2010; Gordon and Lindo, 2011).

Figure 3.3 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar



The Afghan exposure also created strong bondage and linkages (social networks) among Southeast Asian militants where Indonesian “cadres” trained alongside their Southeast Asian comrades: Thais; Malaysians; and Filipinos in a camp run by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. These Southeast Asian cohorts included manpower from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abdulrajak Janjani, a Moro insurgent who

¹⁶⁶ For more, see “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group, August 26, 2003, 5; quoted in (Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 3.

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf is an Afghan national and former mujahed. Currently he is an Afghan politician. Sayyaf took part in the war against the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government in the 1980s, leading the Afghan mujahedeen faction, Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Sayyaf was an announced candidate for the President of Afghanistan in the 2014 election, in which he received 7.04% of the vote in the first round, as the candidate for the Islamic Dawah Organisation of Afghanistan, and winning Kandahar Province.

later become the founder of the *Abu Sayyaf* Group, an *al-Qaeda*-linked terrorist group in the Philippines that was named after Janjani's Afghan host: Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.¹⁶⁸

3.3 The Initial Reshaping and Operations of JI (1992 – 2002)

a. Initial Reshaping of JI

It was around 1992 when the disagreement between Sungkar and a DI leader named Ajengan Masduki developed after Sungkar charged Masduki with having Shi'ite and Sufi tendencies, and therefore straying from the Salafi teaching.¹⁶⁹ Sungkar actually had preached about the impressing need to create a new organization since the 1970s, and over the years his argument with Masduki led him to split from DI in order for him to pursue his own objectives.¹⁷⁰ Sungkar then formed a new group called JI, and the men that Sungkar and Ba'asyir had previously dispatched to Afghanistan formed the backbone of this newly created organization.

As JI initially took shape, it adopted a hierarchical structure whose operational and administrative coverage included Singapore and Malaysia (*Mantiqi I*); Indonesia (*Mantiqi II*); Mindanao, Sabah, and Sulawesi (*Mantiqi III*); and Papua and Australia (*Mantiqi IV*).¹⁷¹ In addition to these regional/territorial based compartments, JI also had a special operation unit that was not tied to a specific location. According to the JI's charter, known by its Indonesian acronym as PUPJI, the group clearly sought to create a Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia.¹⁷² Once that goal had been achieved, the group hoped that the boundaries of that state would expand to include Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Mindanao.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ For more, see "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," International Crisis Group, December 11, 2003, 3; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3.

¹⁷¹ For more, see "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia," International Crisis Group, 11; quoted in (Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 3.

¹⁷² For more, see "What Governments Are Doing: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)," Australian Government, November 8, 2010; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3.

¹⁷³ Ibid.


Figure 3.4 JI Top Leadership Structure

(At the apex of the JI structure is the *amir*. Beneath the *amir* are four councils)



Source: Police Brigadier General (Ret.) Suryadharma (the Former Head of Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) in discussion with the author, October 18, 2016.

Figure 3.5 JI Organizational Structure: Another Look



Source: Police Brigadier General (Ret.) Suryadharma (the Former Head of Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88). Interviewed by the author on 18 October 2016.

However, although JI focused on Southeast Asia, the JI leadership maintained a presence in South Asia to continue providing the *jihadi* fighters with sufficient training. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, JI's training facilities were relocated from Pakistan to a camp near Khost, Afghanistan.¹⁷⁴ Later around 1993, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf set up a JI camp in Torkham, Afghanistan that also trained Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members.¹⁷⁵ JI continued to send their best trainees to Afghanistan until 2000 as Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali organized training for several men.¹⁷⁶ Between 2000 and 2003, JI had a strong cell in Karachi, Pakistan which allegedly received training supports from *Lashkar-e-Taiba*.¹⁷⁷

In addition to the training camps in the Afghanistan – Pakistan territory (the first core according to Sageman's social networks theory), JI also established an infrastructure closer to the home. In the mid-1990s, Sungkar established training camps in Mindanao that were cheaper and easier to access than those in Afghanistan – Pakistan area.¹⁷⁸ As most Mindanao areas were controlled by MILF, and the connecting sea-lanes in the area were also poorly policed, this island seemed like a best, natural safe haven for Sungkar's fighters. JI constructed a facility within the compound of MILF's Camp Abu Bakar and began to train and to indoctrinate a new cadre of Salafi jihad fighters. Many years later, the growing relationship between JI and Moro insurgents would prove to be an important source of resilience for Sungkar's organization and its offshoots.

¹⁷⁴ For more, see "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia," International Crisis Group, 6; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3.


¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ For more, see "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia," International Crisis Group, 10; quoted in (Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 3.

¹⁷⁷ For more, see "Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings," International Crisis Group, July 24, 2009, 7; quoted in (Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 3.

¹⁷⁸ For more, see "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia," International Crisis Group, 16; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3.

Figure 3.6 The Map of JI Area of Operations



Source: Reproduced from Zachary Abuza, "The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, STRATEGIC ASIA 2003-04: FRAGILITY AND CRISIS, by permission from The National Bureau of Asian Research.

Source: (Benedict 2017)

b. JI's Operations in Indonesia

It was such a great political opportunity for JI when the 30-year reigning President Suharto resigned in May 1998 followed by the separation of Indonesian armed forces (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/ABRI*) into the Indonesian national military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI*) and Indonesian national police (*Kepolisian Republik Indonesia/Polri*). This sudden separation created the loophole within the Indonesian domestic security system (Pandjaitan 2003). Ba'asyir and Sungkar took advantage out of this opportunity by returning to Indonesia, having decided that the moment for creating a Southeast Asian caliphate was at hand.¹⁷⁹ However, a month later, Sungkar died of natural causes, leaving the organization in the hands of Ba'asyir, whom many saw as a weak leader.¹⁸⁰ Ba'asyir only needed a few months after his return to Indonesia in order for him to become the head of the governing council of the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), an overtly operating group seeking the implementation of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law in Indonesia.

With Ba'asyir in charge, significant gaps soon emerged within JI. *Mantiqi* II leaders questioned whether the moment was right for a violent action in Indonesia, and instead preferred to concentrate on building the resources necessary to establish a Salafi Islamist state over the long run, setting a target date of 2025.¹⁸¹ *Mantiqi* I leaders, on the other hand, had a different focus altogether and pointed to bin Laden's 1996 and 1998 *fatwas* authorizing strikes against the United States and its allies. Another spat emerged over Ba'asyir affiliation with MMI, which some JI members saw as a potential conflict of interest.

As another political opportunity for JI emerged following the outbreak of sectarian violence in the main city of Ambon and wider Maluku province in January 1999, the internal divides within JI were exacerbated. Whilst members of *Mantiqis* II and III were cautious about getting involved, members of *Mantiqi* I, however, were angry that their

¹⁷⁹ For more, see "Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi," International Crisis Group, February 3, 2004, 2; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3.

¹⁸⁰ For more, see "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates" International Crisis Group, December 11, 2002, 3; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3.

¹⁸¹ For more, see "Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi," International Crisis Group, February 3, 2004, 3; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3.

Muslim brothers were being killed and wanted to act.¹⁸² Some JI fighters eventually participated in the conflict, joining a loose coalition known as *Laskar Mujahedeen* that also included *Darul Islam* (DI) factions and members of other radical-Islamist groups.¹⁸³

A few months later, JI members operating within *Laskar Mujahidin* also took part in another sectarian conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi. These conflicts served as the “mini-Afghanistan” that helped network to grow and train a new generation of JI members.¹⁸⁴ On the Christmas Eve of 2000, JI executed a number of coordinated bombings against 38 churches (along with the priests) in the capital city of Jakarta, Sumatra island, and Java island.¹⁸⁵ Although not all the explosives detonated, 19 people were killed and leaving 120 others severely wounded. These attacks signaled JI’s growing capacity as a serious terrorist organization, but indicated an ongoing focus on local, nationwide targets throughout the archipelago of Indonesia.

By 2001, a group of JI members who supported bin Laden’s *fatwas* made a more-determined decision to pursue the mass-casualty terrorism that was advocated by the *al-Qaeda* core. After a plot to strike British, United States, Israeli, Australian, and Singaporean targets in Singapore was disrupted in December 2001, JI shifted their targets to the Westerners located in Indonesia.¹⁸⁶ On October 12, 2002, JI members detonated bombs at the Sari Club and Paddy’s Bar on the Indonesian famous island of Bali, killing 202 people, many of whom were Western tourists.

¹⁸² For more, see “Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,” International Crisis Group, February 3, 2004, 4; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3.


¹⁸³ For more, see “Weakening Indonesia’s Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso,” International Crisis Group, October 13, 2005; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4.

¹⁸⁴ This term is credited to Sally Neighbour, a member of the second CSIS Trusted Information Network (TIN). For more, see Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas Sanderson, and David Gordon, *The Power of Outreach: Leveraging Expertise on Threats in Southeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, April 2009), 27; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4.

¹⁸⁵ For more, see “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” International Crisis Group, 5; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4.

¹⁸⁶ For more, see “Treasury Designates Four Leaders of Terrorist Group-Jemaah Islamiyah,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 13, 2006; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4.

Figure 3.7 A Social Network Analysis of JI Bombers in the 2000 Christmas Eve



Source: (Artran, et al. n.d.).

3.4 The Realignment and Fragmentation of JI (2002 – 2003/2004)

Right after the first Bali bombing attacks in 2002, JI's leadership that was still committed to establish a Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia and in the broader region within the long run (violently if necessary) began to realize that the current environment was not conducive to the armed confrontation and any mass-casualty terrorism within Indonesia was futile for the time being. Instead of focusing on terrorism, JI began to focus on education and *da'wah* (the religious outreach to sharing Islam). During this time the JI's leadership distanced themselves from the *al-Qaeda* core that remained calling for attacks against the Western targets.¹⁸⁷

Subsequently the realignment away from the global jihadist movement “alienated” hard-line members of the organization, leading to the group's gradual fragmentation. Those who left the group turned into “free agents” pursuing their own agendas independently by keeping engaged in the violent engagements (e.g. terrorism). Later these splinters engaged in the violent tactics are known collectively by some JI analysts and scholars as “Non-Structural JI.” Thus, the terminology of “Non-Structural JI” coined by some JI analysts and scholars is aimed to describe the JI individuals who acted in a decentralized way, independent of JI formal structure, and by maintaining their violent engagements (e.g., terrorism).

On the other hand, “Structural JI” represents the remnants of the formal organization growing out of Sungkar and Ba'asyir networks. This “Structural JI” is also known as a constellation of Indonesia-based schools, publishing houses, and other businesses held together by the JI social network, which itself retains a degree of hierarchy. This “Structural JI” began to abandon violent engagements and limiting itself only to non-violent ones.¹⁸⁸ However, the strict separation/division between what is called as “the Structural and Non-Structural” JI is also criticized by some other JI analysts and scholars as in some degree the two divisions complement to each other. In

¹⁸⁷ For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. At some moment, the Structural JI adjusted its tactics from the violent to non-violent ones. However, the Structural JI that at some moment using non-violent tactics was still connected to with JI violent movement performed by the Non-Structural JI. That is why in the latter part of this chapter is also discussed that this kind of separation/division (Structural and Non-Structural JI) is criticized by some other JI scholars. Such critics argue that the Structural JI is merely an unarmed wing of JI.

another terminology, the “Structural JI” can be categorized as “JI with non-violent engagements” whilst the “Non-Structural JI” can be categorized as “JI’s armed wing that maintains its violent engagements (e.g., terrorism).”

The disagreements among JI’s top ranks proved to be the driving force behind the group’s realignment and fragmentation. Many JI members felt that the costs associated with terrorist violence outweighed the benefits, at least for the time being. This viewpoint prevailed, and the organization decided to reorient its energy and funding into religious outreach until conditions changed. JI’s decision to instead focus on *da’wah* alienated its hard-line members, who advocated a more aggressive approach. Noordin Mohammad Top wanted to continue bombings, and Umar Patek and Dulmatin had their own plans in the southern Philippines.¹⁸⁹

Eventually, these divergent opinions led to JI’s fragmentation into Structural and Non-Structural elements. Initially, the Structural JI’s leadership tolerated Non-Structural JI, where the official common practice among them allowed Structural JI members to shelter Non-Structural JI operatives but should not participate in the latter’s operations.¹⁹⁰ This split unfolded over time but came into a sharper focus by July 2004 as Structural JI’s position had changed. Surprisingly, at this point, Structural JI’s leadership authorized its subordinates to betray the whereabouts of certain Non-Structural JI operatives to government authorities.¹⁹¹ This decision was clearly an indication of a serious split between Structural and Non-Structural JI.

3.5 The Rise and Decline of JI Splinters (2003 - 2011)

These Non-Structural JI members, however, were not entirely separated from their Structural counterparts, thus systematizing the clear separation between the two became the target of critiques from some counterterrorism experts.¹⁹² In fact, Non-

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 4-5.

¹⁹⁰ For more, see Sidney Jones, “The Changing Face of Terrorism in Indonesia: Weaker, More Diffuse, and Still a Threat,” International Crisis Group, September 15, 2005; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4.

Structural JI members were products of JI-linked schools, consumers of JI publications, and frequently drew on their relationships with other (Structural) JI members. Since this separation/division in 2004 at least there were three prominent clusters of Non-Structural JI members that merited more specific analysis (Gordon and Lindo, 2011).

a. Noordin Mohammad Top's Network (2003 – 2009)

Noordin Mohammad Top's network was in fact the most high-profile Non-Structural JI network. A Malaysian citizen and prominent JI member, Noordin was tied to the 2002 Bali bombings and independently led his group called *al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago* to continue perpetrating Bali-type operations against the “far enemy” long after the Structural JI's realignment.¹⁹³ His group was also linked to the 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. The year of 2003 was the year of transition in the separation/division of Structural and Non-Structural JI that culminated in 2004. Noordin Mohammad Top's network was also directly involved in the 2004 attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, another Bali attack in 2005 that proved crucial to turning public sentiment against the group, and a pair of suicide bombings against Western hotels in Jakarta in 2009.¹⁹⁴ Noordin Mohammad Top was eventually killed in 2009 during a counterterrorism raid by the Indonesian security forces in the Central Java city of Solo.¹⁹⁵ His close followers have not carried out a successful attack since his death.

b. Umar Patek's Network (2003 – 2011)

Another prominent Non-Structural JI network was led by Umar Patek and Dulmatin, the two Islamist militants that received training in *al-Qaeda* core camps in Afghanistan during the mid-1990s.¹⁹⁶ After being wanted by the Indonesian government due to their role in the 2002 Bali attacks, Patek and Dulmatin fled to the southern

¹⁹³ For more, see Associated Press, “Terrorism Mastermind Noordin Top Killed,” CBS News, March 9, 2010; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ For more, see Zachary Abuza, “Umar Patek: Indonesia's Most Wanted,” Jamestown Foundation, April 30, 2010; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

Philippines in mid-2003.¹⁹⁷ Corresponding to the earlier pattern of connections with their Southeast Asian counterparts in the Mindanao, both Patek and Dulmatin trained members of the *Abu Sayyaf* Group in the manufacturing and using of improvised explosive devices (IED).¹⁹⁸ Despite the leaders' exile in the southern Philippines, the cells in Indonesia and in the Southern Philippines still maintained their communication. It was between 2003 and 2005 when Patek used contacts in the Central Java province to recruit fighters and to raise funds for supporting his activities in the southern Philippines.¹⁹⁹

According to the intelligence reports from Indonesian and the Philippines authorities, Patek left the southern Philippines in May 2010 and traveled to the Middle East before settling in Pakistan.²⁰⁰ Other sources, however, indicate that he departed earlier and spent one year living in Jakarta suburb before departing to Pakistan with the intention to fight in Afghanistan.²⁰¹ On January 25, 2011, Patek was arrested in Abbottabad, Pakistan, the same town where Osama bin Laden would be killed only four months later.²⁰² Patek's arrest in Abbottabad came as a surprise to many and raised questions about the current relationship between *al-Qaeda* and Non-Structural JI. The intelligence gathered at bin Laden's compound and obtained from Patek's subsequent interrogations may shed light on this nexus.²⁰³

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ For more, see Rommel C. Banloi, "The Sources of the Abu Sayyaf's Resilience in the Southern Philippines," *CTC Sentinel*, May 2010, 18; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

¹⁹⁹ For more, see Zachary Abuza, "Umar Patek: Indonesia's Most Wanted," Jamestown Foundation, April 30, 2010; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

²⁰⁰ For more, see Asif Shahzad and Chris Brummitt, Associated Press, "Militant Arrested in Pakistan after Years on the Lam," *msnbc.com*, April 14, 2011; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

²⁰¹ This information is based on CSIS research interview, June 23, 2011, Jakarta, Indonesia.; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

²⁰² For more, see Peter Baker, Helene Cooper, and Mark Mazzetti, "Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says," *New York Times*, May 1, 2011; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

²⁰³ Indonesians investigators have already questioned Patek in Pakistan and reportedly returned with nothing of value. This conclusion is based on CSIS research interview, June 23, 2011, Jakarta, Indonesia; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

c. Dulmatin's *Lintas Tanzim* Network (2007 – 2010)

In the late 2007, Dulmatin, who was the Patek's close associate returned to Indonesia and began to establish a third cluster of Non-Structural JI in Aceh. Dulmatin's network was also known as *Lintas Tanzim* or cross-organization project that included manpower associated with several radical-Islamist groups: disgruntled JI members; the Islamist group KOMPAK; the Banten Ring; a group of new recruits from Aceh; and a network centred around a man named Aman Abdurrahman.²⁰⁴

This coalition under the leadership of Dulmatin both perceived Structural JI as too passive and Noordin Mohammad Top's approach as too excessive and ultimately futile. Unlike Structural JI and Noordin Mohammad Top's group, the Dulmatin coalition sought a violent, but disciplined campaign that focused on carving out a secure base in the Indonesian society for implementing Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and whilst necessary attacking whatever obstacles emerged in the process. The *Lintas Tanzim* camp in Aceh went undetected for nearly a year until a tip from a local villager alerted government security apparatus to the *Lintas Tanzim*'s presence. A subsequent series of Indonesian national police raids between February and March 2010 captured or killed nearly 100 militants, including Dulmatin, and disrupted *Lintas Tanzim*.²⁰⁵

Later in August 2010, the Indonesian authorities during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's era arrested Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the former leader of Structural JI, for his alleged links to the Aceh camp.²⁰⁶ Given the fact that Ba'asyir was reported to have renounced violence and remained in Structural JI, this development was significant for the counterterrorism experts who questioned the Structural/Non-Structural separation of JI. According to the testimony of Ubeid, a former associate of Noordin Mohammad Top, Ba'asyir had met with Dulmatin face-to-face to discuss the Aceh

²⁰⁴ For more, see "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh," International Crisis Group, April 20, 2010, 5; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

²⁰⁵ For more, see Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh," International Crisis Group, April 20, 2010, 12-13; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

²⁰⁶ For more, see Arabinda Acharya and Fatima Astuti, "Indonesia's Case against Abu Bakar Bashir," *CTC Sentinel*, October 1, 2010; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

project.²⁰⁷ On June 16, 2011, Ba'asyir was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for his activities related to the Aceh camp.²⁰⁸

Why Did JI Splinters/Non-Structural JI Decline?

The most important factor and centre-of-gravity of Non-Structural JI is indeed its leadership (Gordon and Lindo, 2011). Based on those three Non-Structural JI networks, it is obvious that their leadership played significantly for the existence and survivability of the networks. Top, Patek, and Dulmatin were all charismatic leaders who were able to personally cultivate networks transcending organizational boundaries. As skilled militants with battle-tested experiences they were savvy to operate effectively in the increasingly inhospitable environments, in some cases transnationally. Their charisma, connections, and operational experience provided coherence and direction for radicalized militants who were eager for action but lacked an organizational platform.²⁰⁹

Under the leadership of these three charismatic and operationally skillful leaders, the three Non-Structural JI networks operated with surprising effectiveness. Top's network carried out several high-profile attacks in Indonesia whilst Patek's group fueled instability in the southern Philippines. Although Dulmatin's *Lintas Tanzim* was nipped in the bud, his ability to leave the southern Philippines and clandestinely cobble together a coalition on the Indonesian soil came as a shock to most counterterrorism experts. Therefore, without the key role played by these prominent figures, the chance of these disgruntled JI members and like-minded individuals to carry out significant operations or develop infrastructure has greatly diminished.²¹⁰

The second most important factor is the local support (Gordon and Lindo, 2011). Most Indonesians generally were reluctant to address or acknowledge the threat of terrorism in their daily live. This was an advantage for JI which never had the broad-

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ For more, see Simon Montlake, "Indonesian Militant Abu Bakar Bashir Sentenced to 15 Years in Jail," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 16, 2011, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0616/Indonesian-militant-Abu-Bakar-Bashir-sentenced-to-15-years-in-jail>; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5.

²⁰⁹ See (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4-8.

²¹⁰ See Ibid.

based support in general Indonesian society. Even after the first Bali attack in 2002, conspiratorial rumors circulated that the bombings were carried out by the United States or the Indonesian military. It was right after the second round of Bali bombings in 2005, the public mentality significantly shifted where Indonesians' "tolerance" for JI (deemed clearly culpable for the attack) began to disintegrate.²¹¹

The third most important factor is the counterterrorism pressure (Gordon and Lindo, 2011). It was well proven where counterterrorism operations at the global, regional, national, and local level were critically important to disrupt the evolution of Non-Structural JI. Such operations have captured and killed several key figures connecting *al-Qaeda* core and JI. The killing of Mohammed Atef by the U.S. airstrike in Kabul in November 2001, the capture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammad (KSM) in Rawalpindi in March 2003, and the capture of Hambali in Thailand in August 2003 have weakened JI-*al-Qaeda* core relationship, thus making JI hard-liners such as Top, Dulmatin, and Patek to work self-sufficiently and independent of support from the *al-Qaeda* core. This condition eventually impacted the survivability of JI.²¹²

Later in 2005, following the second Bali bombing attacks, the combination of Western counterterrorism pressure, regional counterterrorism operations in the Pacific theatre (e.g., Southeast Asia), and the Indonesian government's mounting pressure against JI have isolated JI's pro *al-Qaeda* faction and dismantled JI's organizational infrastructure. With significant political will and support at the national level, central authorities in Southeast Asian countries worked together to aggressively confront, kill, or capture dozens of JI militant members and their associates across Southeast Asia. The governments across Southeast Asian countries also engaged in various soft approaches to prevent radicalization (e.g., through a series of deradicalization campaigns). All these successes were significantly underpinned by the professionalization of security forces and regional cooperation that were coupled by the Australian and U.S. assistance (Gordon and Lindo, 2011).

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

3.6 The *Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid*/JAT (2008 – 2010)

The name of *Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT) has been an enigma since its founding in 2008 by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the former leader of Structural JI who later joined *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI).²¹³ The name of JAT gained its prominence following the Ba'asyir capture in May 2010 as he was allegedly involved in the Aceh project with Dulmatin, a Non-Structural JI leader that led the *Lintas Tanzim* network.

As an overt/above-the-ground organization, JAT under Ba'asyir leadership as its *Amir* has embraced individuals with known ties to fugitive extremists. It has welcomed many members of the militant JI but clashed with the JI leadership over strategy and tactics. It preached jihad against enemies of Islam but insists it stays within the law – though it rejects man-made laws as deemed illegitimate. It is a mass membership organization but entirely dependent upon Ba'asyir, without whom it would quickly disintegrate. This is the main reason to believe that the JAT would be progressively weakened as Ba'asyir was convicted and put in jail since 2010.

That said, Ba'asyir's celebrity status and an active religious outreach (*da'wah*) campaign have turned JAT into an organization with a nationwide structure within two years of its founding in 2008. JAT recruited people through mass rallies and smaller religious instruction sessions in which Ba'asyir and other JAT figures, until 2016, fulminate against democracy, advocate full application of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law, and preach a militant interpretation of jihad. That public face gives "plausible deniability" to what appears to be the covert support on the part of a small inner circle for the use of violent force. JAT cannot have it both ways: in the beginning, its attraction to the potential followers was almost certainly the non-violent *da'wah* option (the militancy without the risks). Consequently, any established links to violence will lose its followers.

The dark side of JAT's activities came into the spotlight on 6 May 2010, when Indonesian police raided its Jakarta headquarters and charged 3 JAT officials with raising funds for a militant training camp uncovered in Aceh in the late February 2010. JAT's alleged involvement in fundraising and combat training immediately led to a speculation that another arrest of 72-year-old Ba'asyir was imminent and unavoidable. However, many also predicted that the impact of Ba'asyir arrest (the third time since the

²¹³ For more, see (Indonesia: The Dark Side of *Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT) 2010).

first Bali bombing attacks in 2002) was limited both in terms of Indonesian extremism and the domestic political fallout. It is indeed true that Ba'asyir has been a perpetual thorn for the Indonesian government since the early 1970s. But, as an elder statesman of Indonesia's radical movements, the old Ba'asyir is neither the driving force behind it nor its leading ideologue, and he has numerous critics among fellow jihadists who cite his lack of strategic sense and poor management skills.

However, regardless of the Ba'asyir effective influence on the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, since its establishment in 2008 JAT has become an important element in the network of Indonesian jihadi groups but simultaneously has also been the target of harsh criticism from some erstwhile allies. Understanding JAT's nature, its many faces, and the ideological rifts it has generated is still important, since it would help us to illuminate the weakness and divisions within the Indonesian jihadi movement. It also highlights the possible diminishing influence of Ba'asyir who has been in the prison since 2010 until today.

According to some counterterrorism experts, the jihadi project in which Ba'asyir has been involved during his lifetime has practically failed in Indonesia. They argue that the rifts and shifting alignments we have seen so far in the jihadi community are merely a reaction to that failure, and there is no indication that violent extremism is gaining ground in the archipelago. Instead, as with JAT's formation, we are seeing the same old faces (e.g., Ba'asyir) finding new packages for old goods. Indeed, the far bigger challenge for Indonesia is to manage the aspirations of thousands who join JAT rallies for its public message: that democracy is antithetical to Islam, that only a Salafi Islamist state can uphold the faith, and that Islamic (*Shari'a*) law must become the source of all justice.

3.7 The Remnants of Radical-Islamist Networks and the Emergence of ISIS in Indonesia (2010 – Today)

According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) report in September 2014, although until 2014 the capacity of violent extremist groups in Indonesia remain low following the capture of Structural and Non-Structural JI key figures, the rising support for the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS) could

significantly raise the risk of violence in the archipelago since the eventual return-home of Indonesians who were fighting in Syria and Iraq would utilize their training, combat experience, and leadership potential that were lacking in Indonesia's extremist community.²¹⁴ Factually JI is still the most important "nodes" for ISIS in Indonesia. From late 2012 until January 2014, JI's humanitarian wing, *Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia* (HASI), sent ten delegations to Syria, bringing in cash and medical assistance to the Islamist resistance in a way apparently designed to open channels for more direct participation in the fighting.²¹⁵ Other Salafi jihadists, including from various *Darul Islam* factions, are also trying to go, as members of the non-violent Salafi community.²¹⁶

Apocalyptic Syria and the End of the World

The conflict in Syria has uniquely captured the imagination of Indonesian extremists in a way no foreign war has before. For the first time, Indonesians are going overseas to fight, not just to train as in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and 1990s, or to give moral and financial support as in the case of Palestine. There are at least four following factors contributing to the special attraction of Indonesian extremists to fighting with ISIS in Syria.

The first factor is the enthusiasm for Syria, as this is directly linked to predictions in Islamic eschatology, which one of them is the final battle of the end times that will take place in Sham, the region sometimes is called the Greater Syria or the Levant, encompassing Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. Indeed, within some extremist circles, the Syrian conflict is known as the "one-way ticket of jihad" because anyone goes there to fight will be able to stay and see the Islam's final victory.

The second factor is the impact of a best-selling book, *The Two-Arm Strategy*, which was translated from Arabic into Indonesian.²¹⁷ This intellectual product has made

²¹⁴ For more, see (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 24 September 2014).

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ For more, see (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 30 January 2014).

²¹⁷ This is based on the investigative reports that were issued by the Indonesian authorities. This is also mentioned by the report of Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict. See (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 30 January 2014).

many extremists believe that the chaos and suffering produced by the Arab Spring can be exploited in a way that will lead to the restoration of an Islamist caliphate.

The third factor is the atrocities of government forces against Sunni Muslims. Such atrocities have been given the wide play in the local media, including in radical websites, playing into a campaign that was already underway before the conflict erupted to portray Shi'ite Muslims, represented by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as deviant and murderous.

The fourth factor is the geographical factor. Syria is easier to reach for Indonesians, especially through Turkey than any other major conflicts that feed the global jihad. As a result, Indonesians from different radical streams including those associated with JI are going or trying to go to Syria.

These four factors affecting Indonesians willing to fight with the ISIS correspond to the view of Gareth Stansfield (2014). Not only is ISIS a different organization that is on the verge of being a state, the ISIS presents a narrative of success to those young and youngish Arabs and/or Sunni Muslims who feel a genuine sense of powerlessness in the modern world. In this sense, ISIS takes this deep-rooted feeling and molds it into a dynamic which is strong, proud, vengeful, and immensely transformative.²¹⁸

The Syrian conflict, however, has also caused divisions among Indonesian jihadists. The tensions between two of the most hard-line Islamist factions there, the Islamic state of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and the *al-Nusra* front, have carried over to Indonesia, where each side has its supporters of Indonesian jihadists. Divisions have also emerged in Indonesia between those seeing the conflict in Shi'a-Sunni terms and those saying these sectarian differences are being deliberately fanned by the West to mobilize opposition against the Assad government because of its strong opposition to Israel. These differences could anyway weaken the overall impact of the conflict on Indonesian extremists and keep them divided. Nevertheless, the danger remains as fighters returning from Syria could infuse new energy into Indonesia's weak and ineffectual jihadi movement.

Having examined "the apocalyptic spirit" of ISIS movement, we can conclude that this appearance of ISIS and its support networks in Indonesia was rather a rare

²¹⁸ For more, see (Stansfield 2014).

example where the international development becoming a direct driver of jihadi recruitment in Indonesia; whilst contrastingly, in the past, such drivers have been overwhelmingly local.²¹⁹ When Indonesians went to Afghanistan to train in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, they were mostly spurred by the repression at home and the desire to develop the capacity to fight President Suharto. The bombing campaign of JI between 1999 and 2002 was also mostly sparked by domestic socio-political opportunities: the communal conflicts in Ambon and in Poso. Despite all the rhetoric about support for Palestine within the Israeli-Palestinian continuous conflicts, in fact, very few Indonesians have ever gone to fight there. However, the appeal of ISIS is distinct where a combination of religious prophecies involving Sham (greater Syria), the string of victories in Iraq in June 2014 that gave a sense of backing a winner, the resonance of the concept of the caliphate, and the sophisticated use by ISIS of social media has effectively and uniquely generated ISIS cells, fighters, and support networks in Indonesia.

Factually, support for ISIS in Indonesia goes back to the links of one young Indonesian activist, Tuah Febriwansyah alias Muhammad Fachry, to the organization of *Al-Muhajiroun*. Founded by a militant Syrian cleric named Omar Bakri Muhammad, *Al-Muhajiroun* started out in 1983 as a Salafi jihadi wing of the organization *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (HT; the Indonesian spelling is Hizbut Tahrir), the radical international organization campaigning for a caliphate and the application of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law. In 1986, Omar Bakri was expelled from Saudi Arabia for creating a clandestine network of HT cells. He moved to the United Kingdom where he became simultaneously the head of *Al-Muhajiroun* and leader of the British branch of HT. He broke completely with the latter in 1996 and together with a cleric named Anjem Choudary set up *Al-Muhajiroun* as a separate organization.

Whilst it was officially disbanded in 2004, *Al-Muhajiroun* has lived on under different names. Whilst Omar Bakri was expelled from Britain in 2005 and moved to Lebanon, where he was arrested in May 2014, Anjem Choudary stayed in Britain. Since its establishment in 1983, both Omar Bakri Muhammad and Anjem Choudary have

²¹⁹ The multivariate statistical analysis in chapter 4 will be proving that the influence of foreign global jihad is the most significant variable with the greatest impact on the occurrence of Islamist terrorism (Salafi jihadism) in Indonesia.

gone on to establish a global network of advocacy groups supporting the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law, if necessary by violent means. The first branch, in the U.K. where Choudary is based, was called Islam4UK, later Sharia4UK. Each national branch had "Sharia4" in its title; where Sharia4Indonesia was established in 2010.

Al-Muhajiroun in Indonesia

The cyberspace provides an excellent medium through which the ISIS-supporting networks in Indonesia have been developed since 2005. *Al-Muhajiroun* came to Indonesia through the Internet. In 2005, Muhammad Fachry, usually seen as just M. Fachry, found *Al-Muhajiroun* through a video chat forum called *Paltalk* (www.paltalk.com) and began to take part in online religious discussions led by Omar Bakri. Omar Bakri reportedly gave him the green light to establish an *Al-Muhajiroun* group in Indonesia. He dropped the "o" in the spelling, as the organization considered Indonesia a key country. Fachry built up two mailing lists that he called *Al Ghuraba* and *Ahl us Sunnah Wal Jama'ah* for sending out *Al-Muhajiroun* materials. In 2006 he also began to use the free Geocities web hosting service to promote *Al-Muhajiroun*.²²⁰ He later bought the domain www.almuhajirun.com. Fachry and his wife, Ummu Fauzi, translated Omar Bakri's writings from English into Indonesian and uploaded them to the site.

Around the same time, Fachry began to take part in an online religious discussion run by a jihadi who used nickname *Qital* (the Arabic word for "battle"), to which another person using the name *Al-Irhab*, or "terror", was a frequent contributor. *Qital* turned out to be Abdul Aziz, a junior high school teacher from the Central Java city of Pekalongan who was arrested in 2005 for assisting the terrorist mastermind Noordin Mohammad Top in setting up a website called www.anshar.net, long since the shut down by the Indonesian government. *Al-Irhab* was the Bali bomber then on death row and since executed, Imam Samudra. From others in the discussion group, Fachry obtained translations from Arabic into Indonesian of writings by two other radical clerics, Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz, better known in the West as Dr. Fadl, and Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, and uploaded these as well. With the knowledge he gleaned from these

²²⁰ The name of the website was www.geocities.com/abuya_2005/almuhajirun.

discussions, Fachry in 2006 set up his own study circle via Yahoo messenger and MSN messenger and invited those on his lists to take part in Omar Bakri's lectures via *Paltalk*. He also began to move beyond cyberspace to promote Omar Bakri's teachings in-person through lectures and sermons.

Later on, August 4, 2014, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration announced a ban on ISIS after the appearance on YouTube of a video called "Joining the Ranks", in which an Indonesian calling himself "Abu Muhammad al Indunisi" urges others to follow his example and join the jihad in Syria. Abu Muhammad turned out to be an activist named Bahrum Syah with links to an extremist organization once known as *Al-Muhajiroun*. Having traced their activities a few years back *Al-Muhajiroun* in Indonesia consisted only the small group of Indonesians inspired by Bakri and Choudary that initially became the engine of the pro-ISIS networks in Indonesia.

The group later runs the website www.al-mustaqbal.net, hereafter referred to as *Al-Mustaqbal*. It has links to most of the terrorist groups still operating in Indonesia, including the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia and the Mujahidin of Western Indonesia. It sponsored most of the ceremonies across Indonesia pledging loyalty to IS after the latter on 29 June 2014 announced the establishment of a caliphate, whilst its fighters in Syria, including Bahrum Syah, have formed an Indonesian-Malaysian unit of ISIS in Syria that reportedly aims at eventually establishing an archipelagic Islamic state in Southeast Asia that would be called the *Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara*.²²¹

Later the announcement of the caliphate has split the Indonesian jihadi community, leading to numerous deep divisions among convicted terrorist prisoners and the splintering of a leading jihadi organization, *Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT). The individual who has emerged as the most important ideological promoter of ISIS is Aman Abdurrahman, a cleric associated with Dulmatin's *Lintas Tanzim* who is imprisoned in the maximum-security compound on the island of Nusakambangan, off the south coast of Java Island. It is Aman Abdurrahman who became the mentor of the Sharia4Indonesia group, and whose followers constitute the glue that binds disparate elements of the Indonesian ISIS network together.

²²¹ For more, see (Waluyo 2016).

Indonesia's Lamongan Network

According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)'s report in April 2015 titled "Indonesia's Lamongan Network: How East Java, Poso and Syria are Linked," it is well explained of how the trajectory of an extremist network in Lamongan, East Java illustrates how support for local jihadi struggles has been transformed into a significant system of support for ISIS. Lamongan, a district some 50km west of Surabaya (Indonesia's second largest city) was the home to the Bali bombers from JI: Amrozi; Mukhlas, and Ali Imron as well as the Islamic boarding school their family run: *pesantren al-Islam*. In March 2015 two sisters-in-law from Lamongan were deported from Turkey with their children after trying to get to ISIS-controlled Syria. One was a widow; whilst the other was trying to join her husband, Siswanto, one of the thousands of foreign fighters in the ISIS army and a former student at *pesantren al-Islam*. In other words, Lamongan's extremist community was indeed shaped by JI and remain a significant source of Islamist terrorism movements in Indonesia.

Figure 3.8 The Map of Indonesia and the Location of Lamongan (Next to the City of Surabaya) in the Eastern Part of Java Island



Source: (Map of Indonesia n.d.).

In 1993, around the same time JI was founded by a group of Indonesian exiles living in Malaysia (e.g., Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar), the three brothers of Amrozi, Mukhlas, and Ali Imron established *pesantren al-Islam* in the village of Tenggulun, Lamongan. It was a satellite school of *pesantren al-Mukmin* in Ngruki, Solo that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir helped found in the 1970s and that became the centre of JI activities in Indonesia. *Pesantren al-Islam* borrowed teachers from *pesantren al-Mukmin* to help it get started, and Ali Imron, trained in Afghanistan like his brother Mukhlas, returned to teach there.

Between 1999 and 2002, *pesantren al-Islam*, largely because of the brothers' involvement in a JI special operations unit, became a critical centre of jihadi activities. Many of the early JI bombing operations such as the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, the attack on the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta, and the Bali bombing themselves were partially planned in or started from the city of Lamongan. After the three brothers were arrested in late 2002, the two were tried and sentenced to death. Ali Imron, the "remorseful" bomber, was given a life sentence, and then with his half-brother, Ali Fauzi, began to work to move the school away from its association with violence. But by this time, it was so integrated into JI that this was easier said than done for several reasons.

JI was not just a terrorist organization; it was a tightly knit social community. A single class *pesantren al-Mukmin* in Ngruki could produce one hundred or more students who had lived and studied together, sometimes married into each other's families, and went to teach at or send their children to other JI-affiliated schools. Any students or teachers at *pesantren al-Islam*, whatever their views, were still only one degree of separation away from a committed extremist and most of them would feel obligated to help if asked to provide shelter or other forms of support. Students frequently moved from one JI school to another, so even if the environment at *pesantren al-Islam* became less militant over time, any moderating influences could be counteracted by the teachers encountered at the next schools.

Until 2007, according to the IPAC report, JI maintained an active program of religious outreach (*da'wah*) and jihad in Central Sulawesi city of Poso, with a branch there that regularly mounted attacks on Christians and less frequently on informers and government officials. Youth from the local JI affiliates were occasionally sent to study at

pesantren al-Islam to broaden their religious knowledge, and individuals fleeing police operations that these JI attacks triggered frequently also came through Lamongan. After a shoot-out with the police in Poso on 22 January 2007, JI effectively disengaged from violence in Indonesia, but the network it left behind, including men it had trained and indoctrinated like Santoso, went on to regroup as the military wing of JAT in late 2010. Until July 2016 Santoso was still the most wanted Indonesian terrorist associated with ISIS. Santoso was killed and many of his networks were dismantled by the Indonesian government during *the Counterterrorism Operation Tinombala*.

From 2002 to 2008, when Mukhlas, Amrozi, and their confederate from West Java, Imam Samudra, were executed, there was a steady stream of their admirers coming to *pesantren al-Islam* to see the family or join them on visits to the prison where they were held. The brothers' burial after their capital punishment in 2008 by the Indonesian government was also an occasion for thousands of militants to gather and celebrate their "martyrdom"; where their graves later became a popular destination for young people hoping to follow in their footsteps. Thus, despite the efforts of Ali Imron and Ali Fauzi to moderate *pesantren al-Islam's* teachings, until today Lamongan remains an important hub for radical-Islamists such as Siswanto who is a Ngruki alumnus who plays his role as the preacher; Sibghotullah who is Siswanto's brother-in-law and a alumnus of LIPIA, a Saudi-funded Salafi institute in Jakarta; Arif Tuban who is a former student at *pesantren al-Islam* who plays his role as the networker; Arif Wicaksono alias "Hendro Laptop" who is a Ngruki alumnus who plays his role as the cyber jihadist; Mohammad Hidayat alias Dayat who is a computer student who plays his role as a hacker through whom they were able to steal a significant amount of money to help Santoso and ISIS activities in Indonesia; and Salim Mubarak Attamini who is a Yemeni graduate and former member of *the Laskar Jihad*, the Salafi force that fought in Ambon, Maluku at the height of the communal conflict in 2000.

Therefore, from this nexus (JI-Lamongan Networks-Poso-ISIS) we could identify three lessons. One of the most important lessons of the Lamongan network, according to IPAC and Indonesian authorities is that pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia have emerged from existing radical networks that basically have never gone away. They may have morphed, realigned, regrouped, and regenerated but they are not new.

Figure 3.9 The Route of Islamist Terrorist Cells from their Training-Camp in Southern Philippine (MILF) Where Poso Becoming the Important Spot Within Their Outreach



Source: (Buku Petunjuk Lapangan Anti-Terror TNI-AD 2008)²²²

The translation of four points above: First, the ideological tension between MILF and the Philippines government significantly influenced the ideological perception of Sangihe-Talaud society in the North Sulawesi. Second, the Sangihe-Talaud island became an important transit point for terrorists that took part in the military training in the Southern Philippines. Third, these territories also became the distributing point of weapons and other munitions. Fourth, the Miangas, Marore and Marampit islands (within the constellation of Sangihe-Talaud island) were included in the official Philippines tourism map by the Philippines government.

²²² Translated in English: Indonesian Army 2008 Field Manual (FM) on Counterterrorism.

The second lesson is that it is impossible to understand Indonesian pro-ISIS networks without understanding Poso, the former conflict area in central Sulawesi. Since 2000, extremists have seen it as a secure base (*qaedah aminah*) and training centre with the potential to expand into a community that eventually applies the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law. From 2009 – 2010, there was a short-lived project to relocate that base to Aceh, the only Indonesian province authorized to apply the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law. When it failed, with the Indonesian security forces breaking up a training camp in late February 2010 and eventually arresting more than 100 suspects, Poso again became the refuge of choice, under the leadership of a former combatant named Santoso, the target of a massive Indonesian security apparatus operation until 2016, who sought to train recruits for the jihad against enemies of a Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. Lamongan indeed provided some of those recruits. Until July 2016 the Indonesian government was carrying out the Joint Law Enforcement and Military Counterterrorism Operations code name *the Counterterrorism Operation Tinombala* to go after the Santoso's networks in the Poso area that also involved the foreign nationals from ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China.²²³ *The Counterterrorism Operation Tinombala* has also killed three one-star generals from the Indonesian Army.²²⁴

The third lesson is that the case of Poso provides us with a clear example of how radical ideologues will always try to keep “a secure base” alive. Based on the historical exploration of JI evolution on this chapter we can learn that the extremists were never very strong in terms of numbers (quantity) or competence (quality). Even interest in jihadi activities at home had steadily declined after the strength of radical groups once peaked between 1999 – 2001. But, however committed radical ideologues still wanted to keep alive “the idea of a secure base” in the archipelago. They needed to convince themselves that the dozens of often not-very impressive men sent to Poso for training would eventually be transformed into an army of reliable *mujahidin* (holy warriors) that could join the global jihad and lead to the establishment of a Salafi Islamist state of

²²³ For more, see (Sofwan, *Warga Asing Tewas dalam Baku Tembak Poso* 2016) and (Sofwan, *WNA Uighur Gabung Kelompok Teroris Santoso Sejak 2014* 2016). The Uyghurs /'wi:gər/ are a Turkic ethnic group living in Eastern and Central Asia. Today, Uyghurs live primarily in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, where they are one of 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities.

²²⁴ For more CNN coverage, see (Fantz 2016).

Indonesia. The key to this was providing Santoso with an effective media arm, and the Lamongan network did just this, connecting Santoso first with *al-Qaeda* Global-Islamic Media Front and then with ISIS.

The objective of “keeping the secure base” like in Poso was clearly to create the illusion, both internationally and at home, that the Indonesian effort (keeping a base and war alive in Indonesia) was bigger and more significant than it really was. The propagandists may have wanted international recognition for Indonesia’s homegrown jihad, but they wanted even more to persuade small-town recruits from other parts of Indonesia that conflict in Poso was always a war worth fighting. As the wave theory postulating, the international links are always the unique attraction for keeping terrorist activities at the national and local level alive (Rapoport, 2004).

These would-be *mujahidin* never actually seemed to realize how dangerous the connection to Poso was because Poso simply was one place that had intense police surveillance. If Indonesia’s extremists had not kept trying to come to Poso, they probably could have avoided many of the crackdowns that followed. But the pursuit by the Indonesian National Police was a factor in pushing several key Lamongan members to leave for Syria. Many wanted to go anyway, but the steady stream of arrests and the information they produced turned departure into a necessity.

Based on the stories of six Indonesian citizens who were involved in the pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia as of 2015, it is clear to conclude that their lives intersected with how a pro-ISIS network in Lamongan and Poso is shaped. These six individuals were Siswanto, Sibghotullah, Arif Tuban, Arif Wicaksono alias “Hendro Laptop”, Mohammad Hidayat alias Dayat, and Salim Mubarak Attamini.

As of early April 2015, Salim Mubarak Attamini and Siswanto were in Syria fighting with ISIS. Since Indonesian ISIS fighters suffered heavy casualties in Syria in the first weeks of April 2015; it is unknown whether these two were among them. Sibghotullah was arrested by Malaysian authorities trying to leave for Syria in early December 2014; he remains in a police detention in Jakarta. Arif Wicaksono alias “Hendro Laptop” and Dayat are dead, killed by the Indonesian National Police anti terror detachment 88 (Densus 88), in Poso and East Java respectively. Arif Tuban was arrested in June 2014 and subsequently was tried and convicted of terrorism.

Based on the IPAC's report in April 2015, there are at least three features that characterizes the enduring importance of several kinds of bonds of JI-Lamongan Network-Poso-ISIS.

The first feature is where the alumni networks of *pesantren al-Islam* and other schools are once affiliated to the JI. Although some key individuals are not-or in some cases, no longer-JI members, these schools remain a critically important component of the extremist community long after JI itself has disengaged, at least temporarily, from violence at home.

The second feature is a strong commitment to the ideology propounded by the detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Siswanto and Salim Mubarak Attamini were Aman's most trusted associates in East Java. His followers control the channels in Indonesia for sending fighters to Syria. Mapping out Aman Abdurrahman's support base and understanding his teachings are essential prerequisites to any targeted programs to counter violent extremism.

The third feature is the kinship and marriage. Family ties have been a recurring theme in studies of Indonesian Islamist violent extremists. The Lamongan network shows they are more important than ever as ISIS appeals to families and sets up Indonesian-language schools in Syria for its "cubs". Women in extremist families can be the main motivators, urging their husbands and children to fight, but they can also be the key to disengagement. Documenting the family's orientation in this regard (towards or away from violence) is another prerequisite of an effective counter-extremism effort.

There are also, however, bonds produced by training in Poso; experience in prison; and participation in radical study groups as well as the close ties that often emerge between fugitives and those who hide them. All these relationships produce a complicated web of interactions, but if the bonds can be identified, then at least there is a possibility of effective target interventions to address them. One potentially useful program is underway in Lamongan, that is run by a former JI member but much more needs to be done. It has always been the case that the key to designing counter-extremism programs that have any hopes of success is to root them in a thorough knowledge of the patterns of radicalization in local communities. The story of the Lamongan network reinforces such premise.

Prospect of Pro-ISIS Networks in Indonesia.

The upheaval in the Middle East still has direct consequences in Indonesia, but the dangers should not be overdrawn. The drivers of jihad will continue to be mostly local as they have been from the beginning. Indonesians coming back from Afghanistan from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s did not use their skills and training to undertake violence in Indonesia until after President Suharto fell and the Ambon communal conflict erupted, with Indonesian Muslims dying in a local war. Without local grievances to build on, no *mujahidin* coming back from Syria or Yemen or anywhere else can build such of a movement, and without community support, no movement can succeed.

However, although Indonesian democratic politics is relatively stable and peaceful, it is still nonetheless worth keeping an eye on Syria. Until 2016, ISIS has triggered a bigger backlash than ever seen before in the Indonesian Muslim community, suggesting that although the ISIS network in Indonesia is dangerous, the support towards it will stay limited to the radical fringe. The Chief of Indonesian National Police, Police General Badrodin Haiti on January 24, 2016, made a public statement that there were more networks and organizations in Indonesia increasingly tending to support the formation of ISIS. At least until January 2016, the three biggest radical groups in Indonesia according to him were *Jamaah Islamiya* (JI) that targets the Western interests; *Tauhid Wal Jihad* that targets the *takfir*; and *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII).


Besides these three, according to Police General Haiti, there were at least 15 out of 21 Islamist radical groups that proactively support ISIS: *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Timur*; *Mujahidin Indonesia Barat*; *Ring Banten*; *Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid*; *Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad*; *Pendukung dan Pembela Daulah Islam*; *Jemaah Ansauri Daulah*; *Ma'had Ansyarullah*; *Laskar Dinullah*; *Gerakan Tauhid Lamongan*; *Halawi Makmun Grup*; *Ansharul Khilafah Jawa Timur*; *IS Aceh*; *Ikhwan Muahid Indonesia fil Jazirah al-Muluk*; and *Khilafatul Muslimin*.

As of the final stage of writing this Ph.D. thesis in the academic year 2017 - 2018, the profiling of these organizations is still valid. According to a prominent member of Indonesian Islamist party *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* who served as the Chairman of Defence, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs and Information Committee at Indonesian Parliament from 2009 – 2014, the ISIS threats along with its supporting networks in

Indonesia have reached its serious level since “the raw material” are simply the old radical-Islamist networks that have persisted in Indonesia.²²⁵


²²⁵ For more, see (Hermawan 2016).

Figure 3.10 The Estimated Number of Foreign Fighters (including Indonesians) in Iraq and Syria




Source: (The Soufan Group 2015).

Figure 3.11 JI Within the Reach of ISIS' Global Influence




Source: (Charlton 2015).

Figure 3.12 The City of Lamongan and Poso within the Reach of ISIS' Influence in Southeast Asia



Source: (Gunaratna n.d.).

Figure 3.13 The Multi-Channel Media of Radicalization in Indonesia (Globally Connected)



Source: Self-made.²²⁶

²²⁶ Adapted. Synthesized from the point of view of Police Inspector General DR. Petrus Golose (The Deputy for the International Relations to the Head of Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency/BNPT) in a discussion with the author, October 1, 2014.

The IPAC report in September 2014 was also confirming that from the late 2013 onwards, some of the networks that were getting to Syria run instead through prisons.²²⁷ As of January 2015, according to figures compiled by the Indonesian National Police anti terror detachment 88 (Densus 88), there were 123 Indonesians who had been identified as having joined the fighting in Syria. This total included men and women identified by name, including wives who have accompanied their *mujahidin* husbands, but it does not include individuals going back and forth to Syria as members of humanitarian missions, even when the missions are linked to extremist groups. As the individuals involved are nonetheless dangerous, and it is cause for concern that inmates of high security prisons continues to be among the most active propagators of ISIS views and teachings; Indonesian counterterrorism policy, strategy, and operations under the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency must implement a strict prison system of these radical inmates.

3.8 The Neo *Jemaah Islamiyah* (2016 – Today)

In March 2016 the Indonesian National Police officially made the statement declaring that Neo-JI exists and is connected to a number of old figures of Islamist terrorists in Indonesia such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Imam Samudra, and Dr. Azhari.²²⁸ According to the official statement of Chief of Indonesian National Police and Sydney Jones (2016), the Neo-JI structure consists of hundreds of members, and is more sophisticated than the ISIS structure that tends to operate with smaller radical networks. Neo-JI is also readier to operate in Indonesia since it has been strengthening its footing in the archipelago for the last 5 years (since 2011) with its main base in the Java island.²²⁹

The members of Neo-JI which were convicted from 2014 – 2015 did not acknowledge this name. But, since the Indonesian National Police found the indication that this group has its roots in JI, this group is named after Neo-JI. According to the

²²⁷ For more, see (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 24 September 2014).

²²⁸ For a detailed account of counterterrorism operation on Dr. Azhari in 2005, see (Wachjunadi 2017).

²²⁹ For more, see (Sofwan, Polisi Sebut Neo Jamaah Islamiyah Terkait Abu Bakar Baasyir 2016).

official statement of Indonesian National Police, this group has undergone name and formation changes, but the members are the same and have roots in JI. Recently, the Indonesian government authority have begun to pay a serious attention on this group since its members were getting active in making weapons and other explosive devices.

3.9 The Prospect of Structural (Non-Violent) and Non-Structural (Violent) JI

Having descriptively discussed the existence of JI and other radical-Islamist groups/networks, and how they are transformed along the way, we can conclude that Islamist terrorism in Indonesia has its unique latent presence, and thus its latent threats are still tend to exist in the future. Gordon and Lindo (2011) argue that some manifestation of JI or its offshoots will probably exist in 2025. This is however in line with the predictions of other counterterrorism experts and intelligence assessments.

According to Gordon and Lindo (2011), with the assumption that the Indonesian government counterterrorism efforts are maintained at the current level, Structural JI (JI with non-violent engagements) is best positioned for the long-term survival. Although Structural JI has been severely degraded, critical portions of the group's infrastructure remain intact. The roughly 50 schools affiliated with Structural JI are still open, as is the network of publishing houses run by the organization.²³⁰ These platforms have enabled the group to continue recruiting new members, spread propaganda, and, most importantly, maintain its social network. If JI-linked institutions continue to operate, Structural JI's survival seems all but guaranteed.

JI's splinter groups (JI with violent engagements) are unlikely to remain operationally viable in 2025. If Top, Dulmatin, and Patek are any indications, high-profile militants who break off from Structural JI and conduct violent attacks have relatively short life spans. The most violent and active JI splinters will probably remain be anchored in the ungoverned corners of the southern Philippines. If the slow-going negotiations between MILF and Manila bear fruit (a distinct possibility over the next decade and a half) this haven will probably become unviable. Some Non-Structural JI members (the armed wing of JI with violent engagements) may remain active in

²³⁰ For more, see (International Crisis Group 20 April 2010).

Indonesia in 2025, but they would face an increasingly capable Indonesian counterterrorism apparatus.

In the nearer term, one wonders whether a new generation of JI members will follow the examples set by Top, Dulmatin, and Patek, and to conduct activities outside of the group's formal command structure. Whilst possible, this scenario seems unlikely. For more than half a decade, Structural JI has prioritized *da'wah* over violence. Those who disagree with this approach have probably already left the organization. Younger cadres who are eager for action probably recognize Structural JI's posture and will seek other, more aggressive platforms for activism. These alternative options are multiplying due to the recent proliferation in Indonesia of small, informal operational cells.²³¹ By the process of elimination, then, the only individuals left in Structural JI today are those patiently committed to the group's long-term approach. This suggests that Structural JI's fragmentation will slow or cease in the years ahead. According to Gordon and Lindo (2011), five factors seem most likely to alter the future trajectory of JI and its splinters through 2025.

a. Ideological Resonance

Variations of the Salafi jihadist ideology promoted by JI and like-minded groups and individuals have become embedded in certain Indonesian communities. From the height of the DI insurgency to the smaller cells and even individuals carrying out attacks today, the ideological resonance necessary for violent action persists, even if the organizational structures behind such attacks have atrophied. In addition, the Indonesian government's tacit tolerance of non-violent Islamist organizations has allowed militants to use those groups as a platform for recruitment and radicalization (Gordon and Lindo 2011). Compared with other radical-Islamist groups, JI-associated individuals and cells have their own uniqueness in terms of their inclusivity and adaption to the society wherever they are existing. Prior to his arrest, for example, Ba'asyir used his new aboveground group, *Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT), to disseminate the Salafi

²³¹ For more, see "Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans," International Crisis Group, April 19, 2011; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 8.

jihadi propaganda. This pattern of reality suggests that a latent pool of recruits could be mobilized should Structural JI reengage in violence or should a new platform for terrorism emerge.

b. Conflict

The second factor is the outbreak of escalation of conflict in Southeast Asia. As previously explained in this chapter, the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, sectarian conflicts in Indonesia, and violence in the southern Philippines were crucial to radicalizing, training, and mobilizing the JI network. Rumors about Patek aside, no Indonesians seem to have fought U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, so it is unlikely that conflict in far-off places such as Yemen or Somalia would mobilize the next generation of JI to the same extent as did the Afghan theater in the 1980s. Instead, the most likely combat opportunities for JI operatives in the future are the insurgencies in the southern Philippines, southern Thailand, and Burma or a fresh round of sectarian bloodshed in Indonesia (Gordon and Lindo, 2011). Significant involvement in these conflicts could reinvigorate JI.

c. Terrorist Patron

The third factor relates to the emergence of a new terrorist patron. As the foregoing analysis illustrates, *al-Qaeda* core had a major impact on the evolution of JI. A new terrorist patron could have a similar effect. The transnational terrorist organization which is best positioned to support terrorism in Southeast Asia is probably Pakistan-based *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (LeT). Although LeT's network of training camps and financial resources could theoretically fill the void left by *al-Qaeda* core's erosion, there is no indication that it has the intent to do so. That said, JI and LeT have cooperated in at least one instance in the past and this nexus could further develop if LeT's objectives were to expand to include Southeast Asia.²³²

²³² According to the International Crisis Group and the Australian government, JI operated a cell in Karachi, Pakistan, between 2000 and 2003 that received training from LeT. See "Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings," International Crisis Group, 7; and "The Terrorist Threat in South-East Asia," Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 8.

Beyond LeT, other South Asian or Middle Eastern-based terrorist groups could also become patrons for JI or its offshoots. Recent efforts by JI members and associated individuals to cultivate ties with militant groups abroad support this hypothesis. Abu Husna and Dr. Agus are clear examples of this. Both men served as senior JI operatives and were detained in Malaysia in 2008 before they could travel to Syria on a Qatar Airways flight.²³³ According to an Australian government document, intelligence from their arrest detailed JI's links and desire to renew its international terrorist links.²³⁴ Muhammad Jibriel, the alleged conduit for foreign funds used in Noordin Mohammad Top's July 2009 attack in Jakarta, also made significant efforts to develop relationships with militants from outside the region.²³⁵ This pattern of reality suggests that individuals associated with Non-Structural JI may also seek foreign patrons in the future.

d. Leadership

The fourth factor pertains to the leadership influence. The rise of a charismatic leader could breathe the new life into Structural or Non-Structural JI. Such a leader could potentially emerge from the population of incarcerated JI militants to be released in the coming years. Although the number of JI members behind bars is relatively small, many of them are the hardened veterans with the proper bona fides to assume leadership positions.²³⁶ Documented incidents of recidivism reinforce concerns that the incarcerated militants could reengage in the violent activity.²³⁷

²³³ For more, see (International Crisis Group 20 April 2010), 7.

²³⁴ For more, see "What Governments Are Doing: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)," Australian Government; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 9.

²³⁵ According to Gordon and Lindo (2011), from documents in the trial of Muhammad Jibriel, arrested on suspicion of seeking foreign funds for the July 2009 hotel bombings, it is clear that Jibriel had met the late Pakistan Taliban leader Mehsud and that he was in regular communication with the media division of al-Qaeda, al Sahab. He was also trying to send Indonesians for training in Waziristan, meeting with al-Qaeda members in Saudi Arabia, and planning to open an office in Cairo." See "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh," International Crisis Group, 14. For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 9.

²³⁶ According to the International Crisis Group, less than half of the roughly 170 men in Indonesian prisons "linked to jihadism" in 2007 were JI members. See "Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons," International Crisis Group, November 19, 2007. For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 9.

e. Strategic Calculus

The fifth and final factor worth contemplating is the strategic calculus of Structural JI. Currently JI is focused on *da'wah* to boost its strength, which its leaders view as a prerequisite for the armed resistance. When JI's commanders believe that their organization is powerful and popular enough to reengage in violence, they could resume terrorist attacks. Alternatively, the group's leadership could recalculate its decision to postpone violence. Although nowadays both scenarios seem unlikely, it is important to bear in mind that Structural JI's tactical decision to abandon terrorist attacks is not a renunciation of violence. The group is still committed to its long-term objective of creating a Salafi Islamist state and it will continue to pose a terrorist threat until it formally rejects violence, abandons its struggle, or is comprehensively dismantled.

3.10 Looking Ahead: Indonesia, JI, and the Globalization of Terrorism Justified by Religious-Based Arguments.

As extensively discussed in chapter 2, terrorism has been used as an old tactic by governments to suppress revolution as well as by revolutionaries who have sought to achieve power over a government. The terrorist whether in possession of governmental power or in-want of governmental power, uses terror to achieve a political, social or religious goal. Modern terrorism is at least two hundred years old and she has not aged a day. The Anarchist started in the 1880s in Russia and lasted for a decade later in Western Europe, Balkans, and Asia; as well as the Marxist/Leftist and the Rightist terrorist groups throughout the twentieth century. The religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments is even older and rooted for more than the last two thousand years in Hinduism (the Thugs), Judaism (Zealot Zicariis), Islam (the Assassins during the Turkish Seljuk Empire era), and Christianity (the Ku Klux Klan in the U.S.).

²³⁷ According to Gordon and Lindo (2011), at least 12 members of the Aceh cell had served time in prison, mostly on terrorism charges. For more, see (International Crisis Group 20 April 2010) and (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 9.

Since the early 1980s the world has entered the era of modern religious terrorism movement or terrorism movement justified by religious-based arguments where this era is characterized by not abiding to one's state law, bounded rationality not understandable by secular views, and having religious symbolic meaning in their commitment towards terrorism to change the structure of society. *Al-Qaeda* and its associated movements including the JI and ISIS fit with this wave, and they have a strategic aim of restoring the world under the Islamic caliphate. Correspondingly, this is in line with a definition of Islamist terrorism, which is a form of political violence partly manifested in the form of terrorism as a criminal armed tactic that rejects democracy and pluralism whilst aiming to make sudden, deep socio-politico-economic changes and legitimating the violent action by selective and extreme interpretation of Islamic texts.

The religion itself is not the inherent cause of violence or terrorism since violence might occur with or without religious context. However, religion provides mores and symbols which make horrific bloodshed easier to vindicate. Jews and Christians, as well as Muslims, have much to answer for as fomenters of religious terror. Nevertheless, the Islamist fanatics have a much greater opportunity for mayhem because of the alienated hordes in the Middle East who see no hope at all in the status quo. The opportunity created by despair and rage, not the intrinsic elements of the religion itself, gives Islam the edge over Christianity and Judaism as a force for terror. Consequently, the cure for religious violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation for religion itself and in the acknowledgement of religion in public life. The solution is not the secularization but a renewed/revived understanding of religion.

As for Indonesia, this great archipelago used to be a Buddhist, Hindu and Christian nation before the arrival of Islam. The coming of Islam to Indonesia in the fourteenth century was filtered by the pre-existing culture, thus making Islam in Indonesia an Indonesian version of Islam. However, over the years the streams of transnational-Islamist movements from the Middle East began to transform the Indonesian version of Islam into the "pure"/Middle Eastern version of Islam. The Middle Eastern influence appears a profound one on Indonesian radical fundamentalists.


The dissemination of ideas from the Middle East to Southeast Asia is grounded in age-old cross-regional and global processes of the transference of ideas. New

methods of communication (e.g., the Internet and physical transportation) further facilitate the general process of the globalization of Islam, including the dissemination of radical fundamentalist ideas to the Indonesian archipelago. The fundamentalist movements, consisting of Islamist transnational movements, have similar characteristics, which are part of the international Sunni pan-Islamist political movement. They are commonly associated with a goal of unifying all Muslim countries under an Islamist caliphate ruled by Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and led by a caliph as the head of state elected by Muslims.

Having identified such global patterns, Indonesia should address this phenomenon no longer as a tactical and temporary phenomenon, but as a strategic, national security issue, which in turn calls for the objective academic research and the involvement of all instruments of national power. Historically, Indonesia's national security is characterized by the fact that global conflicts would always permeate through the Indonesian society, so the Indonesian government must be vigilant about the threat of global violent Islamist movements permeating through the Indonesian society and exacerbating potential domestic conflicts.


All that said, to better formulate the right counterterrorism policy, strategy, and operations for Indonesia, Indonesia should engage terrorism from four levels of analysis: individual; group; state; and global level. Ending terrorism should become the goal of any counterterrorism policies and strategies, and this is not a simple task. In dealing with radical-Islamist groups, the Indonesian government so far has engaged in decapitation through eliminating group leaders, negotiation (e.g., winning their heart and mind), and repression.

Figure 3.14 A Transnational Terrorism Networks Model



Source: (Marks 2006)

Figure 3.15 The Scope of Islamist Terrorism (Red) and the use of Cyber Terrorism by JI and Its Other Related Networks



Source: Self-made.²³⁸

²³⁸ The articulation from many sources based on the author's interviews with the Indonesian authority and experts in the field. For the source of the map, see (Countries in which Islamist terrorist attacks have occurred between September 11, 2001, and May 2013 n.d.).

However, the case of Santoso terrorist group and its connection with the dismantled but still dangerous JI, which lost its leader in a security operation and saw many of its members captured in July 2016 suggests that violent Islamist groups in Indonesia do not simply self-implode when they fail to reach their ultimate goals, but rather transition to another *modus operandi*, where their cells engage in illegal criminal activities (e.g., through the cyber crime in order to extract and mobilize financial resources).²³⁹ There is no guarantee that they have abandoned their goal to establish a Salafi Islamist state and will refrain from terrorist attacks in the future.

Unity between people (civil society as well as the academic community), national security forces, and democratic government is highly relevant in the protracted counterterrorism struggle, since in the view of radical-Islamists, they are engaging in an unfinished war to achieve their utopian goals that may be unachievable during their lifetime, so their war becomes their heritage to future generations. As a nation guided by the national and state ideology of Pancasila, Indonesia must be highly vigilant to ensure that this country will become neither a producer of terrorists nor the battlefield of a global religious terrorist movement.

²³⁹ Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma (the Former Head of the Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) in a discussion with the author, October 18, 2016.

CHAPTER 4: THE ANALYSIS

As the continuation of previous chapters, the purpose of this chapter is to critically analyze and systematically synthesize the independent (determining) variables of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that are examined in this Ph.D. thesis: economic grievances; social grievances; political grievances; radical ideology; social networks; state repression; and government incentive. On the other hand, the dependent variable in this analysis is the creation/occurrence of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, which is measured in terms of the ideology and/or behaviour to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).

In this chapter, I conduct the combined analyses by using both qualitative and quantitative methods, which are coupled with the discussion on the social network analysis of JI-related individuals. Part 4.1. is focused on the qualitative analysis by using the discovering patterns analysis, the content analysis, and the discourse analysis. Part 4.2. is focused on the quantitative analysis by using the chi-square test, the logistic regression, and the proportional test to build several multivariate statistical models. Part 4.3 is focused on the discussion of social network analysis of JI-related individuals to complement both qualitative and quantitative analysis in parts 4.1. and 4.2. Part 4.4. is focused on addressing the analysis warranty of this Ph.D. thesis.

4.1 The Qualitative Analysis

a. The Discovering Patterns Analysis

There are 22 individuals in the sample who are examined by the discovering patterns analysis. All them have been indicted in the terrorism case. 16 individuals are still in the prison, whilst 6 individuals have been recently released.²⁴⁰ They are examined only through public documentation-archival evidence including legal court

²⁴⁰ For the profiling of these 22 individuals, please the attachment #1 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis.

cases and published media documents. The discovering patterns analysis in this part uses a systematic pattern of “who-how-frequencies-magnitudes-structures-processes-causes-consequences” to achieve the aim of comprehending the systematic pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that is based on this purposive sample.

Actors: Who?

On the Ideology

They are the individuals who adamantly believe that the Islamic *Shari'a* law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia must be established within a wider Islamic caliphate at the international level. The radical and violent way is both the necessary and sufficient variable to achieve their aim. The nation-state and democracy are not the valid form of government through which they could not channel out their aspirations. For them, the idea of the nation-state with its democratic system that bestows the state legitimacy on the popular will of people is an absolute violation of the purity of Islamic faith. In other words, for them the idea of liberal democracy as manifested by the Indonesian national and state ideology (*Pancasila*) and the Indonesian national motto whose meaning is the unity in diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) are the idol, thus must be replaced.

They also view that anything or anyone, which are not in-line with them in terms of ideology and operational courses of action are deemed as the *takfir*, *togut* or *taghut*, and enemy of the Islam. All them are deemed as the “hindrances” and the legitimate targets of attack and killing. Meanwhile, for any Islamic imams/clerics who are not in-line with their view are called as “*ulama su*.” The meaning of “*ulama su*” for them is the Islamic clerics who are deemed apostate, money-oriented, and power-hunger by willing to collaborate with the status-quo government.

Other than with JI, these 22 individuals have mixture associations with the following organizations along with their inherent political ideology. HTI (*Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*) that believes in the establishment of Islamic caliphate that must be currently implemented; NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia*) that believes in the establishment of Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia; MMI (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*) and JAT (*Jamaah*

Anshorut Tauhid) that also believe in the establishment of Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. For MMI and JAT, the Islamic caliphate may later be implemented when the situation permits.

On the Political Background

Based on the profiling of these 22 individuals, there are two camps of political backgrounds. The first camp is the anti-democracy and anti-pluralism, whilst the second camp is the ones who believe that pragmatically using democracy and *da'wah* (religious preaching) as a means and ways to achieve their aims are something that is permitted. Nevertheless, the individuals in the second camp are not associated with any registered political parties in Indonesia, but merely being the sympathizers of Islamist parties.

As the Indonesian Muslims, all these 22 individuals are aspired to and inspired by the *Darul Islam* and its founding father, Raden Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo (1905 – 1962). *Darul Islam*, which in English means the *House of Islam* is also known as the DI/TII (*Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia*), which means the House of Islam and the Islamic military forces of Indonesia. It is also called as the NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia*), which means the Islamic State of Indonesia. It began its activities in 1942 and led by a group of Muslim militias and insurgents under the coordination of Raden Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo. The entity only recognized *Shari'a* as the valid source of law. Later the movement has produced splinters and offshoots ranging from *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) to other Islamist radical groups. This cluster of Indonesian Muslims is not the majority but they are still vociferous for the majority of Indonesian democratic and pluralistic society.

These 22 individuals are also aspired to rewrite the eliminated seven-words in the Jakarta Charter. The Jakarta charter written on 22 June 1945 was the earliest form of *Pancasila* (the national and state ideology). The essential meaning of these seven Indonesian words is “the obligation to apply the Islamic *Shari'a* law for all Indonesian Muslims.” These seven words were suddenly eliminated on August 18, 1945, which was only one day after Indonesia declaring her independence on August 17, 1945.

On the Social Class and Their Encounter with Radical Ideology

Generally, they come from the lower-to-middle economic class with educational backgrounds reaching up to the high school level. During their formative years, they encountered “enlightened” Islamic teachings that emphasize on the Salafi jihad through selective and extreme interpretation of the Islamic text. These encounters were experienced mainly through Islamic boarding schools, Quran recitation fellowships, and some other interactions within their social networks. Such interactions were exacerbated by their common involvement in a number of training and operational activities.

On the Criminal Background

Their involvement in the terrorism (the act of violence) is also directly or indirectly connected with other ordinary criminal violations where many of them are also the recidivists. After their capture, these 22 individuals are either disengaged from terrorism activities, successfully deradicalized from their radical ideology, or they are still aspired to continue on their violent jihad activities once the opportunities are opened (e.g., fighting and died for the ISIS in Syria among many others).

Frequencies and Magnitudes: How Often and How Much?

Jl and other related Islamist radical/extremist/violent jihadist movements in Indonesia (as represented by these 22 individuals) have numerously become the thorn throughout the Indonesian history, especially through their violent and non-violent extremist movements. They have existed throughout the history of independent Indonesian state (since 1945) and acted violently since the early 1950s until today.

During their presence, the magnitude of their extremism have reached a full spectrum of extremist movements covering from the non-violent engagement (e.g., the extreme *da'wah*; the selective, extreme interpretation and teaching of Islamic texts; and the hatred speech), ordinary criminal violations, up to violent engagement (e.g., deadly attacks on civilians and government symbols that are manifested both as insurgent as

well as non-insurgent terrorist attacks). Until today, they have been vociferous and disturbing for the majority of Indonesians who are themselves also Muslims.

Structures: To Whom?

These 22 individuals target whoever deemed as the hindrance to the establishment of the Islamic *Shari'a* law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. Such hindrance within their bounded rationality is called *togut or taghut*: anything/anyone being worshipped or anything/anyone that rules but non-*Shari'a* conforming laws. Their radical, violent activities throughout the years reflect a general pattern of terrorism that is justified by religious-based arguments. They use the victims (the direct targets) not as the ultimate targets. Instead, the government and the leadership of current democratic political establishment are indeed their ultimate targets.

Based on the profiling of these 22 individuals, they have two main agendas. The first agenda is to ruin down the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and to have it replaced with the Indonesian Salafi Islamist state of their own version (*al-daulah al-Islamiyyah*). The second agenda is to implement the Islamic teachings at all layers of society according to their own interpretation as reflected by fashion/apparel that Muslim must wear and other cultural manifestations among many others.

Otherwise, without such implementation, they will deem Indonesian society as the *jahiliyyah* society. That is why for this particular reason these 22 individuals agree with JI's ideology since JI believes in the establishment of the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the southern Philippines, that is followed by the establishment of Islamic caliphate at the international level. After they successfully establish the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia, they aim to fix the governance of the state under the Islamic *Shari'a* law, and then to restore the glory of the Islamic caliphate (*al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah*).

Subsequently, the last step is to become the Islamic *ummah* that has a very significant role in the global arena. Therefore, in order to realize all these strategic objectives, they believe that it is imperative to start this movement as early as possible

by the enforcement of *Shari'a* law in the purest sense and to garner the general support to liberate the society from the influence of infidel (*kafir*) state. For them, these first two steps are imminent to be realized.

Processes: In What Order?

The exposure of these 22 individuals to the radicalization (in terms of non-violent and violent extremist movements) is started from joining the small circle/cell of Qur'an recitation fellowships to the more inclusion of extensive but exclusive social networks, and taking the allegiance oath (*bai'at*) to the causes, missions, and visions of JI and other related Islamist radical/extremist/violent jihadist movements. As such individuals have embraced this stepwise, subsequently they are trained and prepared to take their role within the organization either as the sympathizers, bombers, field leaders or imams/ideologues. Other than playing one of these roles, these radicalized individuals are also ready to become the lone wolf acting upon their own initiation. Looking at this phenomenon from another perspective, they also implement the *da'wah* strategy as commanded by Hasan al-Banna, where their exposure to the radicalization and committing the act of violence can also be explained as follow: the first step which is the introduction (*marhalah al-tarif*); the second step which is the leadership and character development (*marhalah al-takwin*); and the execution (*marhalah al-tanfiz*).

Causes: Why?

On the Ideology and Social Network

Based on the discovering patterns analysis on these 22 individuals, radical ideology seems to be the most significant factor that is boosted by the social network. These two independent variables (radical ideology and social network) are exploiting the combination of existing grievances (economic, social, and political). This situation is exacerbated by the lack of serious government incentive programs given to these individuals. In fact, the maximum level of repression (e.g., the death penalty or life

imprisonment) as the maximum level of deterrence that is implemented according to the rule of law in Republic of Indonesia must be balanced by effective deradicalization efforts and consistent government incentive programs in order to moderate the ideology and behaviour of violent jihadists. These already radicalized individuals must be disengaged from radical networks and activities, must be de-radicalized from radical ideology, must be re-empowered to do the right things (e.g., working along with the government in the extensive deradicalization engagements among many others), and must be persuaded to voluntarily embracing the pluralism and democracy at the ideological and behaviour level.

On the Ontology and Epistemology of Their Ideology

The discovering patterns analysis of these 22 individuals also gives us the insight pertaining to the ontology and epistemology of their radical ideology. They believe in the *takfirism*, which means they ontologically believe that any Islamic practices that are not in-line with their ideology and behaviour are deemed as the stain on the purity of Islam (*takfir* means “to declare someone an apostate or an infidel”). They are also literalist (*harfiyyah*), which means they totally reject any implicit meanings/interpretations on Quran and Hadith. They also believe in limiting the capacity of human ratio, that within their bounded rationality the revelation is the ultimate source of *istinbath* in Islam. For them, the revelations have been clearly and literally manifested in the Quran and Hadith. Thus, any interpretations of human ratio on these revelations cannot supersede any literal statements of Quran and Hadith.

They are also against the Islamic imams whom according to their bounded rationality ignore their own way of using and interpreting “the Yellow Book.”²⁴¹ This is indeed the old (Salafi) Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) that uses “the Yellow Book”

²⁴¹ See also (Abegebriel, Abeveiro and Team 2004). In the Islamic education, “the Yellow Book” refers to the traditional books that consist of Islamic teaching materials (*diraasah al-Islamiyyah*) that are taught in the Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*). “The Yellow Book” covers a wide spectrum of Islamic teaching materials: *fiqh*; *aqidah*; *akhlaq/tasawuf*; Arab grammar (*‘ilmu nahwu* and *‘ilmu sharf*); Hadith; *tafsir*; *‘ulumul* Quran; as well as social affairs and humanities (*mu’amalah*). “The Yellow Book” is an Arabic-language book that is without vowel (*harakah*) or commonly known in Indonesian language as “the Arab *Gundul*.” In fact, there are many Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia that use “the Yellow Book” but produces a constructive, peaceful, and pluralistic Islamic teaching and ideology. For more, see (Bruinessen 2013), (NU 2006), (Narendra 2015), (Kosim n.d.), and (Suryaningsih and Marbun 2013).

as the main reference of studying Islam.²⁴² Therefore, for their basic principles of *tawheed*, *fiqh*, and *aqeedah* they mainly refer to the Hanbali Sunni Islamic school of jurisprudence according to the interpretation of ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.²⁴³ Lastly, they are intolerant and unconsciously tend to be against any groups that are not in-line with their views. For them, Islam is the only way of life and must be enforced at all costs without considering its impacts on other stakeholders. In their view, the straight way of life has been pre-ordained through the *Shari'a* law. This concept is called *as-Shirat al-Mustaqim*.

On Their Methodology

In terms of methodology, they have identical characteristics with their Islamist fundamentalist counterparts at overseas. They radically believe that the implementation of Islamic life and governmental system in the current Islamic world as a deviation, thus any fundamental changes must be unavoidably implemented. Therefore, they strongly support the violent ways. It means that any corrections to such deviations must be done either through violent jihad or non-violent *da'wah*. For them, any forms of jihadism are mandatory and must be unconditionally implemented in the offensive ways. They believe in Sayyid Qutb's teachings. First, the core of *tauhid uluhiyyah* is the *al-hakimiyatu lillah*. Whoever formulate, implement, and comply to the man-made regulations is *syirik* and *kafir* (although he/she is a Muslim). Thus, he/she is deemed as an apostate and killing him/her is valid. Likewise, the society that is apathetic/silent towards such condition is called a *jahiliyah* (uncivilized) society. Since fighting against *kafir* is mandatory for every Muslim, thus there is no difference between the *dzimmy kafir* and the *mu'ahad kafir*. All them are deemed as the *harbi kafir*.

²⁴² See also (Suryaningsih and Marbun 2013).

²⁴³ This does not mean that the strict adherents of the works of Imam Bin Hanbal according to the interpretation of ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab are the violent salafi jihadists. However, the data proves that these 22 individuals only recognize/endorse such works. Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab had based many of his Quranic interpretations on the fatwas of ibn Taymiyyah (Sage-man, 2004), 8. The works of these two Islamic scholars become the main reference for their basic principles of *tawheed*, *fiqh*, and *aqeedah*. At the same time, these 22 individuals also greatly admired and were inspired by Khalid ibn Walid, one of Muhammad's companions, known as the "Sword of Allah" for his fierceness in battle.

They are fanatical and militant, meaning they believe that their belief system (including the ideological conviction) is the absolute truth that must be spread out by any possible ways and means. They are also anti-Western, which means that they view the Western civilization as the prime cause of the decadence in the Islamic civilization (e.g., Islamic culture, Islamic intellectualism, Islamic economic system, and Islamic politics). They believe that the political power of nation-state must be held by Muslim since this is the religious duty. They are fanatic towards a strict, single interpretation of Islam as religion and state system (*ad-din wa ad-daulah*). That said, whoever, including Muslim who does not implement the Islamic *Shari'a* law and does not establish the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia is deemed as *kafir* and valid to be killed.

Therefore, for them, Islam must have a special privilege in the state system. This means that Islam must become the only official religion recognized/endorsed by the government, full right of citizenship for Muslim and *dhimmi* system for non-Muslim, the nationwide implementation of Islamic *Shari'a* law, the mandatory that any high-rank governmental positions must be held by Muslim, and the government must support only Islam where any non-Islamic divisions inside the Indonesian government's ministry of religious affairs must be abolished. They also tend to be *tatharruf*, which means they are excessively extreme in many ways. They often place *Sunnah* as the mandatory, *furu/furu'uddin* (non-principal/non-fundamental) as *ushul/ushuluddin* (principal/fundamental), and something profane as sacral.


Consequences: With What Outcomes?

This radical phenomenon will produce five possible consequences: the possibility for the thriving of non-violent extremist movements; the thriving of violent extremist movements; the terrorized society; the establishment of Islamic *Shari'a* law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia; or otherwise the moderation of ideology and behaviour where they will eventually decide to abandon their extreme ideology and action/behaviour.

It is also noteworthy that not all these 22 individuals have truly abandoned their violent ideology and/or behaviour. Once the opportunity is available for them to

reactivate their violent behaviour, it is likely that they will come back accordingly. It is well proven by the fact where a number of these 22 sentenced individuals are indeed the recidivist or have decided to continue on their fighting by joining the ISIS at overseas among many other radical/violent activities.

Figure 4.1.1 A Way of Looking at the Pattern of Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia



Source: Self-made.

b. The Content Analysis

Similar with the discovering patterns analysis, the content analysis in this part is also based on the same sample of 22 individuals who are examined only through public documentation-archival evidence including legal court cases and published media documents. All them have been indicted in the terrorism case. 16 individuals are still in the prison, whilst 6 individuals have been recently released.²⁴⁴ Correspondingly, based on the content analysis in this part I could draw on several selective words that are most mentioned and have substantial meanings in the mind of violent (Salafi) jihadists in Indonesia. This profiling is based on the official investigative reports and court documents published by the Indonesian authority. These selective words are also deemed as the most important concepts by the academicians and policy scholars in understanding the phenomenon of Islamist movement in Indonesia particularly the extremist, radical, and violent one.

Table 4.1.1 The Content Analysis

No	The Most Mentioned and Important Terminologies by 25 Individuals	Meaning Within Their Bounded Rationality	Their Frequency of Use/Mentioning
1	The establishment of Salafi Islamist State of Indonesia.	Their goal. This is the integral part of their belief and obligation as the devout Muslim.	This word is mentioned by 22 individuals and has very important meaning for them.

²⁴⁴ For the profiling of these 22 individuals, please the attachment #1 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis.

2	The implementation of Islamic (<i>Shari'a</i>) law in Indonesia.	Their goal. This is the integral part of their belief and obligation as the devout Muslim.	This word is mentioned by 22 individuals and has very important meaning for them.
3	Violent/Lesser/Physical Jihad. (violent action)	As a necessary way. For them this is something justified by the Quran and Hadith.	This word is mentioned by 22 individuals and has very important meaning for them.
4	<i>Da'wah.</i>	As a necessary way. They believe that this is something mandated by the Quran and Hadith. For them, with or without violent acts, <i>da'wah</i> is still very important element in the Islamic struggles.	This word is mentioned by 22 individuals and has very important meaning for them. <i>Da'wah</i> is deemed by them as an integral part of violent jihad.
5	<i>Al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah.</i>	Their goal (nationally, regionally, and globally). This is the integral part of their belief and obligation as the devout Muslim.	This word is mentioned by 22 individuals and has very important meaning for them.

6	<i>Takfir.</i>	<p>They believe that others with different view, ideology, and belief system are deemed as <i>kafir</i> (in the wrong way and not being grateful to Allah). Muslim people with different view are also deemed as <i>takfir</i> (apostate or infidel). Thus, they must be excommunicated and are also the valid targets to be attacked and fought on.</p>	<p>This word is mentioned by 22 individuals and has very important meaning for them.</p>
7	<i>Togut or taghut.</i> ²⁴⁵	<p>Anything/anyone being worshipped or anything/anyone that rules but non-<i>Shari'a</i> conforming laws. This meaning goes beyond, where Togut or taghut is also</p>	<p>This word is mentioned by 22 individuals and has very important meaning for them.</p>

²⁴⁵ In general, this is an Islamic concept that refers to any voluntary allegiances other than to Allah and His commands. However, in another perspective *taghut* is more complex than that. As an Islamist/jihadist literature, *taghut* is understood as anything/anyone being worshipped or anything/anyone that rules but non-*Shari'a* conforming laws.

		<p>interpreted as any hindrances (in the government or outside the government) to their goal. <i>Togut or taghut</i> must be fought on. For them, fighting the <i>togut or taghut</i> is justified by the Quran and Hadith.</p>	
8	<p>The Enemy of Islam (the Western world, Jewish People, Judaism, and Christianity).</p>	<p>These enemies of Islam are actively conspiring to destroy Islam at various lines of life. These enemies are the retarding force for both the advancement of Islamic civilization and the establishment of a just society at the global level. For them, this belief is also justified by their selective and extreme interpretation of Quran and Hadith.</p>	<p>This word is mentioned by 22 individuals and has very important meaning for them.</p>

9	<i>Pancasila.</i>	<p><i>Pancasila</i> is not acknowledged within their bounded rationality as the legitimate national and state ideology. Anything related to the state system is man-made and not worthy to be complied on. They believe that this “secular” ideology must be replaced by the Islamic-based ideology/Islamism (reflected by Quran and Hadith) as the ideological foundation and ultimate source of law in Indonesia.</p>	22 individuals believe and mention <i>Pancasila</i> as the idol, man-made ideology that must not be followed.
10	UUD 1945.	<p>UUD 1945 is not recognized as the legitimate constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Like <i>Pancasila</i>, anything related to the state system is man-made and not worthy to be</p>	22 individuals also believe and mention UUD 1945 as the idol, man-made foundational constitution that must not be followed.

		<p>complied on. They believe that this secular-based foundational constitution must be replaced by the Islamic <i>Shari'a</i> law as the only legal foundation in Indonesia.</p>	
11	<i>Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.</i>	<p><i>Bhinneka Tunggal Ika</i>, which is the national motto whose meaning is “the unity in diversity” is also not recognized within their bounded rationality. Anything related to the state system is man-made and not worthy to be complied on.</p> <p>They believe that this “secular-based” national motto must be replaced by the uniformity under the Islamic-based ideology/Islamism and the application of <i>Shari'a</i> law in the</p>	<p>22 individuals also believe and mention <i>Bhinneka Tunggal Ika</i> as the idol, man-made motto that must not be followed.</p>

		Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia.	
12	NKRI <i>(Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia).</i>	NKRI is the Indonesian acronym for “the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia.” This is the state formation according to the UUD 1945. NKRI is also not recognized by them. They believe that this state formation must be replaced by the establishment of Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia (<i>Negara Islam Indonesia</i>).	100% 22 individuals also believe and mention NKRI as a ramification of both the illegitimate national and state ideology of <i>Pancasila</i> , as well as the national constitution of UUD 1945.

c. The Discourse Analysis

The discourse analysis in this part is based on the series of interview with the 15-key state/security officials and experts in the field. There are three stages carried out in this discourse analysis. The first stage is where these 15 individuals filled out the written open ended-questionnaire to express their opinions about the examined independent (determining) variables, dependent variable (Islamist terrorism), and counterterrorism measures in Indonesia. Some of these 15 individuals also discuss the matter directly with me as the author of this Ph.D. thesis. These 15 individuals portray the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia including its countermeasures in the various ways, thus providing us with a synthesized view of the phenomenon being

examined. The second stage is where I analyze their opinions and have them elaborated according to the independent and dependent variables examined in this Ph.D. thesis. The first and second stage's materials of analysis are available in the attachment of this Ph.D. thesis.²⁴⁶ The third stage is where I synthesize and rephrase their opinions in the following part.

On the Economic Variable (The Independent Variable #1)

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts in the field indicate that nearly all violent Salafi jihadists come from the lower-level economic class so that their economic condition is dire that makes it hard to plan their financial life ahead. Indeed, there are some individuals who come from the mid-level economic class, but their numbers are relatively low and most of them rather play their role as the planner, specialist (e.g., ICT/Information and Communication Technology expert), resources provider, and ideologue. In other words, often their families are not well off and these individuals are living a very low quality of life. The individuals coming from the low-level economic class usually could not afford secular education beyond public schools, so that joining the Islamic boarding schools becoming an alternative. Although not all Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia are emphasizing on the ideology of Salafi jihadism (many of them are still the *Pancasila*-based Islamic boarding schools), the radical boarding schools emphasizing on the ideology of Salafi jihadism become an attractive choice for them to learn about religion. Whilst they are attending such boarding schools, they are concurrently forming a strong social network. In addition to that, a harder economic life will make these individuals more willing to seek "their God" through certain religious activities (e.g., the Quran recitation) that eventually would expose them to the radical ideology.

It seems that the economic variable could become necessary, but not a sufficient variable for Salafi jihad terrorism to occur in Indonesia. Generally, after they are exposed to the radical ideology they believe that their economic difficulties are caused by external forces including the conspiracy of the secular government, Jewish,

²⁴⁶ For the first and second stage's materials, see the attachment #2 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis.

Christian, and the Western civilization that invisibly conquer and dominate the world whilst at the same time destroying Islam. That said, the economic variable is not the motivation, although the economic variable is needed to finance terrorist activities.

From another perspective, we also can see that by joining radical and terrorist networks they have their immediate financial needs fulfilled. The economic imbalance in Indonesia as indicated by the gini-coefficient index is also still a concerning factor for the terrorist recruitment and for Salafi jihad terrorism to occur. The fact showing that extremists/violent jihadists not only come from the lower-level economic class also confirms the hypothesis that there is no single economic class that is impenetrable by radical/extremist/violent jihadist ideology.

On the Social/Education Variable (The Independent Variable #2)

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts in the field indicate that nearly all violent Salafi jihadists who have been indicted in the terrorism case have various, formal educational exposures ranging from the elementary to the doctorate level. However, according to the series of interview with these 15-key state/security officials and experts, most them is at least the high school graduates with some college courses (or its equivalence in the Islamic boarding school system). This indication provides us with the insight that the influence of Salafi jihad terrorism in Indonesia has a tremendous capability to penetrate every level of educational background and wider social structures.

According to the opinions of these key state/security officials and experts, such influence infiltrates through Islamic boarding schools and Quran-recitation fellowships. Moreover, the infiltration of ideology is also carried through the *da'wah* council of various mosques and the Islamic student body of various college/universities. They receive some support from certain political parties and overseas sources. The Islamist ideology that directly or indirectly supports the establishment of Islamic *Shari'a* law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia to some degree is deemed as a national security threat to the Republic of Indonesia.

On the Employment Variable (The Independent Variable #2)

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate that the employment status of Salafi jihadists is usually a low-paying one, thus making their social status generally from the lower class of society. That is why they would find a more financial stability by aligning themselves with a radical group since many of them having no high-paying jobs prior to their joining with a radical group. Their social grievances are largely compensated by centring on a sense of wanting to feel important and feel like leaders in the community. They do not have important jobs or positions of power before joining with an Islamist group, so they find that working towards a radical goal will be providing them with some meanings in life. Additionally, the association with the radical social network also add to the sense of self-importance. They find safety, comfort, and acceptance in those groups. Nearly all violent jihadists are involved in the Salafi jihad terrorism because they have been previously connected with the related social networks.

On the Political Variable (The Independent Variable #3)

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate that the political grievances are not the main reason for these individuals before joining with an Islamist radical group. That said, in the Indonesian context, the radical ideology precedes political grievances instead of being otherwise. In this case, the weight of radical ideology seems to be heavier than that of political grievances. This is indeed an interesting finding that challenges the conventional findings in security studies where the factor of political repression usually causes politically repressed people to become radical. In other words, addressing the political grievances is indeed not their main priority. However, upon joining the group, the political dimension becomes an important end-state for such individuals to help achieve. Correspondingly, nearly all violent jihadists view that democracy including in Indonesia as a failure in terms of its conceptual model and of its application.

They view that in the authoritarian system they could not channel out their political aspiration, whilst within their bounded rationality the product of Indonesian

democracy also could not produce the expected outcomes characterized by the free-corruption society, economic equality and equitability, equal justice, and the come-back of Islamic Golden Age. The failure to apply the Islamic values and *Shari'a* law in the society is deemed as the most significant factor for the defects found in the politico-social-economic life.

On the Radical Ideology Variable (The Independent Variable #4)

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate that the religious knowledge of Islamist terrorists (the Salafi jihadists) is very minimal before joining radical groups. In often cases, their first in-depth exposure to Islam is through radical groups. This allowed radical leaders to take advantage of their lack of religious knowledge and misinformation, and then to manipulate these individuals. These conditions are exacerbated by the radicals' use of social media and cyberspace. Whilst the old, *al-Qaeda* type of radicals (e.g., Taliban's Afghanistan) desired to turn back the clock, the current Islamist radicals/terrorists embrace and exploit technology. As previously mentioned, a harder economic life will make these individuals more willing to seek "their God" through certain religious activities (e.g., the Quran recitation) that eventually would expose them to the radical ideology. The interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate that the radical ideology is the most significant factor for the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. It is for this reason that the biggest Indonesian Islamist organizations (NU and *Muhammadiyah*) have been trying to develop in the archipelago an Islamist movement that is *Pancasila*-based (inclusive and pluralistic Islamism).

On the Social Network Variable (The Independent Variable #5)

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate that social network is an important venue through which they are gradually exposed to the radical ideology and behaviour including in the act of terrorism. Practically it is through a social network that these individuals would have the desire to feel important in the exclusive community where the striving for something greater than themselves is

deemed as very important. The complex interaction within the social network is also related to a sense of acceptance by their peers. If they do a good job of committing radical activities, their peers will view them as strong leaders.

On the State Repression Variable (The Independent Variable #6/“Stick”) and Government Incentive Variable (The Independent Variable #7/“Carrot”)

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate that the current level of state repression in Indonesia is already enough to deter Salafi jihad terrorism activities. However, this is not an absolute term, meaning that any adjustments must be made depending upon the dynamic development of Salafi jihad terrorism movement. The correlation of state repression and government incentive must also be in the positive state, which means that the higher the state repression level, the higher government incentive level should be. The state repression is aimed to deter people from becoming violent jihadists/terrorists, whilst the government incentive is aimed to moderate the view, ideology, and belief system of already radicalized individuals. In other words, the government incentive is a significant policy tool to both disengage radicalized individuals from terrorism networks and activities as well as to de-radicalize them from extremist/violent jihadist ideology.

On the Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia (The Dependent Variable)

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate that Indonesia is still potential to become both the producer of violent jihadists as much as to become the training field and battlefield for global religious terrorism (terrorism that is justified by religious-based arguments). For the Indonesian context, the individuals who have been involved in the act of terrorism (Salafi jihad) still have the strong passion as they are talking about the application of Islamic values and *Shari’a* law in every level of society, although at this moment this aim would not be effectively achieved through radical, violent ways. The peaceful jihad to gradually/progressively achieve their aim through democratic ways is the only current way they could do. However, once the opportunity for them to re-engage in the radical and violent ways is opened, they will

make their come-back accordingly. For the Indonesian general society and national security community, the Islamist ideology that directly or indirectly supports the establishment of Islamic *Shari'a* law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia is deemed as a serious threat to the Indonesian national security.

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts also indicate that the radical ideology is the most significant factor for the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. According to these key state/security officials and experts, within the bounded rationality of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists), violence is permitted and encouraged in the Quran and the Hadith as a form of lesser jihad, thus committing violent jihad in the form of terrorists attacks against the civilian as well as the government and national security apparatus will erode the power and legitimacy of the establishment, and to provide for a space in which the Islamic *Shari'a* law and the Salafi Islamist state to potentially arise. Such radical, violent ways are needed for them to establish the caliphate within the traditional Muslim lands (e.g., Arab peninsula extending to some parts of southeast and southwest Asia) before reaching out the northern and eastern Europe, the Americas, and sub-Saharan Africa. Such caliphate is deemed by these Salafi jihadists as a perfect system that will rid the lands of the *ummah* of any crimes, poverty, or decadence.

On the Indonesian Counterterrorism Efforts

The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate that the Indonesian counterterrorism efforts must be done in a consistent way and still need to be improved in many aspects.

First, the government must continue to effectively address the root causes of Islamist terrorism: economic, social, and political grievances; radical ideology; social networks; state repression; and government incentive. Second, in terms of constitutional aspect, the current counterterrorism bill needs to be passed as a new counterterrorism act with some revisions in the substantial matters.

Third, in terms of strategic engagement and holistic whole-of-government-and-society approaches, the Indonesian counterterrorism efforts must maximize the involvement of all national instruments of power, sustained by the recalibration of

Indonesian national counterterrorism agency/BNPT. This recalibration includes the centralization of national counterterrorism policy and strategy at the presidential cabinet level; coordination, strategic decisionmaking process, and the specialization in counterterrorism efforts at the BNPT level; and the development of effective and timely operational capabilities among the involved agencies (including the prison system among many others).

On top of these dimensions, the Indonesian government must promote Quran research activities by using positivist approaches. Such engagement will help to counter Quran recitation activities that often lead people to blindly believe in something which they do not actually understand. Rationalizing the radicalized mind is an important step towards more moderation in their mind and behaviour.

4.2 The Quantitative Analysis.

The quantitative analysis in this part is based on the close-ended survey over 40 former convicted Islamist terrorists living outside prisons. Currently they support the Indonesian government in the deradicalization efforts. There are four stages carried out in this analysis. The first stage is where they filled out the questionnaires. The second stage is where their responses are converted into the excel format. The third stage is where their responses are transformed into specific STATA data set files.²⁴⁷ The fourth stage is where I analyze all converted data in this specific STATA data set by using various multivariate statistical techniques available in the STATA software.

The entire analysis is directed towards independent variables (economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive) and the dependent variable. The variable “YBelieveOnJihadAndTerrorism or ybeliefonjihadandterrorism” is the dependent variable that captures and measures the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari’a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).²⁴⁸

a. Individual Relationship Between Each Independent Variable with the Dependent Variable.

In this sub-part of chapter 4.2., I conduct several statistical analyses to measure the existence of a relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable. The statistical test used is the chi-square test. The test is to be conducted under the two models: with the initial categorical variables (for all independent variables

²⁴⁷ For the first, second and third stage’s materials, see the attachment #3 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis.

²⁴⁸ As a reminding, this Ph.D. thesis excludes other perpetrators since the sample for this Ph.D. thesis is only focused on the salafi-jihadists who are convicted of terrorism acts. There are no other categories of perpetrators from different political ideology camps (e.g., communists or etno-nationalists) in this sample. Communists or etno-nationalists could perform the acts of terror/terrorism for different objectives.

and the dependent variable) and with the binary variables (for all independent variables and the dependent variable).

In the binary model, the dependent variable will be re-categorized into agree and less agree (1) and disagree (0). Likewise, the independent variables are re-categorized into (1) and (0) by replacing certain variables' attributes into (1) and otherwise into (0).

Y: YBelieveOnJihadAndTerrorism

Table 4.2.1 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism
```

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	9	26.47	26.47
2	5	14.71	41.18
3	20	58.82	100.00
Total	34	100.00	

1. Disagree (0)
2. Less Agree (1)
3. Agree (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: Out of 40 individuals surveyed, 58.82% of them is agree, 14.71% is less agree, and 9% is disagree with the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).

1. The Independent Variable “Age” and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.2 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism Age, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
frequency
expected frequency
chi2 contribution
row percentage

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	Age							Total
	24	25	26	29	31	33	34	
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	9
	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.8	9.0
	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	14.1
	0.00	11.11	0.00	11.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5
	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	5.0
	0.2	1.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	12.6
	0.00	20.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
3	1	0	1	0	2	3	3	18
	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.6	1.1	1.7	1.7	18.0
	0.3	1.1	0.3	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.0	9.1
	5.56	0.00	5.56	0.00	11.11	16.67	16.67	100.00
Total	1	2	1	1	2	3	3	32
	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	32.0
	0.8	3.0	0.8	2.6	1.6	2.3	2.3	35.8
	3.13	6.25	3.13	3.13	6.25	9.38	9.38	100.00

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	Age							Total
	35	36	38	40	41	42	45	
1	0	2	1	1	0	0	2	9
	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.6	9.0
	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	3.7	14.1
	0.00	22.22	11.11	11.11	0.00	0.00	22.22	100.00
2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	5
	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	5.0
	1.5	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	1.5	0.3	12.6
	20.00	20.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	20.00	0.00	100.00
3	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	18
	1.1	2.3	1.1	1.1	0.6	1.1	1.1	18.0
	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.1	9.1
	5.56	5.56	5.56	5.56	5.56	5.56	0.00	100.00
Total	2	4	2	2	1	2	2	32
	2.0	4.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	32.0
	2.1	1.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	2.1	5.1	35.8
	6.25	12.50	6.25	6.25	3.13	6.25	6.25	100.00

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	Age				Total
	49	53	55	65	
1	0	0	1	0	9
	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	9.0
	0.3	0.3	1.8	0.3	14.1
	0.00	0.00	11.11	0.00	100.00
2	1	0	0	0	5
	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	5.0
	4.6	0.2	0.2	0.2	12.6
	20.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
3	0	1	0	1	18
	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	18.0
	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.3	9.1
	0.00	5.56	0.00	5.56	100.00
Total	1	1	1	1	32
	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	32.0
	5.4	0.8	2.6	0.8	35.8
	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	100.00

Pearson chi2(34) = 35.8222 Pr = 0.383

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Age”.

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Age”.

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Age.”

Tab 4.2.3 The STATA Calculation

. tab Age

Age	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
24	1	2.70	2.70
25	2	5.41	8.11
26	1	2.70	10.81
29	1	2.70	13.51
30	1	2.70	16.22
31	2	5.41	21.62
33	3	8.11	29.73
34	3	8.11	37.84
35	2	5.41	43.24
36	4	10.81	54.05
38	4	10.81	64.86
40	3	8.11	72.97
41	1	2.70	75.68
42	2	5.41	81.08
45	3	8.11	89.19
49	1	2.70	91.89
53	1	2.70	94.59
55	1	2.70	97.30
65	1	2.70	100.00
Total	37	100.00	

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari’a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the age category.

2. The Independent Variable “Birth Place” and Y: No Significant Relationship

Tab 4.2.4 The STATA Calculation

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	BirthPlace			Total
	5	8	9	
1	0	0	0	8
	0.3	0.3	0.7	8.0
	0.3	0.3	0.7	6.1
	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
2	0	1	0	4
	0.2	0.2	0.3	4.0
	0.2	4.2	0.3	8.0
	0.00	25.00	0.00	100.00
3	1	0	2	12
	0.5	0.5	1.0	12.0
	0.5	0.5	1.0	5.4
	8.33	0.00	16.67	100.00
Total	1	1	2	24
	1.0	1.0	2.0	24.0
	1.0	5.0	2.0	19.5
	4.17	4.17	8.33	100.00

Pearson chi2(18) = 19.5000 Pr = 0.362

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “BirthPlace”.

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “BirthPlace”.

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “BirthPlace.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Tab 4.2.5 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism birthplace, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	BirthPlace		Total
	0	1	
0	2	6	8
	2.7	5.3	8.0
	0.2	0.1	0.3
	25.00	75.00	100.00
1	6	10	16
	5.3	10.7	16.0
	0.1	0.0	0.1
	37.50	62.50	100.00
Total	8	16	24
	8.0	16.0	24.0
	0.3	0.1	0.4
	33.33	66.67	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.3750 Pr = 0.540

Tab 4.2.6 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab BirthPlace
```

BirthPlace	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	4	13.79	13.79
10	2	6.90	20.69
11	1	3.45	24.14
12	1	3.45	27.59
2	8	27.59	55.17
3	5	17.24	72.41
4	2	6.90	79.31
5	2	6.90	86.21
7	1	3.45	89.66
8	1	3.45	93.10
9	2	6.90	100.00
Total	29	100.00	

1. Province of DKI Jakarta (1)
2. Province of JATENG (1)
3. Province of JATIM (1)
4. Province of JABAR (1)
5. Province of SUMBAR (0)
6. Province of SUMSEL (0)
7. Province of LAMPUNG (0)
8. Province of KEPRI (0)
9. Province of NTB (0)
10. Province of SULTENG (0)
11. Province of SULUT (0)
12. Province of SUMUT (0)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the birthplace category.

3. The Independent Variable “Ethnicity” and Y: No Significant Relationship

Tab 4.2.7 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism Ethnicity, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	Ethnicity							Total
	1	10	2	3	5	6	7	
1	5	0	0	2	0	1	1	9
	5.9	0.3	0.3	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.3	9.0
	0.1	0.3	0.3	1.2	0.3	1.5	1.5	6.0
	55.56	0.00	0.00	22.22	0.00	11.11	11.11	100.00
2	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	5
	3.3	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	5.0
	0.0	0.2	4.0	0.5	4.0	0.2	0.2	9.3
	60.00	0.00	20.00	0.00	20.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
3	11	1	0	1	0	0	0	15
	9.8	0.5	0.5	1.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	15.0
	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	3.8
	73.33	6.67	0.00	6.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Total	19	1	1	3	1	1	1	29
	19.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	29.0
	0.3	0.9	4.8	1.9	4.8	2.2	2.2	19.1
	65.52	3.45	3.45	10.34	3.45	3.45	3.45	100.00

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	Ethnicity		Total
	8	9	
1	0	0	9
	0.3	0.3	9.0
	0.3	0.3	6.0
	0.00	0.00	100.00
2	0	0	5
	0.2	0.2	5.0
	0.2	0.2	9.3
	0.00	0.00	100.00
3	1	1	15
	0.5	0.5	15.0
	0.5	0.5	3.8
	6.67	6.67	100.00
Total	1	1	29
	1.0	1.0	29.0
	0.9	0.9	19.1
	3.45	3.45	100.00

Pearson chi2(16) = 19.0846 Pr = 0.264

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Ethnicity.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Ethnicity.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Ethnicity.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.8 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism ethnicity, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	Ethnicity		Total
	0	1	
0	4	5	9
	3.1	5.9	9.0
	0.3	0.1	0.4
	44.44	55.56	100.00
1	6	14	20
	6.9	13.1	20.0
	0.1	0.1	0.2
	30.00	70.00	100.00
Total	10	19	29
	10.0	19.0	29.0
	0.4	0.2	0.6
	34.48	65.52	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.5732 Pr = 0.449

Tab 4.2.9 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab Ethnicity
```

Ethnicity	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	22	66.67	66.67
10	1	3.03	69.70
2	1	3.03	72.73
3	3	9.09	81.82
4	1	3.03	84.85
5	1	3.03	87.88
6	1	3.03	90.91
7	1	3.03	93.94
8	1	3.03	96.97
9	1	3.03	100.00
Total	33	100.00	

1. Javanese (1)
2. Malay (0)
3. Sundanese (0)
4. Palembang (0)
5. Betawi (0)
6. Batak (0)
7. Poso/Bugis (0)
8. Bima/Sasak (0)
9. Minang (0)
10. Mbojo/Bima (0)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the ethnicity category. However, it is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 66.67% of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) are the Javanese ethnic.

4. The Independent Variable “Marriage Status” and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.10 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism MarriageStatus, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	MarriageStatus		Total
	0	1	
1	2	7	9
	2.0	7.0	9.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	22.22	77.78	100.00
2	0	5	5
	1.1	3.9	5.0
	1.1	0.3	1.5
	0.00	100.00	100.00
3	5	12	17
	3.8	13.2	17.0
	0.4	0.1	0.5
	29.41	70.59	100.00
Total	7	24	31
	7.0	24.0	31.0
	1.5	0.4	1.9
	22.58	77.42	100.00

Pearson chi2(2) = 1.9128 Pr = 0.384

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “MarriageStatus.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “MarriageStatus.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “MarriageStatus.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.11 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism marriagestatus, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	MarriageStatus		Total
	0	1	
0	2	7	9
	2.0	7.0	9.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	22.22	77.78	100.00
1	5	17	22
	5.0	17.0	22.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	22.73	77.27	100.00
Total	7	24	31
	7.0	24.0	31.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	22.58	77.42	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0009 Pr = 0.976

Table 4.2.12 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab MarriageStatus
```

MarriageSta tus	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	8	22.22	22.22
1	28	77.78	100.00
Total	36	100.00	

1. Married

0. Single/Div

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia

through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the marriage category. However, it is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 77.78% of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) are married or already having a family (as opposed to the single status).

5. The Independent Variable “Location” and Y: Significant Relationship (the confidence level of 90%)

Table 4.2.13 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism Location, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key	
<i>frequency</i>	
<i>expected frequency</i>	
<i>chi2 contribution</i>	
<i>row percentage</i>	

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	Location							Total
	1	10	11	2	3	4	5	
1	1 0.6 0.3 11.11	1 0.3 1.8 11.11	0 0.6 0.6 0.00	3 2.3 0.3 33.33	2 2.0 0.0 22.22	0 1.4 1.4 0.00	0 0.3 0.3 0.00	9 9.0 7.1 100.00
2	0 0.3 0.3 0.00	0 0.2 0.2 0.00	2 0.3 9.1 40.00	1 1.3 0.1 20.00	1 1.1 0.0 20.00	0 0.8 0.8 0.00	1 0.2 4.6 20.00	5 5.0 15.9 100.00
3	1 1.1 0.0 5.56	0 0.6 0.6 0.00	0 1.1 1.1 0.00	4 4.5 0.1 22.22	4 3.9 0.0 22.22	5 2.8 1.7 27.78	0 0.6 0.6 0.00	18 18.0 5.3 100.00
Total	2 2.0 0.7 6.25	1 1.0 2.6 3.13	2 2.0 10.8 6.25	8 8.0 0.4 25.00	7 7.0 0.0 21.88	5 5.0 3.9 15.63	1 1.0 5.4 3.13	32 32.0 28.3 100.00

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	Location			Total
	6	7	8	
1	0 0.3 0.3 0.00	2 0.8 1.6 22.22	0 0.6 0.6 0.00	9 9.0 7.1 100.00
2	0 0.2 0.2 0.00	0 0.5 0.5 0.00	0 0.3 0.3 0.00	5 5.0 15.9 100.00
3	1 0.6 0.3 5.56	1 1.7 0.3 5.56	2 1.1 0.7 11.11	18 18.0 5.3 100.00
Total	1 1.0 0.8 3.13	3 3.0 2.3 9.38	2 2.0 1.6 6.25	32 32.0 28.3 100.00

Pearson chi2(18) = 28.3429 Pr = 0.057

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Location.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Location.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.1.
Therefore, by using 90% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant
relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Location.”

However, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary
model, the relationship becomes insignificant.

Table 4.2.14 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism location, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	Location		Total
	0	1	
0	3	6	9
	2.8	6.2	9.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	33.33	66.67	100.00
1	7	16	23
	7.2	15.8	23.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	30.43	69.57	100.00
Total	10	22	32
	10.0	22.0	32.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	31.25	68.75	100.00

```
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0253 Pr = 0.874
```

Table 4.2.15 The STATA Calculation

. tab Location

Location	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	2	5.41	5.41
10	1	2.70	8.11
11	3	8.11	16.22
2	11	29.73	45.95
3	7	18.92	64.86
4	5	13.51	78.38
5	1	2.70	81.08
6	1	2.70	83.78
7	3	8.11	91.89
8	2	5.41	97.30
9	1	2.70	100.00
Total	37	100.00	

1. Province of DKI Jakarta (1)
2. Province of JATENG (1)
3. Province of JABAR (1)
4. Province of JATIM (1)
5. Province of SUMUT (0)
6. Province of SULSEL (0)
7. Province of SULTENG (0)
8. Province of NTB (0)
9. Province of LAMPUNG (0)
10. Province of KEPRI (0)
11. Province of BANTEN (0)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, based on the first model I can conclude that the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the location category. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 29.73% (the highest percentage) of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) live and come from the province of Central Java followed by West Java (18.92%) and East Java (13.51%).

6. The Independent Variable X1 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.16 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X1GrievOnDailyInc, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key					
<i>frequency</i>					
<i>expected frequency</i>					
<i>chi2 contribution</i>					
<i>row percentage</i>					

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X1GrievOnDailyInc				Total
	1	2	3	4	
1	1	6	1	1	9
	1.1	6.1	1.6	0.3	9.0
	0.0	0.0	0.2	2.0	2.3
	11.11	66.67	11.11	11.11	100.00
2	1	4	0	0	5
	0.6	3.4	0.9	0.1	5.0
	0.3	0.1	0.9	0.1	1.4
	20.00	80.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
3	2	13	5	0	20
	2.4	13.5	3.5	0.6	20.0
	0.1	0.0	0.6	0.6	1.3
	10.00	65.00	25.00	0.00	100.00
Total	4	23	6	1	34
	4.0	23.0	6.0	1.0	34.0
	0.3	0.1	1.7	2.8	5.0
	11.76	67.65	17.65	2.94	100.00

Pearson chi2(6) = 4.9700 Pr = 0.548

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X1GrievOnDailyInc.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “GrievOnDailyInc.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X1GrievOnDailyInc.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.17 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism xlgrievondailyinc, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	XlGrievOnDailyInc		Total
	0	1	
0	7	2	9
	7.1	1.9	9.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	77.78	22.22	100.00
1	20	5	25
	19.9	5.1	25.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	80.00	20.00	100.00
Total	27	7	34
	27.0	7.0	34.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	79.41	20.59	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0200 Pr = 0.888

Table 4.2.18 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X1GrievOnDailyInc
```

X1GrievOnDailyInc	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	4	10.00	10.00
2	27	67.50	77.50
3	7	17.50	95.00
4	2	5.00	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

1. Rp. 200,000 and Up (0).

This range of income level is already above the income level of average Indonesians (the middle-to-upper class).

2. Rp. 30,000 – Rp. 200,000 (0).

This is the range of income level for average Indonesians (the lower-to-middle class).

3. Less Than Rp. 30,000 (1).

This range is already below the poverty line in Indonesia (the poor-to-the middle class).²⁴⁹

4. No Income (1).

This is already below the poverty line in Indonesia.

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the daily income category. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 67.50% (the highest percentage) of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) earns within

²⁴⁹ Even the current Indonesian government uses US\$ 1/day as the lowest income per capita. See (Sukmana 2017).

the range of average Indonesians, whilst the other 10% earns above average Indonesians. In fact, only 22.5% of them earns below the poverty line of about US\$2/day.

Note: This finding is in line with Leon Trotsky's argument that people need more than just poverty to motivate them to revolt. Precisely in his 1936 book, *The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going*, he argued that if poverty was the cause of revolutions, there would be revolutions all the time since most people in the world is poor. Corresponding to Trotsky's argument, Ted Robert Gurr (1970) in his book, *Why Men Rebel?* also argues that people need to feel more intense and prolonged frustration (not only poverty) to make them become rebellious. In other words, Gurr argues that poverty does not necessarily cause people to become rebellious. It is the relative deprivation that causes people to become aggressive and rebellious. This relative deprivation is the perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities, and the intensity and scope of relative deprivation determine the potential for collective violence. These value include welfare, security, self-actualization, and so forth.

7. The Independent Variable X2.1 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.19 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X21GrievOnEmployStatus, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key					
<i>frequency</i>					
<i>expected frequency</i>					
<i>chi2 contribution</i>					
<i>row percentage</i>					

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X21GrievOnEmployStatus				Total
	1	2	3	4	
1	1	3	4	1	9
	1.9	1.9	4.5	0.8	9.0
	0.4	0.7	0.1	0.1	1.2
	11.11	33.33	44.44	11.11	100.00
2	2	0	3	0	5
	1.0	1.0	2.5	0.4	5.0
	0.9	1.0	0.1	0.4	2.5
	40.00	0.00	60.00	0.00	100.00
3	4	4	10	2	20
	4.1	4.1	10.0	1.8	20.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	20.00	20.00	50.00	10.00	100.00
Total	7	7	17	3	34
	7.0	7.0	17.0	3.0	34.0
	1.3	1.7	0.2	0.5	3.7
	20.59	20.59	50.00	8.82	100.00

Pearson chi2(6) = 3.7354 Pr = 0.712

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X21GrievOnEmployStatus.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X21GrievOnEmployStatus.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X21GrievOnEmployStatus.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.20 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x21grievonemploystatus, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X21GrievOnEmployStatu s		Total
	0	1	
0	4	5	9
	3.7	5.3	9.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	44.44	55.56	100.00
1	10	15	25
	10.3	14.7	25.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	40.00	60.00	100.00
Total	14	20	34
	14.0	20.0	34.0
	0.0	0.0	0.1
	41.18	58.82	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0540 Pr = 0.816

.

Table 4.2.21 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X21GrievOnEmployStatus
```

X21GrievOnE mployStatus	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	9	22.50	22.50
2	7	17.50	40.00
3	21	52.50	92.50
4	3	7.50	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

1. Employer (0)
2. Employed (0)
3. Self-Employed (1)
4. Unemployed (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the employment status category. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 60% (the highest percentage) of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) did not have a permanent job (category 3 and 4) whilst they were committing terrorism acts: 52.5% were the self-employed (category 3) whilst 7.5% were the unemployed ones (category 4).

8. The Independent Variable X2.2 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.22 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X22GrievOnEducLevel, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key				
<i>frequency</i>				
<i>expected frequency</i>				
<i>chi2 contribution</i>				
<i>row percentage</i>				

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X22GrievOnEducLevel			Total
	1	2	4	
1	2	7	0	9
	2.4	6.4	0.3	9.0
	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4
	22.22	77.78	0.00	100.00
2	2	3	0	5
	1.3	3.5	0.1	5.0
	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.6
	40.00	60.00	0.00	100.00
3	5	14	1	20
	5.3	14.1	0.6	20.0
	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3
	25.00	70.00	5.00	100.00
Total	9	24	1	34
	9.0	24.0	1.0	34.0
	0.4	0.1	0.7	1.3
	26.47	70.59	2.94	100.00

```
Pearson chi2(4) = 1.2698 Pr = 0.866
```

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X2.2GrievOnEducLevel.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X2.2GrievOnEducLevel.”

Based on the following chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X2.2GrievOnEducLevel.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.23 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x22grievoneduclevel, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
<i>frequency</i>			
<i>expected frequency</i>			
<i>chi2 contribution</i>			
<i>row percentage</i>			

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X22GrievOnEducLevel		Total
	0	1	
0	9	0	9
	8.7	0.3	9.0
	0.0	0.3	0.3
	100.00	0.00	100.00
1	24	1	25
	24.3	0.7	25.0
	0.0	0.1	0.1
	96.00	4.00	100.00
Total	33	1	34
	33.0	1.0	34.0
	0.0	0.4	0.4
	97.06	2.94	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.3709 Pr = 0.543

Table 4.2.24 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X22GrievOnEducLevel
```

X22GrievOnE ducLevel	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	10	25.00	25.00
2	27	67.50	92.50
3	1	2.50	95.00
4	2	5.00	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

1. Undergraduate (0)
2. SMP/SMA (0)
3. Passing Elementary (1)
4. Not Passing Elementary (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the educational level category. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 92.5% of them at least have completed the minimum mandatory educational years (9 years) stipulated by the Indonesian government.

9. The Independent Variable X3 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.25 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X3GrievOnPol, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X3GrievOnPol			Total
	1	2	3	
1	5	2	2	9
	4.9	1.4	2.7	9.0
	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.5
	55.56	22.22	22.22	100.00
2	4	0	1	5
	2.7	0.8	1.5	5.0
	0.6	0.8	0.2	1.5
	80.00	0.00	20.00	100.00
3	9	3	7	19
	10.4	2.9	5.8	19.0
	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.5
	47.37	15.79	36.84	100.00
Total	18	5	10	33
	18.0	5.0	10.0	33.0
	0.8	1.1	0.6	2.5
	54.55	15.15	30.30	100.00

Pearson chi2(4) = 2.4719 Pr = 0.650

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X3GrievOnPol.”

Ha: There is statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X3GrievOnPol.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X3GrievOnPol.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.26 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x3grievonpol, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X3GrievOnPol		Total
	0	1	
0	5	4	9
	4.9	4.1	9.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	55.56	44.44	100.00
1	13	11	24
	13.1	10.9	24.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	54.17	45.83	100.00
Total	18	15	33
	18.0	15.0	33.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	54.55	45.45	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0051 Pr = 0.943

Table 4.2.27 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X3GrievOnPol
```

X3GrievOnPo 1	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	23	58.97	58.97
2	5	12.82	71.79
3	11	28.21	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

1. Neither One (0)
2. Unrepresented (1)
3. Marginalized (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the political grievances category. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 58.97% (the majority) of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) did not feel that they had any political grievances (they neither felt politically unrepresented nor marginalized).

10. The Independent Variable X4.1 and Y: Significant Relationship (95% of Confidence Level)

Table 4.2.28 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X41SyariahLaw, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X41SyariahLaw			Total
	1	2	3	
1	3	6	0	9
	1.3	4.5	3.2	9.0
	2.1	0.5	3.2	5.8
	33.33	66.67	0.00	100.00
2	0	4	1	5
	0.7	2.5	1.8	5.0
	0.7	0.9	0.3	2.0
	0.00	80.00	20.00	100.00
3	2	7	11	20
	2.9	10.0	7.1	20.0
	0.3	0.9	2.2	3.4
	10.00	35.00	55.00	100.00
Total	5	17	12	34
	5.0	17.0	12.0	34.0
	3.2	2.3	5.7	11.2
	14.71	50.00	35.29	100.00

Pearson chi2(4) = 11.1683 Pr = 0.025

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X41SyariahLaw.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X41SyariahLaw.”

Based on the chi-square test, H_0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.05

Therefore, by using 95% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X41SyariahLaw.” Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still significant (but decreasing to 90% of confidence level).

Table 4.2.29 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x41syariahlaw, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X41SyariahLaw		Total
	0	1	
0	3	6	9
	1.3	7.7	9.0
	2.1	0.4	2.5
	33.33	66.67	100.00
1	2	23	25
	3.7	21.3	25.0
	0.8	0.1	0.9
	8.00	92.00	100.00
Total	5	29	34
	5.0	29.0	34.0
	2.9	0.5	3.4
	14.71	85.29	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 3.3859 Pr = 0.066

Table 4.2.30 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X41SyariahLaw
```

X41SyariahL aw	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	5	13.16	13.16
2	17	44.74	57.89
3	16	42.11	100.00
Total	38	100.00	

1. Not Islamic (*Shari'a*) law (0)
2. Islamic (*Shari'a*) law (1)
3. Islamist State (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of how the individual perceive the mandatory to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 44.74% of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) firmly believe that the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law must be established in Indonesia, whilst the other 42.11% believe even more which was the mandatory to establish the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. The two groups combined is already equal with 86.85% of total sample surveyed.

11. The Independent Variable X4.2 and Y: Significant Relationship (95% of Confidence Level)

Table 4.2.31 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X42IslamistState, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X42IslamistState		Total
	0	1	
1	9	0	9
	5.8	3.2	9.0
	1.7	3.2	4.9
	100.00	0.00	100.00
2	4	1	5
	3.2	1.8	5.0
	0.2	0.3	0.5
	80.00	20.00	100.00
3	9	11	20
	12.9	7.1	20.0
	1.2	2.2	3.4
	45.00	55.00	100.00
Total	22	12	34
	22.0	12.0	34.0
	3.1	5.7	8.8
	64.71	35.29	100.00

Pearson chi2(2) = 8.8220 Pr = 0.012

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.2IslamistState.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.2IslamistState.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.05

Therefore, by using 95% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.2IslamistState.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still significant.

Table 4.2.32 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x42islamiststate, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X42IslamistState		Total
	0	1	
0	9	0	9
	5.8	3.2	9.0
	1.7	3.2	4.9
	100.00	0.00	100.00
1	13	12	25
	16.2	8.8	25.0
	0.6	1.1	1.8
	52.00	48.00	100.00
Total	22	12	34
	22.0	12.0	34.0
	2.4	4.3	6.7
	64.71	35.29	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 6.6764 Pr = 0.010

Table 4.2.33 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X42IslamistState
```

X42Islamist State	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	24	60.00	60.00
1	16	40.00	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

1. Yes
0. No

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia

through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of how the individual perceive the mandatory of establishing the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. Connecting to the table 4.2.33 above, 40% of individuals surveyed in this sample (of 40 individuals) firmly believe in the mandatory to establish the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia, whilst 60% believe that at least the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law must be established in Indonesia.

12. The Independent Variable X4.3 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.34 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X43IslamicEduYears, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X43IslamicEduYears				Total
	1	2	3	4	
1	2	3	3	0	8
	1.0	3.9	2.3	0.8	8.0
	0.9	0.2	0.2	0.8	2.1
	25.00	37.50	37.50	0.00	100.00
2	1	2	1	1	5
	0.6	2.4	1.5	0.5	5.0
	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.6	1.0
	20.00	40.00	20.00	20.00	100.00
3	1	10	5	2	18
	2.3	8.7	5.2	1.7	18.0
	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.0
	5.56	55.56	27.78	11.11	100.00
Total	4	15	9	3	31
	4.0	15.0	9.0	3.0	31.0
	1.9	0.5	0.3	1.4	4.0
	12.90	48.39	29.03	9.68	100.00

Pearson chi2(6) = 4.0262 Pr = 0.673

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.3IslamicEduYears.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.3IslamicEduYears.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.3IslamicEduYears.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.35 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x43islamicduyears, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
<i>frequency</i>			
<i>expected frequency</i>			
<i>chi2 contribution</i>			
<i>row percentage</i>			

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X43IslamicEduYears		Total
	0	1	
0	2	6	8
	1.0	7.0	8.0
	0.9	0.1	1.0
	25.00	75.00	100.00
1	2	21	23
	3.0	20.0	23.0
	0.3	0.0	0.4
	8.70	91.30	100.00
Total	4	27	31
	4.0	27.0	31.0
	1.2	0.2	1.4
	12.90	87.10	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 1.4040 Pr = 0.236

Table 4.2.36 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X43IslamicEduYears
```

X43IslamicE duYears	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	6	16.22	16.22
2	18	48.65	64.86
3	10	27.03	91.89
4	3	8.11	100.00
Total	37	100.00	

1. Never (0)
2. 1-3 (1)
3. 3-6 (1)
4. More than 6 (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how many years the individual having the full-time Islamic teaching at the Islamic boarding school. Based on this sample of 40 individuals, only 16.22% had never attended the Islamic boarding school before they were committing terrorism acts.

13. The Independent Variable X4.4 and Y: No Significant Relationship Under the 1st Model and Significant Under the 2nd Model

Table 4.2.37 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X44IslamicOrg, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key						
<i>frequency</i>						
<i>expected frequency</i>						
<i>chi2 contribution</i>						
<i>row percentage</i>						

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X44IslamicOrg					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
1	3	2	0	3	1	9
	2.4	0.8	1.3	4.0	0.5	9.0
	0.2	1.8	1.3	0.2	0.4	4.0
	33.33	22.22	0.00	33.33	11.11	100.00
2	2	0	2	1	0	5
	1.3	0.4	0.7	2.2	0.3	5.0
	0.3	0.4	2.2	0.7	0.3	3.9
	40.00	0.00	40.00	20.00	0.00	100.00
3	4	1	3	11	1	20
	5.3	1.8	2.9	8.8	1.2	20.0
	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.2
	20.00	5.00	15.00	55.00	5.00	100.00
Total	9	3	5	15	2	34
	9.0	3.0	5.0	15.0	2.0	34.0
	0.8	2.6	3.5	1.4	0.7	9.1
	26.47	8.82	14.71	44.12	5.88	100.00

Pearson chi2(8) = 9.0981 Pr = 0.334

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.4IslamicOrg.”

Ha: There is statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.4IslamicOrg.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.4IslamicOrg.”

However, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship becomes significant.

Table 4.2.38 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x44islamicorg, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X44IslamicOrg		Total
	0	1	
0	6	3	9
	3.7	5.3	9.0
	1.4	1.0	2.4
	66.67	33.33	100.00
1	8	17	25
	10.3	14.7	25.0
	0.5	0.4	0.9
	32.00	68.00	100.00
Total	14	20	34
	14.0	20.0	34.0
	1.9	1.4	3.3
	41.18	58.82	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 3.2834 Pr = 0.070

Table 4.2.39 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X44IslamicOrg
```

X44IslamicO rg	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	10	25.00	25.00
2	5	12.50	37.50
3	5	12.50	50.00
4	17	42.50	92.50
5	3	7.50	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

1. NU (0)

2. Muhammadiyah (0)

3. Non-NU and Muhammadiyah Campus Islamic Da'wah Fellowship/LDK (1)

4. Non-NU and Muhammadiyah Quran Recitation Fellowship (1)

5. Never (0)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, under the second model we can see that the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of Islamist organization to which they have association (at 90% of confidence level). Based on this sample of 40 individuals, 42.50% of them associate themselves with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship, whilst 12.50% associate themselves with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *Da'wah* fellowship. In other words, this model indicates that the dependent variable is dependent upon whether individuals being associated with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *Da'wah* fellowship.

14. The Independent Variable X4.5 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.40 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X45TakfirismView, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key				
	<i>frequency</i>			
	<i>expected frequency</i>			
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>			
	<i>row percentage</i>			

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X45TakfirismView			Total
	1	2	3	
1	4	5	0	9
	2.1	6.4	0.5	9.0
	1.7	0.3	0.5	2.5
	44.44	55.56	0.00	100.00
2	1	4	0	5
	1.2	3.5	0.3	5.0
	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.4
	20.00	80.00	0.00	100.00
3	3	15	2	20
	4.7	14.1	1.2	20.0
	0.6	0.1	0.6	1.3
	15.00	75.00	10.00	100.00
Total	8	24	2	34
	8.0	24.0	2.0	34.0
	2.3	0.4	1.4	4.1
	23.53	70.59	5.88	100.00

Pearson chi2(4) = 4.1241 Pr = 0.389

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.5TakfirismView.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.5TakfirismView.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.5TakfirismView.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.41 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x45takfirismview, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	frequency		
	expected frequency		
	chi2 contribution		
	row percentage		

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X45TakfirismView		Total
	0	1	
0	9	0	9
	8.2	0.8	9.0
	0.1	0.8	0.9
	100.00	0.00	100.00
1	22	3	25
	22.8	2.2	25.0
	0.0	0.3	0.3
	88.00	12.00	100.00
Total	31	3	34
	31.0	3.0	34.0
	0.1	1.1	1.2
	91.18	8.82	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 1.1845 Pr = 0.276

Table 4.2.42 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X45TakfirismView
```

X45Takfiris mView	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	8	20.51	20.51
2	29	74.36	94.87
3	2	5.13	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

1. Not *Kafir* (0)
2. Not Necessarily *Kafir* (0)
3. *Kafir* (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how the individual views others with different ideology and point of view as *kafir*. This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact only 5.13% of them firmly view others with different ideology and point of view as *kafir*. 74.36% of them believe that others with different ideology and point of view were not necessarily *kafir*.

Note: the meaning of *kafir* within the bounded rationality of the 40 individuals questioned is the derogatory term to define the unbelievers who reject God and the teachings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, and also to deny the absolute dominion and sovereignty of God.

15. The Independent Variable X4.6 and Y: Significant Relationship (99% of Confidence Level)

Table 4.2.43 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X46ForeignGlobalJihad, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X46ForeignGlobalJihad		Total
	0	1	
1	6	3	9
	2.4	6.6	9.0
	5.5	2.0	7.5
	66.67	33.33	100.00
2	3	2	5
	1.3	3.7	5.0
	2.1	0.8	2.9
	60.00	40.00	100.00
3	0	20	20
	5.3	14.7	20.0
	5.3	1.9	7.2
	0.00	100.00	100.00
Total	9	25	34
	9.0	25.0	34.0
	12.9	4.6	17.6
	26.47	73.53	100.00

Pearson chi2(2) = 17.5591 Pr = 0.000

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is 0.000. Therefore, by using 99% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still significant.

Table 4.2.44 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x46foreignglobaljihad, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X46ForeignGlobalJihad		Total
	0	1	
0	6	3	9
	2.4	6.6	9.0
	5.5	2.0	7.5
	66.67	33.33	100.00
1	3	22	25
	6.6	18.4	25.0
	2.0	0.7	2.7
	12.00	88.00	100.00
Total	9	25	34
	9.0	25.0	34.0
	7.5	2.7	10.2
	26.47	73.53	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 10.1607 Pr = 0.001

Table 4.2.45 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X46ForeignGlobalJihad
```

X46ForeignGlobalJihad	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	9	23.08	23.08
1	30	76.92	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

1. Helping fellow Muslims at the global level through jihad
0. Helping fellow Muslims at the global level through peaceful ways (e.g., prayer)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of how the individual aspires to be involved in the global jihad activities (e.g., helping fellow Muslims at the global level through various physical jihad activities). This is important to notice that based on this sample, this factor has the smallest p-value, meaning this is the independent variable with the strongest correlation (at 99% of confidence level) with the dependent variable. This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 76.92% of them firmly have the aspiration to be involved in the global jihad activities. Only 23.08% of them believe that their involvement in helping other fellow Muslims at the global level could be realized in the peaceful ways.

16. The Independent Variable X4.7 and Y: Significant Relationship (95% of Confidence Level)

Table 4.2.46 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X47ViewTowardWest, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key					
<i>frequency</i>					
<i>expected frequency</i>					
<i>chi2 contribution</i>					
<i>row percentage</i>					

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X47ViewTowardWest				Total
	1	2	3	4	
1	2 0.5 4.1 22.22	4 2.1 1.7 44.44	1 0.5 0.4 11.11	2 5.8 2.5 22.22	9 9.0 8.7 100.00
2	0 0.3 0.3 0.00	1 1.2 0.0 20.00	1 0.3 1.7 20.00	3 3.2 0.0 60.00	5 5.0 2.0 100.00
3	0 1.2 1.2 0.00	3 4.7 0.6 15.00	0 1.2 1.2 0.00	17 12.9 1.3 85.00	20 20.0 4.2 100.00
Total	2 2.0 5.6 5.88	8 8.0 2.3 23.53	2 2.0 3.3 5.88	22 22.0 3.8 64.71	34 34.0 15.0 100.00

Pearson chi2(6) = 14.9630 Pr = 0.021

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.7ViewTowardsWest.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.7ViewTowardsWest.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.021.

Therefore, by using 95% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.7ViewTowardsWest.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still significant, but the confidence level increases from 95% into 99%.

Table 4.2.47 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x47viewtowardwest, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
<i>frequency</i>			
<i>expected frequency</i>			
<i>chi2 contribution</i>			
<i>row percentage</i>			

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X47ViewTowardWest		Total
	0	1	
0	7	2	9
	3.2	5.8	9.0
	4.6	2.5	7.1
	77.78	22.22	100.00
1	5	20	25
	8.8	16.2	25.0
	1.7	0.9	2.6
	20.00	80.00	100.00
Total	12	22	34
	12.0	22.0	34.0
	6.3	3.4	9.7
	35.29	64.71	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 9.6734 Pr = 0.002

Table 4.2.48 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X47ViewTowardWest
```

X47ViewTowa rdWest	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	2	5.26	5.26
2	8	21.05	26.32
3	3	7.89	34.21
4	25	65.79	100.00
Total	38	100.00	

1. Not *Kafir* (0)
2. Not Sure (0)
3. Some *Kafir* Some Not (0)
4. *Kafir* or viewing/generalizing the Western world as *kafir* (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of how the individual perceives the Western world as *kafir*. This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 65.79% of them firmly viewing/generalizing the Western world as *kafir* instead of being otherwise.

Note: the meaning of *kafir* within the bounded rationality of the 40 individuals is the derogatory term to define the unbelievers who reject God and the teachings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as well as deny the absolute dominion and sovereignty of God.

17. The Independent Variable X4.8 and Y: Significant Relationship (95% Confidence Level)

Table 4.2.49 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X48ViewOnIsraeliPalestine, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
<i>frequency</i>			
<i>expected frequency</i>			
<i>chi2 contribution</i>			
<i>row percentage</i>			

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X48ViewOnIsraeliPalestine		Total
	0	1	
1	2	7	9
	1.1	7.9	9.0
	0.7	0.1	0.8
	22.22	77.78	100.00
2	2	3	5
	0.6	4.4	5.0
	3.0	0.4	3.5
	40.00	60.00	100.00
3	0	18	18
	2.3	15.8	18.0
	2.3	0.3	2.6
	0.00	100.00	100.00
Total	4	28	32
	4.0	28.0	32.0
	6.0	0.9	6.8
	12.50	87.50	100.00

Pearson chi2(2) = 6.8063 Pr = 0.033

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.8ViewOnIsraeliPalestine.”

Ha: There is statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.8ViewOnIsraeliPalestine.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.033.

Therefore, by using 95% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.8ViewOnIsraeliPalestine.”

However, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship becomes insignificant.

Table 5.2.50 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x48viewonisraelipalestine, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
<i>frequency</i>			
<i>expected frequency</i>			
<i>chi2 contribution</i>			
<i>row percentage</i>			

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X48ViewOnIsraeliPales tine		Total
	0	1	
0	2	7	9
	1.1	7.9	9.0
	0.7	0.1	0.8
	22.22	77.78	100.00
1	2	21	23
	2.9	20.1	23.0
	0.3	0.0	0.3
	8.70	91.30	100.00
Total	4	28	32
	4.0	28.0	32.0
	0.9	0.1	1.1
	12.50	87.50	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 1.0821 Pr = 0.298

.

Table 4.2.51 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X48ViewOnIsraeliPalestine
```

X48ViewOnIs raeliPalest ine	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	5	14.29	14.29
1	30	85.71	100.00
Total	35	100.00	

1. Palestine is Right

0. Neutral (Israel and Palestine could be equally right)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, under the first model the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of how the individual perceives the Israeli-Palestine conflict. This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 85.71% of them firmly support Palestine, whilst the rest of 14.29% view the conflict in the neutral way.

Note: The specific purpose of measuring this independent variable is to see whether there is a significant impact of Israeli-Palestinian conflicts on the mind and behaviour of Indonesian Salafi jihadists. This is important to anticipate whether any developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts can cause Indonesian Salafi jihadists to execute/perform their violent ideology and/or behaviour (e.g., terrorist attacks) in Indonesia or overseas.

18. The Independent Variable X4.9 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.52 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X49HeavenAssurance, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X49HeavenAssurance		Total
	0	1	
1	3	6	9
	2.9	6.1	9.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	33.33	66.67	100.00
2	3	2	5
	1.6	3.4	5.0
	1.2	0.6	1.7
	60.00	40.00	100.00
3	5	15	20
	6.5	13.5	20.0
	0.3	0.2	0.5
	25.00	75.00	100.00
Total	11	23	34
	11.0	23.0	34.0
	1.5	0.7	2.2
	32.35	67.65	100.00

```
Pearson chi2(2) = 2.2443 Pr = 0.326
```

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.9HeavenAssurance.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.9HeavenAssurance.”

Based on the following Chi-Square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.9HeavenAssurance.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.53 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x49heavenassurance, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X49HeavenAssurance		Total
	0	1	
0	3	6	9
	2.9	6.1	9.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	33.33	66.67	100.00
1	8	17	25
	8.1	16.9	25.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	32.00	68.00	100.00
Total	11	23	34
	11.0	23.0	34.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	32.35	67.65	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0054 Pr = 0.942

Table 4.2.54 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X49HeavenAssurance
```

X49HeavenAs surance	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	13	33.33	33.33
1	26	66.67	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

1. Sure
0 Not Sure

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how

the individual believes in the heavenly assurance once they experience the physical death.

This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 33.33% of them actually did not have a certain feeling or belief that they would go to the heaven if they experience the physical death even though it happens through jihad/martyrdom.

19. The Independent Variable X5.1 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.55 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X51RoleInNetworks, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X51RoleInNetworks			Total
	1	2	3	
1	7	2	0	9
	5.6	2.1	1.3	9.0
	0.4	0.0	1.3	1.7
	77.78	22.22	0.00	100.00
2	2	3	0	5
	3.1	1.2	0.7	5.0
	0.4	2.8	0.7	3.9
	40.00	60.00	0.00	100.00
3	12	3	5	20
	12.4	4.7	2.9	20.0
	0.0	0.6	1.4	2.1
	60.00	15.00	25.00	100.00
Total	21	8	5	34
	21.0	8.0	5.0	34.0
	0.8	3.5	3.5	7.7
	61.76	23.53	14.71	100.00

Pearson chi2(4) = 7.7186 Pr = 0.102

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X51RoleInNetworks.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X51RoleInNetworks.”

Based on the following chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X51RoleInNetworks.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.56 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x51roleinnetworks, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
<i>frequency</i>			
<i>expected frequency</i>			
<i>chi2 contribution</i>			
<i>row percentage</i>			

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X51RoleInNetworks		Total
	0	1	
0	7	2	9
	5.6	3.4	9.0
	0.4	0.6	1.0
	77.78	22.22	100.00
1	14	11	25
	15.4	9.6	25.0
	0.1	0.2	0.4
	56.00	44.00	100.00
Total	21	13	34
	21.0	13.0	34.0
	0.5	0.8	1.3
	61.76	38.24	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 1.3290 Pr = 0.249

Table 4.2.57 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X51RoleInNetworks
```

X51RoleInNe tworks	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	25	64.10	64.10
2	8	20.51	84.62
3	6	15.38	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

0. Sympathizer (0)

1. Indirectly Connected (1)

2. Directly Connected (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of the individual's role in the terrorist networks. This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 64.10% of them actually were only the sympathizer, whilst the other 35.9% were either directly or indirectly connected through kinship, marriage, and other friendship modes.

20. The Independent Variable X5.2 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.58 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X52ConnectionToIndividual, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X52ConnectionToIndividual			Total
	1	2	3	
1	5	2	1	8
	4.8	1.3	2.0	8.0
	0.0	0.5	0.5	1.0
	62.50	25.00	12.50	100.00
2	3	1	1	5
	3.0	0.8	1.3	5.0
	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
	60.00	20.00	20.00	100.00
3	11	2	6	19
	11.3	3.0	4.8	19.0
	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.7
	57.89	10.53	31.58	100.00
Total	19	5	8	32
	19.0	5.0	8.0	32.0
	0.0	0.8	0.9	1.7
	59.38	15.63	25.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(4) = 1.7268 Pr = 0.786

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X5.2ConnectionToIndividual.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X5.2ConnectionToIndividual.”

Based on the following chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X5.2ConnectionToIndividual.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.59 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x52connectiontoindividual, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X52ConnectionToIndivi dual		Total
	0	1	
0	5	3	8
	4.8	3.3	8.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	62.50	37.50	100.00
1	14	10	24
	14.3	9.8	24.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	58.33	41.67	100.00
Total	19	13	32
	19.0	13.0	32.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0
	59.38	40.63	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0432 Pr = 0.835

Table 4.2.60 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X52ConnectionToIndividual
```

X52Connecti onToIndivid ual	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	24	64.86	64.86
2	5	13.51	78.38
3	8	21.62	100.00
Total	37	100.00	

1. Sympathizer to certain prominent individuals in the networks (0)
2. Indirectly Connected to certain prominent individuals in the networks (1)
3. Directly Connected to certain prominent individuals in the networks (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of the individual's connection to certain prominent individuals within terrorist networks. This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 64.86% of them actually were only the sympathizer towards certain prominent individuals in the networks, whilst the other 35.14% were either having direct or indirect connections to certain prominent figures within terrorist networks.

21. The Independent Variable X5.3 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.61 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X53AffToIndAndGrp, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X53AffToIndAndGrp					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	2	0	1	0	5
	2.4	1.7	0.4	0.2	0.2	5.0
	0.1	0.0	0.4	2.8	0.2	3.6
	40.00	40.00	0.00	20.00	0.00	100.00
2	2	0	1	0	1	4
	1.9	1.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	4.0
	0.0	1.4	1.2	0.2	3.9	6.7
	50.00	0.00	25.00	0.00	25.00	100.00
3	7	6	1	0	0	14
	6.7	4.9	1.2	0.6	0.6	14.0
	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.6	1.5
	50.00	42.86	7.14	0.00	0.00	100.00
Total	11	8	2	1	1	23
	11.0	8.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	23.0
	0.1	1.7	1.7	3.6	4.8	11.8
	47.83	34.78	8.70	4.35	4.35	100.00

Pearson chi2(8) = 11.8211 Pr = 0.159

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X5.3AffToIndAndGrp.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X5.3AffToIndAndGrp.”

Based on the following chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no

statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X53AffToIndAndGrp.”

However, for this variable, I intentionally do not test it under the binary model.

Table 4.2.62 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X53AffToIndAndGrp
```

X53AffToInd AndGrp	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	14	53.85	53.85
2	8	30.77	84.62
3	2	7.69	92.31
4	1	3.85	96.15
5	1	3.85	100.00
Total	26	100.00	

1. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir/StructuralJI/Ngruki
2. ISIS/Santoso/Poso/Aman Abdurahman/Salim Mubarak Attamini/Lamongan
3. M Fachry of Al-Muhajiroun
4. Habib Rizieq of the Islamic Defender Front/*Front Pembela Islam*/FPI
5. DR. Azhari Husin

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of the individual's affiliation towards certain prominent individuals within radical Islamist networks. However, it is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 53.85% of them have the affiliation to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir/Structural JI/Ngruki networks, and 30.77% have the affiliation to ISIS/Santoso/Poso/Aman Abdurahman/Salim Mubarak Attamini/Lamongan networks.

22. The Independent Variable X6 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.63 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X6ViewOnStateRepression, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X6ViewOnStateRepression			Total
	1	2	3	
1	3	2	2	7
	1.2	2.3	3.5	7.0
	2.9	0.0	0.6	3.6
	42.86	28.57	28.57	100.00
2	1	2	2	5
	0.8	1.7	2.5	5.0
	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2
	20.00	40.00	40.00	100.00
3	1	6	11	18
	3.0	6.0	9.0	18.0
	1.3	0.0	0.4	1.8
	5.56	33.33	61.11	100.00
Total	5	10	15	30
	5.0	10.0	15.0	30.0
	4.2	0.1	1.2	5.5
	16.67	33.33	50.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(4) = 5.5492 Pr = 0.235

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X6ViewOnStateRepression.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X6ViewOnStateRepression.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X6ViewOnStateRepression.”

Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary model, the relationship is still not significant.

Table 4.2.64 The STATA Calculation

```
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x6viewonstaterepression, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key			
	<i>frequency</i>		
	<i>expected frequency</i>		
	<i>chi2 contribution</i>		
	<i>row percentage</i>		

YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism	X6ViewOnStateRepression		Total
	0	1	
0	5	2	7
	3.5	3.5	7.0
	0.6	0.6	1.3
	71.43	28.57	100.00
1	10	13	23
	11.5	11.5	23.0
	0.2	0.2	0.4
	43.48	56.52	100.00
Total	15	15	30
	15.0	15.0	30.0
	0.8	0.8	1.7
	50.00	50.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 1.6770 Pr = 0.195

Table 4.2.65 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X6ViewOnStateRepression
```

X6ViewOnStateRepression	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	5	14.71	14.71
2	10	29.41	44.12
3	19	55.88	100.00
Total	34	100.00	

1. Low Level Repression (0)
2. Mid Level Repression (0)
3. High Level Repression (1)

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how the individual perceives and experiences the state repression. This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 55.88% of them actually perceive and experience the state repression as the high level one as opposed to the low and middle level one. What is included as the high-level repression is the life imprisonment, death penalty, and the killing of perpetrators without the court trial.

23. The Independent Variable X7 and Y: No Significant Relationship

Table 4.2.66 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x7viewongovincentive, cchi2 chi2 expected row
```

Key
<i>frequency</i>
<i>expected frequency</i>
<i>chi2 contribution</i>
<i>row percentage</i>

YBeliefOnJ ihadAndTer rorism	X7ViewOnGovIncentive		Total
	0	1	
0	0	9	9
	0.3	8.7	9.0
	0.3	0.0	0.3
	0.00	100.00	100.00
1	1	24	25
	0.7	24.3	25.0
	0.1	0.0	0.1
	4.00	96.00	100.00
Total	1	33	34
	1.0	33.0	34.0
	0.4	0.0	0.4
	2.94	97.06	100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.3709 Pr = 0.543

.

H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X7ViewOnGovIncentive.”

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X7ViewOnGovIncentive.”

Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X7ViewOnGovIncentive.”

Table 4.2.67 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x7viewongovincentive
```

X7ViewOnGov Incentive	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	5	12.50	12.50
1	35	87.50	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

1. They view that the government gives no incentives at all, need to give them the power-sharing concession, and to stop the repression.

0. Otherwise.

Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how the individual perceives and experiences the government incentive. This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 87.50% of them actually perceive that the government has not given them enough incentives. They expect that the government must stop the repression and giving them power-sharing concession in the government.

b. The Various Multivariate Analysis Using the Logistic Regression.

Based on a number of previous chi-square tests, it can be concluded that there are 8 independent variables that have statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable (either 90%, 95%, or 99% of confidence level). Such variables are the following ones:

location;
 x4.1syariahlaw;
 x4.2islamiststate;
 x4.4islamicorg;
 x4.6foreignglobaljihad;
 x4.7viewtowardswest;
 x4.8viewonisraelipalestine;
 x4.10christendtimes.²⁵⁰

Therefore, in this sub-part I conduct several logistic regression analyses in order to examine the causal relationship, direction and strength of such relationship between all independent variables and the dependent variable. The logistic regression models run in this part will be using the binary model where all independent and dependent variables examined are tested under the binary model (1 and 0).

²⁵⁰ This independent variable is not further analyzed in the following part. The chi-square test to test the statistically significant relationship between this independent variable and the dependent variable is not included in the draft of this Ph.D. thesis. However, upon the specific request it is available to be shown.

b.1. The Logistic Regression of Each Significant Independent Variable Towards the Dependent Variable.

Location

Table 4.2.68 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism location
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -19.012161
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -18.999604
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -18.999601
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -18.999601
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          32
                                LR chi2(1)         =           0.03
                                Prob > chi2        =        0.8741
Log likelihood = -18.999601       Pseudo R2       =        0.0007
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
location	.1335314	.8398554	0.16	0.874	-1.512555	1.779618
_cons	.8472979	.6900656	1.23	0.220	-.5052058	2.199802

Based on this model, it can be concluded that being in the Java island (the province of DKI Jakarta, JATENG, JABAR and JATIM) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.13. However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

x4.1syariahlaw

Table 4.2.69 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x41syariahlaw
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -18.202435
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -18.149817
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -18.149714
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -18.149714
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =        34
                                LR chi2(1)         =         3.00
                                Prob > chi2          =        0.0833
Log likelihood = -18.149714       Pseudo R2        =        0.0763
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x41syariahlaw	1.7492	1.021508	1.71	0.087	-.2529187	3.751318
_cons	-.4054651	.9128709	-0.44	0.657	-2.194659	1.383729

Based on this model, it can be concluded that having the belief (including the ideological conviction) that both Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state must be established in Indonesia increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.7. This prediction has 90% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.1), and the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is significant. The explanatory power of this model is 7.63% (Pseudo R2).

x4.2islamiststate

Table 4.2.70 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x42islamiststate
```

```
note: x42islamiststate != 0 predicts success perfectly
      x42islamiststate dropped and 12 obs not used
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -14.883571
```

```
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -14.883571
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =           22
                                LR chi2(0)        =           0.00
                                Prob > chi2        =           .
Log likelihood = -14.883571       Pseudo R2      =           0.0000
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x42islamiststate	0	(omitted)				
_cons	.3677248	.4336291	0.85	0.396	-.4821726	1.217622

Based on this model, I cannot make any further analysis.

x4.4islamicorg²⁵¹

Table 4.2.71 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x44islamicorg
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.055011
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.014928
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -18.014895
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -18.014895
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          34
                                LR chi2(1)         =           3.27
                                Prob > chi2         =          0.0706
Log likelihood = -18.014895       Pseudo R2       =          0.0832
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x44islamicorg	1.446919	.8269362	1.75	0.080	-.1738462	3.067684
_cons	.2876821	.5400617	0.53	0.594	-.7708195	1.346184

Based on this model, it can be concluded that being associated with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship as opposed to only being associated with NU and *Muhammadiyah* increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.45. This prediction has 90% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.1), and the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is significant. The explanatory power of this model is 8.32% (Pseudo R2).

²⁵¹ Under the second/binary model, there is a statistically relationship between being associated with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship (as opposed to be associated only with NU and *Muhammadiyah*) with being agree and less agree with the ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).

x4.6foreignglobaljihad

Table 4.2.72 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x46foreignglobaljihad
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -15.091612
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -14.90295
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -14.901752
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -14.901752
```

```
Logistic regression              Number of obs   =          34
                                LR chi2(1)       =           9.50
                                Prob > chi2       =          0.0021
Log likelihood = -14.901752      Pseudo R2      =          0.2416
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x46foreignglobaljihad	2.685577	.9374369	2.86	0.004	.8482348	4.52292
_cons	-.6931472	.7071068	-0.98	0.327	-2.079051	.6927566

Based on this model, it can be concluded that having an aspiration to help fellow Muslims by being involved in the physical (jihad) activities at the global level increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 2.69. This prediction has 99% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.01), and the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is significant. The explanatory power of this model is 24.16% (Pseudo R2).

x4.7viewtowardswest

Table 4.2.73 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x47viewtowardwest
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -15.115885
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -14.855011
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -14.852314
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -14.852313
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          34
                                LR chi2(1)         =          9.59
                                Prob > chi2         =         0.0020
Log likelihood = -14.852313       Pseudo R2        =         0.2441
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x47viewtowardwest	2.639057	.9449111	2.79	0.005	.7870652	4.491048
_cons	-.3364722	.58554	-0.57	0.566	-1.48411	.8111652

Based on this model, it can be concluded that firmly viewing/generalizing the Western world as *kafir* (as opposed to otherwise: being unsure and viewing/generalizing the Western world as not necessarily *kafir*) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 2.64. This prediction has 99% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.01), and the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is significant. The explanatory power of this model is 24.41% (Pseudo R2).

Note: the meaning of *kafir* within the bounded rationality of these 40 individuals is the derogatory term to define (and to generalizing) the unbelievers who reject God and the teachings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as well as deny the absolute dominion and sovereignty of God.

x4.8viewonisraelipalestine

Table 4.2.74 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x48viewonisraelipalestine
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.012161
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.528398
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.517973
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -18.517973
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =           32
                                LR chi2(1)         =           0.99
                                Prob > chi2         =          0.3201
                                Pseudo R2          =          0.0260

Log likelihood = -18.517973
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x48viewonisraelipalestine	1.098612	1.091089	1.01	0.314	-1.039884	3.237108
_cons	-2.04e-11	1	-0.00	1.000	-1.959964	1.959964

Based on this model, it can be concluded that for Indonesian Salafi jihadists with having a firm support towards Palestine (as opposed to be neutral and pro-Israel) increases the log-odd of them to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.1. The explanatory power of this model is 2.6% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

Note: The specific purpose of measuring this independent variable is to see whether there is a significant impact of Israeli-Palestinian conflicts on the mind and behaviour of Indonesian Salafi jihadists. This is important to anticipate whether any developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts can cause Indonesian Salafi jihadists to execute/perform their violent ideology and/or behaviour (e.g., terrorist attacks) in Indonesia or overseas.

b.2. The Logistic Regression of Each Non-Significant Independent Variable Towards the Dependent Variable.

In this part I examine the causal relationship between each non-significant independent variable on the dependent variable by using the logistic regression technique. Although these independent variables do not have significant correlational relationship according to the previous chi-square tests, it does not mean I cannot examine their causal relationship by using the logistic regression technique. Out of these regression models we can see how strength their causal relationship is, and under what direction.

Ethnicity

Table 4.2.75 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism ethnicity
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -17.961912
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -17.681477
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -17.680465
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -17.680465
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          29
                                LR chi2(1)         =           0.56
                                Prob > chi2         =          0.4531
Log likelihood = -17.680465       Pseudo R2      =          0.0157
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ethnicity	.6241543	.8295151	0.75	0.452	-1.001665	2.249974
_cons	.4054651	.6454972	0.63	0.530	-.8596862	1.670616

Based on this model, it can be concluded that being a Javanese (as opposed to be other ethnicities) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.62. The explanatory power of this model is 1.6% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

Marriage Status

Table 4.2.76 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism marriagestatus
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -18.675648
```

```
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.675181
```

```
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.675181
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =           31
                                LR chi2(1)         =           0.00
                                Prob > chi2         =          0.9756
Log likelihood = -18.675181       Pseudo R2        =          0.0000
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
marriagestatus	-.0289875	.9495687	-0.03	0.976	-1.890108	1.832133
_cons	.9162907	.83666	1.10	0.273	-.7235328	2.556114

Based on this model, it can be concluded that being a married individual (as opposed to be single) decreases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.29. The explanatory power of this model is 0 (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

X1

Table 4.2.77 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism xlgrievondailyinc
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -19.639471
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -19.639466
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -19.639466
```

```
Logistic regression      Number of obs   =        34
                        LR chi2(1)          =         0.02
                        Prob > chi2         =        0.8882
Log likelihood = -19.639466  Pseudo R2        =        0.0005
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
xlgrievondailyinc	-.1335314	.9449112	-0.14	0.888	-1.985523	1.71846
_cons	1.049822	.439155	2.39	0.017	.1890941	1.91055

Based on this model, it can be concluded that earning under the poverty line (as opposed to be above the poverty line) decreases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.13. The explanatory power of this model is 0.05% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

For this sample and model, it can be interpreted another way: based on this sample of 40 individuals, earning under the poverty line does not necessarily increase the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.13.

X2.1

Table 4.2.78 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x2lgrievonemploystatus
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.62249
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -19.622477
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -19.622477
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          34
                                LR chi2(1)         =           0.05
                                Prob > chi2         =          0.8167
Log likelihood = -19.622477       Pseudo R2        =          0.0014
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x2lgrievonemploystatus	.1823216	.7852813	0.23	0.816	-1.356801	1.721445
_cons	.9162907	.591608	1.55	0.121	-.2432396	2.075821

Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a non-permanent job (as opposed to being either an employee or employer) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.18. The explanatory power of this model is 0.14% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

X2.2

Table 4.2.79 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x22grievoneduclevel

note: x22grievoneduclevel != 0 predicts success perfectly
      x22grievoneduclevel dropped and 1 obs not used

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.336436
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.336436

Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          33
                                LR chi2(0)        =          0.00
                                Prob > chi2        =          .
                                Pseudo R2         =          0.0000

Log likelihood = -19.336436
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x22grievoneduclevel	0	(omitted)				
_cons	.9808293	.390868	2.51	0.012	.2147421	1.746916

Based on this model, I cannot make any further analysis.

X.3

Table 4.2.80 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x3grievonpol
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -19.336436
```

```
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -19.333888
```

```
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -19.333888
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          33
                                LR chi2(1)         =           0.01
                                Prob > chi2         =          0.9431
Log likelihood = -19.333888       Pseudo R2        =          0.0001
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x3grievonpol	.0560895	.786023	0.07	0.943	-1.484487	1.596666
_cons	.9555114	.5262348	1.82	0.069	-.0758898	1.986913

Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a political grievance such as feeling politically marginalized and unrepresented (as opposed to not having/feeling any political grievances) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.06. The explanatory power of this model is 0.01% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

x4.3islamiceduyears

Table 4.2.81 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x43islamiceduyears
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -17.701704
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -17.096364
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -17.074657
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -17.074656
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          31
                                LR chi2(1)         =           1.25
                                Prob > chi2        =          0.2628
Log likelihood = -17.074656       Pseudo R2      =          0.0354
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x43islamiceduyears	1.252763	1.101946	1.14	0.256	-.9070122	3.412538
_cons	-5.55e-10	1	-0.00	1.000	-1.959964	1.959964

Based on this model, it can be concluded that having religious education in the islamic boarding school increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.25. The explanatory power of this model is 3.54% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

X4.5

Table 4.2.82 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x45takfirismview
```

note: x45takfirismview != 0 predicts success perfectly
x45takfirismview dropped and 3 obs not used

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -18.675648
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -18.675648

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	31
	LR chi2(0)	=	0.00
	Prob > chi2	=	.
Log likelihood = -18.675648	Pseudo R2	=	0.0000

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
x45takfirismview	0 (omitted)				
_cons	.8938179	.3956838	2.26	0.024	.1182919 1.669344

Based on this model, I cannot make any further analysis.

X4.9

Table 4.2.83 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x49heavenassurance
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341
```

```
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.646662
```

```
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -19.646662
```

```
Logistic regression
```

```
Number of obs   =          34
```

```
LR   chi2(1)     =          0.01
```

```
Prob > chi2      =          0.9416
```

```
Pseudo R2       =          0.0001
```

```
Log likelihood = -19.646662
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x49heavenassurance	.0606247	.8269362	0.07	0.942	-1.560141	1.68139
_cons	.9808292	.6770032	1.45	0.147	-.3460727	2.307731

Based on this model, it can be concluded that a belief in the heavenly assurance (as opposed to otherwise) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.06. The explanatory power of this model is 0.01% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

X5.1

Table 4.2.84 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x51roleinnetworks
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -18.960449
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -18.947998
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -18.947997
```

```
Logistic regression              Number of obs   =          34
                                LR chi2(1)        =           1.40
                                Prob > chi2        =          0.2363
Log likelihood = -18.947997      Pseudo R2       =          0.0357
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x51roleinnetworks	1.011601	.8973264	1.13	0.260	-.7471266	2.770328
_cons	.6931471	.46291	1.50	0.134	-.2141399	1.600434

Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a role in the network (as opposed to merely being a sympathiser) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.01. The explanatory power of this model is 3.57% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

X5.2

Table 4.2.85 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x52connectiontoindividual
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -17.994725
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -17.973014
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -17.973002
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -17.973002
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =        32
                                LR chi2(1)         =         0.04
                                Prob > chi2          =        0.8349
Log likelihood = -17.973002       Pseudo R2        =        0.0012
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x52connectiontoindividual	.1743534	.839501	0.21	0.835	-1.471038	1.819745
_cons	1.029619	.5209881	1.98	0.048	.0085016	2.050737

Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a connection to certain prominent individuals in the networks (as opposed to merely as a sympathiser) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.17. The explanatory power of this model is 0.12% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

X6

Table 4.2.86 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x6viewonstaterepression
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -16.298183
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -15.457957
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -15.437854
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -15.43783
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -15.43783
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          30
                                LR chi2(1)          =          1.72
                                Prob > chi2          =          0.1896
Log likelihood = -15.43783        Pseudo R2       =          0.0528
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x6viewonstaterepression	1.178655	.9364417	1.26	0.208	-.656737	3.014047
_cons	.6931472	.5477226	1.27	0.206	-.3803693	1.766664

Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a feeling that the government has the high-level repression level towards terrorist perpetrators (as opposed to otherwise) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.18. The explanatory power of this model is 5.28% (Pseudo R2).

However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant.

X7

Table 4.2.87 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x7viewongovincentive
```

```
note: x7viewongovincentive != 1 predicts success perfectly
      x7viewongovincentive dropped and 1 obs not used
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.336436
```

```
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.336436
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          33
                                LR chi2(0)        =           0.00
                                Prob > chi2         =            .
Log likelihood = -19.336436        Pseudo R2       =          0.0000
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x7viewongovincentive	0	(omitted)				
_cons	.9808293	.390868	2.51	0.012	.2147421	1.746916

Based on this model, I cannot make any further analysis.

b.3. The Moderating/Interaction Variables

In this part I have three examples of how certain independent variables when they are combined/interacted with another independent variable will produce greater effect on the dependent variable.

The Moderating/Interaction Variable #1: Variable x44 and Variable x46

Scenario #1: The impact of being being associated with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship.

Table 4.2.88 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x44islamicorg
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -18.055011
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -18.014928
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -18.014895
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -18.014895
```

Logistic regression

```
Number of obs   =      34
LR chi2(1)      =       3.27
Prob > chi2     =      0.0706
Pseudo R2      =      0.0832
```

Log likelihood = -18.014895

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
x44islamicorg	1.446919	.8269362	1.75	0.080	-.1738462 3.067684
_cons	.2876821	.5400617	0.53	0.594	-.7708195 1.346184

Based on this model, it can be concluded that being associated with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship as opposed to only being associated with NU and *Muhammadiyah* increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.45. This prediction has 90% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.1), the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is significant. The explanatory power of this model is 8.32% (Pseudo R2).

The Moderating/Interaction Variable #2: Variable x6 and Variable x46

Scenario #1: The impact of feeling a high-level state repression.

Table 4.2.90 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x6viewonstaterepression
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -16.298183
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -15.457957
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -15.437854
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -15.43783
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -15.43783
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =       30
                                LR chi2(1)         =       1.72
                                Prob > chi2         =     0.1896
Log likelihood = -15.43783        Pseudo R2       =     0.0528
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x6viewonstaterepression	1.178655	.9364417	1.26	0.208	-.656737	3.014047
_cons	.6931472	.5477226	1.27	0.206	-.3803693	1.766664

Increasing the log-odd by 1.17

Not significant

5.28% of Pseudo R2.

Like the previous case, as the interaction of two independent variables are made, all these three indicators: coefficient value; p-value; and pseudo R2 are improved. See the scenario #2 below.

Scenario #2: The impact of feeling a high level state repression (x6) will produce a greater causal impact on the dependent variable when they have an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad (x46). Precisely, the p-value in this model is also becoming quite small, making this new variable almost reaching at 90% of significance level, and both the coefficient level of moderating/interaction variable and the Pseudo R2 of this new model also increase.

Table 4.2.91 The STATA Calculation

```
. gen x46_x6 = x46foreignglobaljihad*x6viewonstaterepression
(7 missing values generated)
```

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x46_x6
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -16.298183
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -14.667812
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -14.563264
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -14.562684
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -14.562684
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =       30
                                LR chi2(1)         =       3.47
                                Prob > chi2          =     0.0625
Log likelihood = -14.562684       Pseudo R2        =     0.1065
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x46_x6	1.878771	1.157976	1.62	0.105	-.390821	4.148363
_cons	.6061358	.5075192	1.19	0.232	-.3885836	1.600855

Increasing the log-odd by 1.88

Still not significant

10.65% of Pseudo R2.

(But the p-value is getting smaller)

After the interaction of two independent variables is made, all these three indicators: coefficient value; p-value; and pseudo R2 are improved.

The Moderating/Interaction Variable #3: Variable x7 and Variable x46

Scenario #1: The impact of having a feeling that government does not give enough incentives.

Table 4.2.92 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x7viewongovincentive

note: x7viewongovincentive != 1 predicts success perfectly
      x7viewongovincentive dropped and 1 obs not used
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.336436
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.336436
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =        33
                                LR chi2(0)         =         0.00
                                Prob > chi2         =          .
Log likelihood = -19.336436       Pseudo R2        =       0.0000
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x7viewongovincentive	0 (omitted)					
_cons	.9808293	.390868	2.51	0.012	.2147421	1.746916

Like the previous case, as the interaction of two independent variables is made, all these three indicators: coefficient value; p-value; and pseudo R2 are improved. See the scenario #2 below.

Scenario #2: The impact of feeling a that government does not give enough incentives (x7) will produce a greater causal impact (increase the log odd by 2.35) on the dependent variable when they have an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad (x46). The p-value in this model is also becoming very small, making this new variable reaching at 99% of significance level.

Table 4.2.93 The STATA Calculation

```
. gen x46_x7 = x46foreignglobaljihad*x7viewongovincentive
(1 missing value generated)
```

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x46_x7
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -15.93395
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -15.773087
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -15.772601
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -15.772601
```

Logistic regression

```
Number of obs   =      34
LR chi2(1)      =       7.75
Prob > chi2     =      0.0054
Pseudo R2      =      0.1973
```

Log likelihood = -15.772601

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x46_x7	2.351375	.8930952	2.63	0.008	.6009408	4.10181
_cons	-.4054651	.6454972	-0.63	0.530	-1.670616	.8596862

Increasing the log-odd by 2.35

Significant

19.73% of Pseudo R2.

After the interaction of two independent variables is made, all these three indicators: coefficient value; p-value; and pseudo R2 are improved.

b.4. The Multivariate Models Using Several Independent Variables

Multivariate Model #1

Table 4.2.94 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x41syariahlaw x46foreignglobaljihad
```

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -19.649341
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -13.877258
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -13.615575
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -13.613319
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -13.613319
```

```
Logistic regression              Number of obs   =          34
                                LR chi2(2)         =          12.07
                                Prob > chi2         =          0.0024
                                Pseudo R2          =          0.3072

Log likelihood = -13.613319
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x41syariahlaw	1.960614	1.244147	1.58	0.115	-.4778686	4.399097
x46foreignglobaljihad	2.792314	1.015422	2.75	0.006	.8021231	4.782505
_cons	-2.350644	1.354603	-1.74	0.083	-5.005617	.3043287

Based on this model that at the same time controlling the two variables with the highest significance level, it can be concluded that having an aspiration to help fellow Muslims by being involved in the physical (jihad) activities at the global level is still a significant factor, whilst having a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia becomes insignificant in this equation. The explanatory power of this model is 30.72% (Pseudo R2). That said, by looking at this model it can be concluded that:

Having a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.96. However, in this equation the variable “a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia” does not have a causal significant effect on the dependent variable.

Having an aspiration to help fellow Muslims by being involved in the physical (jihad) activities at the global level significantly increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 2.80. This prediction has a 99% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.01).

Multivariate Model #2

Table 4.2.95 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x4lsyariahlaw x43islamiceduyears x44islamicorg x46foreignglobaljihad x47viewtowardwe
> st x48viewonisraelipalestine x410christendtimes
```

```
note: x410christendtimes != 1 predicts failure perfectly
      x410christendtimes dropped and 2 obs not used
```

```
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -14.548235
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -11.23644
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -10.981951
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -10.979318
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -10.979317
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          28
                                LR chi2(6)        =           7.14
                                Prob > chi2         =          0.3083
Log likelihood = -10.979317       Pseudo R2      =          0.2453
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x4lsyariahlaw	1.58712	1.393481	1.14	0.255	-1.144053	4.318293
x43islamiceduyears	.5119289	1.442151	0.35	0.723	-2.314636	3.338493
x44islamicorg	.5601928	1.343607	0.42	0.677	-2.073228	3.193614
x46foreignglobaljihad	1.34955	1.376525	0.98	0.327	-1.348388	4.047489
x47viewtowardwest	.9497066	1.462008	0.65	0.516	-1.915776	3.815189
x48viewonisraelipalestine	.0093881	1.961002	0.00	0.996	-3.834106	3.852882
x410christendtimes	0	(omitted)				
_cons	-2.183987	2.099926	-1.04	0.298	-6.299766	1.931793

Based on this model that at the same time controlling the seven ideological variables (all are significant), we can see that neither variables are significant. The explanatory power of this model is 24.53% (Pseudo R2). However, based on the coefficient values on the this model we can still say that the variable x4.1 (having a firm belief, including the ideological conviction to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia) and x4.6 (having an aspiration to help fellow Muslims by being involved in the physical jihad activities at the global level) are still the variables with the highest causal impact on the dependent variable.

However, it is important to note that when these two variables are combined in the same model (model #1), the variable x4.1 which has a bigger lod-odds in the model #2 would become insignificant in the previous model #1 (whilst the variable x4.6 is still consistently significant). Thus, it can be concluded that the variable x4.6 (global jihad) has a very strong causal impact on the dependent variable.

Multivariate Model #3

Table 4.2.96 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x1grievondailyinc x2lgrievonemploystatus x3grievonpol x4lsyariahlaw x46foreignglobal
> jihad x6viewonstaterepression x7viewongovincentive
```

note: x7viewongovincentive omitted because of collinearity

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -16.027274
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -9.7739047
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -8.9117733
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -8.8590054
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -8.8587339
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -8.8587339
```

```
Logistic regression               Number of obs   =          29
                                LR chi2(6)         =          14.34
                                Prob > chi2         =          0.0261
                                Pseudo R2          =          0.4473

Log likelihood = -8.8587339
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x1grievondailyinc	.3212124	2.182568	0.15	0.883	-3.956543	4.598968
x2lgrievonemploystatus	2.309511	1.75467	1.32	0.188	-1.129578	5.748601
x3grievonpol	.5505043	1.362451	0.40	0.686	-2.119851	3.22086
x4lsyariahlaw	3.772268	2.488046	1.52	0.129	-1.104212	8.648748
x46foreignglobaljihad	3.886797	1.69827	2.29	0.022	.5582499	7.215344
x6viewonstaterepression	.8599328	1.387321	0.62	0.535	-1.859167	3.579033
x7viewongovincentive	0 (omitted)					
_cons	-5.921618	3.771902	-1.57	0.116	-13.31441	1.471173

Based on this model that at the same time controlling all representative variables from variable 1 (economic grievance), 2 (social grievance), 3 (political grievance), 4 (radical ideology), 5 (social network), 6 (state repression), and 7 (government incentive).

By looking at this model we can find that all independent variables have a positive causal relationship on the dependent variable, although the only significant variable (95% of confidence level) is x4.6 (foreign global jihad). Again, it can be concluded that the variable x4.6 (global jihad) has a very strong causal impact on the dependent variable. The explanatory power of this model is 44.73% (Pseudo R2). The specific interpretation is as follow:

Earning a daily income that is under the poverty line increases the log-odd to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.32.

Having a non-permanent job (self-employed and unemployed) increases the log-odd to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 2.31.

Having political grievances (feeling politically marginalized and unrepresented) increases the log-odd to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.55.

Having a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) that both Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Islamist state must be established in Indonesia increases the log-odd to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 3.77.

Having an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad increases the log-odd to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 3.89.

Having a perspective that the government has the high level of repression increases the log-odd to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.86.

Multivariate Model #4

The construct of this model is similar with the previous model #3. The only difference is that this model control one more variable which is the “x4.7viewtowardswest.” In this model, neither independent variables have a significant causal relationship on the dependent variable. However, based on their coefficient values we can see that the three independent variables are still the variables with the highest impact on the dependent variable: x4.1syariahlaw; x4.7viewtowardswest; and x4.6foreignglobaljihad.

Table 4.2.97 The STATA Calculation

```
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism xlgrievondailyinc x2lgrievonemploystatus x3grievonpol x4lsyariahlaw x46foreignglobal
> jihad x47viewtowardwest x6viewonstaterepression x7viewongovincentive

note: x7viewongovincentive omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -16.027274
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -8.3289951
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -7.1475306
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -7.0559387
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -7.05499
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -7.05499

Logistic regression               Number of obs   =        29
                                LR chi2(7)          =        17.94
                                Prob > chi2          =        0.0122
                                Pseudo R2           =        0.5598

Log likelihood =   -7.05499
```

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
xlgrievondailyinc	.7772365	2.454761	0.32	0.752	-4.034006	5.588479
x2lgrievonemploystatus	2.067923	1.729404	1.20	0.232	-1.321647	5.457492
x3grievonpol	-1.655876	2.32797	-0.71	0.477	-6.218614	2.906861
x4lsyariahlaw	3.665449	2.61725	1.40	0.161	-1.464266	8.795164
x46foreignglobaljihad	2.99732	1.936426	1.55	0.122	-.7980039	6.792645
x47viewtowardwest	3.467588	2.341345	1.48	0.139	-1.121364	8.05654
x6viewonstaterepression	1.341046	1.562197	0.86	0.391	-1.720803	4.402894
x7viewongovincentive	0 (omitted)					
_cons	-6.184437	3.762539	-1.64	0.100	-13.55888	1.190004

c. The Comparative Condition Before and After The Deradicalization

In this sub-part, we can see several statistical findings that capture the (violent) ideology and/or behaviour of former terrorists after they undergo the deradicalization process.

x4.1syariahlaw (in the second/binary model) Versus CurSyariahView

Table 4.2.98 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X41SyariahLaw
```

X41SyariahL aw	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	5	13.16	13.16
2	17	44.74	57.89
3	16	42.11	100.00
Total	38	100.00	

Table 4.2.99 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x41syariahlaw
```

X41SyariahL aw	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	5	13.16	13.16
1	33	86.84	100.00
Total	38	100.00	

1. Disagree with the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state (0).
2. At least agree with Islamic (*Shari'a*) law (1).
3. Agree with Salafi Islamist state (1).

Table 4.2.100 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurSyariahView
```

CurSyariahView	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	39	100.00	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, surprisingly there is an increasing number of former radicals/terrorist in terms of firmly trusting at least in the mandatory implementation of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law. It increases from 44.74% to become 100%.

X4.2IslamistState Versus CurIslamistState

Table 4.2.101 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x42islamiststate
```

X42Islamist State	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	24	60.00	60.00
1	16	40.00	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

Table 4.2.102 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurIslamistState
```

CurIslamist State	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	5	14.29	14.29
1	30	85.71	100.00
Total	35	100.00	

1 Agree

0. Disagree

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, surprisingly there is an increasing number of former radicals/terrorist in terms of firmly trusting in the implementation of Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. It increases from 40% to become 85.71%.

X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad Versus CurSympathyISIS

Table 4.2.103 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x46foreignglobaljihad
```

X46ForeignG lobalJihad	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	9	23.08	23.08
1	30	76.92	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

Table 4.2.104 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurSympathyISIS
```

CurSympathy ISIS	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	19	54.29	54.29
1	16	45.71	100.00
Total	35	100.00	

1. Sympathy

0. Not Sympathy

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, there is a decreasing number of former radicals/terrorists in terms of being inspired by the global jihad. Before the deradicalization, there was 76.92% of them being inspired to be involved in the global jihad, whilst after the deradicalization process there are only 45.71% of them having a sympathy towards the ISIS.²⁵²

²⁵² ISIS can be used as a phenomenon to symbolize the aspiration to be involved in the global jihad.

x3grievonpol (in the second/binary model) Versus CurDemView

Table 4.2.105 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x3grievonpol
```

X3GrievOnPo 1	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	23	58.97	58.97
1	16	41.03	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

Table 4.2.106 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurDemView
```

CurDemView	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	33	84.62	84.62
1	6	15.38	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

1. Involved in Democracy
0. Not Involved in Democracy

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, there is only 15.38% of them being involved in the democracy/democratic process in Indonesia. If we compare to the initial political grievances table, surprisingly we can see that 41.03% of them felt politically marginalized or unrepresented in the Indonesian democracy. However, after undergoing the deradicalization process the fact shows that only 15.38% begin to believe and involve in the democratic process. In other words, these 15.38% individuals who are already involved in the democratic process may come from the 58.97% individuals who previously never felt any political grievances in the Indonesian democracy. Note: only 5 individuals are willing to declare their political party affiliations, all which are the Islamist political parties (See the table below).

Table 4.2.107 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurPolParty
```

CurPolParty	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	3	60.00	60.00
2	1	20.00	80.00
3	1	20.00	100.00
Total	5	100.00	

1. PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)
2. PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)
3. PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)

ybeliefonjihadandterrorism (in the second/binary model) and x41syariahlaw Versus
CurViewOn4Pillars

Table 4.2.108 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x41syariahlaw
```

X41SyariahLaw		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0		5	13.16	13.16
1		33	86.84	100.00
Total		38	100.00	

1. At least agree with Islamic (*Shari'a*) law.

0. Agree with Salafi Islamist state.

0. Disagree with the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state.

Table 4.2.109 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurViewOn4Pillars
```

CurViewOn4Pillars		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0		6	16.22	16.22
1		31	83.78	100.00
Total		37	100.00	

1. Disagree/Not Sure

0. Agree

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, there is 83.78% of former radicals/terrorists that still disagree and being unsure with the four most basic values of the nation: *Pancasila*, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (unity in diversity), UUD 1945, and the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. This number is not only majority, but it is quite concerning if we compare to the previous number (86.84%) before the deradicalization where all these 86.84% individuals have a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) in the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia.

Table 4.2.110 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab ybeliefonjihadandterrorism
```

YBeliefOnJi hadAndTerro rism	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	9	26.47	26.47
1	25	73.53	100.00
Total	34	100.00	

Likewise, when we compare it with the dependent variable, it is also concerning. If in the past 73.53% of them have “agree/less agree view on the establishment of Islamic (*Shari’a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad and the act of terror,” currently 83.78% still being disagree/unsure with the four most basic values of the nation.

x6viewonstaterepression (in the second/binary model) Versus CurViewOnDerad

Table 4.2.111 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x6viewonstaterepression
```

X6ViewOnSta teRepressio n	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	15	44.12	44.12
1	19	55.88	100.00
Total	34	100.00	

Table 4.2.112 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurViewOnDerad
```

CurViewOnDe rad	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	22	66.67	66.67
1	11	33.33	100.00
Total	33	100.00	

1. Repressive
0. Persuasive and Constructive

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation we can see that after undergoing the deradicalization process, there is a decreasing percentage in terms of perception about the state repression. If in the past 55.88% individuals viewed the state repression was high, after the deradicalization process only 33.33% of them view the government's deradicalization as repressive.

X4.4IslamicOrg Versus CurIslamicOrg

Table 4.2.113 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X44IslamicOrg
```

X44IslamicOrg	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	10	25.00	25.00
2	5	12.50	37.50
3	5	12.50	50.00
4	17	42.50	92.50
5	3	7.50	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

Table 4.2.114 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurIslamicOrg
```

CurIslamicOrg	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	6	16.67	16.67
2	5	13.89	30.56
3	5	13.89	44.44
4	20	55.56	100.00
Total	36	100.00	

1. NU (0)
2. *Muhammadiyah* (0)
3. Non-NU and *Muhammadiyah* Campus Islamic *Da'wah* Fellowship/LDK (1)
4. Non-NU and *Muhammadiyah* Quran Recitation Fellowship (1)
5. No Islamist organization (0)

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, there is an increasing number in terms being associated with the non-NU *and Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship (from 17 to 20), whilst the number of individuals being associated with the non-NU *and Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship (LDK) is still same (5). This is important to notice since these two variables have the significant and positive causal relationship on the dependent variable as being tested in the previous logistic regression models.

X4.5TakfirismView Versus CurTakfirismView

Table 4.2.115 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab X45TakfirismView
```

X45TakfirismView	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	8	20.51	20.51
2	29	74.36	94.87
3	2	5.13	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

Table 4.2.116 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurTakfirismView
```

CurTakfirismView	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	3	7.50	7.50
2	36	90.00	97.50
3	1	2.50	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

- 1 Not *Kafir* (0)
2. Not Necessarily *Kafir* (0)
3. *Kafir* (1)

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, the apparent improvement of before-and-after the deradicalization is not promising. There is a decreasing number from 5.13% to 2.5% in viewing others as *kafir*; an increasing number from 74.36% to 90% in viewing others as not necessarily *kafir*; and a decreasing number from 20.51% to 7.5% in viewing others as not *kafir*.

Note: the meaning of *kafir* within the bounded rationality of these 40 individuals who are questioned for the analysis of chapter 4.2 is the derogatory term to define the unbelievers who reject God and the teachings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as well as deny the absolute dominion and sovereignty of God.

X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad (already a binary model since beginning) Versus CurForeignGlobalJihad

Table 4.2.117 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x46foreignglobaljihad
```

X46ForeignG lobalJihad	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	9	23.08	23.08
1	30	76.92	100.00
Total	39	100.00	

Table 4.2.118 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurForeignGlobalJihad
```

CurForeignG lobalJihad	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	12	31.58	31.58
1	26	68.42	100.00
Total	38	100.00	

1 Jihad Engagement to Help Other Muslims at the Global Level

0 Peaceful Engagement to Help Other Muslims at the Global Level

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, there is a decreasing percentage in terms of the aspiration to be involved in the global jihad. However, the decrease is only slightly which is from 76.92% to become 68.42%. This is also important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, this specific variable is a variable with the most significant and strongest positive causal effect on the dependent variable.

x4.7viewtowardswest Versus CurViewOnWest

Table 4.2.119 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x47viewtowardwest
```

X47ViewTowardWest	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	13	34.21	34.21
1	25	65.79	100.00
Total	38	100.00	

Table 4.2.120 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurViewOnWest
```

CurViewOnWest	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	6	15.79	15.79
1	32	84.21	100.00
Total	38	100.00	

1. *Kafir*0. Not *Kafir*

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation we can see that after undergoing the deradicalization process, there is an increasing percentage in terms of their perspective towards the Western world. If in the past there were 65.79% of them firmly viewing/generalizing the Western world as *kafir* (as opposed to otherwise), after undergoing the deradicalization process the percentage instead increases to become 84.21%. This is also important to notice that based on this sample, this specific variable is a variable with the significant and positive causal effect on the dependent variable.

Note: the meaning of *kafir* within the bounded rationality of 40 individuals questioned for the analysis of chapter 4.2 is the derogatory term to define the unbelievers who reject God and the teachings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as well as deny the absolute dominion and sovereignty of God.

x4.8viewonisraelipalestine (already a binary model since beginning) Versus CurOnIsraelPalestine

Table 4.2.121 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x48viewonisraelipalestine
```

X48ViewOnIs raeliPalest ine	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	5	14.29	14.29
1	30	85.71	100.00
Total	35	100.00	

Table 4.2.122 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurOnIsraelPalestine
```

CurOnIsrael -Palestine	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	6	17.65	17.65
1	28	82.35	100.00
Total	34	100.00	

1. Pro Palestine

0. Neutral (Israel and Palestine could be equally right)

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, there is a decrease in terms of their perspective towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If in the past there were 85.71% of them firmly supporting Palestine, after undergoing the deradicalization process the percentage of firmly supporting Palestine instead slightly decrease to become 82.35%. This is also important to notice that based on this sample, this specific variable is a significant variable with a positive causal effect on the dependent variable.

X6viewonterrorism Versus CurViewOnGovApproach.

Table 4.2.123 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab x6viewonstaterepression
```

X6ViewOnSta teRepressio n	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	15	44.12	44.12
1	19	55.88	100.00
Total	34	100.00	

- 1. High Level Repression
- 0. Mid and Low Repression

Table 4.2.124 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurViewOnGovApproach
```

CurViewOnGo vApproach	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	24	68.57	68.57
1	11	31.43	100.00
Total	35	100.00	

- 1. Repressive
- 0. Persuasive and Constructive

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, there is a decreasing percentage in terms of perception about the state repression. If in the past 55.88% viewed the state repression was high, after the deradicalization process only 31.43% of them view the government's general approach towards violent jihadists/radicals/terrorists as repressive.

CurViewOnGovPersApproach

Table 4.2.125 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurViewOnGovPersApproach
```

CurViewOnGovPersApproach	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	14	40.00	40.00
1	21	60.00	100.00
Total	35	100.00	

1. No Difference of Treatment By the Government Institution and Personnel
0. Some Personnel Gives More Personalized Attention

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, the former radicals/terrorists view that at least 40% of state security apparatus have a personalized attention to them.

CurViewOnAntiTerrorBill

Table 4.2.126 The STATA Calculation

```
. tab CurViewOnAntiTerrorBill
```

CurViewOnAn tiTerrorBill		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1				
1		3	9.68	9.68
2		9	29.03	38.71
3		19	61.29	100.00
Total		31	100.00	

1. Agree
2. More Revision Needed
3. Disagree

Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after undergoing the deradicalization process, the former violent jihadists/radicals/terrorists view that at least 9.68% being agree with the current counterterrorism bill, whilst 29.03% says it must be revised, and the majority (61.29%) being disagree towards the current counterterrorism bill.

Note: the Indonesian government is currently in the process of issuing a new counterterrorism act to supersede the 2003 terrorism crime eradication act.

d. The Concluding Analysis of the Quantitative Part.

This part is the conclusion of various quantitative analysis made throughout chapter 4.2. These various multivariate statistical analysis have indeed provided us with the elaborate pattern/picture/characteristic of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia.

d.1. The Pattern of Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia.

The various multivariate statistical analysis made in this chapter 4.2. have confirmed that all determining variables encompassing economic-social-political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive have relationship and causal effects on the dependent variable (the ideology and/or behaviour of individuals through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia). However, not all them have a significant relationship and causal effect on the dependent variable. Indeed, only ideological and social networks-related variables have the significant relationship and causal effect on the dependent variable. In other words, based on these findings I can also conclude that the two latent characteristics of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia (according to this sample; n=40 individuals) are the ideological and social networks issue.

That said, based on the findings in the various statistical analysis made in this part, it could be concluded that the pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is as follow.

First. Economic grievances, social grievances, and political grievances are only a set of potential, necessary variables. With or without these economic, social and political grievances, individuals in Indonesia could believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). Consequently, these variables are also not a set of sufficient variables since they do not have the significant relationship or direct causal effect on the dependent variable.


Second. It is through being associated with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship, these individuals are more likely to be exposed to a firm

belief (including the ideological conviction) that generalizes the Western world is *kafir* as opposed to be otherwise. Their generalizing view of the Western world as *kafir* is identical with their view that Indonesian democratic political system is the Western-based culture, thus making them to believe that it is mandatory to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia that is purely based on the Islamic teaching.


Third. As they begin to have a belief system (including the ideological conviction) to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia, they will also start having an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad. Subsequently, once they are already determined to commit violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror), any negative feelings towards government repression and insufficient government incentive only play their role to exacerbate their determination to commit the act of terror. Part b.3. above (the moderating/interaction variables section) shows that when the variable "x6staterepression" is interacted with the variable "x46foreignglobaljihad" (e.g., for supporting ISIS among many others), the coefficient of this new moderating/interaction variable increase quite much (compared to the coefficient value of only variable "x6staterepression") and make this new variable almost becoming significant (at 90% of confidence level). Meanwhile, another moderating/interaction variable combining both variable "x7govincentives" and "x46foreignglobaljihad" makes this new moderating/interaction variable into a significant variable with 99% of confidence level (with the coefficient value of 2.35 or increasing the log odd on the dependent variable by 2.35).

Therefore, a possible pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that is based on the multivariate statistical analysis made in chapter 4.2 is as follows:


#1. Either experiencing or not experiencing economic, social and political grievances. These are just a set of regular independent variables without necessarily connect with and have the impact on the dependent variable.




#2. Being associated with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship. This is the 1st intervening variable.²⁵³




#3. Viewing/generalizing the Western world and all its elements (e.g., democracy) as *kafir*. This is the 2nd intervening variable.




#4. Having a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. This is the 3rd intervening variable.



#5. Having an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad (e.g., ISIS). This is the 4th intervening variable.



#6. Experiencing/feeling a state repression + #7. Feeling that government incentive are not enough. Consecutively, these two are the endogenous or moderating variables.²⁵⁴



#8. The individual is to believe (the ideological level) and being involved (the behavioural level) towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).

Note: The event #6 and the event #7 only play their role to exacerbate the continuous impacts on the event #8 of the event #1 up to the event #5. On their own, the event #6 and the event #7 will not cause the event #8.

²⁵³ The intervening variable is a variable that explains a relation or provides a causal link between other variables. Also called by some authors as the “mediating variable” or “intermediary variable.”

²⁵⁴ The endogenous variable is a variable that is an inherent part of the system being studied and that is determined from within the system (a variable that is caused by other variables in a causal system). At the same time they also can be mentioned as the moderating variable: a variable that influences, or moderates, the relation between two other variables and thus produces an interaction effect.

Table 4.2.128 The Conclusion Table of Various Multivariate Statistical Analysis

Category	Meaning of Variables	Correlation with the Dependent Variable Based on the chi-square test (Under 1 st /Original and 2 nd /Binary Model)		Direct Causal Effect of Select Independent Variables on the Dependent Variable Based at the Bi-Variate Logistic Regression (Under the Binary Model)	Direct Causal Effect of Select Independent Variables on the Dependent Variable Based at the Multivariate Model #3
		<div><div></div><div></div></div>			
Economic Grievances	Earning a lesser daily income.	Not Significant.	Not Significant.	Negative. -0.13	1.32
Social Grievances	Having a lesser year of education.	Not Significant.	Not Significant. Not completing a mandatory 9-years of education (as opposed to otherwise).	N/A.	N/A.
	Having a less secure/permanent job.	Not Significant.	Not Significant. Not having a secured/permanent job (as opposed to otherwise)	Positive. 0.18	2.3
Political Grievances	Feeling politically marginalized and unrepresented.	Not Significant.	Not Significant. Feeling politically marginalized and unrepresented (as opposed to otherwise).	Positive. 0.06	0.55

Social Networks <u>Note:</u> Since the two ideology-related variables ("Islamist organization" and "Islamic education") have the element of social networks, in this table these two variables are also categorized as the social networks-related variables.	Being associated with the selected Islamist organizations.	Not Significant.	Significant** Being associated with the non-NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i> -based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i> -based campus <i>da'wah</i> fellowship (as opposed to be associated with NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i>).	Positive* 1.45	N/A
	Having attended more years at the Islamic boarding school.	Not Significant.	Not Significant. Having attended the Islamic boarding school (as opposed to never at all attended the Islamic boarding school).	Positive. 1.25	N/A
	Having a closer connection in the networks.	Not Significant.	Not Significant. Having a connection (as opposed to just being a sympathizer).	Positive 0.17	N/A

	Having a more role in the networks.	Not Significant.	Not Significant. Having a connection role as opposed to just being a sympathizer.	Positive 1.01	N/A
Radical Ideology	Having a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to establish the Islamic (<i>Shari'a</i>) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia.	Significant**	Significant*	Positive* 1.75	3.78
	Viewing/generalizing the Western world as <i>kafir</i> .	Significant*	Significant**	Positive*** 2.64	N/A
	Having an aspiration to be involved in the (physical) jihad at the global level.	Significant***	Significant***	Positive*** 2.69	3.89**
	Pro-Palestine.	Significant**	Not Significant.	Positive. 1.1	N/A
	Viewing others with different belief and ideology as <i>kafir</i> .	Not significant.	Not significant.	N/A.	N/A
	Being associated with the selected Islamist organizations.	Not Significant.	Significant** Being associated with the non-NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i> -based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i> -based campus <i>da'wah</i> fellowship	Positive* 1.45	N/A

			(as opposed to be associated with NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i>).		
	Having attended more years at the Islamic boarding school.	Not Significant.	Not Significant. Having attended the Islamic boarding school.	Positive. 1.25	N/A
State Repression	Viewing that government implements the high-level repression.	Not Significant.	Not Significant.	Positive 1.18	0.86
Gov. Incentives	Viewing that government does not give enough incentives.	Not Significant.	Not Significant.	Positive N/A	N/A.
Other Factors	Location based on provinces in Indonesia	Significant*	Not Significant* Being in the Java Island (the province of DKI Jakarta, JATENG, JABAR and JATIM).	Positive 0.13	N/A.

*90% of Confidence Level.

**95% of Confidence Level.

***99% of Confidence Level.

The numbers displayed on the 5th and 6th columns represent the coefficient level. The greater the coefficient level, the greater the log-odd's increase/decrease on the dependent variable that is caused by the respective independent variables.

d.2. Revisiting the Pattern of Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia After Such Radicals Undergoing the Deradicalization Efforts.

By looking at the condition of former violent jihadists/radicals/terrorists after they undergo the deradicalization efforts, it can be concluded that the pattern is not significantly different. In general, they still preserve the four most significant variables that make them commit violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). These factors are the continuous attendance at the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship, the firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to establish Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia, the perception that generalizes the Western world as *kafir*, and the aspiration to be involved in the global jihad. Most of them also do not embrace democracy and being involved in such political mechanism.

Currently, they merely hibernate without apparent willingness to be involved in further jihad activities nor being involved in the peaceful democratic process. That is why, once the opportunity is available either in the domestic or at the global level, there is no guarantee that they will not recommit themselves in such violence and the act of terror. Nevertheless, the only positive factor we can see from the deradicalization efforts is the fact that the government deradicalization efforts alter these individuals' perspectives towards government approach. In this case, 68.57% of them begin to see that the Indonesian government deradicalization approach is persuasive and constructive rather than repressive, with at least 40% of them view that some security apparatus gives them some personal, kind attention during their detention and deradicalization process.

The following table displays a set of statistical measurements to measure the elaborate impact of deradicalization efforts over these 40 individuals. This kind of measurement that uses the proportional test can become an indicator for program evaluation and policy analysis in this governmental effort.

Table 4.2.129 The Comparative Condition Between Before and After Undergoing Deradicalization

	Variable tested <u>before</u> deradicalization	%	Variable tested <u>after</u> deradicalization	%	Increase or Decrease	Significant or Insignificant	Commentary
1	The belief in the mandatory establishment of Islamic (<i>Shari'a</i>) law.	44.74% ²⁵⁵	The belief in the mandatory establishment of Islamic (<i>Shari'a</i>) law.	100%	Increase	Significant***	Not a good performance.
2	The belief in the mandatory establishment of Salafi Islamist state.	40% ²⁵⁶	The belief in the mandatory establishment of Salafi Islamist state.	85.71%	Increase	Significant***	Not a good performance.
3	The belief in the mandatory establishment of both Islamic (<i>Shari'a</i>) law and Salafi Islamist state.	86.84%	Not Sure and Disagree with the 4 core values of the nation.	83.78%	Decrease	Not Significant	A decreasing percentage is a good performance. However, it is not significant.

²⁵⁵ For this percentage number, see Table 4.2.30 The STATA Calculation.²⁵⁶ For this percentage number, see Table 4.2.33 The STATA Calculation.

4	Viewing state repression as the high-level (as opposed to mid and low level).	55.88%	Viewing the deradicalization efforts as repressive (as opposed to persuasive and constructive).	33.33%	Decrease	Significant***	A good performance.
5	Being associated with the non-NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i> -based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i> -based campus Islamic <i>da'wah</i> fellowship (as opposed only to NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i>).	55%	Being associated with the non-NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i> -based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i> -based campus Islamic <i>da'wah</i> fellowship (as opposed only to NU and <i>Muhammadiyah</i>).	69.44%	Increase	Significant**	Not a good performance.

6	Firmly viewing others as <i>kafir</i> .	5.13%	Firmly viewing others as <i>kafir</i> .	2.5%	Decrease	Not Significant	A decreasing percentage is a good performance. However, this is not significant.
7	Being aspired by the involvement in the global jihad.	76.92%	Being aspired by the involvement in the global jihad.	68.42%	Decrease	Not Significant	A decreasing percentage is a good performance. However, this is not significant.
8	Viewing/generalizing the Western world as <i>kafir</i> .	65.71%	Viewing/generalizing the Western world as <i>kafir</i> .	84.21%	Increase	Significant***	Not a good performance.
9	The firm support towards Palestine (as opposed to be neutral).	85.71%	The firm support towards Palestine (as opposed to be neutral).	82.35%	Decrease	Not Significant	A decreasing percentage is a good performance.

							However, this is not significant.
10	Viewing state repression as the high-level (as opposed to mid and low level).	55.88%	Viewing the government personnel approach as repressive (as opposed to persuasive and constructive).	31.43%	Decrease	Significant***	A good performance.

*90% of confidence level.

**95% of confidence level.

***99% of confidence level.


4.3 The Social Network Analysis.

The biggest JI operations from 2002 until 2009, in terms of the number of casualties and other unquantifiable impacts, were the Bali bombing attack I and II, respectively carried out in 2002 and 2005. The combined attacks also significantly altered the history of JI and Indonesian counterterrorism efforts. That is why it is noteworthy to focus on JI individuals and networks that were involved in these two biggest attacks. Out of the social network analysis over 79 JI individuals involved in the Bali bombing attack I and II, at least we could draw the conclusion that the social network is indeed the significant factor to determine of why and how an individual would be involved in the radical network that culminated in the terrorist attack (e.g., the bombing attack). Every involved individual played his/her unique roles in the network, where his/her involvement was significantly shaped by at least four intertwining factors: personal relationship to other individuals in the network; shared educational backgrounds; shared training experiences; and shared involvement in the operations (Klaimanee and Nogaj 2008).²⁵⁷ As confirmed by the Indonesian Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and various trusted sources, this pattern not only reflected the JI networks in the past but also reflects the current Islamist radical/extremist/terrorist networks in Indonesia until today.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ For this material, see the attachment #4 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis.

²⁵⁸ Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma (the Former Head of the Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) and Police Senior Commissioner Didik Novi (The Head of Foreign Terrorist Task Force at the Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) in a discussion with the author, respectively on October 18, 2016 and November 1, 2016.

Figure 4.3.1 The Four Factors Determining the Formation and Cohesiveness of JI Social Network



Source: Self-made.

Based on the research finding of the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2006, Klaimanee and Nogaj (2008) conducted a comprehensive social network analysis over 79 Non-Structural JI individuals.²⁵⁹ The research finding of ICG was based on interrogation depositions, court documents, and Indonesian press reports, with information crosschecked through extensive interviews with knowledgeable sources, both official and unofficial.

In this social network analysis, they used the individual as the node where ties are shaped by four intertwining factors: personal relationship to other individuals in the network; shared educational backgrounds; shared training experiences; and shared involvement in the operations (Bali bombing attacks I and II). This pattern informs us that JI is a well-networked organization through which this entity evolves into a self-discipline, agile, and highly adaptable entity able to culminate its activities in the form of

²⁵⁹ This social network analysis is based on International Crisis Group's Asia Report No. 114 in 2006, titled *Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks*. See (International Crisis Group 5 May 2006). For this material, see the attachment #4 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis.

terrorist attacks. Based on this analysis, the most important person in the JI network as they successfully culminated their attacks in 2002 and 2005 were indeed Zulkarnaen whose whereabouts is still unknown until today (the final stage of writing this Ph.D. thesis in 2018).

Table 4.3.1 The Aspects to be Measured and Names of the Matrix

Aspects to be Measured	Names of 2-Mode Matrix	Names of 1-Mode Matrix
Personal relationship to other individuals in the network.		Friend.
Shared educational backgrounds.	School.	School-Aff.
Shared training experiences.	Train.	Train-Aff.
Shared involvement in the operations.	Bali bombings.	Bali bombings-Aff.

a. The Mechanism of Analysis

First, as a starting point, the research focused on determining the 79 individuals as the nodes. These 79 individuals were investigated in terms of their relationship to each other by creating a 1-mode matrix linking each individual. This matrix was named "Friend."

Table 4.3.2 The Illustration of Relationship/Ties Among Individuals

	Individual #1	Individual #2	Up To	Individual #79
Individual #1				
Individual #2				
Up To				
Individual #79				

Second, the research also created a 2-mode matrix linking the 79 individuals with their involvement in the Bali bombing I and II. This matrix was named “Bali Bombings.”

Table 4.3.3 The Illustration of Relationship/Ties Among Individuals Based on Their Involvement in Bali Bombing Attack I and II

	Bali Bombing Attack I	Bali Bombing Attack II
Individual #1		
Individual #2		
Up To		
Individual #79		

Third, the research also created a 2-mode matrix linking the 79 individuals with certain schools they attended in the past. This matrix was named “school.”

Table 4.3.4 The Illustration of Relationship/Ties Among Individuals Based on Their Educational Backgrounds

	Luqmanul Hakiem	Al- Mukmin in Ngruki	Universitas an-Nur	Darusy Syahada	Al- Husein	Al- Mutta qien
Individual #1						
Individual #2						
Up To						
Individual #79						

Fourth, the research also created a 2-mode matrix linking the 79 individuals with certain training exposures they had in the past. This matrix was named “train.”

Table 4.3.5 The Illustration of Relationship/Ties Among Individuals Based on Their Training Experiences

	Waimurat (Maluku)	The KOMPAK office in Ambon (Maluku)	West Ceram (Maluku)	Poso	Mindanao/ the Southern Philippines
Individual #1					
Individual #2					
Up To					
Individual #79					

After the making of these four matrixes, all them were aggregated. First, before the aggregation was performed all 2-mode matrixes must be transformed into the 1-mode matrix. After the transformation we have four 1-mode matrixes: “Friend,” “Bali bombings-Aff,” “School-Aff,” and “Train-Aff.” Second, after these transformations, all these 1-mode matrixes were stacked to produce one new integrated matrix called “Joined.” Third, these stacked 1-mode matrixes were aggregated to produce a single-valued matrix called “Joined-wda.” Fourth, this single-valued matrix was later dichotomized to produce the final matrix called “Joined-wdaGTO.”

Figure 4.3.3 The Sociogram Reflecting the Ties Based on Shared Educational Backgrounds
(With the Size of Nodes Depending Upon the Betweenness Centrality)




Figure 4.3.4 The Sociogram Reflecting the Ties Based on Shared Training Experiences
(With the Size of Nodes Depending Upon the Betweenness Centrality)





Figure 4.3.5 The Sociogram Reflecting the Ties Based on Shared Involvement in the Operations/Bali Bombing Attack I and

II

(With the Size of Nodes Depending Upon the Betweenness Centrality)

1-Mode and 2-Mode Sociogram



Interpreting the Meaning by Looking at the Matrix of Centrality

Figure 4.3.7 The Multiple Measures of Centrality in UCINET
(Referring to Degree Centrality, Closeness Centrality, and Betweenness Centrality)

Output Log #6

File Edit Log File Number 6

Normalized Centrality Measures

		1	2	3	4
		Degree	Closeness	Betweenness	Eigenvector
1	Abdul Malik	0.000		0.000	0.000
2	Abdul Rauf	30.769	14.607	1.890	34.427
3	Abdul Rohim	1.282	13.065	0.000	1.705
4	Abdullah Sunata	24.359	14.579	8.608	9.582
5	Abdullah Sungkar	20.513	14.365	0.000	28.211
6	Abu Bakar Ba'asyir	20.513	14.365	0.000	28.211
7	Abu Dujanah	12.821	14.208	1.187	10.861
8	Abu Fida	7.692	14.054	0.480	6.912
9	Aceng Kurnia	1.282	11.729	0.000	0.047
10	Achmad Hasan	5.128	13.636	0.350	3.247
11	Adung	24.359	14.525	1.228	30.248
12	Agus Ahmad	1.282	12.245	0.000	0.286
13	Ahmad Rofiq Ridho	29.487	14.857	11.680	30.107
14	Ahmad Syaid Maulana	0.000		0.000	0.000
15	Ajengan Masduki	0.000		0.000	0.000
16	Akram	5.128	13.153	2.489	0.823
17	Ali Ghufro	17.949	14.130	0.464	15.748
18	Anif Solchanudin	10.256	14.029	0.000	6.641
19	Apuv	10.256	13.565	0.263	5.726
20	Aris Munandar	11.538	13.805	0.000	5.662
21	Asep Jaja	17.949	14.079	1.528	6.701
22	Asmar Latin Sani	24.359	14.525	0.499	30.959
23	Azhari Husin	33.333	14.717	7.417	22.755
24	Beharudin Soleh	23.077	14.525	5.958	12.092
25	Chandra	1.282	12.808	0.000	1.641
26	Cholily	5.128	13.565	0.129	4.376
27	Dani Chandra	12.021	13.030	2.390	5.679
28	Dulmatin	23.077	14.418	2.109	17.547
29	Enceng Kurnia	0.000		0.000	0.000
30	Engkos Kosasih	15.385	14.105	4.624	4.604
31	Fathurrehman al-Ghozi	21.795	14.391	0.113	29.104
32	Fathurrochman	1.282	12.245	0.000	0.286
33	Hambali	16.667	13.978	0.251	16.652
34	Hari Kuncoro	16.667	14.130	1.750	7.361
35	Harun	7.692	13.265	0.000	1.941
36	Hence Malewa	7.692	13.265	0.000	1.941
37	Heri Golun	11.538	13.805	0.606	7.340
38	Heri Siga Sanboja	3.846	13.402	0.020	3.186
39	Iaan Bukhori	6.410	13.879	2.446	5.994
40	Iaan Samudra	12.821	13.978	1.466	10.111
41	Iqbal	11.538	13.879	0.000	10.065
42	Iqbal Huseini	1.282	12.850	0.000	0.543
43	Irun Hidayat	2.564	12.850	0.197	0.859
44	Ismail	10.256	13.830	0.015	10.347
45	Iwan Dharmawan	11.538	13.805	6.002	5.057
46	Jabir	34.615	14.829	5.591	34.454
47	Joko Triharmanto	2.564	12.808	0.000	0.642
48	Joni Achmad Fauzan	20.513	14.365	0.000	28.211
49	Marwan	1.282	12.264	0.000	0.322
50	Misno	10.256	14.029	0.000	6.641
51	Mohamed Ihsan	11.538	13.879	0.000	10.065
52	Mohamed Rais	28.205	14.607	1.035	33.326
53	Mohamed Saifuddin	20.513	14.312	3.861	7.467
54	Muchtar	11.538	13.805	0.000	5.662
55	Munfiatun	1.282	12.460	0.000	0.396
56	Mus'ab Sahidi	1.282	13.065	0.000	1.705
57	Muzayin Abdul Wahab	1.282	12.850	0.000	0.543
58	Nasir Abas	0.000		0.000	0.000
59	Noordin Mohammed Top	29.487	14.607	6.451	18.176
60	Purnama Putra	11.538	13.953	1.765	3.984
61	Ootadah	3.846	13.043	0.014	1.892
62	Rosihin Noor	5.128	13.518	0.000	2.355

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Table 4.3.6 The Rearrangement of Measures
(Selected Number of Actors/Nodes Arranged by Based on the Highest-to-the-Lowest
Scores as Indicated by the Figure 4.3.7 Above)

Matrix of Centrality			
Degree	Closeness	Betweenness	Eigenvector
Zulkarnaen	Zulkarnaen	Zulkarnaen	Zulkarnaen
Jabir	Ahmad Rofiq	Ahmad Rofiq	Jabir
Azhari Husin	Jabir	Abdullah Sunata	Abdul Rauf
Abdul Rauf	Azhari Husin Ubeid	Azhari Husin	Tohir Mohamed Rais
Ahmad Rofiq Noordin M. Top Ubeid	Suramto	Noordin M. Top	Suramto

Degree Centrality: Indicating the number of incoming and outgoing ties that an actor/node has. This indicates how well an actor/node is connected within the overall network (the individual measure).

Closeness Centrality: Indicating the number of links/steps along shortest paths from the focal to any other actors in the network. This is an indicator of how quickly an information can reach an actor.

Betweenness Centrality: This is the extent to which an actor lies on the shortest path between other actors/nodes (adjusted by the number of alternative shortest paths). This measurement indicates the medium of information and of resource flow (e.g., when the actor/node plays the role as a liaison or gatekeeper).


Table 4.3.7 Another Rearrangement of Centrality Measures by Scoring the Actors

Actor/Nodes	Matrix of Centrality				
	Degree	Closeness	Betweenness	Eigenvector	Total
Zulkarnaen (unknown until today)	5	5	5	5	20
Jabir (killed in 2006)	4	3	0	4	11
Ahmad Rofiq (released)	1	4	4	0	9
Azhari Husin (killed in 2005)	3	2	2	0	7
Abdul Rauf (died when fighting with ISIS in 2014)	2	0	0	3	5
Abdullah Sunata (serving 10 years in the prison)	3	0	0	0	3
Ubeid (serving 10 years in the prison)	0	1	2	0	3
Noordin (killed in 2009)	1	1	0	0	2
Suranto	0	0	1	1	2
Tohir (serving 10 years in the prison)	0	0	0	2	2
Mohammed Rais (released)	0	0	0	2	2

Note: 5 points are given to the actor with the highest position, 4 to the second highest, 3 to the third highest, 2 to the second highest, 1 to the least high. 0 is given to the actors who are not listed in the table 4.3.7 above.


Finding #1: The analysis of different types of centrality identified 11 individuals who scored the highest scores. Among them, the first five actors seem to be the central figures in the analyzed social network. These actors/nodes are **Zulkarnaen, Jabir, Ahmad Rofiq, Azhari Husin, and Abdul Rauf.**

Figure 4.3.8 A Degree Centrality Measure Using the Pajek Software
(Drawn in the y- direction and showing the same result as the one with UCINET)



Interpreting the Meaning by Looking at the Cut-Points/Vertices

Figure 4.3.9 The Sociogram Indicating the Cut-Points/Vertices (Blue Color) in the Aggregated Network/Joined-wdaGTO
(With the Size of Nodes Depending upon the Betweenness Centrality)



Finding #2: The cut-points/vertices analysis informs us that the three actors/nodes with the highest scores (based on the betweenness centrality) are **Ahmad Rofiq**, **Abdullah Sunata**, and **Iwan Dharmawan**. All these are the three actors/nodes with the highest importance of communication flow throughout the network. When we want to disrupt the communication throughout the network, we should aim these three actors/nodes as the priority.

Interpreting the Meaning by Looking at the Brokerage Matrixes

The brokerage matrix is designed to analyze the brokerage roles of nodes in the network in terms of being a coordinator, representative, consultant, and liaison. In this social network analysis, they used as a partition the sub-network of Bali I and Bali II bombing attacks. Subsequently, a new 2-mode matrix was created to transform this 2-mode network into a format of partition. The numbers attached to actors/nodes in this new 2-mode matrix were as follow. 0 = actors/nodes were not involved in both Bali bombing attack I and II; 1 = actors/nodes were involved in Bali bombing attack I; 2 = actors were involved in Bali bombing attack II; and 3 = actors were involved in both Bali bombing attack I and II.

Figure 4.3.10 The One-Column Matrix of Bali Bombings
(Used as a partition for computing the brokerage functions)

Actor/Node	Value
1 B	
1 Abdul Malik	0
2 Abdul Rauf	1
3 Abdul Rohim	0
4 Abdullah Sunata	0
5 Abdullah Sungkar	0
6 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir	0
7 Abu Dujanah	0
8 Abu Fida	0
9 Aceng Kurnia	0
10 Achmad Hasan	0
11 Adung	0
12 Agus Ahaad	0
13 Ahmad Rofiq Ridho	0
14 Ahmad Syaid Maulana	0
15 Ajengan Masduki	0
16 Akram	0
17 Ali Ghufron	1
18 Anif Solchanudin	2
19 Apuy	0
20 Aris Munandar	0
21 Asep Jaya	0
22 Asmar Latin Sani	0
23 Azhari Husin	3
24 Bahrudin Soleh	2
25 Chandra	0
26 Cholily	0
27 Dani Chandra	0
28 Dulaetun	1
29 Enceng Kurnia	0
30 Engkos Kosasih	0
31 Fathurrahman al-Ghozzi	0
32 Fathurrochman	0
33 Hambali	1
34 Hari Kuncoro	0
35 Harun	0
36 Hencse Malewa	0
37 Heri Golun	0
38 Heri Sigu Saabaja	0
39 Iwan Bukhori	0
40 Iwan Saundra	1
41 Iqbal	1
42 Iqbal Huseini	0
43 Irun Hidayat	0
44 Ismail	0
45 Ivan Dharmawan	0
46 Jabir	2
47 Joko Triharmanto	0
48 Joni Achmad Fauzan	0
49 Marwan	0
50 Misno	2
51 Mohamed Ihsan	1
52 Mohamed Rais	0
53 Mohamed Saifuddin	0
54 Muchtar	0
55 Munfiatun	0
56 Mus'ab Sahidi	0
57 Muzayin Abdul Wahab	0
58 Nasir Abes	0
59 Noordin Mohammed Top	2
60 Purnama Putra	0
61 Qotadeh	0
62 Rosihin Noor	0
63 Said Sungkar	0

Figure 4.3.11 The Output Log with the Brokerage Computations


Output Log #15

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		Coordinat	Gatekeepe	Represent	Consultan	Liaison	Total
1	Abdul Malik	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	Asep Jaja	56	10	10	0	0	76
3	Abdul Rohim	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	Abdullah Sunata	80	22	22	0	0	124
5	Abdullah Sungkar	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	Abu Bakar Ba'asyir	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	Abu Dujanah	20	6	6	0	0	32
8	Abu Fida	2	2	2	0	0	6
9	Aceng Kurnia	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	Achmad Hasan	4	2	2	0	0	8
11	Adung	26	26	26	0	0	84
12	Agus Ahmad	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	Ahmad Rofiq Ridho	190	19	19	0	0	228
14	Ahmad Sayid Maulana	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	Ajengan Masduki	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	Akram	10	0	0	0	0	10
56	Mus'ab Sahidi	0	0	0	0	0	0
57	Muzayin Abdul Wahab	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	Apuy	8	0	0	0	0	8
20	Aris Munandar	0	0	0	0	0	0
78	Usman bin Sef	10	0	0	0	0	10
22	Asmar Latin Sani	22	24	24	0	4	74
62	Rosihin Noor	0	0	0	0	0	0
63	Said Sungkar	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	Chandra	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	Chelilly	0	0	0	0	0	0
27	Dani Chandra	14	2	2	0	0	18
67	Sardona Silwengi	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	Enceng Kurnia	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	Engkos Kosasih	42	10	10	0	0	62
31	Fathurrehman al-Ghozi	0	11	11	0	0	22
32	Fathurrochman	0	0	0	0	0	0
72	Toni Togar	0	11	11	0	0	22
34	Hari Kuncoro	28	13	13	0	0	54
35	Herun	0	0	0	0	0	0
36	Hence Malewa	0	0	0	0	0	0
37	Heri Golun	14	0	0	0	0	14
38	Heri Sigu Samboja	2	1	1	0	0	4
39	Inam Bukhori	2	5	5	0	0	12
49	Marwan	0	0	0	0	0	0
60	Purnama Putra	28	0	0	0	0	28
42	Iqbal Huseini	0	0	0	0	0	0
43	Irun Hidayat	0	1	1	0	0	2
44	Isaail	2	2	2	0	0	6
45	Ivan Dharnawan	28	4	4	0	0	36
65	Salman	8	7	7	0	0	22
47	Joko Triharanto	0	0	0	0	0	0
48	Joni Achmad Fauzan	0	0	0	0	0	0
58	Nasir Abbas	0	0	0	0	0	0
68	Son Hadi	110	12	12	0	0	134
70	Suranto	96	25	25	0	4	150
52	Mohamed Rais	20	36	36	0	4	96
53	Mohamed Saifuddin	64	10	10	0	0	84
54	Muchtar	0	0	0	0	0	0
55	Munfiatun	0	0	0	0	0	0
75	Umar Patek	4	38	38	0	0	80
66	Saptono	20	5	5	0	0	30
71	Tolir	44	51	51	0	8	154
77	Urwah	0	3	3	0	0	6
73	Ubeid	90	19	19	0	4	132
61	Oetadah	0	0	0	0	0	0
74	Umar	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	Abdul Rauf	0	97	97	0	22	216
41	Iqbal	0	0	0	0	0	0
33	Hambell	0	24	24	0	0	48


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Figure 4.3.13 The Brokerage Function #2: A Representative Role
(Depicted in the NetDraw)




Finding #4: The most prominent actors in terms of representative role are **Zulkarnaen**, **Abdul Rauf**, and **Jabir**.

Figure 4.3.14 The Brokerage Function #3: A Consultant Role
(Depicted in the NetDraw)



Finding #5: The most prominent actors/nodes in terms of consultant role are **Zulkarnaen, Noordin, and Jabir**.

Figure 4.3.15 The Brokerage Function #4: A Liaison Role
(Depicted in the NetDraw)



Finding #6: The most prominent actors/nodes in terms of liaison role are **Azhari Husin**, **Zulkarnaen**, and **Jabir**.

Finding #7: The overall analysis of different brokerage functions identified **Zulkarnaen** and **Jabir** as the key figures. Both actors/nodes appear 3 times in the top 3 positions in the different brokerage roles.

b. A Concluding Analysis

By referring to the previous qualitative and quantitative analysis in this chapter (chapter 4.1 and 4.2) we could see that social network is indeed a significant variable to determine of why and how an individual become involved in the terrorism activities. Correspondingly, the analysis of the aggregated social networks by Klaimanee and Nogaj (2008) that is discussed and reinterpreted in chapter 4.3 provides us with the information about the key actors/nodes in the JI networks that culminated their attacks in Bali bombing attack I and II respectively in 2002 and 2005. Given the high complexity of terrorist networks, this comprehensive social network analysis assumes that individuals' involvement was shaped by at least four intertwining factors: personal relationship to other individuals in the network; shared educational backgrounds; shared training experiences; and shared involvement in the operations.

To further identify which actors/nodes were important and playing the key roles in the network, the analysis used various techniques by using the UCINET, NetDraw, and Pajek software. The techniques used in this analysis were the different types of centrality, the cut-points/vertices, and the different brokerage matrixes. Such further identifications would allow us to better know the underlying structure of Islamist radical networks in Indonesia.

In terms of centrality, this analysis found that 5 key individuals in the network were Zulkarnaen, Jabir, Ahmad Rofiq, Azhari Husin, and Abdul Rauf. In terms of cut-points/vertices this analysis found that 3 key individuals in the network were Ahmad Rofiq, Abdullah Sunata, and Iwan Dharmawan. In terms of brokerage functions this analysis found that 2 key individuals in the network were Zulkarnaen and Jabir.

The final, combined analyses also proved that the key actors/nodes in the analyzed network was Zulkarnaen, closely followed by Jabir. Zulkarnaen appeared to be the most important actor/node in terms of centrality and of brokerage functions. He was relatively less important as the cut-points/vertices, but it could be explained by the fact that he was located deep inside the structure of the network; thus, he had many ties and served rather as a consultant than as a liaison. This assumption was proved by the analysis of brokerage functions, where Zulkarnaen also scored highest as a consultant.

On the other hand, for Jabir, he scored less than Zulkarnaen, but he was always between the highest-ranked three to four individuals in terms of almost every matrix developed in this analysis.

Therefore, as Jabir was already killed by the Indonesian government in 2006, it is indeed important to find the whereabouts of Zulkarnaen in order to disrupt the survivability and the development of JI social networks in the future. Based on the previous qualitative and quantitative analysis, the background of all important actors/nodes in this social network were also reflecting the general pattern of Islamist radicals/violent extremists/terrorists in Indonesia. Their behaviours were influenced by the combination of economic-socio-politico grievances, radical ideology, social networks, state repression and government incentive.

Most of these key actors/nodes in the examined network were also notorious. They were either killed during the counterterrorism raids, serving the death sentence, serving the life sentence, serving minimum of 20 years in the prison, or returning to the radical/terrorism activities (e.g., fighting with the ISIS) once they were released from the prison. Another scholarly and policy importance that we could draw on from this social network analysis is the fact that the presence of Islamist radical networks in Indonesia could survive and develop by having a number of elusive consultants (e.g., Zulkarnaen) who play their role to advising the individuals involved in the radical networks.

4.4 The Analysis Warranty.

4.4.1 The General Assessment on Analysis.

Whilst the issues pertaining to sample and ethical aspects have been discussed in the part 2.3.2 (The Research Framework and Design: Variables and Methodology), this particular part is dedicated to provide a general assessment on the analysis.

Independent variables in this Ph.D. thesis project cover and control multivariate aspects that potentially cause terrorism to occur. Specifically, all independent variables examined have the causal effect (some with statistically significant effect and some are not) on individuals to believe in the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through jihadism and act of terror. This is a fine and overarching coverage by to some extent referring to the *Mutually Exclusive, Collectively Exhaustive* (MECE) model.²⁶⁰ In general, all qualitative and quantitative analyses coupled by the discussion on social network analysis are also fine and complementary to each other.

Whilst the qualitative analysis (using the discovering patterns analysis, content analysis, and discourses analysis) provides us with a general picture of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, this picture reflects a number of phenomena and elements that subsequently are tested by multivariate statistical analysis. The chi-square test, logistic regression, and proportional test coupled by a number of descriptive statistical analyses indeed complement the findings in the qualitative and in the social networks analysis. Overall, these three pieces of analytical methods provide us with a much clearer and elaborate picture of the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, through which we also can make the prediction about the future state of Islamist terrorism (Salafi jihadism) in Indonesia from multi-dimensional strategic perspectives (Harrison 2013).²⁶¹

²⁶⁰ MECE is a method used by McKinsey & Company to identify and describe a social phenomenon by the way of organizing information that is "Mutually Exclusive, Collectively Exhaustive." For more on MECE method, see also (Minto 1996).

²⁶¹ Please see (Harrison 2013) where he examines in-depth pertaining to the knowing of ourselves (internal part of strategy), knowing of what we face (external part of strategy), knowing of the system

However, as previously discussed, this Ph.D. study has its own limitations that need to be underlined and improved in the further study. The first limitation is in terms of sample size of 40 individuals surveyed whose response were analyzed by advance multivariate statistical analysis techniques. The initial intention was to have at least 100 individuals in the quantitative part, but due to the unavailability of this number the sample size was reduced into 40 individuals. Later the compensation was made by adding two other groups of samples (to make overall into 77), which were analysed qualitatively.

According to Koizumi (2012), this sample size ($n=40$) is still fine to be analysed statistically if it captures general characteristics of real population (the external validity aspect) and being analysed properly based on the proper theoretical assumptions and statistical techniques. The face validity is also emphasized to make sure that indicators/atributes used in the variable (e.g., economic income, years of education, etc) are reflecting the real phenomena to be measured. It is for this reason the analysis of these 40 individuals are rigorously based on the same theoretical framework as the other 32 individuals, plus being complemented by the internal validity measurement (e.g., Pseudo R2) on logistic regression models developed in this Ph.D. thesis.

Another limitation is from the sample of 22 individuals of convicted Islamist terrorists serving in the prison (6 of them have recently been released), which is chosen by based on the purposive method. This choice is limited only to those who are incarcerated in the Indonesian jurisdiction and whose documents are available to be further examined. Correspondingly, the examination on them is also based on the documentation-archival evidence, so that there is no direct interaction with them that can be used to double-check their current opinions about the issue being studied.

The third limitation is from the sample of 15 key state/security officials and experts in the field, which is chosen by based on the purposive method. It may only represent the view of officials and experts who are against (or less sympathy towards) the ideology and/or behaviour of violent Islamist movement (e.g., salafi jihadism) and

(external part of strategy), and knowing of the groups impacting one's national interests (external part of strategy).

who are available to be interviewed. The opinions of these officials and experts are also limited by their bounded rationality and subjectivity.

4.4.2 Inputs/Suggestions for the Future Research.

Several improvement toolkits can be implemented to overcome limitations of this Ph.D. research project and to leverage the quality of it.

First, the size of the sample could be increased (by covering more layers and types of Islamist radicals spanning not only over Indonesia but also over the regional and global level). This improvement should also be coupled with the implementation of more qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques. There are many qualitative and multivariate statistical analysis techniques and validity assessments that can be creatively used for this kind of study.

Second, the variables examined (and their inherent attributes) could also be expanded in more elaborated ways. By having implemented these two improving aspects, we expect to see the new and improved research that could provide us with a more sophisticated result with which we can compare the result of this Ph.D. thesis project.

CHAPTER 5: THE SYNTHESIS OF VARIOUS ANALYSIS

This chapter is dedicated to synthesizing various analytical findings in chapter 4 with the first purpose to prove whether the H0 established in this Ph.D. thesis could be rejected. The second purpose is subsequently to visualize the general pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that is based on the entire research of this Ph.D. thesis.

5.1 The Rejection of H0.


The entire analysis made through qualitative methods (the discovering patterns analysis, content analysis, and the discourse analysis) and quantitative/multivariate statistical methods (the chi-square test, the logistic regression, and the proportional test) have confirmed that all independent variables: economic grievances; social grievances; political grievances; radical ideology; social network; state repression; and government incentive play their own roles on the dependent variable: the creation/occurrence of individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and of Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). In other words, this Ph.D. thesis has proven and confirmed the initial, general hypothesis, which is to reject the H0 and accepting the Ha.

H0: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is not caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive.

Ha: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive.


Hypothesis Ha1 (Causal Relationship with Mediating Variables): Economic, social, and political grievances are the necessary factors for people committing Islamist terrorism. However, it will only lead people to commit Islamist terrorism if the mediating variables (social network and radical ideology) take part in transforming people with such grievances to commit Islamist terrorism. Economic, social, and political grievances along with social network and radical ideology are the significant factors leading people to commit Islamist terrorism, where the higher the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them to commit Islamist terrorism.

Figure 5.1 The Two Possible Models (Among Many Other Possibilities) Based on Ha1




Hypothesis Ha2 (Multi-Chain Relationship): Economic, social, and political grievances along with radical ideology and social network all together form the multi-chain relationship with people's decision on committing Islamist terrorism. Economic, social, and political grievances along with social network and radical ideology are the significant factors leading people to commit Islamist terrorism, where the higher the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them to commit Islamist terrorism.

Figure 5.2 The One possible model (Among Many Other Possibilities) based on Ha2



Hypothesis Ha3 (The Significant Role of Control Variables): When included as control variables in the equation, state repression and government incentive will be proven significant in leading people to commit Islamist terrorism. The higher the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them to commit Islamist terrorism.

Figure 5.3 The Two Possible Models (Among Many Other Possibilities) Based on Ha3



5.2 The General Pattern of Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia.

By based on the rigorous qualitative and quantitative analysis, which are examined in chapter 4, at least I can lay out and predict several possible patterns of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. The Ha1 and Ha3 are more likely to represent the general pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, although the Ha2 is also still a possible pattern.

The economic, social and political grievances serve as the laying ground with or without which the social network and radical ideology could permeate through the society, and thus altering the affected individuals in the society to start believing in the radical ideology that along the way will make them more exposed to the idea of being involved in violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).

The combined analyses have also proven that it is mostly through being associated with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship, individuals are exposed to the radical ideology. Once they enter the vicious cycle of the radical social network, their mindset and behaviour are shaped by the interaction of four intertwining social network constructs: personal relationship; shared educational experiences; shared training experiences; and shared operational experiences.

The findings in chapter 4 have also proven that the long-standing, traditionalist Islamist organizations in Indonesia such as NU/*Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* (as opposed to the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship), could serve as the defending layer against the influx and permeate through of radical ideology in Indonesia. Consistent with this finding, according to Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma, the former head of Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Detachment 88 who is still serving as the senior adviser on counterterrorism affairs to the Indonesian government, the spreaders of radical ideology (e.g., hard-liner organizations) are keen in using both Quran recitation fellowship and campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship as the entry gate for the radical ideology to penetrate and permeate through the Indonesian society. It is according to General Suryadharma and the current head of intelligence

section at the Detachment 88 that once the hard-liner organizations taking advantage of such channels, they are sustained by strong fundings, teaching materials, technological supports, man-power, and other supporting infrastructures.²⁶²

On the other hand, a large range of traditionalist organizations (e.g., NU and *Muhammadiyah*) also seek to obtain followers from among students through Quran recitation fellowship and campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship.²⁶³ Not only must these traditionalist organizations compete to neutralize the influence of radical ideology in the Indonesian society through Quran recitation fellowship and campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship, they also must “neutralize” themselves against the infiltration of radical ideology in these traditionalist organizations (Wahid, ed. 2011).²⁶⁴

Regarding the radical ideology in this case, such ideology is basically an ideological system that makes the affected individuals believe that at all costs the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state must be established in Indonesia. This is indeed in line with the open statements of Police Inspector General (Ret) Ansyad Mbai, the former head of Indonesian Counterterrorism Agency and many other experts and senior policymakers in the field who argue that until today this is the end-state/ultimate intention in the mind of affected individuals.²⁶⁵ This firm ideological system exists along with other concurrent perceptions that view the Western world (including its democratic culture that Indonesia adopts) as a man-made and *kafir*, thus making the de-establishment of current social order by physical (lesser) jihad and act of terror at the local, national, and global level (e.g., the foreign jihad) as both compulsory and a divine obligation. Subsequently, such ideological system is exacerbated by the fact that such affected individuals have a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) in the Apocalyptic Day (*Qiyamah*). Although all three Abrahamic religions (Judaism,

²⁶² Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma (the Former Head of the Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) and Senior Commissioner/Colonel Ibnu Suhendra (the Head of Intelligence Section at the Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) in a discussion with the author, October 18, 2016.

²⁶³ For more, see (Afrianti, Indonesia's Islamic Educational Institutions and Radicalism Among Muslim Youth 2011). See also (Loveita 2017).

²⁶⁴ See also (Loveita 2017).

²⁶⁵ See also (Police General Tito Karnavian 2016).

Christianity, and Islam) believe in the Judgment Day, this belief in the *Qiyamah* is important for these affected individuals. Specifically, within their bounded rationality these affected individuals also believe that their firm, consistent commitment in the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia including through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is in line with their higher chance of being accepted in the heaven and being spared by the wrath of God in the Apocalyptic Day.

In line with this fact, Jerry L. Walls (2008) also argues that the twentieth-century was marked by the emergence of Islamist fundamentalism as *a significant energy in* world politics and in the acts of terrorism, which have often been overtly motivated by eschatological convictions, especially with respects to the belief system about rewards in the afterlife of Islamist martyrs. Therefore, the failure by secularists to dismiss eschatological beliefs as nothing more than misguided fanaticism would expose their own failure to truly understand the world around them. Indeed, this failure will open more spaces for the “scoundrels” and “demagogues” to employ this eschatological multi-interpretation in manipulating the naïve and uninformed.²⁶⁶

Correspondingly, once these Salafi jihadists have the determination, courage, and commitment to be involved in the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror), the other independent variables: the high-level state repression and the insufficient government incentive only play their own role to exacerbate the situation. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis have proven that the more these affected individuals feel that the level of state repression is high and the government incentive are insufficient, the more determined, courageous, and committed they become to be involved in the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad and the act of terror.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁶ For more, see (Walls 2008), 10 – 11. In order to grasp the significance of Muslim teachings on the afterlife, we need first to have a sense of the basic eschatological narrative as set down in the Quran and the Hadith and elaborated upon by generations of preachers, scholars, and teachers. For more, see (Chittick 2008).

²⁶⁷ According to the Indonesian Minister of Defense, General TNI (Ret) Ryamizard Ryacudu in a discussion with the author in August 2015, if the Indonesian government can dedicate more sufficient attention and resources allocation (e.g., proper government incentives) towards the Islamist radicals, it would become a strategic instrument to winning their heart and mind. The similar view was also

5.3 The Policy Analysis on the Deradicalization Efforts of Indonesian Government.

Having mapped out the general pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, it is also important to examine the effectiveness of Indonesian deradicalization policy since 2002 - 2017. The statistical findings in chapter 4.2. indicate that the Indonesian deradicalization efforts have not significantly altered the end-state/ultimate intention in the mind of these affected individuals. Although during this timeframe the Indonesian counterterrorism forces have successfully prevented a number of potential terrorist attacks to occur, coupled by some successes to disengage the affected individuals from the violent networks, in general the Indonesian government has not been able to significantly deradicalize the affected individuals (by being measured by their end-state/ultimate intention) and to make most of them embracing the political democratic process or being involved in the political democratic life.

In this sense, although after undergoing the deradicalization efforts most of these deradicalized individuals feel and view that the Indonesian government's counterterrorism approach is more constructive and persuasive (as opposed to being repressive), they merely become hibernate, which means that they neither adopt non-violent ways nor embracing²⁶⁸ the political democratic process (or being involved in the political democratic life). At the same time, after they undergo the deradicalization efforts they also still disagree and being unsure with the four most basic values of the nation: *Pancasila*, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (the unity in diversity), UUD 1945, and the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. This condition is quite concerning, because once any windows of opportunity to make "their come-back" at the domestic and at the global level are available, they could be potentially exposed to the old violent ideology and/or behaviour. Strictly speaking, this phenomenon requires more preventive measures of counterterrorism efforts other than the deradicalization itself.

expressed by the Vice Chief of Indonesian State Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General TNI (Ret) Torry Djohar in a discussion with the author in October 2015.

²⁶⁸ Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma (the Former Head of the Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) and a former terrorism prisoner who is now a Ph.D. student at one of the leading Universities in Indonesia in a discussion with the author, October 1, 2016.

5.4 Predicting the Existence and Latent Threat of Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia.

Having identified a set of determining variables that determine the creation/occurrence of ideological and behavioural system that adopts violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror), at least I can make the prediction that the chance of Indonesia to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments) are still high.

First. If in the future the Indonesian economic, social, and political conditions are not significantly well improved, it could contribute to the higher risk of Indonesia to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments). Such improving socio-economic-politico conditions include but not limited to a more economic equality and welfare in the whole Indonesian society, a better education (in terms of its quality and quantity) at the national level, a more enlightened society, a lesser unemployment level, and a more quality democracy and effective democratic government sustained by a high quality law enforcement.

Second. If the Indonesian government along with the whole Indonesian society and its traditionalist, long-standing Islamist organizations fails to effectively curb the existence and the supporting factors of various social network modes that become the entry gate of radical ideology to influx and permeate through Indonesian society, the risk likelihood of Indonesia to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments) is still high.

Third. If the Indonesian government along with the traditionalist, long-standing Islamist organizations (e.g., NU/*Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*) and other Islamist political parties fail to curb “the influencing power” of radical-Islamist ideology to spread and permeate through the Indonesian society, the risk likelihood of Indonesia to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism

movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments) is still high.

Fourth. The Indonesian government and its national security establishment need to continuously keep the balance between the under-reaction and over-reaction when they deal with the potential and actual threats of Islamist terrorism. In this case, the state repression level must be sophisticatedly tailored and continuously adjusted. If they fail to maintain this balance, it will increase the risk likelihood of Indonesia to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments).

Fifth. If the Indonesian government fails to improve its winning-heart-and-mind approaches in deradicalizing the affected individuals, it will increase the risk likelihood of Indonesia to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism movement. The better government incentive perceived in the mind of affected individuals will attenuate/lessen the risk likelihood of Indonesia to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global terrorism movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments).

CHAPTER 6: THE CONCLUSION AND POLICY RELEVANCE/RECOMMENDATION

6.1 The Thesis Conclusion.

A series of research processes conducted throughout this Ph.D. thesis project have confirmed that the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia are caused by the intertwining set of determining multivariate/multi-dimensional variables, instead of being otherwise. Although the unit of analysis of this project is the individual, the thorough analysis made in this Ph.D. thesis project still accommodates the scope of other units of analysis: group level; state level; and global level, thus making this Ph.D. thesis project comprehensively covering all related aspects in the field. Concurrently, throughout the research processes, the pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is also examined from the perspective of terrorism as a logic of action, a method of action, and a psychological phenomenon.

The combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis complemented by the discussion on social networks analysis has proven that radical ideology is the most significant variable in making the individuals believe in the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). The second most significant variable after the radical ideology is the social network through which the radical ideology influxes and permeates through the Indonesian society and affects certain individuals. As these two variables are found as the significant variables, so that these two variables play their own role as the mediating variables connecting the economic-socio-political grievances and the dependent variable (the individual's ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror)).

Subsequently, once the affected individuals are exposed to such radical ideology, the two other variables (the state repression and the government incentive) only play their own role to exacerbate the situation. In this sense, the higher state repression level and the less government incentive will increase the likelihood of these affected individuals to become more determined, courageous, and committed in the

establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).

Thus, by having mapped out the underlying, latent variables in this phenomenon it can be concluded that the likely future pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is determined by how effective the Indonesian government in managing and manipulating these intertwining multivariate/multi-dimensional variables. These intertwining variables are the set of predictors that we can use to formulate a better national counterterrorism policy, strategy, and operation by employing all instruments of national power (military, intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, information, economic, and financial), academic community, and entire Indonesian society in the most comprehensive sense.

6.2 The Policy Relevance/Recommendation.

In counterterrorism, the general guide to success is to catch or kill as many terrorists as you can without creating more.²⁶⁹ However, for Indonesia, the issue is not that simple. As the world's most Muslim populated country and as a democracy, the counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia must require both the guarantee of security and the maintenance of broad and in-depth public support at the national level. Any counterterrorism policies must be specifically crafted and continuously updated based on the likely pattern of terrorist threats and movements this country is facing, whilst at the same time considering the fact that the long-term goals should not be undermined for the short-term gains.

The effectiveness and accountability of Indonesian counterterrorism policy must balance between the two aspects: security (the under-reaction versus over-reaction) and political integration (the involvement of key political leadership and stakeholders of the nation). Actions need to be strategically chosen with proximate and ultimate goals in mind. Otherwise, according to Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, "individual application of selected tactics and policies without a comprehensive national plan can prolong a conflict or even lead to complete failure."²⁷⁰

²⁶⁹ See (Holmes 2015), 35 – 49.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

Table 6.1 An Example of Spectrum of Terrorism Warning and Threat Assessment

Types of Threat Information	Plot-Specific	Tactical	Strategic	Grand Strategic	Educational
Specificity of information.	Exact address.	A few cities (e.g., Bali, Jakarta, Surabaya).	Country or region (e.g., selected ASEAN countries, Middle Eastern countries, and Western countries).	Regions (e.g., ASEAN, Southwest Asia, Middle East, Europe, North America).	Worldwide.
	Exact date.	Days or weeks.	Weeks or months.	Months or years.	Years or decades.
	Single named target.	Several named targets (e.g., foreign assets in Indonesia and other public facilities).	Single category of interests (e.g., Indonesian embassies and other national assets overseas).	Several categories of interests.	Indonesian National interests in the long run.
Possible countermeasures (For the Indonesian case, the leading sector is BNPT whose key elements consist of inter-governmental agencies).	Roll up the plot; evacuate or relocate the target (e.g., tactical operations of Densus 88 within the domestic territory).	Short-term, high-cost security measures; watch for the perpetrators (e.g., tactical intelligence operations of Polri supported by TNI and BIN).	Raising the alert levels, coupled by temporary but sustainable security measures (e.g., strategic countermeasures involving more instruments of power including diplomacy and foreign intelligence engagements).	Permanent new physical measures and procedures.	Legislation (e.g., the newly proposed 2017 counterterrorism bill); major national programs (e.g., the newly formulated national counterterrorism policy).

Source: Self-made.²⁷¹²⁷¹ Adapted. See (Pillar 2004).

a. Improving economic, social, and political conditions.

Although the economic, social and political grievances are not necessarily the variables that can directly cause terrorism to occur in Indonesia, such variables are still important to notice and must be improved along the way. The economic, social and political improvement at the national level requires the concerted involvement of all instruments of national power. Such improvements could be measured by various indicators of governance. These indicators include but not limited to the higher Human Development Index (HDI), the better/higher Corruption Perceptions Index (HPI), the better index of World Bank Ease of Doing Business, the lesser Human Poverty Index (HPI) or UN's Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI), the lesser Gini Coefficient (indicating the level of economic imbalance), the higher Per Capita Electricity Consumption (kilowatt hours per year), the better Human Freedom Index, the more enlightened and welfare society, and the more quality democracy as reflected by the higher Democracy Index (DI).

This Democracy Index (DI) contains four elements: whether national elections are free and fair; the security of voters; the influence of foreign powers on government; and the capability of the civil servants to implement policies. As most of Indonesian (former) jihadists/radicals/terrorists are anti-democracy, this is indeed important for the Indonesian government to make sure that its democracy is not defect and does not generate the loopholes of which the Islamist radicals could exploit and further popularizing their extremist ideology throughout the society. That said, it is a very important task for Indonesia to assuring the survivability of her democracy, and how this democracy can afford to generate the best economic, social, and political outcomes and to serve the wider national interests. It is predictable that once the Indonesian democracy collapse, it will open a strategic entry point for certain Islamist ideologies to further their agenda by establishing the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia.

Asia 2025, an already open-source U.S. Department of Defense assessment made in 1999 predicted the possibility of Indonesia's internal implosion/breakdown

before 2025.²⁷² Could it be prevented? Surely it could, and the answer is laid out in the hand of Indonesians themselves. According to Abraham Diskin, Hanna Diskin and Reuven Hazan (2005) in their comprehensive study over 62 democratic countries titled *“Why Democracies Collapse: The Reasons for Democratic Failure and Success”*, there are at least four main determining variables that encompass economic, socio and political aspects that determine the fate of democracy of a nation: whether it is going to survive, or it is going to collapse.

The first determining variable is the institutional factor such as the state and government system, where the unitary state with pluralistic society and presidential system (like Indonesia) is more vulnerable towards a democratic collapse as opposed to the federal state with the parliamentary governmental system. The second variable is the social factor such as the social cleavages, non-functioning economy, and the historical factor. In this case, a democracy with deep social cleavages coupled with an unequal and/or equitable economic distribution will make a democracy to be more vulnerable to collapse. The third variable is the government instability where the more a democratic government has the reshuffle and re-election, the more likely a democracy of that nation to collapse. The fourth variable is the foreign intervention, meaning that the higher degree of foreign intervention will cause a democracy to be more likely to collapse. Based on their study, out of these four determining variables it is the social factor that most determines the fate of democracy: the deep social cleavages; the unequal and/or equitable economic distribution issue; and the historical aspect, all which Indonesia is currently having. However, this complex social condition is not only occurring today but already existed throughout the history of the Republic of Indonesia from 1945 until today.

Historically Indonesian society consists of three divisions of social cleavages: pro-Islamist versus pro-secular nationalist (state ideology-based); the pro-the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia versus pro-federalism (state and governmental system-based); and pro-socialist/people-based economy versus pro-capitalism/elitists-based economy (political economy-based). These social cleavages were then reflected

²⁷² See (U.S. Department of Defense 1999). For more on the scenario of Indonesia breakdown also see (Singer and Cole 2016).

in the multiparty system during the first 1955 Indonesian general election and still exist until today. These are the social cleavages that have been the characteristic of this nation, and a failure to fully comprehend and handle such phenomenon will lead to a poor management of political disagreement among Indonesia's deeply-divided social cleavages, which in turn will be dangerous for the Indonesian democracy.

As of 2014, before the current administration taking place, and with all due respects with the great leadership of previous Indonesian presidents, there were still at least 100 million out of 245 million Indonesians living with the income of less than \$2 USD/day. In addition to that, Indonesia that historically consists of highly pluralistic elements eventually decided to establish a nation-state called Indonesia. Therefore, any efforts to enforce a uniformity (e.g., Islamizing the whole nation) by certain elements in the society will become a serious threat to the Indonesian pluralistic nature. Such efforts will only disturb the economic development process, thus exacerbating the unequal and/or equitable economic distribution challenges that facing the archipelago since 1945 until today.

Looking forwards, it is the current ultimate challenge of Indonesian top national leadership to be able to manage all ideological differences and political disagreements at the national level by diligently looking at the whole characteristics examined above. The ideological differences followed by the political disagreement occurring in the peacetime is normal, and such disagreement has both the root causes and apparent symptoms. As discussed in chapter 2 of this Ph.D. thesis, according to Alex Schmid (1988), there are at least five levels of gradation in managing the political disagreement within a democracy: the full state of peace; the management of political disagreements through political persuasions; the engagement by political pressures; the use of political violence; and the civil war.

Therefore, it is the braveness of top national leadership for having to acknowledge the root causes whilst at the same time gradually fixing the symptoms of political disagreements within this nation. Such political disagreements must be managed at the political persuasion level where the government consistently implements the rule of law (such as the routine rule legitimated by the traditional customs, constitutional procedures, and the political compromise of give-and-take). This

particular point is also stressed by Hamad El-Said who argues that in order to win our struggle against terrorism and other violent radicalism, the government needs to restore trust, legitimacy, respect for law and human rights, freedom of expression, and the promotion of good governance.²⁷³ Correspondingly, on the other side, the non-government actors who want to settle any political disagreements should play their constitutional-based oppositional role in elegant and non-violent ways (such as through the formation of opposition press and parties, rallies, electoral contests, and litigation/use of courts for solving the political disputes).

However, if the government fails to manage political disagreements within the boundary of political persuasion, the government would likely to start controlling the situation by engaging in the political pressure and oppression. Such pressures and oppressions could include the manipulation of the competitive electoral process, the censorship, the surveillance, the harassment, the discrimination/criminalization of political oppositions, the infiltration of oppositions, and the misuse of emergency legislation. If such conditions happen usually the non-government actors will respond by engaging in the various extra-parliamentary action (e.g., non-violent actions such as social protest, demonstrations to show the strength of public supports, the strikes, the boycotts, the civil disobedience and non-cooperation, and other forms of pressure politics short of violence). However, this is already an alarming situation and not conducive to the national security.

Subsequently, if the government fails again to manage the political disagreements at this stage, it automatically will degrade to the worst level which is the political violence. In this case, the government will likely to engage in the violent repression for the control of state power that includes state terrorism/terrorism by the state actor or so-called the terror from above (e.g., the torture, the death squads, the disappearances, and the concentration camps); the counterinsurgency; the

²⁷³ For more, see (El-Said n.d.). See also, (Saadi 2012). Correspondingly, according to Lieutenant General TNI (Ret) Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo (the former Presidential candidate in 2014 and chairman of the third biggest political party in the parliament for the period of 2014 - 2019) in a discussion with the author, March 25, 2018, the Islamist movement in Indonesia can be well and peacefully managed as long as the Indonesian democracy and political leadership can deliver the best possible resources for its people, thus being respectable and exemplary in the eyes of its citizens. Another factor deemed important is the capacity of government and society to stand against transnational Islamist radical movements that spill over to Indonesia.

assassination; the massacres; and the “government political justice” (e.g., the mass arrest, the banning, and the deportation). Consequently, the non-governmental actors would like to respond with another kind of political violence for challenging the state power that correspondingly mirrors what the state actor does. It could include the terrorism (de-individuated political murder); the insurgency; the assassination (e.g., the individuated political murder); the indiscriminate massacres; and the material destruction (e.g., the sabotage and the arson). After the stage of political violence, the worst of the worst would happen which is the civil war and the implosion of the country.

Having laid out a general pattern of Indonesian characteristics, of the challenge of keeping a stable democracy, and of addressing the root causes and apparent symptoms of Indonesian democratic challenges, it is not exaggerating if all elements involved in the political disagreement including the governmental and non-governmental actors to refrain themselves, not to be involved in the self-destructive political behaviour, and instead keeping their engagement within the border of political persuasion. Once the managing of political disagreement has shifted beyond the boundary of political persuasion, it would potentially become uncontrollable. Such condition could give the leeway for the radical-Islamist movement to take advantage of the situation and to exacerbate its condition. Indonesia is a big, promising nation where there is no political disagreement that is not unsolvable, and all together Indonesians should keep this nation strong and great through democratic, gradual, and non-violent ways.

b. Effectively dealing with the social network as an entry point of radical ideology.

This Ph.D. thesis project has proven that the social network and the radical ideology each plays its own significant role in the equation that generates Islamist terrorism to occur in Indonesia. In this sense, the social network is indeed the entry point for the radical ideology to influx and to permeate through the society, thus affecting the individuals to become radical. The involvement of individuals in the social network is shaped by the four intertwining social constructs: personal relationship; shared educational experiences; shared training experiences; and shared operational experiences. On the other side of the same coin, the social network is manifested both

in the cyber and physical realm through a complex web of human interactions at the personal, group, state, and global level.

In its relationship with this particular matter, the quantitative analysis has proven that being associated with the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and *Muhammadiyah*-based campus Islamic *da'wah* fellowship as opposed to only being associated with the traditionalist, long-standing Islamist organizations (e.g., NU/*Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*) has a significant relationship and the positive causal effect on the individuals to believe in the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). It is also important to note that since individuals' involvement in the social network is shaped by the personal relationship, shared educational experiences, shared training experiences, and shared operational experiences; the Indonesian government must pay a very serious attention to the Islamic educational system and institutions throughout the nation.

The serious attention is not only given to the domestic supporting factors that make such social networks to exist, but also to the international forces (international state and non-state actors) that support these networks through fundings, teaching materials, technological supports, man-power, and other supporting infrastructures. In other words, the special attention needs to be made on the social network-based counterterrorism efforts (from the policy to the strategy and operational level) in order to prevent such social networks from existing, growing, and recruiting potential individuals/terrorists whether by the means of preventing their occurrence, of penetrating and disturbing the Salafi jihad social networks, and of decreasing the pool of potential terrorists.

There are several creative social networks-based engagements that the government can do. These engagements can include promoting the banning of extremist imams from preaching, promoting the open and intellectual discussion of politico-religious related issues, and working with the fundamentalist Muslim groups to promote a pacifying message and repudiate terrorist violence. Just as European socialists acted as a bulwark against Soviet communism in the twentieth century, the peaceful fundamentalist Muslim groups' help is essential to neutralize

extremist/jihadist/terrorist networks, for they attract the same clusters of alienated young men as the Salafi jihad but may provide them with a peaceful alternative to terror.²⁷⁴ This is indeed an intelligence-heavy work that must be consistently supported by the means of law enforcement, diplomacy, and even military.

c. Effectively curbing the influencing power of radical ideology.

On top of that, the Indonesian government along with the traditionalist, long-standing Islamist organizations (e.g., NU/*Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*) and the whole society at the personal, familial, group, and national level must exactly know the strategic minds behind the radical ideology that Indonesia is facing.²⁷⁵ This effort must also be boosted by a more strict security clearance process in order to assure that any government individuals involved in curbing the influencing power of radical ideology are indeed the ones who have serious personal and professional integrity in this kind of counter-ideology engagement.²⁷⁶ This is not only because the radical ideology is the most significant variable for the occurrence of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, but also such ideology is becoming more global in its nature.

By referring to four main ideologues in the twentieth century who are discussed in chapter 2, whose works are influential for the occurrence of Islamist terrorism (e.g., Salafi jihadism), the Indonesian government is expected to fully grasp of how the ideologies of these global-level ideologues are implemented in the modern-day context of irregular warfare. The Indonesian government must be keen to acknowledge what

²⁷⁴ For more, see Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 182.

²⁷⁵ The crucial dates in the evolution of the ideology of global jihad that also influences the pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia: 1918 – 1924 (the end of Caliphate); 1945 – 1948 (the creation of Israel state); 1979 (Iranian Revolution, the Siege of Mecca, and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan); 1988 (Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan); and 1990 – 1991 (Fall of USSR and Gulf War I). See (Gorka and Sookhdeo 2012).

²⁷⁶ According to Rear Admiral TNI Dr. Amarullah Oktavian, ST., MSc., DESD. (the Dean of Defence Management Faculty at the Indonesian Defence University) in a discussion with the author on September 30, 2017, a stricter security clearance process is instrumental in the nation's effort in counter-ideology engagements.

Correspondingly, according to Lieutenant General TNI (Ret) Agus Widjojo (the Governor of the National Resilience Institute of Republic of Indonesia) in a discussion with the author on October, 19, 2017, it is highly critical for Indonesian strategic leaders to be educated in the totally different way by transforming their “how-to-think” in dealing with contemporary strategic security challenges.

kind of radical ideology that this country is facing. Over generalizing the radical ideology of Indonesian Islamist terrorism as merely “violent extremism or religious right-wing” could be misleading and detrimental to the Indonesian ability to understand, cope, and defeat the Islamist terrorist threats this country is facing. Denying this fact simply out of a misguided tolerance/sensitivity to other Muslims will delay Indonesian ability to understand the true nature of this conflict and to delegitimize that threat: the radical ideology implemented through violent and non-violent jihad. Both of which have the same goal, which is the establishment of Islamic (*Shari’a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia.

What to do about that?

When it comes to laying out and examining about Islamist radical ideology, it may not be as complex as offering solutions to it. Theological, philosophical, intellectual, and psychological engagement must be fully employed at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of any counter-radicalization and deradicalization efforts by using all instruments of national power available: military; informational; diplomacy; law enforcement; intelligence; financial; and economic. Based on the lesson learned from the case of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyyah that was founded in 1978 and Muslim Brotherhood that was founded in 1928, at least we can conclude a two-point strategy that the Indonesian government may adopt.²⁷⁷

First, radical groups must reach the conclusion that violent campaigns will not achieve their goals and will lead to the destruction of their groups and their influence. In this sense, radical groups must be answered with enough force and determination that they perceive a cease-fire (stop being engaged in the violent way) as the only way for them to survive. This means that radicals’ violence cannot go unanswered. Each unanswered act of violence makes them bolder. The *mujahidin* in Afghanistan felt that they could overcome a world superpower because they drove the Soviet Union out of the country. As *al-Qaeda* moved on to attack the United States interest overseas, the United States gave a weak response, which made *al-Qaeda* bolder. They actually firmly believed that they could win an all-out battle with the United States.

²⁷⁷ For more on this two-point strategy, see (Gabriel 2006), 165 – 167.

Based on this premise, if the Indonesian government along with the government of other countries continue to demonstrate their lethal force (military/intelligence/law enforcement) and their resolve, radicals will eventually be forced to recognize that violence will not achieve their goals. Instead, violence will only succeed in self-annihilation and bring harm to the cause of Islam. In addition to that, the Muslim public will harden their hearts against radicals who continue to harm their society instead of improving it. Although it may not be possible to change the goal of (fundamental) Islamists, which is to claim the whole world for Islam, it is possible to cause them to change their current strategy of achieving it.²⁷⁸ That said, the Indonesian government must back Islamist radicals into a corner where jihad will not work and then give them a dignified third option: the peaceful involvement in the civilized society.

Second, during the cease-fire (or at the hibernate stage where these radicals neither adopt violent ways nor peaceful democratic mechanisms), the Indonesian government should not allow extremist groups to regroup and gather strength to make a better attempt at mounting violent attacks in the future along their way to establish the Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. Therefore, the Indonesian government must cripple their ability to do this by the means of preventing radical groups from using funds for violent purposes, and of educating young people about teachings in the Quran and hadith that support the spreading of Islam through peaceful engagements, instead of through jihad. This religious enlightenment campaign needs to be given an important place within a wider strategic informational campaign involving all media outlets available.

Additionally, these Islamist moderate voices need to have a prominent place on the Internet in order to counteract the thousands of Islamist Web sites that are feeding jihad to Muslim young men.²⁷⁹ Perhaps the new writings of the historic leadership of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah can provide the philosophical foundation that a committed Muslim can follow to demonstrate the sincerity of his/her faith and ideology without causing harm to those who believe differently. It is time for Muslim scholars and leaders to take

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 165 – 166.

²⁷⁹ These moderate Islamists may come from the silent majority in the Islamic world: the secular/ordinary Islamist; liberal-Islamist; and orthodox or traditional-Islamist.

the lead in educating Muslim society in an interpretation of the Quran that looks forwards to the twenty-first century instead of dragging Muslim society backwards into the seventh century where preserving and advancing Islam through violent/lesser jihad is no longer needed; treating the religious preachers not as the judges; supporting the voices of Islamist moderation; leaving religious education to the family; and having more enlightened/emancipated Muslim women.²⁸⁰

On another side of the same coin, the counterterrorism efforts must also acknowledge the imperfection of any human-made systems (e.g., Western civilization, colonialism, crusades, and democracy) that might alienate the Islamic world in the past. The successful appeal of any counter-radicalization efforts will also depend on the speaking respectfully towards the Muslims, Muhammad, and Muslim beliefs and to some extents by providing humanitarian aid to Muslims and showing many other humanized faces of Indonesian democracy and counterterrorism efforts.

Having laid out the specific ideologies to be anticipated and how to engage in the counter-radicalization, at the practical level the Indonesian government along with the traditionalist, long-standing Islamist organizations (e.g., NU/*Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*), and the whole society at the personal, familial, group, and national level must also consistently develop the Islamic educational teaching and *da'wah* system that accommodate the growth and dominance of pluralistic and inclusive Islam, which is based on the secular basic values of the nation, whilst at the same time discrediting any extremist ideologies to influx and to permeate through the society.

Moreover, since the multivariate statistical analysis has also proven that the dynamic of Islamist struggle at the global level (among some other ideological-related factors) has the most significant relationship and causal effect on individuals to believe in the establishment of Islamic (*Shari'a*) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror), the Indonesian government must do their best to build the resilience of its citizens against the appeal of Salafi and other extremist ideologies, including the allure of being involved in any kinds of foreign jihad at the

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 166 – 167, 169 – 173.

global level.²⁸¹ Discrediting and preventing the extremist ideology to permeate through the Indonesian society is one thing, whilst discouraging Indonesians to be allured with such ideologies is another significant challenge.

This policy recommendation is in line with the view of Hamed El-Said. According to El-Said, the engagement with the community and its key members is a powerful instrument in building a society that is resilient to violent extremist ideologies, aware of its dangers and risks, and capable of building and maintaining bonds and trustful relationships. In this sense, the government must stimulate programmes that promote community engagement and participation, debates, and discussion of all sorts of problems that becoming the concern of Islamist radical individuals. Through this way, the communities will be more resilient and empowered to find solutions for their problems, including the problems that are related to violent extremism.²⁸²

d. Continuously Improving the quality and quantity of government incentive.

The analysis in this Ph.D. thesis project has proven that the combination of the higher level of state repressive measure (according to the rule of law enacted by the Indonesian government) and the less government incentive contribute positively to the creation/occurrence of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. It is for this reason that the Indonesian government must sophisticatedly and specifically improve its “carrot” policy (e.g., the government incentive) to balance any repressive measures (e.g., death penalty or life imprisonment) that the government adopts as the consequence of complying with the rule of law in the Republic of Indonesia. In other words, the Indonesian counterterrorism policy, strategy, and operation must be formulated in such a way that keeping the balance between the under-reaction and the over-reaction to better address specific terrorist threats at the potential and actual stage.

²⁸¹ According to the finding of Ph.D. thesis, being anti-Western is significant for causing individuals to become the Salafi jihadists in Indonesia. This particular finding is in line with what Marc Sageman said, where the global Salafi jihad feeds on anti-Western and anti-American hate speech. Such virulent discourse is a necessary condition for the jihad and provides a justification for it. For more, see (Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* 2004), 182.

²⁸² For more, see (El-Said n.d.).

At the end, by referring to the findings of this Ph.D. thesis project the Indonesian government can know that the kind of terrorist threat this nation is dealing with is the religious extremism that has both domestic and global orientation. This kind of extremism justifies its violent ideology and/or behaviour with religious-based arguments. Thus, the formulated Indonesian counterterrorism strategic policy must know of how best to address the terrorists' motivating grievances, funding sources, support networks, leaders, operatives, and capabilities.²⁸³ It is by based on these aspects, the Indonesian government will know of how and of where to determine and to commit the nation's resources in the counterterrorism efforts.

Therefore, whilst the Indonesian government is integrating all elements of national power towards a comprehensive counterterrorism effort, it must be sure to pause and reflect on how well the nation understands its own intentions, capabilities, and biases about the Islamist terrorism and its wider fundamental, extremist, and violent movements. In this sense, by referring to the terminology of James J. F. Forest (2015), the Indonesian counterterrorism policy must not accommodate the room of prejudice, bloodthirsty, or bigotry. Policymakers, intelligence analysts, law enforcement/police officers, military personnel, diplomats, and other involved in counterterrorism must be committed to objectivity, self-discipline, integrity, and attention to nuances and details of whatever terrorist threat this country is confronting.

²⁸³ For more, see (Forest, *An Introduction to the Study of Counterterrorism* 2015).

6.3 Revisiting the Indonesian Counterterrorism Policy and Deradicalization Efforts (2002 – 2017 and Beyond).

Based on the finding of this Ph.D. thesis project, we can clearly see the general pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, and how it will likely to transform in the future. Correspondingly, this part revisits the pattern of Indonesian counterterrorism policy since 2002 until 2017, whilst at the same time trying to recommend the overall counterterrorism policy for the future.

The counterterrorism policy in Indonesia for the last fifteen years (2002 – 2017) has been shaped by the two schools of thought. The first school of thought views the emerging Salafi jihad as a form of violent, fundamental-Islamist movements which are more driven by international conflicts that permeate through the Indonesian society by taking advantage of Indonesian politico-socio-economic weakness. The proponents of this camp argue that the Indonesian engagement in the global struggle against Salafi jihad movements is necessary as long as the United States and the Western world are still engaged in the “war” with Salafi jihad at the global and strategic level. In this case, the violent, fundamental-Islamist movements are considered equally significant in the way the United States dealt with the communism and the Soviet Union in the Cold-War era.

The proponents of this camp do not seriously view terrorism that is justified by religious-based arguments as the latent problem but merely as the strategic effect of the “war” between the United States and the Western world versus violent, fundamental-Islamist movements that eventually spill over to Indonesia. According to their point of view, counterterrorism measures are rather to be treated non-exclusively. In other words, they simply view that the national development would automatically in the long-run eliminate the Salafi jihad movements in Indonesia so that having more specific national counterterrorism measures (e.g., counterterrorism law, counterterrorism policy, and counterterrorism strategy) are less important.

On the other hand, the second school of thought argues that Salafi jihad movements in Indonesia have been an integral part of Indonesian social cleavages, and continuously appear since the Independence day in 1945, particularly due to the failure

to insert the implementation of *Shari'a* law for Muslim citizens in the constitution of Republic of Indonesia (UUD 1945) with the ultimate end-state to establish the Indonesian Salafi Islamist state (see in attachment #5 of the accompanying materials: the Jakarta Charter written in 1945). The camp of this school argues that violent Salafi Islamist movements in Indonesia are latent with or without the United States and Western world engagement in the “war” with the Salafi jihad. For the last fifteen years (2002 – 2017), the policy of this camp places a strong emphasis on the deradicalization efforts that are integrated into wider politico-socio-economic development policy. As opposed to the first camp, this camp argues that although the national development would automatically eliminate the Salafi jihad movements, having more specific national counterterrorism measures (e.g., specific counterterrorism law, specific counterterrorism policy, and specific counterterrorism strategy) are still an imperative.

Subsequently, for the last fifteen years the Indonesian counterterrorism policy is categorized into three phases: 2002 – 2006 (from the sanctuary doctrine to the accommodation doctrine); 2006 – 2010 (from the accommodation doctrine to the suppression and preventive doctrine); and 2010 – 2017 (the improvement of suppression and preventive doctrine under BNPT).

The first phase (2002 – 2006) is the period where the Indonesian government initially denied the existence of home-grown Salafi jihad movements (the sanctuary doctrine). This period was ended by the acknowledgment of Indonesian government that the Salafi jihad movements indeed existed in Indonesia, although the Indonesian government still preferred to silently deal and make concessions with the alleged terrorists (the accommodation doctrine). It is for this reason that in 2005 the Indonesian government acquitted Abu Bakar Baasyir in the charge for his alleged involvement in the continuous terrorist attacks from 2002 until 2005. This period was marked by the establishment in 2002 of a special coordinating desk at the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs that dealt with the terrorism eradication; the issuance of the terrorism crime eradication act in 2003 (UU 15/2003); the establishment of Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in 2004; and the publication of joint guide book on the eradication of terrorism in 2004 by the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. This

coordinating ministry is responsible to oversee and supervise all national security ministries and agencies in Indonesia.

The second phase (2006 – 2010) is the period where the Indonesian government began to fix classical problems in the national security community: the competition among national security apparatus following the separation of Indonesian National Military (TNI) and Indonesian National Police (*Polri*) in 1998 that caused the intelligence loopholes, where these loopholes were seriously problematic for the government counterterrorism efforts. Based on the comprehensive review of the government counterterrorism policy from 2002 - 2006, during the period of 2006 – 2010 the Indonesian government began to adopt the suppression doctrine which focused on crushing terrorist networks and halting the impending terrorist attacks. In 2006 the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs issued a newly-updated policy: the revision of strategic policy in the terrorism eradication along with the publication of integrated joint operations guide book. This period was marked by transforming in 2010 the 2002-established coordinating desk on the terrorism eradication into a single national agency that focuses on dealing with counterterrorism. Based on the international comparative study by the Indonesian government, the newly built agency is named the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) that is equipped with policy and operational arms.


The third phase (2010 – 2017) is the period where the Indonesian government openly acknowledges the latent existence of Salafi jihad movements and acts more confidently by the support of general Indonesian people. This is a period that improves the implementation of both suppression and preventive doctrine. This period has been marked by the empowerment of BNPT as the leading multi-agencies government institution that deals with terrorism issues from the strategic level down to the tactical level, the issuance of preventive terrorism finance act in 2013 (UU 9/2013), the strengthening of Indonesian National Police anti terror detachment 88 (Densus 88) supported by the Indonesian National Military counterterrorism forces (the Army, Navy, and Air Force), and the more aggressive preventive measures (e.g., the domestic surveillance on alleged individuals, groups, and networks), more suppression (e.g., the direct action towards alleged individuals who fight back during the counterterrorism

operations and the fair court trial for alleged individuals who do not fight back during counterterrorism operations), and the deradicalization efforts that uniquely accommodate the “remorseful” individuals.²⁸⁴

Being more aware of the spreading of radical Salafi ideology in Indonesia and on the importance of international cooperation/global engagement by the Indonesian government also begins to mark this period. Up to the finishing stage of writing this Ph.D. thesis in the quarter one (Q-1) of 2018, the Indonesian government is in the process of issuing a new counterterrorism act to supersede the 2003 terrorism crime eradication act. During this period, the government has been doing its best to fix the legal and institutional counterterrorism capabilities (e.g., the establishment of National Counterterrorism Agency/BNPT in 2010 and a new preventive terrorism finance act in 2013), to fix the interagency issues in government counterterrorism efforts (e.g., the establishment of whole-of-government-and-society approaches and joint operations mechanism inside BNPT from the international, down to the national, provincial, municipal, and village level), and to fix other operational aspects of government entities in counterterrorism efforts (e.g., the empowerment of counterterrorism capabilities in each governmental ministry and agency). The figure 6.1 and table 6.2 below visualize the engagement structure of BNPT and the SWOT analysis of Indonesian counterterrorism efforts since 2002 until 2017.

²⁸⁴ According to Major General TNI Benny Indra (the Assistant for Intelligence to the Commander of Indonesian National Military) in a discussion with the author on April 25, 2017, in the compliance to rule of law and based upon the executive order of the President of Republic of Indonesia, the Indonesian National Military is always ready to dedicate its assets and capabilities to sustain the strategic engagement of Indonesian government’s counterterrorism efforts.

Figure 6.1. The Engagement Structure of BNPT

Source: Self-made.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁵ Adapted. See (H. Pandjaitan 2011).

Table 6.2. The SWOT Analysis of Indonesian Counterterrorism Policy (2002 – 2017)

Strength	Weakness
<p>Long-time experiences of Indonesian armed forces (the Indonesian National Military and Indonesian National Police) in the internal security including in dealing with Islamist Salafi rebellions and other separatist movements since 1945.</p> <p>The strong political will of Indonesian government to develop the institutional capacity and the revision of several counterterrorism strategic policies throughout 2002 - 2017.</p> <p>The state still has the huge potential from its instruments of national power (military, information, intelligence, diplomacy, economic, financial, and law enforcement) that have not yet been maximized for the counterterrorism efforts.</p>	<p>The law enforcement is still dominating counterterrorism efforts, so other instruments of national power have not been well developed. In this sense, the roles and capabilities of law enforcement and non-law enforcement instruments of national power need to be proportionally strengthened to make them better reinforcing to each other according to its own division of labor.</p> <p>The legal and strategic policy is relatively outdated and narrowly putting the emphasis on law enforcement. In this sense, the Indonesian National Police engagements (as the front liner of domestic law enforcement and of government domestic counterterrorism efforts) needs to be supported and strengthened by all other governmental and societal elements.</p> <p>The kinetic force (e.g., military and police) is rather limited in the reactive than in the preemptive and preventive measures.</p> <p>The intelligence loopholes at both the strategic and operational level.</p> <p>The Indonesian counterterrorism methods are more defensive as opposed to offensive.</p> <p>The weak reinforcement of Indonesian state secular ideology (e.g., <i>Pancasila</i> and <i>Bhinneka Tunggal Ika</i>) as the nation's strategic culture after President Suharto's era makes the Indonesian society becomes vulnerable against the radical ideology.</p>

	Complicated bureaucratic issues tend to hinder the accelerated issuance of national security related bills. This is coupled by the condition where many legislatures do not have sufficient knowledge in national security matters.
<p style="text-align: center;">Opportunity</p> <p>The global audience has been more aware that violent movements justified by religious-based arguments are the common threat for the global civilized society.</p> <p>The violent Salafi jihad movement that Indonesia is facing is also considered a serious common global threat.</p> <p>The increased awareness of society in terms of the deadly effect of terrorism justified by religious-based arguments.</p> <p>The increased awareness among various stakeholders in the Indonesian society regarding the importance of counterterrorism efforts and of national resilience against violent Islamist movements.</p> <p>The strong public support that is coupled by dedicated international stakeholders.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Threat</p> <p>Terrorism is still thriving although many of its cells have been exposed and crushed. The rebirth rate of terrorist cells is higher than the government's ability to cope up.</p> <p>Terrorist networks have been transnational and present in many countries by taking advantage of globalization, media, and technological development.</p> <p>The terrorist funding with the cover of spreading religion keep infiltrating the Indonesian society. The influences of these Islamist transnational movements in Indonesia are significant.²⁸⁶</p> <p>The poverty and ungoverned territories in Indonesia's remote islands.</p> <p>Terrorism can occur at anytime and anywhere, whilst terrorist networks have the in-depth root within the society backed by a systematic recruitment pattern.</p>

Source: Self-made.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁶ For more, see Abdurahman Wahid, ed, *The Illusion of an Islamic State: How an Alliance of Moderates Launches a Successful Jihad Against Radicalization and Terrorism in the World's Largest Muslim-Majority Country*, kindle edition. (LibForAll Foundation Press, 2011), 59 – 221. In this book, the Indonesian Minister of Defense (2004 – 2009) Professor Juwono Sudarsono also warned the public regarding the infiltration of Islamist transnational movements that come to Indonesia and infiltrate the society. Their main characteristics are their intolerance, and often violent towards others including towards Indonesian modern Islamist people and society.

²⁸⁷ Adapted. See (H. Pandjaitan 2011).

Looking forwards, the Indonesian counterterrorism policy needs an overhaul in terms of adjusting it with the current and likely future pattern of terrorist movements that this country is facing, as well as by improving the state capacities that are supported by the public support at the domestic and global level. Correspondingly, any efforts to issue a new piece of legislation related to terrorism and counterterrorism issues must also cover the essential elements of the strategic response to the global terrorist movement that this country is facing (e.g., global violent Islamist salafi movement). Whilst the table 6.3 below lists the key elements to be considered for drafting the new counterterrorism bill, the figure 6.2 below visualizes the possible future trajectory of Indonesian counterterrorism efforts.


Table 6.3 The Essential Elements for Drafting the Indonesian Counterterrorism Bill/Act

Essential Elements	Notes
Terror as a violent/armed tactic that can be used by anyone/any actors (e.g., state and/or non-state actors).	Terrorism can become a strategic phenomenon depending upon its (various) social contexts.
The minimum and the widening/overarching definition of terrorism.	<p>The common denominator of terrorism is the use of violence towards civilians to send the message to achieve political goals. In other words, at the very least we can define terrorism as a criminal violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve political goals via targeting civilians.</p> <p>This definition can be expanded by based on the 22 key elements found in at least 109 definitions of terrorism, and by based on the specific social contexts of terrorism movement that Indonesia is facing.</p>
The overlapping of terrorism with other forms of political violence (e.g., crime, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare).	We need to examine the phenomenon of terrorism movement that Indonesia is facing from a wider perspective (e.g., criminal, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare perspectives).
<p>The end-state, strategic objectives, reasons, targets of attack, ultimate audience, domain of attacks (land, sea, air, cyber), tactics, weapons, resource mobilization, organization, territorial control, war zones, and global energy of certain terrorism movement that Indonesia is facing.</p> <p>Is it the non-state terrorism, state terrorism/terror from above, or state-sponsored terrorism?</p> <p>Who are the terrorist perpetrators that Indonesia is facing?</p>	<p>These parameters are useful to identify whether certain terrorism movement that Indonesia is facing (e.g., violent Islamist salafi movement) is a strategic challenge or merely a tactical and local one.</p> <p>Likewise, it is essential to identify whether certain terrorism movement that Indonesia is facing is a pure crime, pure insurgency, pure guerrilla warfare, or pure conventional warfare. Is there any overlapping of it from the perspective of Indonesian national interests?</p>

<p>The in-depth understanding that the non-state terrorism that Indonesia is facing (e.g., violent Islamist salafi movement) is neither a pure crime (it is an extraordinary crime) nor a pure conventional warfare.</p>	<p>We need to identify the overlapping domain of certain terrorism movement that Indonesia is facing (e.g., violent Islamist salafi movement).</p>
<p>The strength and weakness of 2003 terrorism crime eradication act (UU 15/2003). Is there any improvements need to be made and in which aspects?</p>	<p>There are two options if the improvement is needed. It is either to add the amendment (<i>konsideran</i>) to the existing 2003 terrorism crime eradication act or to drafting and issuing a new counterterrorism act (<i>UU Penanggulangan Terorisme</i>).</p> <p>It is very essential that any changes in the legal aspect (e.g., new pieces of legislation) must cover not only a single terrorism movement (e.g., violent Islamist salafi movement) that Indonesia is currently facing, but also to cover other terrorism phenomena that Indonesia might be facing in near future (e.g., insurgency-based non-state terrorism in Papua or other Indonesian provinces).</p> <p>Subsequently, any new pieces of legislation must also improve the strategic response capacity of the nation and the Indonesian government itself. The piece of legislation must ideally cover strategic multi-dimensional aspects involved in national counterterrorism efforts. Such aspects include military, intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, information, financial, and economic instruments of national power.</p>

Source: Self-made.

Figure 6.2. A Proposed Framework for Indonesian Counterterrorism Policy
(Beyond 2017)



Source: Self-made.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁸ Adapted. See (Collins 2001) and (H. Pandjaitan 2011).

On Deradicalization Efforts

As this Ph.D. thesis has contributed to the creation of knowledge in the field particularly in terms of Islamist terrorism in the case of Republic of Indonesia, it is necessary if this last section is dedicated to discussing the Indonesian deradicalization efforts since 2002. As an individual becomes an extremist through processes, there will be also processes through which an extremist individual eventually decides to renounce violence, leaves a group or such a violent movement, or even rejects a radical worldview. However, according to Rabasa, et al. (2010), there is the reason to believe that deradicalization appears to have its own distinct features, some of which are quite different from the factors associated with the initial radicalization of extremist individuals.

The policy analysis of this Ph.D. research project (part 5.3) corresponds with the findings by Rabasa, et.al (2010) on Indonesian deradicalization efforts from 2002 until 2010.²⁸⁹ Unlike her Southeast Asian counterparts, Singapore and Malaysia, deradicalization efforts in Republic of Indonesia are not centrally driven, highly structured, and well-resourced. The Indonesian approach of deradicalization efforts operate at two levels: seeking to develop intelligence on terrorist network and to return detainees to society. The strategic objective of these two levels of engagement is not to change the mindset of the terrorists but rather to obtain intelligence on the terrorist network in order to disrupt it and prevent further terrorist attacks. Much of its success at this level comes from the apparatus' employment of soft approach to terrorist detainees.²⁹⁰ Unlike Singapore and Malaysia, which employ religious establishment to persuade detainees of recanting their extremist views of Islam, in Indonesia the counterterrorism apparatus assisted by a team of psychologists, not mainstream clerics, play the leading role in disengagement efforts.

As previously mentioned on chapter 2 (part 2.2.5), the cultural interrogation method is developed accordingly by the counterterrorism apparatus, where the interrogator to be immersed in the culture of the detainee, understand his hopes and

²⁸⁹ For more specific discussion on Indonesian deradicalization efforts, see (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 106 – 117.

²⁹⁰ Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency Chief Ansyaad Mbai, interview with Angel Rabasa, Jakarta, March 2009; quoted in (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 107.

fears, and speak his language.²⁹¹ Correspondingly, in the Indonesian approach to deradicalization, there is no formal “theological dialogue.” The most appropriate individuals to interact with terrorists are, paradoxically, those who are directly involved in the arrest and interrogation or ex-militants who can speak with the authority of experience in the extremist group. That is why, the Indonesian approach to deradicalization requires the police to treat the prisoners in a humane way and to develop bonds of trust. Such efforts of developing bonds of trust include the reuniting of inmates with their families, to reminding them of their earthly responsibilities as husbands and fathers, and the financial assistance given to their family by counterterrorism apparatus.²⁹² Those involved in such program responded in various ways, ranging from the lowest level of cooperation, which is by accepting assistance, to the level of providing information and to cooperating privately in deradicalization of other militants. After these three levels have been reached, the expectation is to hit the highest level of cooperation, which is publicly recanting and becoming actively engaged in deradicalization and counter-radicalization activities.

From the perspective of terrorism prevention, such program has been very successful in eliciting information that in turn enabling counterterrorism apparatus to disrupt the terrorist network in Indonesia. Since 2002, several extremist individuals have been cooperating privately with the counterterrorism apparatus to disengage other militants from the network, but their identities have not been revealed. This approach is not, however, always successful with all terrorist prisoners. Some show no remorse for their involvement in terrorism and tell the interrogators that one day they will switch places, and the terrorists will interrogate the interrogator (e.g., police), or that struggle will be continued by their children and grandchildren.

On top of that, another approach in Indonesian deradicalization efforts is by capitalizing the high-profile role of ex-militants. The Indonesian government seeks to turn the militants’ respect for seniority and hierarchy into a means of deradicalization.

²⁹¹ Senior consulting psychologist Sarlito Sarwono, interview with Angel Rabasa, Jakarta, March 2009; quoted in Rabasa, et al. 2010), 107.

²⁹² Inspector General Gories Mere, head of the National Police antinarcotics task force and former head of Detachment 88, interview with Angel Rabasa, Jakarta, March 2009; quoted in (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 108.

The interrogators seek to gain the trust of JI insiders and then rely on the insiders to influence the rank and file. Looking retrospectively, the Indonesian approach to deradicalization is unique because, unlike the top-down approaches found in the Middle East, Singapore, and Malaysia, the Indonesian approach has been developed based on experience interacting with detainees and implemented by police interrogators with very little participation by religious authorities or other entities of the Indonesian government. This might seem unusual from a non-Indonesian perspective, but in fact it is consistent with the culture of Indonesian security agencies, which are often left to their own devices to raise funds from donors or their own business enterprises.

Despite the ad hoc nature of the Indonesian deradicalization efforts and the lack of incentives to induce cooperation, the program has achieved some degree of success.²⁹³ Corresponding to the finding of this Ph.D. research project, some critics of the Indonesian deradicalization efforts argue that the ex-militants have not truly deradicalized because they do not promote a truly moderate ideology. Although these ex-militants oppose the killing of civilians, they continue to espouse radical beliefs.²⁹⁴ All these weaknesses of Indonesian deradicalization efforts may substantially come from the lack of a coordinated effort by other government agencies. The government has not allocated funds for the program or to implement some form of post-release monitoring. This is clearly a reflection of political will since the fight against terrorism is linked to Islam and a very sensitive issue in Indonesia.²⁹⁵

The Concluding Thought

As the concluding thought for this Ph.D. thesis, based on the framework developed in the aforementioned model (figure 6.2) and the reflection of Indonesian deradicalization efforts, in the future the Indonesian government may need to be more outward looking/global-oriented, aggressive, and maximally utilizing the four pillars of its

²⁹³ For more on this, see (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 115.

²⁹⁴ Kristen E. Schulze, "Indonesia's Approach to Jihadist Deradicalization," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 1, No. 8, July 2008, 9; quoted in (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 116.

²⁹⁵ Indonesian government official, discussion with Angel Rabasa, Jakarta, March 2009; quoted in (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 116.

counterterrorism efforts: prevention; deradicalization; law enforcement; and international cooperation that includes the global engagement in the widest sense. In this sense, the Indonesian government needs a more clear-cut differentiation between what it means by active and passive measures of counterterrorism efforts that theoretically and practically are dual natures: offensive and defensive. Consequently, it means that the Indonesian national security doctrine as a basis of Indonesian counterterrorism efforts, which historically is based on the free-and-active foreign policy and more inward-looking, also need another adjustment along with the reorientation and refocusing of Indonesian grand strategy. All which merits our further research both by the academic and policy community, and we hope that this Ph.D. thesis could serve one of its purposes as an academic and policy reference for any further studies in the respective fields.

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THE ACCOMPANYING MATERIALS

The Attachment #1:

The Profiling of 16 Prisoners and of 6 Recently Released Prisoners

(The materials for the discovering pattern analysis and the content analysis in the chapter 4.1.a and 4.1.b)

Note: The radicals whose boxes are red-colored in this part are the ones deemed as the most important individuals/nodes in the social network analysis (the chapter 4.3)

On The Prisoners/Imprisoned Violent Jihadists (n=16) and Released Prisoners/Violent Jihadists (n=6).The Breakdown Mapping of Collected Data of the Prisoners/Imprisoned Violent Jihadists (n=16)

Nº	Nama	Alias	Tempat dan Tanggal Lahir	Kewarga negeraan dan Etnis	Pelanggaran Hukum	Status Hukum	Latar Belakang Pendidikan dan Pelatihan	Koneksi Keluarga	Afiliasi
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1	Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (ABB)	Bashir; Abu Somad	17 Agustus 1938 di Jombang, Jawa Tengah. Note: Hari kelahirannya sama dengan Hari Kemerdekaan RI.	WNI (Etnis Jawa keturunan Yaman)	<p>Dia adalah Amir JI sejak 1999, kemudian kepala MMI pada Agustus 2002. Akhirnya ditangkap pada Oktober 2002. Dihukum 4 tahun pada Agustus 2003 karena tuduhan makar (subversif). Setelah mendapat remisi akhirnya keluar pada 30 April 2004, sebelum kemudian ditangkap lagi. Pada 3 Maret 2005 kembali dihukum 30 bulan atas tuduhan terorisme. Setelah melakukan banding lepas lagi pada 14 Juni 2006.</p> <p>Terakhir ditangkap pada 9 Agustus 2010 di Banjar, Jawa Barat. Dakwaan yang dikenakan adalah mendanai kamp pelatihan militer untuk JAT di Aceh.</p> <p>2 Juli 2014 menyatakan pengakuan dan kesetiaannya kepada ISIS.</p>	<p>Hukuman penjara 15 tahun sejak Juni 2011. Setelah banding pada 26 Okt 2011, mendapat pengurangan menjadi 9 tahun. Pada 2012 MA mengembalikan hukumannya menjadi 15 tahun. Saat ini berada di LP Pasir Putih, Nusakambangan.</p>	<p>Alumnus Pesantren Gontor. (Note pesantren Gontor ini sebenarnya banyak melahirkan tokoh nasional yang pluralis dan inklusif).</p> <p>Alumnus Universitas Al-Irsyad di Solo.</p> <p>Pendiri Pesantren Al-Mukmin di Ngruki.</p> <p>Pendiri JAT pada tahun Juli 2009.</p>	Anak dari ABB adalah Abdul Rohim Ba'asyir dan Rashid Ridho Ba'asyir.	DI, JI, MMI, JAT
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2	Abdur Rohim bin Thoyib, Abdurrahman bin Thoyib, Abudrrahim bin Thoyib	Abu Husna	9 Oktober 1959, di Pacitan, Jawa Timur.	WNI (Etnis Jawa)	Ditangkap dan ditahan di Malaysia pada 31 Januari 2008. Kemudian diekstradisi ke Indonesia pada Maret 2008. Menyatakan pengakuan dan kesetiaannya kepada ISIS pada 2 Juli 2014.	Dijatuhi 9 tahun hukuman penjara pada 9 Februari 2009. Ditahan di LP. Pasir Putih, Nusakambangan.	Dia juga alumni (1977 – 1981) dan pengajar (1984 – 1995) di pesantren Al-Mukmin di Ngruki. Kemudian juga pernah menimba ilmu di LIPIA, dan kemudian mengajar di Mahad Aly sejak 1995.	Dia adalah adek kandung dari Abu Fatih. Memiliki 2 istri (satu tinggal di Kartasura, Solo dan satu lagi tinggal di Pondok al-Muttaqien, Cirebon).	JI
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3	Abdullah Sunata (Sonata)	Budi, Harman Kristanto, Andri	Di Jakarta pada 4 Oktober 1978.	WNI (Etnis Betawi)	Ditangkap 23 Juni 2010 di Klaten saat sedang merakit bom bersama Heri Sigu Samboja untuk meledakkan kedutaan Denmark di Jakarta. Pada tahun 2005 pernah ditangkap karena memiliki informasi tentang Azhari dan Noordin Top, sekaligus memasok persenjataan untuk Top. Awalnya berencana membunuh Ulil Abshar Abdullah, yang adalah tokoh jaringan Islam liberal. Pada tahun 2006 divonis 7 tahun dan dilepaskan pada Maret 2009. Dia terlibat pada perekrutan dan operasionalisasi untuk kamp pelatihan JAT di Aceh pada tahun 2010.	Dihukum 10 tahun sejak April 2011. Saat ini di LP. Batu, Nusakambangan.	SD, SMP, STM di Jakarta Timur. STIQ Al Manar, Utan Kayu (2000 – 2001). Guru TPA di Masjid Nurul Hidayah, Cipayung (1997 – 1999). Terlibat pelatihan militer di kamp Wairmurat, Buru yang didanai oleh KOMPAK. Bahkan memimpin pelatihan di Seram Barat (Juli 2004), dan menjalankan aktifitas KOMPAK di Ambon dan Poso.	Istri pertama adalah Siti Rohmah yang mengajar di Lampung dan juga di TK Mesjid Nurul Hidayah, Cipayung-Jakarta). Istri kedua adalah Fitri Lutfiana (lulusan Al-Mukmin, Ngruki dan adik dari Iqbal Husein). Dinikahi di penjara. Fitri mengajar di SMPT Al-Izzah (Bekasi).	Lintas tanzim, KOMPAK
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4	Imron Baihaqi (Bayhaqi)	MUSTOFA Abu Tholut; Yudha;	17 Des 1961 di Semarang, Jawa Tengah.	WNI (Etnis Jawa)	Ditangkap pada 10 Desember 2010 di Kudus, Jawa Tengah karena memimpin kamp pelatihan militer di Aceh. Dia ini juga merupakan figure senior di JI dan mantan pimpinan Mantiqi III. Pertama kali ditangkap 8 Juli 2003 dan dinyatakan tidak terbukti terlibat terorisme, namun tetap dihukum 7 tahun karena kepemilikan senjata dan bahan peledak lainnya. Kemudian dilepaskan pada 28 Agustus 2007. Dilaporkan bahwa dia ini dikirim ke Aceh atas perintah ABB. Membantu perekrutan untuk kamp militer JAT di Poso.	Dihukum 8 tahun pada 13 Oktober 2011, dan dipindahkan ke LP. Semarang pada 21 Mei 2012.	Pernah kuliah kedokteran di UNISULA, Semarang (1980 – 1981) sebelum transfer ke UGM – Yogyakarta untuk belajar ilmu veterinary (1981-1985). Berada di perbatasan Pakistan dari 1985 – 1989 termasuk sebagai instruktur. Kembali ke Jakarta untuk bergabung dengan JI (1995), dan pergi ke kamp Hudaibiyah (1999) untuk mengajar dan kemudian bergabung untuk jihad di Poso. Kepala Mantiqi III (1997 – 2001). Kepala Laskar Khos pada 2001.	Istrinya yang bernama Fathatun adalah murid di pesantren Al-Mukmin, Ngruki dan juga saudari kandung dari Abu Rusdan. Orang tua dari Imron ini adalah purnawairawan Kolonel dari TNI-AD.	JI, JAT, lintas tanzim
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5	Iwan Dharmawan	Rois; Iwan Darmawan; Hendi; Agam	17 Juli 1975 di Pandeglang, Banten.	WNI (Etnis Sunda)	Ditangkap pada 5 November 2004 di Bogor, Jawa Barat karena perannya yang besar dalam perencanaan dan eksekusi peledakan bom di kedutaan Australia, termasuk dengan perekrutannya. Dia juga didakwa melakukan perekrutan untuk kamp militer di Aceh pada tahun 2010 yang dilakukannya melalui penjara.	Dijatuhi hukuman mati pada 13 September 2005. Dipindahkan ke LP. Kembang Kuning Nusakambangan dari LP. Cipinang pada 13 Mei 2010.	Sekolah hingga SMA di Sukabumi dan merupakan teman sekelas dari Agus Ahmed. Dia dilatih di Mindanao (1997 -2000) dan ikut bertempur di Poso. Dia juga merupakan salah satu pemilik dari badan usaha CV Sajira Media Karsa.	Dia ini adalah keponakan kandung dari Kang Jaja, yang merupakan pendiri dari Ring Banten.	Ring Banten
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6	Subur Sugiyarto, Subur Sugiarto	Abu Mujahid; Marwan Hidayat; Ustadz Mujayat; ; Abu Mutahi bin Abu Isa	9 April 1973 di Semarang.	WNI (Etnis Jawa)	Pada 11 November 2005 Densus 88 melakukan penyerangan ke rumah ybs di daerah Protomulyo, Kendal. Polisi menemukan M16 dan beberapa peluru senjata laras pendek. Dia juga diduga sebagai koordinator wilayah Semarang untuk jaringan Noordin. Ditangkap di bis pada 17 Januari 2006 saat berada di Boyolali, Jawa Tengah dalam perjalanannya dari Sukoharjo. Dia juga bertugas sebagai perekrut untuk jaringan Noordin Top dan terlibat dalam perampokan pada tahun 2001 dan 2005. Dia adalah pembuat film pengembom Bali I dan II.	Dihukum seumur hidup pada November 2006 di Semarang. Saat ini ditahan di LP. Kembang Kuning, Nusakambangan.	Bersekolah di SMA 8, Semarang. Mendapatkan pelatihan perakitan bom oleh Dr. Azhari Husin.	Menikah dengan seorang wanita dari Pati, Jawa Tengah dan mempunyai 4 orang anak.	Bergabung dengan JI sejak 1993 dan dengan Noordin Top pada 2005.
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7	Umar Patek	Nama sebenarnya : Hisyam bin Alizein	20 Juli 1966 di Pemalang, Jawa Tengah.	WNI (Etnis Arab)	<p>Ditangkap 25 Januari 2011 di Abbottabad, Pakistan, beberapa saat sebelum tertangkapnya Osama Bin Laden.</p> <p>Memiliki peran besar dalam serangan bom di Bali. Hijrah ke Mindanao pada 2003, dan dilaporkan mengkomandani unit jihadis dari luar negeri yang bergabung dengan kamp Abu Sayyaf di Jolo. Dia kembali ke Indonesia pada Juni 2009, dan pergi menuju Pakistan pada Agustus 2010.</p>	Dihukum 20 tahun sejak 21 Juni 2012. Saat ini ditahan di LP. Porong.	<p>Menikah dengan Ruqoyah Binti Husein Luceno pada tahun 1998 di kamp Abu Bakar milik MILF.</p> <p>Ruqoyah ini pindah menjadi Muslim dan berasal dari Filipina.</p>		ASG, JI
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8	Utomo Pamungkas	Mubarok; Amin bin Suharsono	31 Desember 1969 di Kulon Progo.	WNI	Terlibat di dalam beberapa serangan bom di Indonesia termasuk Bom Bali I dan II, dan serangan bom kepada Duta Besar Filipina di Jakarta. Dia ditahan pada 13 Januari 2003 bersama dengan Ali Imron dan dihukum seumur hidup.	Hukuman seumur hidup di LP. Cipinang terhitung sejak 2003.	Dikirim ke Afganistan oleh Sungkar dari 1990 – 1994 melalui Jemaah Tabligh. Rute yang diambil adalah melalui Sabah (Malaysia) sebelum akhirnya ke Afghanistan. Kenal dekat dengan Syeikh Muklis dari Pakistan, mengajar di sekolah TK di Sandakan. Alumni pesantren Al-Mukmin di Ngruki (1983 – 1989) – 1989), dan mantan guru di pesantren Al-Islam, Lamongan (2000). Juga terlibat dalam kamp Hudaibiyah 95-97.		JI (Kepala wakalah Manado pada tahun 1998)
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9	Yudi Zulfahri	Barok	18 Maret 1983, di Keutapang, Aceh Besar.	WNI (Etnis: Aceh)	<p>Ditangkap pada 22 Februari 2010. Memfasilitasi masuknya para jihadis ke Aceh melalui pesantren Darul Mujahidin di Aceh Utara.</p> <p>Abdullah Sunata dan Maulana dia melakukan survey untuk kamp pelatihan di Payabakon, Aceh Utara pada Mei 2009.</p>	<p>9 Dihukum 9 tahun pada 6 Januari 2011. Ditahan di Aceh sejak November 2014.</p>	<p>Dari SD hingga SMA dia sekolah di sekolah negeri, sebelum bergabung di Kuala University, Malaysia.</p> <p>Akhirnya dia lulus dari STPDN pada tahun 2006.</p> <p>PNS Pemda Aceh dan juga mengenyam pendidikan agama di sekolah Wahdah Islamiyah (Makasar). Dia terlibat dalam kamp pelatihan militer di Aceh pada 2010.</p>	<p>Cerai dari Febriana, dan sekarang menikah dengan Nita yang adalah putrid dari tokoh ring Banten, Ujang Michrodin.</p>	Lintas tanzim
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10	Tuah Febriwan-syah	M. Fachry, Fachri	18/2/1968 di Jakarta		Ditangkap di Tangerang Selatan pada 21 Maret 2015. Dia adalah pendiri dari al-Mustaqbal website. Didakwa dengan UU 15/2003 (Pemberantasan Teror) dan UU 8/2011 tentang ITE serta makar. Dialah yang meng-upload video pelatihan militer anak-anak di internet.		Awalnya dia adalah anggota dari Hizbut Tahrir.		ISIS, FAKSI, shariah4Indonesia
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11	Syailendra Ady Sapta bin Robert Bakri, Sapta Syailendra	Abu Mujahid, Ismet Hakiki, Abu Sidik	15/9/70 di Jakarta. Kemudian pindah ke Pandeglang, Banten.		Ditangkap pada 22 Februari 2010. Dilatih di Mindanao. Terlibat dalam serangan bom di Kedubes Australia dan berprofesi sebagai Satpam di Plaza Senayan. Menyatakan pengakuan dan kesetiaannya kepada ISIS pada 2 Jul 2014.	Dihukum 7 tahun sejak 27 Desember 2010. Ditahan di LP. Pasir Putih, Nusakambangan sejak November 2014.	Terlibat di dalam kamp pelatihan militer Aceh. Bergabung dengan Laskar Jihad di bawah pimpinan Jafar Umar Thalib pada 2001 (hanya selama 2 bulan). Keterlibatannya adalah mencari rumah dan motor untuk plotting peledakan kedutaan Australia pada 2004.	Menikah dengan Odiah dari keluarga ring Banten pada 1994.	Lintas tanzim, Ring Banten, dan NII sejak 1997.
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12	Sutomo bin Sudartoni	Ust. Yasin	Semarang 6 July 1965	WNI (Etnis: Jawa)	<p>Ditangkap pada 3 November 2012 di Kayamanya, Poso. Mendapatkan pelatihan perakitan bom dari kelompok Badri Hartono. Sebelumnya ditangkap setelah konflik dengan Polisi di Tanah Runtuh, Poso pada Januari 2007.</p> <p>Dihukum 5 tahun di LP. Palu, Sulawesi sebelum dilepaskan pada 2010. Dia adalah wakil kepala JAT wilayah Sulawesi Tengah.</p>	<p>Ditangkap dan dihukum 4 tahun pada September 2013. Saat ini ditahan di LP. Semarang sejak 2014.</p>	<p>Sejak SD – SMA bersekolah di di sekolah negeri. Pernah sekolah di Akademi Keuangan dan Akuntansi, Semarang.</p> <p>Pernah bekerja di radio RHK Semarang dan radio Sakti FM.</p> <p>Tahun 1997 masuk universitas Katolik Semarang (jurusan arsitektur).</p> <p>Pindah ke Poso tahun 2000 dan menjalankan radio Dakwah Islam. Ditugaskan ke Tanah Runtuh oleh Abu Tholut. Dia adalah guru fisika dan matematika di pesantren Al-Amanah di Poso.</p>	Tanah Runtuh JI, JAT
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13	Saifudin Umar, Syaifuddin Umar, Saefudin Umar.	Abu Fida; Fuad Ali	26 Januari 1966 di Surabaya.	WNI (Etnis: Sunda)	<p>Ditangkap kembali pada 14 Agustus 2014 saat dideportasi dari Turki (ingin bergabung dengan ISIS).</p> <p>Pada 4 Agustus 2004 sudah pernah ditangkap atas tuduhan menyembunyikan Azhari dan Noordin Top di Surabaya. Dia sempat mendapatkan penyiksaan saat penangkapan tsb dan sempat dirawat di rumah sakit.</p>	Ditahan di Rutan Kelapa Dua sejak Januari 2015.	<p>Lulusan universitas di Mekah, Arab Saudi.</p> <p>Sebelumnya bekerja sebagai guru di pesantren Mahad Aly, Solo (sekolah JI).</p> <p>Sejak 2008 bergabung di dewan <i>shari'a</i> MMI Surabaya.</p> <p>Memimpin Forum Solidaritas Daulah Islamiyah Iraq (FORSODIQ).</p>		Ex-JI, MMI, JAT
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14	Safrizal, Syafrizal.	Tgk. Rizal	Di Bireun, Aceh pada 1982.	WNI (Etnis: Aceh)	<p>Ditangkap untuk keempat kalinya pada 6 April 2011 atas berbagai kasus kriminal, termasuk percobaan perampokan BRI pada Oktober 2010 di Lhoknibung, Pantai Bidadari, Aceh Timur dengan JUNAIDI. Dia juga didakwa terlibat perampokan toko milik etnis China di Bireuenon pada 1 November 2010, serangan di penjara Lhokseumawe pada 11 November 2010, perampokan pom bensin di Bireuen pada 20 Desember 2010, toko emas di Bireuen pada 25 Desember 2010 dan di Lhoksukon, Aceh Utara pada 24 Januari 2011.</p> <p>Didakwa dengan pasal 365 dan UU Darurat 1951 (bukan UU tindak pidana terorisme). 8 Mei 2012 terlibat di dalam pelarian 42 tahanan di LP. Meulaboh. Dia sudah berkali-kali dipindahkan dari satu penjara ke penjara lainnya di wilayah Aceh.</p>	Didakwa dengan tindak pidana kriminal umum di Bireuen, Aceh.	<p>Ditangkap pada Juni 2009 untuk perampokan BRI, Kutablang, Bireuen pada 12 Mei 2009 dan kemudian didakwa selama 2 tahun. Sebelumnya pernah ditahan karena kasus ganja, dan ditahan di LP. Tanjung Gusta, Medan bersama dengan Toni Togar dan beberapa orang lainnya. Dia menjalankan pesantren dengan nama Thaifah Mansuroh.</p>	JI (Toni Togar). Sebenarnya dia bukanlah anggota JI.
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15	Lutfi Haedaroh	Ubeid, Ubaid	12 December 1979, di Ngawi, Jawa Timur.	WNI (Etnis: China)	Ditangkap di Medan pada 11 April 2010. Pada tanggal 14 April 2010 dia dan Mustaqim menunjukkan kepada pihak Polri tempat disembunyikan banyak senapan di daerah Jantho, Aceh Besar. Sebelumnya pernah ditangkap di Surakarta karena asosiasi dia dengan Dr. Azhari Husin dan Noordin M. Top. Dia ikut membantu terhubungnya ring Banten dengan JI sebelum serangan bom di kedubes Australia. Dia dihukum selama 3.5 tahun pada Mei 2005, dan akhirnya dibebaskan pada Maret 2007. Dia dekat dengan Urwah yang tewas tertembak dengan Noordin M. Top pada September 2009.	Dihukum selama 10 tahun pada 12 Februari 2011.	<p>Pesantren Al-Mukmin, Ngruki (92 – 95)</p> <p>Darusyahada, 95-98; Mahad Aly (Universitas an-Nur, Solo), finished 2003</p> <p>Mengajar di pesantren al-Muslimun, Magetan.</p> <p>Salah satu penulis buku “Menabur Jihad.”</p> <p>Fasih dalam bahasa Arab.</p> <p>Pernah menempuh pendidikan di Mindanao pada 1999.</p>	<p>Saudara kandung aki laki dari Umar Burhanuddin, Hawin Murtadlo.</p> <p>Saudara ipar dari Mustaqim, mudir dari pesantren Darusyahada</p> <p>·</p> <p>Ayahnya yang bernama Buchori juga ditahan karena gerakan Komando jihad</p>	JAT, JI, Lintas Tanzim, Noordin M. Top.
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16	Zulkifli Lubis, Dzulkifli Lubis	Abu Irhab	Bima, pada 5 Februari 1982	WNI	Ditangkap di Boyolali pada 7 Mei 2011 karena menjual pistol FN ke Syarip. Dia dihukum selama 8 tahun sejak Februari 2012, dan dipindahkan ke LP. Pasir Putih di Nusakambangan pada 22 Januari 2013. Dia menyatakan pengakuan dan kesetiaannya kepada ISIS pada 2 Juli 2014.	LIPIA, Jakarta; memiliki bisnis senjata <i>air soft</i> , dan dekat dengan Sofyan Tsauri		Kelompok Cirebon.
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The Breakdown Mapping of Collected Data of the Recently Released Prisoners/Violent Jihadists (n=6)

Nº	Nama	Alias	Tempat dan Tanggal Lahir	Kewarganegaraan dan Etnis	Pelanggaran Hukum	Later Belakang Pendidikan dan Pelatihan	Koneksi Keluarga	Afiliasi
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17	Bagus Maskuron	Bagas, Deri	Lamongan, Jawa Timur pada tahun 1980.		<p>Ditangkap pada 19 September 2010 dalam kaitannya dengan perampokan bank CIMB di Medan pada Agustus 2010.</p> <p>Sejak 2013 berada di Syria dengan ISIS.</p>			
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18	Abdul Ghofur bin Imam Bashori	Budi Hariyanto	Tulang Bawang, Lampung pada 29 Oktober 1980.	WNI (Etnis: Jawa)	<p>Ditangkap di Subang, Jawa Barat pada 7 Agustus 2010 karena menyembunyikan Abdullah Sunata, kepemilikan illegal senjata dan amunisi, serta perencanaan untuk megebom sebuah mobil.</p> <p>Dia terkait dengan Fahrul Rozi Tanjung yang dihukum selama 5.5 tahun pada 21 Juni 2011.</p> <p>Dilepaskan pada 21 Januari 2014.</p>	<p>Produk sekolah negeri dan pernah sekolah perawat. Melakukan tugas sukarelawan selama 2 bulan setelah kejadian Tsunami.</p> <p>Dia adalah anak didik dari Abu Wildan yang merupakan tokoh/pimpinan dari DI/MMI/JAT. Dia juga dekat dengan Aman Abdurrahman dan Yuli Harsono yang sudah menyatakan setia terhadap ISIS.</p>	Menantu dari seorang perwira TNI.	MMI (2000-2009) JAT Aman Abdurrahman
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19	Abdul Rauf bin Jahruddin	Syam; Sam	Cipondoh, Tangerang, Banten pada 27 Juni 1981.	WNI (Etnis: Sunda)	Dihukum selama 16 tahun pada tahun 2003. Dilepaskan pada Agustus 2011. Dia ditangkap pada 19 November 2002 karena terlibat di dalam perampokan toko berlian yang mana hasil perampokan tsb digunakan untuk mendanai pengeboman di Bali. Dia juga menyiapkan serangkaian komponen untuk melakukan serangan bom di Bali, sekaligus berperan sebagai pengawal pribadi Imam Samudera. Dia tewas di Ramadi, Iraq saat sedang bertempur dengan ISIS pada pertengahan 2014.	Produk sekolah negeri di Tangerang. Dia pernah ikut pendidikan Kuliyatul Mu'alimin Islamiyah (KMI) di pesantren al-Mukmin dari 1992-1997. Dia pindah ke Darus, Syahada, Boyolali (1995 – 1996), kemudian ke Daar il-Ilmi (setingkat madrasah aliyah). Dia lulus tahun 2000 dan kemudian mengajar di sana.	Cucu dari Haji Rais dari organisasi Darul Islam.	Ring Banten
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20	Masrizal bin Ali Umar	Tohir; Mas'ud; Hariyadi; Deri; Reno; Ari; Ricky; Rizal	Di Pekanbaru pada 11 Maret 1974.	WNI	Tersangka dalam serangan bom hotel Marriot di Jakarta pada 5 Agustus 2003. Ditahan pada 29 Oktober 2003 di Cirebon, Jawa Barat. Dihukum selama 10 tahun sejak September 2004. Ditahan di LP. Cipinang dan dipindahkan ke LP. Nusakambangan pada Mei 2010.	Lulusan SMA. Kemudian juga lulusan Madrasah Aliyah di Tapanuli Selatan (1989 – 1990). Pernah belajar di pesantren Al-Mukmin, Ngruki (1990 – 1994), menjadi guru di pesantren Lukman al-Hakim, Johor. Dia ikut pelatihan militer di Mindanao dari 1998 o 1999. Tahun 2000 kembali pesantren Lukman al-Hakim.		Anggota JI sejak 1994 karena direkomendasikan oleh Djoko Supriyanto yang adalah guru di pesantren Al-Mukmin, Ngruki.
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21	Mohamed Rais	Edi Indra; Iskandar; Ryan Arifin; Fendi; Roni; Rois bin Rusdi	Dumai, Riau pada 28 Agustus 1975.	WNI	Ditahan pada 27 April 2003 karena keterlibatannya sebagai pihak perantara untuk urusan dana yang digunakan selama operasi pengeboman Bali I dan II. Dia juga bertanggung jawab untuk perekrutan 2 orang lainnya yang terlibat serangan Bom Marriott pada tahun 2003, dimana salah satunya adalah Asmar Latin Sani. Dia dihukum selama 7 tahun pada Mei 2004. Dia sudah dilepaskan pada Agustus 2007.	Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki (1991-95). Di Kandahar, Afghanistan pada 2000-2001.	Saudara ipar dari Noordin Moh Top	Jl (sejak 1990). Menjadi anggota yang aktif sejak 1996
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22	Ahmad Rofiq Ridho, Rafiq Ridho	Ali Zein; Aleen; Alien, Allen	Madiun, Jawa Timur pada 29 April 1975	WNI (Etnis: Jawa)	Ditangkap di Jakarta pada Juli 2005 karena keterkaitannya dengan Abdullah Sunata, dkk. Dia menggantikan Lutfi alias Ubeid sebagai pengawal Noordin M. Top. Dia dihukum selama 8 tahun dan saat ini sudah bebas (sejak Agustus 2009).	SD Negeri Mojorejo Pesantren Al-Mukmin, Ngruki (lulus 1992). Dia bekerja sebagai pedagang HP dan pernah terlibat konflik jihad di Ambon.	Adek kandung dari Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi	Jl, Noordin
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The Most Mentioned and Important Words by 22 Individuals

1. The establishment of Salafi Islamist State of Indonesia

Their goal. This is the integral part of their belief and obligation as the devout Muslim.

2. The implementation of Islamic *shari'a* law in Indonesia

Their goal. This is the integral part of their belief and obligation as the devout Muslim.

3. Violent Jihad. (violent action)

As a necessary way. For them this is something justified by the Quran and Hadits.

4. *Da'wah*

As a necessary way. They believe that this is something mandated by the Quran and Hadits. For them, with or without violent acts, *da'wah* is still very important element in the Islamic struggles.

5. *Al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah*

Their goal (nationally, regionally, and globally). This is the integral part of their belief and obligation as the devout Muslim.

6. *Takfir*

They believe that others with different view and belief system are deemed as *kafir* (in the wrong way and not being grateful to Allah). Muslim people with different view are also deemed as *takfir*. Thus, they are also the valid targets to be attacked and fought on.

7. *Togut/Taghut*

Anything/anyone being worshipped or anything/anyone that rules but non-shari'a conforming laws. This meaning goes beyond, where Togut or taghut is also interpreted as any hindrances (in the government or outside the government) to their goal. *Togut or taghut* must be fought on. For them, fighting the *togut or taghut* is justified by the Quran and Hadits.

Correspondingly, they are also against the Islamic imams that ignore "the Yellow Book."¹ This is indeed the old (Salafi) Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) that uses "the Yellow Book" as a main reference of studying Islam. Therefore, these 22 individuals only recognize/endorse the works of Imam Ahmad Bin Hanbal according to the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab.

¹ In the Islamic education, "the Yellow Book" refers to the traditional books that consist of Islamic teaching materials (*diraasah al-Islamiyyah*) that are taught in the Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*). "The Yellow Book" covers a wide spectrum of Islamic teaching materials: *fiqh*; *aqidah*; *akhlak/tasawuf*; Arab grammar (*ilmu nahwu* and *ilmu sharf*); Hadith; *tafsir*; *ulumul Quran*; as well as social affairs and humanities (*mu'amalah*). "The Yellow Book" is an Arabic-language book that is without vowel (*harakah*) or commonly known in Indonesian language as "the Arab *Gundul*."

8. The Enemy of Islam (the Western world, Jewish People, Judaism, and Christianity)

These enemies of Islam are actively conspiring to destroy Islam at the various lines. These enemies are the retarding force for both the advancement of Islamic civilization and the establishment of a just society at the global level. For them, this belief is also justified by their selective and extreme interpretation of Quran and Hadits.

9. Pancasila

Pancasila is not acknowledged within their bounded rationality as the legitimate state ideology. Anything related to the state system is man-made and not worthy to be complied on. They believe that this “secular” ideology must be replaced with the Islamic ideology (reflected by Quran and Hadits) as the ideological foundation and ultimate source of law in Indonesia.

10. UUD 1945

UUD 1945 is not recognized as the legitimate constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Like *Pancasila*, anything related to the state system is man-made and not worthy to be complied on. They believe that this secular-based foundational constitution must be replaced with the Islamic *shari’a* law as the only legal foundation in Indonesia.

11. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which is the national motto whose meaning is “the unity in diversity” is also not recognized within their bounded rationality. Anything related to the state system is man-made and not worthy to be complied on. They believe that this “secular-based” national motto must be replaced with the uniformity under the Islamic ideology and the application of *shari’a* law in the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia.

12. NKRI


NKRI is the Indonesian acronym for “the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia.” This is the state formation according to the UUD 1945. NKRI is also not recognized by them. They believe that this state formation must be replaced with the establishment of Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia*).

The Attachment #2:

The Profiling of Opinions from 15 Key State/Security Officials and Experts in the Field
(The first and second stage's materials for the discourse analysis in the chapter 4.1.c)

The Stage #1: Interviewing/filling out the questionnaires

(The Stage #1 is where 15 Policy-Makers/Experts's Opinions are expressed in the Questionnaires)



The Stage #2: The Breakdown Analysis on the Opinions (n=15)

(The Stage #2 is where the opinions from 15 key state/security officials and experts in the field are analyzed and elaborated according to the independent and dependent variables examined in this Ph.D. thesis)

No	Name	Economic Grievances	Social Grievances	Political Grievances	On Radical Ideology	On Social Networks	On State Repression	On Gov Incentives	On the Radicalism and Terrorism Threat	On the Counterterrorism Efforts
1	<u>SYD</u>	Teroris berasal dari kelompok yang ekonomi rendah. Namun ada yang sedikit dari keluarga berkucupan.	Tingkat pendidikan dan pekerjaan biasa-biasa saja. Banyak yang berlatar belakang pekerja kasar.	Demokrasi bukan sistem politik yang benar. Hukum dan negara Islam seperti yang dicetuskan oleh Kartosuwiryo harus direalisasikan.	Ideology pergerakan radikal melalui cara jihad dengan kekerasan adalah dibenarkan.	Sangat berpengaruh untuk mencetuskan seseorang menjadi ekstrimis /radikal/teroris. Kelompok pengajian dan LDK di kampus-kampus mempunyai peran	Diperlukan untuk menangkal (deteren). Tingkat represi sudah cukup.	Sangat diperlukan untuk disengajement dan deradikalisasi. Insentif yang tinggi diperlukan untuk mengimbangi tingkat represi. Pemerintah masih kurang dlm hal ini.	Tujuan akhir adalah mendirikan negara Islam. Indonesia masih sangat berpotensi menjadi produsen dan medan pertempuran terorisme global.	UU Anti Teror harus segera disahkan. Insentif ditingkatkan.

						besar sebagai pintu masukn ya ideologi radikal.				
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2	SHK	<p>Kondisi ekonomi mereka bervariasi. Ada yang cukup berada tetapi memiliki visi terorisme yang kuat. Intinya ada banyak faktor lain yang membuat orang ingin menjadi teroris di Indonesia.</p>	<p>Mungkin. Yang jelas mereka adalah lulusan SD–S3.</p> <p>Kesenjangan sosio-ekonomi. Banyak diskriminasi dan dikotomis.</p>	<p>Bagi mereka penyaluran aspirasi/ide sangat terbatas. Ruang berpendapat oleh pemerintah terlalu ketat dengan aturan dan diskriminasi sehingga jauh dari rasa bebas berpendapat. Maka dari itu banyak yang memilih opsi lain termasuk dengan kekerasan untuk mencari perhatian.</p>	<p>Banyak yang tidak punya dasar pengajaran Islam yang kuat dan benar.</p> <p>Sebagian percaya Islam harus dipeluk seluruh manusia, dan ada yang tidak demikian.</p> <p>Percaya bahwa penegakan hukum Islam akan menciptakan keadilan</p>	<p>Tidak ada komentar.</p>	<p>Represi bisa menangkal sekaligus menumbuhkan terorisme.</p> <p>Konsep pemenjaraan harus dikalibrasi. Jangan sampai memunculkan teroris baru.</p> <p>Deradikalisasi harus berdasarkan riset yang mendalam (supaya tidak salah asumsi, dsb).</p>	<p>Variabel yang penting. Tanpa atau kurangnya insentif akan mengakibatkan tidak terkendalinya para teroris.</p> <p>Perlu riset untuk tau apakah perlu berbagi kekuasaan dengan kelompok radikal garis keras di dalam sistem demokrasi Indonesia.</p>	<p>Teroris di Indonesia percaya bahwa mereka sedang melakukan ibadah (jihad).</p> <p>Potensi Indonesia menjadi produsen dan battle-field terorisme adalah kecil karena masih ada Pancasila.</p> <p>Orang Indonesia umumnya risih jika kelompok terorisme dikaitkan dengan Islam.</p>	<p>CT efforts must be holistic.</p>
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					<p>bagi umat.</p> <p>Mereka percaya sedang melakukan jihad untuk Allah dan agama.</p> <p>Idiologi radikal ini jika dipadukan dengan variabel lainnya akan membuat orang semakin ingin menjadi teroris.</p>				<p>Teroris dari Indonesia mampu mengambil peran apapun di dalam organisasi terorisme berbasis Islam (simpatisan, pelaksana, perencana, dan imam).</p>	
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3	MHW	Bukan faktor.	Bukan faktor.	Pola pikir radikal dan tindakan anarkis cenderung disebabkan oleh motivasi politik tertentu. Mereka beranggapan bahwa sistem demokrasi merupakan budaya barat dan tidak sejalan dengan nilai keislaman yang mereka pahami dan jalankan. Oleh karena itu, separate establishm ent perlu	Sangat penting. JI bukan berorientasi sosial ataupun ekonomi, melainkan berorientasi ideologi.	Jaringan sosial berbasis agama dengan sarana dan shared values dimanfaatkan untuk menarik kesamaan dlm komunitas mereka. Setelah itu solidaritas akan muncul sendirinya.	Penegakan hukum adalah untuk menjamin social order dan security of the wider. Pelanggaran ditanggulangi, dan pelanggaran diredam.	Insentif diperlukan untuk membuat mereka "bertobat" dan bekerjasama dengan pemerintah untuk membongkar sel-sel terorisme yang ada.	Radikalisme sangat berpotensi , berbahaya dan susah di-deteksi.	Harus kombinasi hard dan soft approach termasuk tentang "financing terrorism."
		Banyak juga teroris yang dari kalangan ekonomi mapan. JI bukan berorientasi ekonomi.	Banyak juga yang berpendidikan tinggi. Umumnya yang berpendidikan rendah menjadi bomber. JI bukan berorientasi sosial.	Mereka beranggapan bahwa sistem demokrasi merupakan budaya barat dan tidak sejalan dengan nilai keislaman yang mereka pahami dan jalankan. Oleh karena itu, separate establishm ent perlu	Doktrinas i dalam kelompok JI sangat sistematis untuk membuat orang menjadi begitu radikal-nya. Inilah faktor yang paling signifikan dan sufficient. Bagi	Oleh krn itu, tentu ada measures tertentu yang diambil oleh aparat termasuk tindakan pencegahan dan penanganan. Ini sangat bergantung		Harus ada keseimbangan secara dinamis dan up-to-date antara penegakan hukum, demokrasi dan penanganan terhadap radikalisme dan terorisme sejak sedini mungkin.	Pemerintah sudah melakukan penguatan UU.	UU No. 5 Tahun 2006 tentang Ratifikasi International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted by the

				<p>mereka buat melalui cara anarkis dan teror. Mereka ingin didengar, karena mereka termarginalkan dan cita-cita mereka juga seperti mimpi saja. Oleh karena itu mereka menebar kebencian untuk menarik perhatian public.</p>	<p>mereka Islam harus dipeluk oleh seluruh umat manusia, hukum Islam ditegakkan, dan negara Islam didirikan dalam sistem khalifah Islam di tingkat global.</p> <p>Islam dimanipulasi untuk membenarkan ideologi radikal mereka.</p>	<p>radikalisme dan terorisme yang tadinya berdiri secara terpisah.</p> <p>Jaringan terorisme adalah bukan hanya jaringan linear, melainkan banyak sekali yang social network-based.</p>	<p>g pada perkembangan situasi di lapangan dan penilaian petugas on site. Mengenai apakah measures itu dapat mereduksi motivasi terorisme, MHW percaya bahwa ideologi tidak akan mati hanya dengan mematikan pembawanya. Artinya, dengan keyakinan yang kuat bahwa</p>		<p>akan menjadi produsen teroris berbasis Islam. Namun, orang Indonesia yang menjadi teroris bisa berperan sebagai apapun (bomber, simpatisan, perencana, dan imam).</p> <p>Indonesia berpotensi menjadi battlefield dari terorisme berbasis agama. Namun, Pancasila</p>	<p>General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999; UU No. 8 Tahun 2010 tentang Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang; UU No. 9 Tahun 2013 tentang Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Pendanaan Terorisme</p>
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							<p>global establish ment haruslah berbentuk khalifah Islam maka para pelaku has nothing to lose in what they're doing. Therefore, pertanyaa nya kemudian bagaiman a persepsi mereka tentang kematian? Apakah mereka takut mati?</p>		<p>dan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika masih merupaka n benteng penting untuk menangka l potensi tsb.</p> <p>Secara umum Islam di Indonesia adalah anti kekerasan dan tidak setuju dengan terorisme.</p> <p>Pancasila harus sebagai Panglima. Sementar a para teroris percaya Islam lah</p>	<p>: memberik an kerangka hukum bagi kriminalisa si pendanaa n terorisme dan mekanism e pembekua n aset terhadap nama- nama yang tercantum dalam Daftar Terduga Teroris yang dikeluarka n oleh Kepolisian RI, yang salah satunya dapat</p>
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									<p>sebagai Panglima. Kita harus menghormati founding fathers yang menjadikan Pancasila sebagai Panglima. Islam mengajarkan kita untuk hormat sama orang yang lebih tua (seperti founding fathers).</p>	<p>bersumber dari Daftar Sanksi DK PBB sebagai implementasi Pemri terhadap Resolusi DK PBB 1267 (1999) dan 1373 (2001); Peraturan Bersama tentang Pencantuman Identitas Orang dan Korporasi dalam Daftar Terduga Teroris dan Organisasi Teroris dan Pemblokir</p>
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										an secara Serta Merta atas Dana Milik Orang atau Korporasi yang Tercantu m dalam Daftar Terduga Teroris dan Organisas i Teroris, oleh Ketua Mahkama h Agung, Menteri Luar Negeri, Wakapolri, Kepala BNPT, dan Kepala PPATK. Peraturan ini telah diundangk an tahun
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										<p>lalu dan memuat mekanisme/petunjuk untuk pembekuan aset serta merta dalam waktu 3 (tiga) hari kerja terhitung sejak disampaikannya pemutakhiran Daftar oleh Kemlu RI kepada Kapolri.</p> <p>Dalam konteks internasional, dalam sidang pleno FATF Februari 2015 di</p>
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										Paris, Indonesia dikeluarkan dari Public Statement FATF dan di bulan Juni 2015 di Brisbane Indonesia juga dikeluarkan dari keseluruhan proses review International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG). Ini artinya transaksi perbankan/keuangan dari dan ke Indonesia dapat lebih
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										lancar, profile perbanka n Indonesia meningkat , dan juga berdampa k baik terhadap rating investasi Indonesia. Thas's why jangan hanya fokus domestic approach. Internation al juga sama pentingny a, krn terorisme adl fenomena lintas negara & multidime nsional.
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4	LMP	<p>Poverty is only a cause of radicalization. However, some terrorists come from the economically stable class.</p>	<p>Socially discriminated and segregated middle class, educated persons couple with the unemployment is a significant cause of radicalization.</p> <p>However, the educated individuals can also be radicalized.</p>	<p>Political establishment does not give them equal, open and fair access and treatment. When peaceful system is deemed unjust, violence will be used by these humiliated splinters.</p>	<p>Radical ideology is a significant factor. Islamist terrorists aim to establish the Islamist state and caliphate. This is the solution to the world's problems.</p> <p>In their view, there is no separation between religion and politics.</p> <p>Their</p>	<p>Social network is a significant variable. This is the exclusive network that bounding them together within their bounded rationality and shared values/characteristics. Social network has the ability to "recruit" the individuals with likeable</p>	<p>Offensive CT measures may have an effect on the internal morale of the organizations' activists and abetting population.</p> <p>However, after the capture and killing of many terrorists and supporters, the internal morale of terrorists and its supporters is still high.</p>	<p>They have to be included in the government. Otherwise they will say that they are the oppressed community.</p> <p>Islamist movement can become a popular movement in the Indonesian democracy, but not as a Islamist militarism.</p>	<p>Terrorism in Indonesia is the multifaceted and complex. Any single response will only create new problems.</p> <p>Terrorism in Indonesia cannot be eradicated. It can only be contained and reduced since terrorism is a method, not a goal.</p> <p>Democratization and decentrali</p>	<p>Direct and indirect CT counterterrorism efforts. Indirect is characterized by not only victory in the military terms.</p> <p>To prevent future terrorist attacks in Indonesia is more about political than legal approach.</p> <p>Government campaign against Islamist extremism</p>
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					<p>radicalization arise around the fantasy of heroism, violence and death, not of shari'a and utopia. The Islamist state is the ultimate gang, celebrating violence for its own sake.</p> <p>Often these jihadists once lost their self identity. Thus</p>	<p>characteristics.</p>	<p>Repression can only breed more extremism (see in President Suharto's era). Law enforcement approach is enough for now, as opposed to military countermeasures (fair trial, put them in prison, and deradicalize them).</p>		<p>ization in Indonesia have created space for regional aspirations to resurface. Not only moderate democrats to emerge, but also those with more radical aspirations.</p> <p>The causes are poverty, illiteracy, inequality, unfairness in politics and education and the perversion</p>	<p>is imperfect and impermanent fixes.</p> <p>Deradicalization program has the limited success. There is no way to defeat Islamist extremism. But there are ways to try and make sense of Indonesia's relative tranquility.</p> <p>Indonesians generally support the counterterrorism</p>
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					<p>they try to find it through ideology that is eventually associated with the radical one. Social media and the cyber world are the appealing venue for them to embrace the radical ideology.</p>				<p>of religion teachings.</p> <p>Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is anti diversity. They are struggling to make the fundamental change socially and politically.</p> <p>The interaction with foreign militants and foreign affairs (U.S. war in Iraq, etc) are also critical for the</p>	<p>efforts against any potential radicalism and terrorism. Psychological warfare must be empowered.</p> <p>CT efforts must understand that terrorists are not the entity to be destroyed but the enemy of the state to be convinced that they are in the errant ways.</p>
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									<p>development of terrorism in Indonesia.</p> <p>Indonesia become a notorious safe haven and hotbed for terrorism in Southeast Asia.</p> <p>However, this is only a minority since Indonesia is not a repressive country and Islam is not an oppressed minority community in Indonesia.</p>	<p>CT efforts must focus on disengagement, deradicalization, and re-engage them as the government agent willing to cooperate with the government in many aspects of counterterrorism efforts.</p> <p>The philosophy of total defense employing all elements must be applied in Indonesia</p>
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											as this country dealing with the latent threats of Islamist radicalism and terrorism.
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5	TF	<p>Generally from lower-middle class.</p> <p>More economic stability by joining a radical group.</p> <p>Economic is not the greatest driver of terrorism in Indonesia.</p>	<p>Low paid job with at least high school education. Some college courses are possible. Socially from the lower level.</p> <p>Inability to afford education beyond public schools making an Islamic boarding schools as the attractive. Here they learn more about radical ideology and bond social</p>	<p>Political dimension becomes an important end state for the individual to help achieve only after they embrace radical ideology and social network.</p>	<p>Initially before embracing radical ideology and social networks their political motivation is very low.</p> <p>Their religious knowledge is limited before joining the networks. The recruiter manipulate this by indoctrinate them with radical and selective</p>	<p>Introduced to radical Islam through networks (family, friends, and mosque).</p> <p>Being in the social network giving them sense of importance and being like a leader in their community (altruism, doing good for the community)</p>	<p>Repression is against the ones planning and engaging in violent jihad. However countermeasures to repress peaceful jihad (hatred speech and discussion) are limited. That is why many of radicals choose the non-violent jihad (less risky for them).</p> <p>Repression</p>	<p>The government should provide welfare, education, and job-training for individuals to deter, disengage and deradicalize people.</p> <p>Violent jihadists in Indonesia do not want to be part of Pancasila-based Indonesian government and political system.</p>	<p>Terrorist attacks against the government is deemed as eroding the power of establishment and providing a space in which Islamic law and state could arise.</p> <p>They are small minority using religious terrorism to feel important and to do something for the overall</p>	<p>The prison system is concerning. Prisoners are allowed to communicate with the outside world using HP. So, prison system needs a major overhaul in how terrorists are treated. The quality of life must also be improved to assure the imprisonment does not breed more</p>
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			network.		<p>interpretation of Islamic texts.</p> <p>Islamic shari'a law, Islamist state and khilafah Islamiyah must be established with radical, violent ways.</p> <p>This is a fantasy but they believe it can rid the lands of ummah of any crime, poverty, and decadence</p>	<p>ity). They find safety, comfort and acceptance in this group.</p>	<p>measures (death penalty and increased imprisonment years) need to be increased to deter terrorism activities (No and Low repression level does not deter terrorism and radicalism . It will only increase the likelihood of terrorist and radical activities).</p>		<p>struggle to establish an Islamic caliphate.</p> <p>However, little plan for them to actually create a government and very few are prepared to lead a country according to the Islamic law.</p> <p>Indonesia is a potential producer of religious terrorists.</p> <p>Indonesia is not really a</p>	<p>terrorists and use that as the source of grievances. There must be a stricter rule to limit their communication one to another.</p> <p>Police and intelligence operations have been very effective.</p> <p>Legal punishment need to be harsher for committing or planning acts of</p>
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					e.				<p>potential battlefield for religious terrorism. They are more interested to attack the government (police) than to attack other civilians.</p> <p>Most Indonesians are opposed to any forms of violent jihadism.</p> <p>However, more Indonesians are interested to engage in the</p>	<p>violence. The current punishment system is not sufficient for deterring individuals from becoming terrorists.</p> <p>Finally the Indonesian anti-terrorism law should be updated to allow detention of individuals that give financial support to known terrorist groups or where there is</p>
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									<p>violent ways such as spreading the radical ideology. The plan is to spread the ideology to enough people that if the Indonesian state collapse for economic or political reasons, those individuals can step in with an Islamist state and will have plenty of supporters to make this occur.</p> <p>Terrorism</p>	<p>proof that the individual intends to join a radical group or to commit an act of violence.</p>
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									<p>is not a solution to the world problems. Changing the mindset and ideologies is the solution. So, they are ready to achieve this strategic objective through violence if deemed necessary .</p> <p>General pattern: Terrorism in Indonesia is a small scale, not centrally organized or planned</p>	
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									by a single group. The greatest factors are sense of social belong/ac ceptance, Islam as the preferred political ideology to correct problems of poverty, crime and corruption in Indonesia; a lack of education on what Islam truly represents . Many of them are drawn to radical Islam because	
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									of their incomplet e and simple understan ding of Islam.	
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6	RPD	<p>Kondisi ekonomi bukanlah sebab dari masalah terorisme di Indonesia. Negara lah penyebabnya. Negara mengabaikan untuk mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa. Negara tidak pernah menciptakan sebuah perekat yang memungkinkan mereka terikat dengan perasaan kebangsaan.</p>		<p>Sejarah Indonesia membuktikan bahwa kelompok terpinggirkan selalu menjadi kambing hitam segala bentuk kerusuhan politik. Mereka rentan secara apapun sehingga terlalu mudah untuk dimanipulasi.</p>	<p>Agama tidak menjadi masalah. Pendidikan agama mereka bukanlah masalah bagi para teroris di Indonesia . Sejarah Indonesia menunjukkan bahwa agama montheisme adalah pengaruh internasional ke Indonesia yang selanjutnya digunakan oleh penjajah (dan</p>				<p>Orang orang yang disebut teroris ini mewakilkan gambaran bahwa negara telah tidak berhasil dalam mengelola sumber daya yang ada. SDA yang ada disia-siakan dan tidak bisa dimanfaatkan seluruh warga.</p> <p>Masalah terorisme di Indonesia bukanlah masalah</p>	<p>Negara harus introspeksi diri kenapa radikalisme dan terorisme dengan menggunakan isu agama bisa muncul di Indonesia. Negaralah masalah utamanya.</p>
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					<p>kemudian oleh TNI dan penguas a) sebagai alat untuk mengontrol keadaan di tingkat nasional.</p> <p>Oleh karena itu yang perlu ditekankan adalah apa itu konsep berkewarnegaraan Indonesia tsb (bukan mempermasalahkan keyakinan radikal mereka</p>				<p>agama, akan tetapi masalah politik dalam pengertian bahwa yang tidak puas adalah mereka yang buta pada politik. Sementara, yang seharusnya mampu melihat masalah, justru mengabaikan dan merasa tidak memiliki keterikatan apapun untuk bersoal tentang keadaan</p>	
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					<p>para teroris).</p> <p>Ideologi Islam radikal bisa saja digunakan sebagai identitas para teroris ini (sama seperti di Perancis) . Namun kedalaman sejarah ber-Indonesia harus digali untuk mengerti akar radikalisme di Indonesia .</p> <p>Mayoritas Indonesia adalah</p>				<p>negara yang sesungguhnya.</p> <p>Jangan salahkan mereka kalo bersikap agresif. Masalahnya ada di negara itu sendiri.</p>	
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					<p>orang Jawa. Orang Jawa adalah orang orang radikal (yang dulu kalah perang pada masa penjajahan).</p> <p>Namun demikian, identitas ke-islaman Indonesia menjadi lebih sensitive terhadap perkembangan keislaman global karena faktor</p>					
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					perkembangan teknologi dan cyber dalam era globalisasi.					
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7	AD	<p>Mereka tidak bisa dikatakan miskin dan tidak percaya jika kemiskinan disebut sebagai akar dari masalah terorisme.</p> <p>Akar terorisme di Indonesia adalah ideologi agama yang salah ditafsirkan dan digunakan untuk kepentingan politik karena ketidakberdayaan untuk berpartisipasi</p>	<p>Secara sosial mereka merupakan orang-orang yang terpinggirkan bukan karena kesalahan orang lain tetapi karena ideologi yang mereka anut sulit diterima oleh akal sehat. Mereka sudah gagal dalam kehidupan dan pergaulan sosial bahkan dengan penganut agama yang</p>	<p>Mereka sendiri tidak percaya diri dan mereka sadar bahwa jumlah pendukungnya juga sedikit dan arena itu tidak berani bertarung dalam demokrasi melalui partai politik. Satu satunya cara untuk menunjukkan signifikansi sosial dan politik adalah menyebarkan teror dan</p>	<p>Mereka sangat dipengaruhi oleh tokoh agama radikal yang jadi pujaannya dan terinspirasi oleh perjuangan idolanya untuk melakukan kekerasan atas nama agama.</p> <p>Mereka juga mempunyai aspirasi agar Islam dipeluk oleh seluruh</p>	<p>Social network ini penting karena social network ini mengikat mereka secara individu dan organisasi dengan keyakinan dan tujuan yang sama pula.</p>			<p>Tujuan akhir mereka adalah implementasi hukum Islam dan pendirian negara Islam serta kekhalifahan dalam skala yang lebih luas di tingkat global sebagai satu-satunya solusi terhadap masalah dunia.</p> <p>Jihad adalah perintah Allah, sehingga valid untuk</p>	
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		<p>asi dalam kontestasi demokrasi yang sehat.</p> <p>Faktor ekonomi hanya dijadikan sebagai alat pendukung untuk pembiayaan aktivitas terorisme dan bukan motivasi utama.</p> <p>Mereka tidak puas secara ekonomi karena menurut pandangan mereka ekonomi dikuasai oleh</p>	sama.	<p>ketakutan massa. Mereka beranggapan bahwa pemerintahan ini adalah <i>thogut</i> yang menindas Islam dan karena itu harus dilawan dan dijatuhkan.</p>	<p>umat manusia di seluruh dunia.</p> <p>Mereka juga percaya akan aspek-aspek eskatologis di dalam ideologi radikal mereka.</p>					dilakukan.	
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		<p>kelompok lain yang berkeyakinan berbeda dengan mereka dan tataran global didominasi oleh Barat yang notabene adalah Kristen.</p> <p>Mereka menyaksikan bahwa umat Islam termarginalkan secara ekonomi dan itu dilakukan secara by-design dan pemerintah yang berkuasa justru berkolaborasi dengan etnis</p>								
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		<p>Tionghoa untuk mengekspl oitasi kaum miskin. Selain itu tentunya menurut persepsi mereka ekonomi dikuasai kapitalisme asing dan ditata secara bertentangan dengan ajaran agamanya.</p>								
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8	HR	Perlu diteliti apakah terdapat hubungan kausal antara kemiskinan dengan keinginan seseorang untuk semakin mendalami agama Islam melalui pengajian.	Idiologi yang radikal yang sudah mencapai titik kulminasi (enlightenment) akan bermanifestasi dalam bentuk kebencian sosial di luar individu seseorang.	Ketidakpuasan politik termasuk terhadap demokrasi tidak akan termanifestasikan dalam bentuk terorisme jika mereka tidak terjamah oleh kulminasi idiologi radikal.	Idiologi radikal yang mereka anut adalah puncak dari "enlightenment" yang mereka terima saat mendalami agama dalam bentuk pengajian Quran.	Jaringan sosial di sekitar mereka akan menggiring mereka/ memberikan peluang kepada mereka untuk ter-ekspos kepada idiologi yang radikal.	Hukum positif di suatu negara dapat digunakan sebagai sarana dari Tuhan untuk menyatakan kasih dan keadilanNya, termasuk kepada para ekstremis/radikal yang mana pandangan dan tindakannya sudah berlawanan dengan main social streams	Pemerintah RI perlu menyadari bahwa para radikal ini pada prinsipnya adalah ingin mencari Tuhan. Namun pada praktiknya mereka "salah jalan."	Terorisme berbasis agama Islam lebih merupakan manifestasi kebencian yang diakibatkan oleh radikalisasi keyakinan dan idiologi yang termanifestasikan secara radikal dalam bentuk terorisme sebagai salah satu bentuk dari political violence.	Pemerintah RI harus mengutamakan program pembelajaran/pengkajian Quran secara scientific positivism. Hal ini dapat mengimbangi budaya pengajian (recitation) yang cenderung dapat membuat seseorang menjadi radikal tanpa mereka mengerti/sadari. Pemerintah RI harus
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							dan hukum yang berlaku.		Indonesia sangat berpotensi menjadi produsen teroris berbasis Islam, sekaligus sebagai battlefield dari aktifitas terorisme global.	memastikan bahwa para calon radikal ini tidak hanya memiliki Quran dalam hidupnya, melainkan juga diberikan kesempatan untuk melihat dan mempelajari hal-hal lainnya.
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9	VPT	<p>Kita perlu memperhatikan dan mempelajari kondisi kelayakan derajad ekonomi mereka yang indikatornya adalah pekerjaan, penghasilan, pemenuhan kebutuhan, aktualisasi diri, kemampuan konsumsi, dan kemampuan berekspresi.</p> <p>Mereka tidak puas dengan kondisi</p>	<p>Kita perlu memperhatikan dan mempelajari hubungan antara “keyakinan iman mereka” dengan status mereka di dalam keluarga, di lingkungan sosial, dan di dalam kehidupannya sebagai WNI.</p> <p>Tidak puas terhadap kondisi sosial mereka, sehingga ini termanifestasikan</p>	<p>Kita perlu memperhatikan dan mempelajari bagaimana orang-orang seperti mereka ini memahami dan memanifestasikan hak dan tanggung jawabnya politik mereka.</p> <p>Mencari pelampiasan ketidakpuasan politik dengan cara berasosiasi dengan kelompok politik yang dianggap paling</p>	<p>Idiologi mereka adalah esktrēm. Percaya kepada konsep Islamic caliphate, kafir/tidak kafir, musuh dekat/musuh jauh dan percaya mutlak kepada penegakkan hukum Islam untuk mengatasi permasalahan dunia.</p> <p>Mereka mengkaitkan aktifitas</p>	<p>Penting. Individu dan jaringan sosialnya adalah saling terkait (<i>first and second image</i>) di dalam <i>intra and inter network</i>s.</p>	<p>Harus konsisten dan mengedepankan penegakan hukum yang dipadukan dengan pendekatan lainnya untuk mencapai tingkat kesempurnaan yang lebih baik (<i>continuous and consistent improvement</i> dalam hal represi negara yang). Hal ini perlu dilakukan secara substansial.</p>	<p>Perlu diberikan secara konsisten tanpa melanggar peraturan dan prinsip demokrasi Pancasila.</p>	<p>Radikalisme dan terorisme adalah fenomena laten di Indonesia.</p> <p>Indonesia berpotensi menjadi produsen dan medan pertempuran dari gerakan terorisme berbasis agama di tingkat global.</p> <p>Pada umumnya orang Indonesia melihat terorisme di Indonesia sebagai kejahatan</p>	<p>Improvisasi dalam upaya penanggulangan teror harus dilakukan karena radikalisme dan terorisme pun semakin dinamis, kompleks, dan tidak menentu.</p> <p>Revisi RUU Anti Teror perlu dilakukan untuk hal-hal yang substansial, bukan pada hal-hal tentang <i>idle-</i></p>
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		ekonomi mereka, sehingga ini berlanjut kepada kepercayaan dan keputusan politik mereka.	hanya oleh persepsi/dogma agama yang mereka yakini sebagai kebenaran absolut.	cocok sesuai dengan apa yang mereka rasakan. Ketidakpuasan sosial ini berlanjut pada terbentuknya keyakinan dan pemahaman (kognisi) bersatu untuk melahirkan suatu keyakinan radikal.	terorisme mereka dengan agama Islam secara subyektif karena adanya pembenaan yang mereka yakini dan tujuan yang harus mereka capai. Keinginan mereka untuk menjadi radikal ini banyak disebabkan oleh keinginan mereka untuk berkuasa (<i>power</i>).				terhadap kemanusiaan, dan bukan kejahatan dari agama tertentu. Tiga faktor utama yang mengakibatkan latennya gerakan terorisme di Indonesia adalah faktor agama, faktor <i>social gap</i> , faktor <i>knowledge (law, nano-tech, medicine, ilmu kimia, dsb)</i> .	<i>capacity</i> TNI-Polri semata. Perlu diperjelas definisi operasionalisasinya apa yang dimaksud dengan deradikalisasi dan <i>dis-engagement</i> .
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10	ACS	<p>Dire, desperate economic conditions. Years of economic hardship through several political local and national administration have led them to consider radicalism/terrorism as a viable option to improve their conditions.</p> <p>Due to their economic condition, they are hardly able to well plan their economic/fi</p>	<p>They may have good education. It is outdated to believe that all terrorists/radicals are lacking education.</p> <p>The income level below the normal ability to support their families. The discrimination toward certain ethnic leads to unwell treatment by the government towards certain ethnicity. Thus it</p>	<p>Frustrated, socially/religiously marginalized groups usually rally around ethnic/religious political parties/movements which are small, thus having little impact on national elections. In the long term, a call to arms seems as the only solution. However let us remember that this is how nations have been born, just</p>	<p>The leadership of movement will use Islam as a rallying flag (common denominator) to gather support in order to fix their problems. See how the Iranian revolution in 1979 was used as the common denominator to fuel the sentiments in addressing these issues.</p>	<p>Today's new radicals (not the Al Qaeda types, more of the ISIS types) are different from the old ones because they are more in tune with the use of social media and cyberspace. While AQ desired to turn back the clock (Taliban's</p>	<p>Life imprisonment leads to the production of more terrorists. They are radicalized and radicalizing others in the prison.</p> <p>Take also into consideration the increasing amount of localized groups which are harder to detect.</p> <p>Continuous raids are great, but only fix the symptom and not</p>	<p>Without a serious government economic/social plan it may increase the likelihood of recruitment.</p> <p>The best incentive the government can give is to improve the living conditions, job opportunities, and overall livelihood for the communities where terrorist cells recruit.</p>	<p>Radical Islam exported from the Middle East cannot thrive in Indonesia. The history has proved that.</p> <p>But Indonesia is still a potential producer of terrorists.</p> <p>Indonesia is not a battlefield of global religious terrorism, since its history and culture</p>	<p>The problem in Indonesian CT is not to giving the economic development of disenfranchised communities. A lot of teeth and not tail. Winning the war is easy, but winning the peace takes more time and effort. Destroying terrorist groups is like playing mole with a hammer, you may knock one</p>
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		<p>nancial life. Even some of them have to employ their kids at home so they cannot go to the school. Eventually they sell their child in the human slavery/trafficking as a viable option to support their families.</p> <p>Correspondingly, they also can give away their kids to be educated by radical individuals</p>	<p>could lead to terrorism and insurgent activities.</p> <p>Ethno-religious segregation and marginalization is very common in Southeast Asia.</p> <p>In Indonesia, it could cause problem when certain ethnic-religion that indwell in certain locations due to transmigration</p>	<p>like U.S., Belgium, Eritrea, etc.</p> <p>Politically they are under or unrepresented at all.</p> <p>Politically they may see their candidates will never achieve the national position desired due to ethnicity.</p> <p>They are probably a majority educated populace, with an educated elite leading the charge. However</p>	<p>Islam has a history of violence. The first two waves of Islam were spread through violence along the Arab/barbaric world and the Turkic lands eventually.</p> <p>Radicalized Islamic teachings can be easily projected as the way to establish</p>	<p>Afghanistan), new radicals embrace and exploit technology.</p> <p>Now the new radicals are radicalize and recruited without training. They can be radicalize through internet. It is cheaper, safer, quicker that convince recruits to move</p>	<p>the problem of economic/social marginalization. Like fixing the headache but ignoring the greater problem of someone's Malaria.</p> <p>All of these cure symptoms but not the problem of economic/social marginalization.</p> <p>Prison serves as a classroom environment for</p>	<p>This is indeed a significant factor.</p> <p>Radical Islam is not accepted by the people of Indonesia. Thus, they must not be absorbed in the government. It can create frictions.</p>	<p>prevent it.</p> <p>Indonesians are generally against Islamist radicalism.</p> <p>Indonesians joining terrorism usually play the supporting roles.</p> <p>Shari'a law is not supported by general Indonesians.</p> <p>Indonesian Islamist terrorists think that terrorism is the only solution to the world.</p>	<p>down for good but another one will pop up if you do not improve conditions.</p>
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		and networks.	projects eventually becoming the majority and elected local leaders in those areas.	due to marginalization they are in a disadvantaged position in comparison to their peers of the majority ethno-religious group.	the caliphate. It is done not via diplomacy but by the sword. They are convinced that the Islamic caliphate and state system must be established at the global level. For them the Islamist caliphate and state system is the ultimate problem solver for global	across the globe to execute training. Online they provide radicalization and explosive e-training as well as directions for attacks. New radicals can produce 100 operatives at the same time the old radicals produce one.	indoctrination of common thieves.		The pattern: Attacking foreign establishments; then toward domestic targets (local churches and police offices) which do not catch the attention of world powers, hence the weaker government response. The most influential factors are economic marginalization, ethno-religious	
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					issues. However, if see the history, the Sunni fundamentalist revolution s have never been successful at securing the of a nation. The only places where they have achieved have been in Algeria and Sudan (winning the war). But, they quickly failed to secure the				tensions, and separatist sentiments.	
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					<p>nation (winning the peace). Jihad and martyrdom are their justification to use violence.</p> <p>Many of terrorists are more into immediate financial gain than the institution of the caliphate. A good example is Abu Sayyaf, only the top cadre are pious, the rank and</p>					
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					file are common thieves, in ransom collection .					
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11	BK	<p>Teroris terutama JI mempunyai i kondisi perekonomian yang mapan dan berkembang dikarenakan kontribusi donatur dan infrastruktur bisnis mereka sendiri.</p> <p>Mereka selalu merasa tidak puas secara ekonomi. Namun mereka punya cara sendiri untuk mengatasi masalah ekonomi</p>	<p>Kondisi latar belakang pekerjaan yang beragam, mulai dengan yang berbasis UMR (yang pendidikan rendah), hingga yang menjadi pengusaha (bagi yang berpendidikan tinggi).</p> <p>Mereka tidak perduli dengan status sosial, karena dalam keyakinan agama mereka,</p>	<p>Mereka hingga saat ini tetap teguh pada ideology agama yang diyakininya , sambil menyusun kekuatan menunggu negara dalam keadaan lemah.</p> <p>Mereka akan terus berusaha menghancurkan negara yang mereka anggap sebagai thagut or togut melalui politik Islam versi</p>	<p>Buat mereka Islam adalah agama yang sempurna. Namun mereka tanamkan ajaran yang melarang untuk intimidasi agama lain.</p> <p>Mereka ingin Indonesia jadi negara Islam dengan hukum Islam, sebagai bagian dari sistem khilafah</p>	<p>Adanya keterkaitan antara kelompok kecil dan besar (dalam hal kelompok pengajian).</p> <p>Dari kelompok ini ada yang sering tampil di muka umum (overt) dan ada yang tersembunyi (covert)</p>	<p>Hukum dan HAM kepada mereka harus ditegakkan oleh negara. Namun, penegakan hukum ini tidak membuat mereka mau melepas ideologi nya. Tingkat represi negara harus dikombinasikan dengan kemampuan aparat untuk “membina” mereka.</p>	<p>Mereka juga tidak boleh diberikan kue politik dalam pemerintah karena hal ini bisa membuat RI menjadi Suriah.</p> <p>Tidak perlu diberikan incentive karena hal ini dapat menyebabkan berkembangnya jaringan yang ada dan malah upaya balas dendam kepada aparat.</p>	<p>Terorisme oleh mereka ini adalah ancaman di segala aspek, bidang dan kepentingan.</p> <p>Indonesia masih potensial menjadi produsen teroris berbasis Salafi.</p> <p>Di beberapa provinsi berpotensi al menjadi medan pertempuran para teroris berbasis Salafi. Hal ini</p>	<p>Penegakan hukum dan diharapkan mereka mau menyerahkan diri sebelum ditangkap.</p> <p>Dalam aspek deradikalisasi, diperlukan penggalangan terhadap tokoh/napi kasus terorisme.</p>
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		nya.	<p>semua manusia diciptakan sama dan sederajat.</p> <p>Pendidikan yang rendah membuat mereka lebih berpikir taktis, sedangkan pendidikan yang tinggi membuat para personil JI lebih mengutamakan strategi.</p>	mereka.	<p>Islam di tingkat internasional.</p> <p>Mereka percaya bahwa inilah solusi terhadap permasalahan dunia. Untuk agama yang lain ikut saja kemauan mereka. Oleh karena itu cara kekerasan dapat dihalalkan.</p>				<p>dikarenakan masih minimnya kekuatan aparaturnegara.</p> <p>Terorisme di Indonesia adalah berbasis Salafi, dengan asing dan aparat keamanan (Polri) menjadi sasaran mereka.</p> <p>Orang Indonesia biasanya suka menjadi perekrut, pelatih, fasilitator, tim dakwah, dan</p>	
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									<p>eksekutor.</p> <p>Apa yang mereka lakukan ini ada dasarnya di dalam ajaran agama Islam.</p> <p>Mereka juga bermotivasi ingin menguji kekuatan NKRI.</p> <p>Pattern terorisme di Indonesia adalah pendidikan agama yang kurang diawasi, kekurangan tokoh agama</p>	
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									dalam memberik an materi ceramah, dan tidak ada standarisa si sekolah.	
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12	<u>IS</u>	Kondisi ekonomi mereka memprihatinkan.	Mereka banyak yang penganggu ran.	Mereka tidak paham arti berpolitik dengan benar. Yang mereka tau adalah berpolitik Islam dengan cara mereka sendiri, termasuk dengan menebar kebencian.	Mereka merasa bertanggung jawab untuk menyebarkan dan melangg engkan pelaksanaan paham radikal. Biasanya sejak kecil mereka sudah didoktrin demikian (biasanya di pesantren pesantren radikal). Mereka juga percaya bahwa	Sangat penting dimana pengajian pengajian digunakan sebagai pintu masuknya ideologi radikal.	Yang terbaik adalah represi tingkat sedang saja, yang diikuti oleh upaya deradikalisasi. Semakin dikerasin, mereka akan semakin melawan, dan semakin dilunakin, mereka akan semakin melawan juga (merasa paling benar).	Mereka tidak boleh diberi kue di dalam pemerintahan. Namun, mereka tetap perlu diberikan insentif untuk memodernisasi kegiatan radikal mereka.	Terorisme berbasis Salafi adalah ancaman strategis bagi NKRI. Dan jika pemerintah lengah maka Indonesia akan terus menjadi produsen teroris Salafi di tingkat global. Buat mereka, apa yang dilakukan ini adalah jihad (menjalankan kewajiban agama).	Negara tidak boleh kalah dengan teroris/terorisme. Improvisasi kontraterorisme di Indonesia harus terus dilakukan (termasuk dengan penggalakan penggunaan cyber).
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					Islam harus dipeluk seluruh umat manusia. Maka dari itu mereka terus paksakan penerapan hukum Islam di Indonesia yang diikuti oleh pembentukan negara Islam Salafi. Buat mereka, siapapun yang berbeda pandangan adalah kafir. Namun					
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					demikian, bukan berarti hanya faktor emosiona l agama yang membuat mereka ingin menjadi teroris.					
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13	<u>AA</u>	<p>Umumnya dari ekonomi yang termarjinalkan. Jikapun ada yang dari kelompok ekonomi yang lebih baik, mereka berperan sebagai penyokong dana.</p> <p>Mereka merasa diperlakukan tidak adil secara ekonomi.</p>	Umumnya dari kelompok sosial bawah.	<p>Sebelum terlibat dalam aktifitas politik Islam Salafi yang menghalalkan cara kekerasan, ideologi radikal mereka umumnya berawal dari keikutsertaan mereka di dalam kelompok-kelompok pengajian (taklim).</p>	<p>Mereka merasa harus memerangi kaum lain selain Islam. Mayoritas mereka merasa sangat emosional terhadap doktrin agama Islam Salafi. Kekhalifahan juga harus didirikan di tingkat global.</p>	Jaringan sosial adalah penting untuk pertumbuhan terorisme berbasis Salafi di Indonesia.	<p>Represi negara selama ini tergolong tinggi dan bahkan hal ini membuat para kelompok radikal menjadi semakin radikal (meningkat).</p>	<p>Insentif perlu diberikan karena jika tidak demikian akan membuat mereka merasa diperlakukan tidak adil oleh pemerintah. Namun demikian, represi kepada mereka juga harus tetap dilakukan, dan tidak ada jaminan bahwa jika mereka diberikan kue politik dalam pemerintahan akan membuat</p>	<p>Orang Indonesia yang banyak merasa diperlakukan tidak adil akan gampang sekali dihasut menjadi teroris. Ini adalah akibat dari kondisi ekonomi-sosio-politik mereka.</p> <p>Namun demikian secara umum orang Indonesia juga tidak suka dengan terorisme. Kalopun ada</p>	<p>Pemantapan strategi deradikalisasi yang diikuti dengan improvisasi sistem penjara bagi mereka. Mereka jangan dicampur satu sama lain.</p>
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								mereka menjadi tidak radikal lagi.	banyak orang Indonesia yang ingin terlibat menjadi teroris, biasanya mayoritas hanya menjadi simpatisan saja (walaupun ada juga yang berperan sebagai pelaksana, imam, pendana, perencana, dsb).	
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14	<u>AC</u>	Ekonomi lemah.	Ada yang sarjana, namun mayoritas tidak punya pekerjaan tetap.	Jarang yang terafiliasi dengan parpol karena mereka tidak setuju dengan sistem demokrasi. Mereka tidak suka dengan korupsi para politisi, dan tidak setuju demokrasi.	Pendidikan agama mereka kurang dalam. Mereka ingin tegakkan hukum Islam dan negara Islam. Oleh karena itu, terorisme merupakan pembelaan diri bagi mereka.	Jaringan sosial adalah penting untuk pertumbuhan terorisme berbasis Salafi di Indonesia. Dapat dilihat dari kelompok pengajian/taklimnya, mesjidnya, dsb.	Represi negara selama ini dapat meningkatkan dan menurunkan tingkat radikalisme, tergantung dari sistem pembinaan selama di LP, dan pemerintah juga perlu terus melihat dampak jangka pendek dan panjangnya.	Insentif dapat menurunkan tingkat radikalisme mereka. Namun, tidak tepat untuk memberikan kepada mereka kue politik dalam pemerintahan. Hal ini malah akan membuat mereka menjadi semakin radikal dan meningkatkan bahaya terorisme di Indonesia.	Negara perlu improvisasi riset terorisme secara mendalam, tentang latar belakang, profil orang-orang yang terlibat, dan dampak serta cara penanganannya yang lebih efektif. Secara umum orang Indonesia juga tidak suka dengan terorisme. Orang	CT di Indonesia sudah baik. Terus lakukan secara pendekatan hard dan soft. Yang perlu ditingkatkan adalah keterlibatan semua stakeholders (tidak hanya Polri), bahkan LSM perlu dilibatkan. Pemerintah RI juga perlu terus studi banding tentang CT di negara-negara
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									<p>Indonesia yang menjadi Salafi jihadist, biasanya menjadi simpatisan, pelaksana, perencana, dan pemimpin.</p> <p>Pattern terorisme di Indonesia adalah ketidakpuasan ekonomi, sosial dan politik serta pemahaman agama yang salah.</p>	lain (Malaysia, Thailand, Singapura, dll)
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15	<u>DN</u>	<p>Ekonomi mereka bervariasi. Ada yang ekonomi lemah (rumah kontrakan dan tanpa pekerjaan tetap), dan ada juga yang mapan dimana mereka memiliki rumah tinggal dan pondok pesantren.</p> <p>Ketidakpuasan ekonomi tetap ada, namun ketidakpuasan ekonomi ini lebih didorong oleh faktor</p>	<p>Ada yang sarjana, namun tidak banyak. Mayoritas adalah lulusan SM atau Madrasah. Ada juga yang tidak sekolah.</p> <p>Intinya mereka berpendapat bahwa kondisi sosial yang ideal adalah yang mana hukum Islam ditegakkan .</p>	<p>Mereka sangat menentang sistem demokrasi. Oleh karena itu, menurut mereka hukum Islam dan negara Islam di Indonesia harus ditegakkan.</p>	<p>Islam harus dipeluk oleh seluruh umat manusia, Khilafah Islam adalah solusi permasalahan dunia, perlunya pemurnian ajaran Islam, dan boleh melakukan teror untuk mencapai sasaran yang mereka harapkan .</p>	<p>Untuk terciptanya Salafi jihadist di Indonesia, jaringan sosial yang terbentuk dari pergaulan adalah faktor yang lebih penting dibandingkan pendidikan agama Islam itu sendiri.</p> <p>Banyaknya jaringan sosial di antara mereka yang</p>	<p>Represi negara selama ini sudah memberikan efek deterrence yang efektif dan tinggi ke pergerakan mereka.</p> <p>Harus diikuti oleh konsep deradikalisasi.</p>	<p>Insentif harus diberikan untuk menurunkan kecenderungan seseorang menjadi teroris. Mereka juga harus dididik menerima kebhinekaan (plurality) di NKRI.</p>	<p>Saat ini mereka sedang mendapatkan panggung. Pattern nya adalah dengan propaganda, dukungan keuangan, dan isu isu yang terus dikembangkan guna membakar semangat para calon jihadist.</p> <p>Oleh karena itu Indonesia sangat berpotensi menjadi produsen teroris di tingkat</p>	<p>NKRI dan demokrasi harus dipertahankan dan terus diperkuat guna melawan ideologi politik radikal Islam Salafi yang menghalalkan jihad dan qital.</p> <p>Deradikalisasi perlu diperbaiki secara konsep dan pelaksanaan.</p> <p>RUU perlu segera disahkan menjadi UU.</p>
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		<p>ideologi.</p> <p>Mereka juga tidak punya pekerjaan tetap, sehingga mau menjadi teroris. Namun, bagi yang sudah mapan, malah menjadi pendana teror.</p>				<p>termanifestasikan dalam bentuk banyak entitas, sebenarnya mereka itu tetap satu (satu tujuan yang sama).</p>			<p>global. Orang Indonesia ini pada umumnya mudah terprovokasi dengan propaganda teroris dan dengan isu pemurnian agama Islam.</p> <p>Orang Indonesia yang menjadi teroris, mayoritas dari mereka menjadi simpatisan.</p>	<p>Bukan kewenangan yang perlu diributkan, melainkan aspek kriminalisasi radikalisme dan terorisme yang dibutuhkan.</p>
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
The Description of 15 Respondents (Key State/Security Officials and Experts in the Field)

	Name	Position	Institution	Atribute	
1	SYD	CT practitioner and Muslim public figure/Imam	Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Detachment 88	General	
2	SHK	Senior Intelligence Analyst	Commission 1 of Indonesian House of Representatives (Defense, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and Informational Affairs) and National Intelligence Agency.	Doctorate	
3	MHW	Career Diplomat	Indonesian Foreign Ministry	Doctorate (LSE)	
4	LMP	Senior Political and Economic Analyst	Senior Businessman	Mr	
5	TF	Senior Intelligence Officer	U.S. Department of Defense	Mr	
6	RPD	Professor on Sociology and Antropology	University of Indonesia	Doctorate	
7	AD	Dean of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences	Universitas Pelita Harapan	Professor, Doctorate	

8	HR	Religious Leader		Physicist, M.Div	
9	VPT	Senior Intelligence Officer	The Indonesian Army	Colonel/BG-qualified.	
10	ACS	Foreign Area Officer	U.S. Department of Defense	Colonel (United States Marines Corps)	
11	BK	The Key Member of Indonesian Counterterrorism Task Force	Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Detachment 88	Colonel	
12	IS	The Head of Intelligence Section	Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Detachment 88	Colonel	
13	AC	The Key Member of Indonesian Counterterrorism Task Force	Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Detachment 88		
14	AA	The Key Member of Indonesian Counterterrorism Task Force	Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Detachment 88		
15	DN	The Commandant of Foreign Fighters Task Force	Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Detachment 88	Colonel	

The Attachment #3: The Quantitative Data of 40 Former Prisoners
(The first, second and third stage's materials for the quantitative analysis in the chapter 4.2).

The Stage #1: Filling out the questionnaires
(The stage #1 is where the 40 respondents filled out the questionnaire)



The Stage #2: Putting the answers in the excel format

(The stage #2 is where their responses are converted into the excel-based table)

Individual	Age	BirthPlace	Gender	Ethnicity	MarriageStatus	Location	X1GrievOnDailyInc	X21GrievOnEmployStatus	X22GrievOnEducLevel	X3GrievOnPol	X41SyariahLaw	X42IslamistState
1	35	8	1	2	1	5	2	3	2	1	2	0
2	35	3	1	1	1	4	2	3	1	1	2	0
3	40		1	1	0	2	2	2	2	3	2	0
4	38	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	1		0
5	45	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	0
6	29	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	1	0
7							2	1	2	1	3	1
8							1	3	2	1	3	1
9							3	1	4	1	3	1
10	26		1	1		2	3	3	2	3	2	0
11	45	7	1	1	1	9	2	3	1	3		0
12	38	3	1	1	1	4	2	2	2	1	3	1
13	42		1	1	1	11	1	1	1	3	2	0
14	33		1	3	1	3	2	3	2	1	2	0
15	38	5	1	4	0	11	4	1	3	1	3	1
16	36	3	1	1	0	4	2	3	2	3	3	1
17	31	10	1	1	0	7	3	4	2	2	3	1
18	49	1	1	5	1	11	2	1	1	1	3	1
19	30	2	1		1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
20	40	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
21	41		1		1	4	2	3	1	1	3	1
22	34	9	1		1	8	2	3	2		2	0
23	25	2	1	1	1	3	2	3	2	1	2	0
24	25	12	1	6	0	10	4	4	2	1	1	0
25	36	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0
26	34	1	1	1	1	3	2	4	2	2	3	1
27	53	2	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	2	3	1
28	36	4	1	3	1	3	2	2	2	1	2	0
29	55	4	1	3	1	3	3	3	2	2	1	0
30	36	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	2	0
31	33	11	1		1	3	2	3	2	1	3	1
32	42	2	1	1	1	4	3	1	2	1	3	1
33	31		1	1	0	2	2	3	2	3	2	0
34	38	10	1	7	1	7	2	3	2	3	2	0
35	45	3	1	1	1	7	2	3	2	1	2	0
36	33		1	1	0	2	2	2	4	1	2	0
37	24		1	8	0	6	3	1	2	3	1	0
38	40	5	1	9	1	1	2	1	1	3	2	0
39	65	3	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	3	3	1
40	34	9	1	10	1	8	2	3	1	3	1	0

The Stage #3: Putting the answers in the excel format

(The stage #3 is where their responses are transformed into specific STATA data set files)


The picture below reflects the original categorization of each variable's attributes

Individual	Age	BirthPlace	Gender	Ethnicity	MarriageSta	Location	X1GrievOnD	X21GrievOnD	X22GrievOnD	X3GrievOnD	X41SyariahL	X42IslamistS
1	35	8	1	2	1	5	2	3	2	1	2	0
2	35	3	1	1	1	4	2	3	1	1	2	0
3	40		1	1	0	2	2	2	2	3	2	0
4	38	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	1		0
5	45	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	0
6	29	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	1	0
7							2	1	2	1	3	1
8							1	3	2	1	3	1
9							3	1	4	1	3	1
10	26		1	1		2	3	3	2	3	2	0
11	45	7	1	1	1	9	2	3	1	3		0
12	38	3	1	1	1	4	2	2	2	1	3	1
13	42		1	1	1	11	1	1	1	3	2	0
14	33		1	3	1	3	2	3	2	1	2	0
15	38	5	1	4	0	11	4	1	3	1	3	1
16	36	3	1	1	0	4	2	3	2	3	3	1
17	31	10	1	1	0	7	3	4	2	2	3	1
18	49	1	1	5	1	11	2	1	1	1	3	1
19	30	2	1		1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
20	40	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
21	41		1		1	4	2	3	1	1	3	1
22	34	9	1		1	8	2	3	2		2	0
23	25	2	1	1	1	3	2	3	2	1	2	0
24	25	12	1	6	0	10	4	4	2	1	1	0
25	36	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	0
26	34	1	1	1	1	3	2	4	2	2	3	1
27	53	2	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	2	3	1
28	36	4	1	3	1	3	2	2	2	1	2	0
29	55	4	1	3	1	3	3	3	2	2	1	0
30	36	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	2	0
31	33	11	1		1	3	2	3	2	1	3	1
32	42	2	1	1	1	4	3	1	2	1	3	1
33	31		1	1	0	2	2	3	2	3	2	0
34	38	10	1	7	1	7	2	3	2	3	2	0
35	45	3	1	1	1	7	2	3	2	1	2	0
36	33		1	1	0	2	2	2	4	1	2	0
37	24		1	8	0	6	3	1	2	3	1	0
38	40	5	1	9	1	1	2	1	1	3	2	0
39	65	3	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	3	3	1
40	34	9	1	10	1	8	2	3	1	3	1	0

This following picture is the categorization of each variable's attributes into the binary model (1 and 0)

Individual	Age	BirthPlace	Gender	Ethnicity	MarriageStat	Location	X1GrievOnDis	X21GrievOnE	X22GrievOnE	X3GrievOnPo	X41SyariahLe	X42IslamistS
1	35	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
2	35	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
3	40		1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
4	38	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0		0
5	45	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
6	29	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
7							0	0	0	0	1	1
8							0	1	0	0	1	1
9							1	0	1	0	1	1
10	26		1	1		1	1	1	0	1	1	0
11	45	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1		0
12	38	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
13	42		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
14	33		1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
15	38	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
16	36	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
17	31	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
18	49	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
19	30	1	1		1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
20	40	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
21	41		1		1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
22	34	0	1		1	0	0	1	0		1	0
23	25	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
24	25	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
25	36	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
26	34	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
27	53	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
28	36	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
29	55	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
30	36	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
31	33	0	1		1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
32	42	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
33	31		1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
34	38	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
35	45	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
36	33		1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
37	24		1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
38	40	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
39	65	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
40	34	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0

The following picture indicates that the data set is already available at the STATA



The Attachment #4: The Social Network Analysis Papers
(The materials for the social network analysis in the chapter 4.3)

FINAL PROJECT- Disrupting Bali bombing's Networks

Wiphusana Klaimanee, Mariusz Nogaj

DA 4600 – Dark Networks

11 June 2008

Background

The terrorist organization created by Mohammed Top Noordin in Indonesia has posed a serious threat to the Indonesian state. Although, the counterterrorist efforts made by police and military have brought significant results, it is too early to say that the Noordin's organization was defeated. Some of the key figures are still at large.¹

From the point of view of social network analysis, the Noordin's network poses an excellent object to examine it. This network is not too big (79 individuals) with relatively well identified ties connecting particular members of the network.²

In this project we have decided to analyze the Noordin's network in order to find a feasible strategy to disrupt it. Just for the training purposes we have assumed that all 79 individuals are both alive and free. Having this assumption in mind we have adopted the strategy to use for our analysis only the key relationships between the members of the network. Once the key relationships had been selected, we have analyzed them by a use of the social analysis software (UCINET, NetDraw, and Pajek), to identify the key figures within the network, who we regard are the targets to aim at. The process of selecting the key figures demanded using of different types of metrics. It allowed us to find the most prominent actors in the network depending on the metric we have used. The final step was to analyze obtained results and point out the terrorists of the highest importance within analyzed network.

Key relationships

According to the assignment we were supposed to do, we have decided to use for the purpose of this exercise the following matrices:

- Matrix called ***Bali bombings***, which we have created for the assignment 3. This is 2-mode matrix containing data about individuals involved in two Bali bombings.
- 1-mode matrix called ***Friend***, containing data about the friendship ties within the Noordin's network.

¹ International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's networks", Asia Report N 114, 5 May 2006.

² Ibid.,

- 2-mode matrix called ***School***, containing data about the ties between the members of Noordin's network and certain schools they graduated from.
- 2-mode matrix called ***Train***, containing data about the members of Noordin's network participating in terrorist training.

The underlying concept which is behind our choice of the relationships is based on the assumptions as follows:

- the climax of the terrorist activity is a terrorist act (e.g. bombing);
- people in order to be capable to conduct a terrorist operation must be well-trained;
- organized training for the terrorists demands involvement of many people, so only a well-developed terrorist organization is able to train its members in organized manner;
- terrorist organization (at least the hard core of it) must be established by people who share not only common ideology, but also have personal ties with each other. The friendship is recognized as one of the strongest relationships joining people;
- friendship usually demands a relatively long time to be established, so it is often that people who share this relation know each other from the school times. Our argument is that school environment is likely to create strong friendship. As we learned from the article about Noordin, many of the members of his terrorist network met for the first time in school.

So, basing on the assumptions made, we have decided to aggregate and subsequently analyze the aggregated network consisting of 4 matrices (***Bali bombing, Friend, Train, School***).

1. The first step we had to do, was to transform all 2-mode matrices into 1-mode ones. This created new matrices called respectively ***Bali bombings-Aff, School-Aff***, and ***Train-Aff***.
2. The next step was to stack all 4 matrices. This created a new matrix called ***Joined***.
3. The next step was to aggregate these 4 stacked matrices into a single-valued matrix. This created the matrix called ***Joined-wda***.
4. Then we dichotomized the joined network and obtained the final matrix called ***Joined-wdaGTO***.

5. The matrix called **Joined-wdaGTO** was the matrix we started to examine by use of the metrics introduced in the class.

PART I Description of the originally coded matrices

In this part of this work we are presenting the originally coded matrices (relationships). We have decided to show the size of nodes within networks as a function of its betweenness centrality. The reason for that is highlight the most central actors and make the picture easier to read.

The first relationship we have originally coded was the relation showing the involvement of particular members of the Noordin's network in two Bali bombings. We were basing on the data obtained from the article about the Noordin's network. We have created a 2-mode matrix where the actors were in the rows, and columns represented the Bali bombings I, II. We coded the involvement in particular bombing by assigning "1" to the actor, and "0" in case certain actor was not involved. We have picked up these two terrorist operations because of their geographical proximity to each other. It could suggest that some of the people involved in the first Bali bombing might participate in the second Bali bombing. Moreover, these two operations were the most deadly terrorist operations conducted by the Noordin's terrorist network.

1. Sociograms of the relationships used.




Figure 1: Sociogram showing the relationship of Bali bombing coded as a 2-mode matrix.




Figure 2: Sociogram showing the relationship of Bali bombing coded as a 1-mode matrix with the size of nodes reflecting the betweenness centrality.

The second relationship we used was friendship.




Figure 3: Sociogram showing the friendship ties with size of nodes depending on the betweenness centrality.

The third relationship we used was training.




Figure 4: Sociogram showing the training ties with size of nodes depending on the betweenness centrality.

The fourth relationship we have used was school ties




Figure 5: Sociogram showing the school ties with size of nodes depending on the betweenness centrality.

2. The aggregated network (*Joined-wda*).




Figure 6: Sociogram showing the ties in the aggregated network (**Joined-wda**) with size of nodes depending on the betweenness centrality.

PART II Analysis of the aggregated dichotomized network (*Joined-wdaGTO*)

The first metric we decided to use in order to analyze the network was centrality. We decided to compute all kinds of centrality, and basing on the analysis of the results to identify the key figures in analyzed network.

1. Analysis of different types of centrality in UCINET (multiple measures of centrality).




Figure 7: Multiple measures of centrality in UCINET.

The results we obtained are depicted in the table below. We decided to take into consideration the top 5 actors who scored highest in term of different types of centrality.

Metrics of centrality			
Betweenness	Degree	Closeness	Eigenvector
1. Zulkarnaen	1. Zulkarnaen	1. Zulkarnaen	1. Zulkarnaen
2. Ahmad Rofiq	2. Jabir	2. Ahmad Rofiq	2. Jabir
3. Abdullah Sunata	3. Azhari Husin	3. Jabir	3. Ahmad Rofiq
4. Azhari Husin	4. Abdul Rauf	4. Azhari Husin	4. Tohir
5. Noordin	5. Ahmad Rofiq	Ubeid	Mohammed

	Noordin		Rais
	Ubeid	5. Suranto	5. Suranto

Table 1: The top 5 actors in terms of different types of centrality.

In order to identify the key actors in terms of centrality we decided to give the actor who scored highest in terms of particular centrality 5 points, then 4 points for the second highest score,, and 1 point for the 5th highest score. The results are in the table below.

Actor	Metrics of centrality				
	Betweenness	Degree	Closeness	Eigenvector	Total
1. Zulkarnaen	5	5	5	5	20
2. Jabir	0	4	3	4	11
3. Ahmad Rofiq	4	1	4	0	9
4. Azhari Husin	2	3	2	0	7
5. Abdul Rauf	0	2	0	3	5
6. Abdullah Sunata	3	0	0	0	3
7. Ubeid	0	1	2	0	3
8. Noordin	1	1	0	0	2
9. Suranto	0	0	1	1	2
10. Tohir	0	0	0	2	2
11. Mohammed Rais	0	0	0	2	2

Table 2: The rearranged results of centrality.

The analysis of different types of centrality allowed us to identify 11 individuals who scored highest. Among them, the first five actors seem to be the central figures in analyzed network. These are **Zulkarnaen, Jabir, Ahmad Rofiq, Azhari Husin, and Abdul Rauf**.

In order to check our findings we also used Pajek to get the picture of the network in terms of degree centrality.




Figure 8: Degree centrality drawn in Pajek in y-direction.

The results obtained from Pajek fit to these ones obtained from UCINET.

2. The cut-points

The second metric we decided to use in order to identify the key figures in analyzed network was cut-points or cut-vertices. We assumed that identification of cut-vertices within network will enable us to make further selection of the key persons. We recognized the importance of people who are cut-vertices, because there are important actors as far as the communication within network is organized. Once the cut-vertex is removed one or more parts of certain network can become separated from the rest of network.³

³ Nooy de Wouter et al, "Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek," Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005.




Figure 9: Sociogram showing the cut-vertices (in blue) in the aggregated network (*Joined-wdaGTO*) with size of nodes depending on the betweenness centrality.

In terms of cut-vertices combined with the betweenness centrality, 3 actors seem to score high. These are **Ahmad Rofiq**, **Abdullah Sunata**, and **Iwan Dharmawan**.

3. Brokerage metric

The third metric we decided to use was set of brokerage functions. We decided to analyze the overall network and use as a partition the sub-network of Bali I, II bombings. In order to transform this 2-mode network into a format of partition we decided to build a new 2-mode matrix, where the numbers attached to actors had meanings as follow:

0-actor not involved in any Bali bombing

1-actor involved in Bali I bombing

2-actor involved in Bali II bombing

3-actor involved in both bombings

Output Log #2

Log File Number 2

1	-	0
1	Abdul Malik	0
2	Abdul Rauf	0
3	Abdul Roha	0
4	Abdullah Sunata	0
5	Abdullah Sunopar	0
6	Abu Bakar Ba'asyir	0
7	Abu Dujana	0
8	Abu Fida	0
9	Aceng Kurnia	0
10	Achmad Hasan	0
11	Adung	0
12	Agus Ahad	0
13	Ahmad Mofiq Ridho	0
14	Ahmad Sayid Maulana	0
15	Ajengan Masduki	0
16	Akron	0
17	Ali Ghufrom	1
18	Anif Solihuddin	2
19	Apuy	0
20	Aris Munandar	0
21	Asep Jaja	0
22	Asrar Latif Sani	0
23	Azhari Husin	3
24	Beharudin Soleh	0
25	Chandra	0
26	Cholily	0
27	Dani Chandra	0
28	Endang Kurnia	1
29	Engkos Kurnia	0
30	Engkos Kurnia	0
31	Fathurrahman al-Shawi	0
32	Fathurrochman	0
33	Hasbi	1
34	Hari Kuncoro	0
35	Herun	0
36	Hence Maleva	0
37	Hari Golun	0
38	Hari Sipi Sembaja	0
39	Inas Bukhori	0
40	Inas Saundra	1
41	Iqbal Husaini	1
42	Iqbal Husaini	0
43	Irun Hidayat	0
44	Imaill	0
45	Iwan Dharmawan	0
46	Jahir	2
47	Joko Triharanto	0
48	Joni Achmad Fauzan	0
49	Karwan	0
50	Mano	2
51	Mohamad Ihsan	1
52	Mohamad Rais	0
53	Mohamad Saifuddin	0
54	Mukhtar	0
55	Muniflatun	0
56	Mus'ab Sahidi	0
57	Muzayin Abdul Wahab	0
58	Nasir Abbas	0
59	Woodin Mohamad Iqbal	2
60	Purnama Putra	0
61	Qotadah	0
62	Roslin Moor	0
63	Said Sungkar	0

Figure 10: One-column matrix of Bali bombings used as a partition for computing brokerage function.

Computing the brokerage function for Bali bombing network.

Output Log #15

Log File Number 15

	Coordinator	Getsewe	Represent	Consultan	Liaison	Total
1	Abdul Malik	0	0	0	0	0
21	Asep Jaja	56	10	0	0	76
2	Abdul Roha	0	0	0	0	0
4	Abdullah Sunata	80	22	22	0	124
5	Abdullah Sunopar	0	0	0	0	0
6	Abu Bakar Ba'asyir	0	0	0	0	0
7	Abu Dujana	20	2	0	0	22
8	Abu Fida	2	2	0	0	4
9	Aceng Kurnia	0	0	0	0	0
10	Achmad Hasan	4	22	22	0	48
11	Adung	0	0	0	0	0
12	Agus Ahad	0	0	0	0	0
13	Ahmad Mofiq Ridho	190	19	19	0	228
14	Ahmad Sayid Maulana	0	0	0	0	0
15	Ajengan Masduki	0	0	0	0	0
16	Akron	10	0	0	0	10
17	Ali Ghufrom	0	0	0	0	0
18	Anif Solihuddin	0	0	0	0	0
19	Apuy	0	0	0	0	0
20	Aris Munandar	0	0	0	0	0
21	Asep Jaja	0	0	0	0	0
22	Asrar Latif Sani	0	0	0	0	0
23	Azhari Husin	22	24	24	4	74
24	Beharudin Soleh	0	0	0	0	0
25	Chandra	0	0	0	0	0
26	Cholily	0	0	0	0	0
27	Dani Chandra	14	2	2	0	18
28	Endang Kurnia	0	0	0	0	0
29	Engkos Kurnia	0	0	0	0	0
30	Engkos Kurnia	0	0	0	0	0
31	Fathurrahman al-Shawi	0	11	11	0	22
32	Fathurrochman	0	11	11	0	22
33	Hasbi	0	11	11	0	22
34	Hari Kuncoro	0	11	11	0	22
35	Herun	0	0	0	0	0
36	Hence Maleva	0	0	0	0	0
37	Hari Golun	14	0	0	0	14
38	Hari Sipi Sembaja	0	0	0	0	0
39	Inas Bukhori	2	5	5	0	12
40	Inas Saundra	0	0	0	0	0
41	Iqbal Husaini	20	0	0	0	20
42	Iqbal Husaini	0	0	0	0	0
43	Irun Hidayat	0	1	1	0	2
44	Imaill	0	0	0	0	0
45	Iwan Dharmawan	28	4	4	0	36
46	Jahir	0	0	0	0	0
47	Joko Triharanto	0	0	0	0	0
48	Joni Achmad Fauzan	0	0	0	0	0
49	Karwan	0	0	0	0	0
50	Mano	110	12	12	0	134
51	Mohamad Ihsan	0	0	0	0	0
52	Mohamad Rais	20	26	26	4	76
53	Mohamad Saifuddin	0	0	0	0	0
54	Mukhtar	0	0	0	0	0
55	Muniflatun	0	0	0	0	0
56	Mus'ab Sahidi	0	0	0	0	0
57	Muzayin Abdul Wahab	0	0	0	0	0
58	Nasir Abbas	0	0	0	0	0
59	Woodin Mohamad Iqbal	0	0	0	0	0
60	Purnama Putra	0	0	0	0	0
61	Qotadah	0	0	0	0	0
62	Roslin Moor	0	0	0	0	0
63	Said Sungkar	0	0	0	0	0
2	Abdul Rauf	0	97	97	0	216
41	Iqbal	0	0	0	22	22
33	Hasbi	0	24	24	0	48

Figure 11: Output log with the brokerage computations

The next step was to visualize different types of brokerage functions. The pictures were drawn with the size of nodes depending on the certain brokerage function.

Coordinator role depicted in NetDraw.




Figure 12: Coordinator role.

The most prominent actors as far as coordinator role is concerned are **Ahmad Rofiq, Son Hadi, Ubeid, and Suranto**.

Consultant role.




Figure 13: Consultant role.

The most prominent actors as far as consultant role is concerned are **Zulkarnaen, Noordin, and Jabir**.

Liaison role.




Figure 14: Liaison role.

The most prominent actors as far as liaison role is concerned are **Azhari Husin, Zulkarnaen, and Jabir.**

Representative role.




Figure 15: Representative role.

The most prominent actors as far as representative role is concerned are **Zulkarnaen, Abdul Rauf, and Jabir**.

The overall analysis of the different brokerage functions allowed us to identify **Zulkarnaen and Jabir** as the key figures. Both terrorists appear 3 times in top 3 positions in different brokerage roles.

PART III Analysis and recommendations

The analysis of the aggregated network provided us with the information about the key figures in this network. As it was stated earlier we have decided to aggregate 4 relations, because we saw the structure of terrorist organization as a set of overlapping relations. In order to identify the key persons in this combined network we used the different types of centrality, as well as cut-vertices and different brokerage metrics. It allowed us to identify the key persons in this network, what can be used to disrupt

analyzed network. We also used the drawings to better understand the complexity of analyzed network. The visualization of the network helped to identify the underlying structure of the analyzed network.

In terms of centrality we identified 5 individuals as key players: **Zulkarnaen, Jabir, Ahmad Rofiq, Azhari Husin, and Abdul Rauf.**

In terms of cut-vertices we identified 3 individuals as key players: **Ahmad Rofiq, Abdullah Sunata, and Iwan Dharmawan.**

In terms of brokerage functions we identified 2 individuals as key players: **Zulkarnaen and Jabir.**

The final combined analysis showed us that the key figure in analyzed network is **Zulkarnaen**, closely followed by **Jabir**. **Zulkarnaen** appeared to be the most important figure in terms of centrality and brokerage functions. He was relatively less important as the cut-vertex, but it can be explained by the fact that he is located deep inside the structure of the network; hence he has many ties and serves rather as a consultant than the liaison. This assumption was proved by the analysis of brokerage functions, where **Zulkarnaen** scored highest as the consultant. As far as **Jabir** is concerned, he scored usually less than **Zulkarnaen**, but he was always between the top 3-4 individuals in terms of almost every metric.

So, our recommendation for disrupting this network is to target **Zulkarnaen** and **Jabir** respectively. However, as it was stated at the beginning just for the training purposes we assumed that all terrorists were alive and free. As we know from the article about Noordin's network, **Jabir** was killed by Indonesian police in 2006,⁴ so taking it into consideration, we recommend that elimination of **Zulkarnaen** will be critical for disrupting analyzed network.

⁴ International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's networks", Asia Report N 114, 5 May 2006.

TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN'S NETWORKS

Asia Report N°114 – 5 May 2006

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TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN'S NETWORKS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Indonesian police are closing in on Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia's most wanted terrorist. In a dramatic pre-dawn raid on 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java, they shot and killed two members of his inner circle and arrested two others. If and when they capture Noordin, they will have put the person most determined to attack Western targets out of commission. But the problem of Noordin's support structure will still have to be tackled.

For four years Noordin has tapped into jihadist networks to build a following of diehard loyalists, and those same networks may be available to others. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the region's largest jihadist organisation, continues to provide the hard core of that following; the two killed in the Wonosobo raid were longstanding JI members, as was at least one of those arrested. But beginning in 2004, Noordin began reaching out to young men from other organisations and some with no previous organisational affiliation.

Many JI members reportedly see the group he has cobbled together – he grandly calls it al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago – as a deviant splinter that has done great harm to the organisation they joined in the mid-1990s. Noordin, however, reportedly sees himself as leading JI's military wing, even though he answers to no one. He justifies his actions by citing jihadist doctrine that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a group of two or three or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from an imam.

This report examines the way in which Noordin has relied on personal contacts to put his group together. It is based on interrogation depositions, court documents, and Indonesian press reports, with information crosschecked through extensive interviews with knowledgeable sources, both official and unofficial.

For the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 2003, he used a small circle of Sumatra-based JI members who had either been associated with a JI school in Malaysia, Lukman al-Hakiem, or with its prototype, the al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school in Ngruki, near Solo, Central Java.

For the Australian embassy bombing in September 2004, he relied on three networks: the East Java division of JI;

alumni of JI schools in Central Java; and a West Java-based faction of an old insurgency, Darul Islam, whose members supplied the key operatives. While individuals from that Ring Banten faction had worked with JI before, military operations had never before been outsourced in this way. It was one indication that Noordin was working on his own.

After the embassy bombing, Noordin was short of funds, weapons and experienced fighters. He turned to two men who had access to all these, neither of whom was JI. One was from a different Darul Islam faction with long experience in the Philippines; the other had been head of the Ambon office of the Islamic charity KOMPAK and could mobilise veterans of Indonesian communal conflicts. Intense negotiations followed with couriers used to relay messages between the bosses. It turned out that neither the Darul Islam nor the KOMPAK leader was interested in joining forces but both were arrested in mid-2005 and began to lose control over their followers, some of whom went over to Noordin.

For the second Bali bombing in October 2005, Noordin relied on his inner circle, including the two who were killed on 29 April, to find and train new members. Recruitment appeared to be rather ad hoc, despite written materials attributed to Noordin suggesting a tightly organised cell structure designed to undertake military operations.

Noordin has shown remarkable determination and capacity to plan operations even as he loses his closest colleagues to police dragnets and remains the target of Indonesia's biggest ever manhunt. It is not clear who among potential successors could do as well.

But his behaviour following Bali II suggests he is running short of money and experienced cadres. The loss on 29 April of the men who served as both couriers and recruiters has to be a significant blow. The Wonosobo raid was a triumph for the police, and Noordin's arrest will be an even greater one. But the networks he drew on will survive as a potential source of recruits for future operations.

Jakarta/Brussels, 5 May 2006

TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN'S NETWORKS

I. INTRODUCTION

Noordin Mohammed Top remains the most wanted man in Indonesia.¹ Despite four years of dogged police pursuit and a raid on 29 April 2006 that netted some of his closest associates, he has managed not only to evade capture but also to recruit new operatives for spectacular, once-a-year suicide bombings: the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003; the Australian embassy in 2004; and three restaurants in Bali in 2005. The 38-year-old Malaysian national by all accounts is not a particularly impressive figure. For a salafi Muslim, his religious knowledge is limited, and he does not speak Arabic. He is not a skilled orator. He has a knack for surrounding himself with devoted followers who possess skills that he does not, however, and his ability to elude police for so long has enhanced his stature. He can also claim to head the one organisation that actively continues to wage jihad against the U.S. and its allies on Indonesian soil.

That organisation is not Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – at least, not the JI most members would recognise. Noordin and members of his inner circle are JI members. Until 2001 he directed the Luqmanul Hakiem school in Malaysia, headquarters of Mantiqi I, the JI division that covered Malaysia and Singapore. But he increasingly appears to have charted his own path, in a gradual process that began with the 2003 Marriott bombing. By the time of the embassy bombing, he seemed to be operating on his own without reference to the JI central command, although he reportedly still considered himself a member.

He reportedly justifies his actions on the grounds that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a small group or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from its imam. In this way, he may see himself as leading the “real” JI, as opposed to the do-nothings who object to the bombings.

However he justifies it, he is running his own show. His followers began calling themselves *thoifah muqotilah*, Arabic for “fighting force”, in 2005. It was a new use for an old term JI had used to refer to a decentralised special forces unit it planned to set up after the first Bali attack. Noordin seems to have appropriated the term without connection to that initiative.

By about April 2005, according to Indonesian police, Noordin was claiming to head the working group for the Malay archipelago of *Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad*, the formal name of al-Qaeda.² The extent of his actual communication with al-Qaeda is not clear but he certainly seems to have been infatuated with it, aping not only its name but also its materials and tactics. As of mid-2004, he had taken on the nom de guerre of “Aiman”, almost certainly after the al-Qaeda No.2 Aiman Zawaheri. A whole section of a website, www.anshar.net, developed under Noordin's guidance between July and September 2005, was devoted to articles translated into Indonesian from *Sawt al-Jihad*, the al-Qaeda online magazine. Noordin's appearance on a videotape found in November 2005, complete with balaclava covering his face, seemed to be an effort to replicate the videos made by Zarqawi, the prominent insurgent in Iraq.

Noordin's ties to Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, the Bali bomber, remain strong. Noordin reportedly idolises the East Java-born preacher, who was his mentor in Mantiqi I and is also a hafez – one who has memorised the Koran. Mukhlas, while on death row in Bali, continued to give his protégé materials for religious discussion groups, thanks to the lax controls on communications within Indonesian prisons. If Noordin is not convincing as a religious scholar, Mukhlas is, and through a variety of media, printed and electronic, his teachings can be –

¹ For related reporting on Indonesia see Crisis Group Asia Report N°103, *Weakening Indonesian Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso*, 13 October 2005; Asia Report N°92, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*, 22 February 2005; Asia Report N°74, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, 3 February 2004; Asia Report N°63, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*, 26 August 2003; Asia Report N°43, *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*, 11 December 2002; and Asia Briefing N°20, *Al-Qaeda in South East Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia*, 8 August 2002 (as corrected 10 January 2003).

² “Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad dibentuk 6 bulan sebelum Bom Bali II”, *Suara Merdeka*, 3 February 2006.

and almost certainly were – used for recruitment and indoctrination.³

Since Bali II, Noordin has suffered setbacks. In November 2005, he lost a key members of his team, the master bomb-maker Azhari Husin, during a police siege in East Java; eight followers were arrested in Semarang, not far from the site of the April raid. But his group survived and even grew because of the networks he was able to tap into for shelter, logistical assistance, and recruits.

These networks have changed over time, reflecting Noordin's increasing distance from JI. For the Marriott bombing, all major operatives were Sumatra-based JI members. For the Australian embassy bombing, Noordin turned to the JI network in East Java, JI schools in Central Java and a Darul Islam group in West Java that had worked with JI in the past but was a separate entity with its own chain of command. The actual bombing was carried out by the latter in a kind of outsourcing operation that was at odds with standard JI practice.

For protection after the embassy attack, Noordin increasingly relied on networks that included but went far beyond JI, taking in non-JI veterans of the two big communal conflicts in Indonesia, Ambon (Maluku) and Poso. He also used those veterans' networks to reach out to two non-JI figures, KOMPAK leader Abdullah Sunata and Darul Islam leader Akram alias Shamsuddin alias Taufikurrahman. They refused to join him, and by mid-2005, both were under arrest.⁴

The Bali II bombings of 1 October 2005 suggest that once Sunata and Akram were behind bars, their control over their followers loosened, allowing Noordin to bring some of them on board. By early 2006 he was trying to turn his ad hoc band into a more structured armed force that could operate beyond Java and, at least in his dreams, beyond Indonesia.

II. THE MARRIOTT BOMBING NETWORKS

The 2003 Marriott Bombing provides the first case study of how Noordin used personal networks. Plans for that operation developed almost by accident, but as they did, Noordin relied heavily on people he knew and trusted – almost all JI members and many associated with the Luqmanul Hakim school in Johor, Malaysia.

A. THE LUQMANUL HAKIEM SCHOOL

Luqmanul Hakiem opened in 1992 on JI founder Abdullah Sungkar's instruction, with Mukhlas as its director. It was directly modelled on the al-Mukmin *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Ngruki, Central Java that Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had founded twenty years earlier. It adopted the Ngruki curriculum wholesale and had the same aim of developing new cadres to wage jihad; moreover, many of its teachers were Ngruki alumni.⁵ After JI's establishment in 1993, the school became the nerve centre of Mantiqi I, most of whose leading members were associated with it in some way. All the best known JI bombers – Hambali, Mukhlas, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Zulkarnaen, Faturrahman al-Ghozi, Dulmatin, Imam Samudra, Azhari and Noordin himself – either taught, lectured or studied there. It taught young women as well as young men, and Hambali was not the only senior JI member who found a wife there. At its height it had about 350 students.

Noordin began to attend lectures there around 1995, when he was studying for a master's degree at the nearby Universiti Teknologi Malaysia; he did not join JI until early 1998.⁶ When it was clear that Luqmanul Hakiem needed a Malaysian national as director to stay open, Noordin took the job, although Mukhlas remained the dominant figure.

In late 2001, a crackdown on JI in Malaysia began, and Luqmanul Hakiem ceased operations by early 2002. Noordin left for Riau, Indonesia early in the year, and in mid-2002 he and his Indonesian brother-in-law, a Luqmanul Hakiem graduate named Mohamed Rais, moved to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra with their families and opened a repair shop for automobile shock absorbers.⁷

³ Mukhlas was moved from Bali to a maximum security prison in Central Java in October 2005 after Bali II, and controls may be tighter now.

⁴ Abdullah Sunata was arrested for weapons possession and failing to disclose information about Noordin's whereabouts, Akram for involvement in a 2000 bombing in Yogyakarta.

⁵ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, March 2006.

⁶ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006.

⁷ Rais and Noordin would have known each other at Luqmanul Hakiem for at least six years. Rais was an Indonesian national whose family lived in Malaysia, in the village where JI founder Abdullah Sungkar and his entourage settled in 1985. He joined JI in 1995 when he turned fifteen and was sent to Ngruki to complete his education. After graduating in 1995, he returned to

They hired Ismail, another Luqmanul Hakiem graduate, and in November 2002, a month after the first Bali bombing, Azhari Husin joined them at Noordin's invitation.

B. THE LEFTOVER EXPLOSIVES

The accidental trigger for the Marriott bombing came in December 2002. As police stepped up their hunt for JI members in the aftermath of Bali, Toni Togar, a JI member based in Medan, North Sumatra, got nervous, because his house stored all the explosives left over from JI's December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings. He contacted Noordin to tell him he was going to throw them out. The question is why he chose Noordin, rather than his immediate superior in the JI organisation, the head of the *wakalah*, who apparently was reachable.

The answer may give a clue to Noordin's subsequent activities. The team that carried out the Christmas Eve bombings was led by Hambali and included Imam Samudra and many of the 2002 Bali bombers. From the beginning these men were operating outside the JI administrative structure, not even part of its special forces unit, *laskar khos*, that reported directly to Zulkarnaen, the person on the central command responsible for military affairs. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was aware of Hambali's activities, but most *wakalah* members were not, and people like Toni Togar were often selected to take part without the knowledge of their division leaders.⁸ Hambali had thus set a precedent for a secret team pursuing jihad on its own. This was probably in part because he controlled separate funding, including from al-Qaeda.⁹

Toni Togar and Azhari had both been members of Hambali's team, and while it is not clear how Noordin got involved, it was logical for Togar to convey his plans to dispose of the explosives to someone within this circle. Noordin, however, saw good materials being wasted and

forbade the disposal, saying the explosives could still be used, and he would arrange to take them.¹⁰ Before he could do so, however, Toni Togar showed up at the shop in Bukittinggi and told Noordin and Rais that he had already moved the materials to the house of a JI member in Dumai, Riau.

C. THE NGRUKI LINKS

In January 2003, Rais, Noordin and Azhari moved to Bengkulu, where a group of JI members lived, including Asmar Latin Sani, who became the Marriott suicide bomber. Noordin and Azhari planned the bombing there as a way of putting the explosives to good use. JI members in Bengkulu, Lampung, and Riau were involved in some planning and logistical support but were not told the target.

Interestingly, Noordin began to plan for a spectacular attack with some of the Bengkulu members just as others from their *wakalah* were taking part in a program to refresh their military skills, as a response to the exposure and arrests that followed the Bali bombings.¹¹ For most of the top JI leadership, this was a time for training and consolidation – not new attacks. But Hambali had set the precedent of going off on his own, and Noordin followed it.

The next stages of the operation involved small teams with ties to one another beyond the JI affiliation. Getting the explosives from Dumai to Bengkulu via Pekanbaru, Riau, in February 2003 and securing additional materials such as detonators involved Noordin, Azhari, Rais, Toni Togar, and a new team member, Masrizal bin Ali Umar

Malaysia to teach at Luqmanul Hakiem and joined the subdivision (*wakalah*) of JI's Mantiqi I in Johor. He remained there until February 2002 when his other Malaysian brother-in-law was arrested as a member of a JI affiliate, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), which consisted of Malaysian nationals, many of whom were members of the Malaysian opposition political party, PAS. JI reportedly did not want to seem as if it were poaching from PAS, so it encouraged those interested in JI to form their own organisation. Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, March 2006.

⁸ For reference to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's involvement in discussions of plans for the Christmas Eve bombings, see statement of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, 30 April 2002 in case dossier of Abdul Aziz bin Sihabudin, No. Pol. BP/364/XII/2002 /SERSE/, Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Daerah Riau Kota Bareleng.

⁹ Ken Conboy, *The Second Front* (Jakarta, 2005), p. 112.

¹⁰ Indictment of Mohamed Rais in South Jakarta District Court, No.PDM-51/JKTSL/01/2004.

¹¹ The training was part of a central command decision to try to coordinate training activities with military operations. Mustofa was responsible for training, Zulkarnaen for military affairs, and they did not get along. Individuals kept weapons caches and did not share them with JI as a whole for training. Hambali snatched *fiah* (cell) members without informing the relevant *wakalah* heads and used them for operations which bore no relevance to their training. In an effort to move beyond egos, reduce confusion, and base training on a coherent military strategy, the acting amir, Abu Rusdan, approved a single central command coordinating post to oversee training and military functions, with a direct administrative line through the *mantiqis* to the *wakalahs*. Trained military units at *wakalah* level were to be known as *thoifah muqotilah*, the original use of the term. Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, March-April 2006. Only Mantiqi II actually got a training program based on the new structure underway in early 2003 but it was discovered by police in June 2003 and many of the participants were arrested. See expert witness testimony of Lobby Loqman SH, 12/12/2003 Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, Direktorat VI Anti-Teror in case dossier of Solihin alias Rofi. (Loqman refers to the units as *thoifah mukhatalah*.)

alias Tohir, another Ngruki alumnus and Luqmanul Hakiem teacher. He was a close friend of Rais and would have been trusted completely by the others.

After the explosives reached Bengkulu safely as unaccompanied baggage on an ordinary intercity bus, they were stored at the house of Sardona Siliwangi, another Ngruki student and JI member. At the time the Marriott plot was being hatched, Sardona, who lived in Bengkulu, was working with Asmar Latin Sani to set up a new Ngruki-like *pesantren* there, and it was he who opened a bank account in March 2003 to facilitate financial transactions for Noordin. That said, he does not seem to have been an enthusiastic team member; it was more that once asked to help, he could not refuse.¹² Noordin only formally asked him to join in early April, and while he initially agreed, he only lasted a few weeks before he decided the demands on his time were too onerous and backed out. Noordin apparently had not shared significant details with him except how to communicate via codes and passwords.¹³

The police were never far behind: Rais was arrested in late April 2003, Sardona in May. The difficulties of mounting an operation had to be severely compounded by knowledge that the police would obtain more information from those in custody but it did not deter Noordin any more than his plans for the Australian embassy attack were affected by the arrests of close associates just before.

In late April, another JI member from Riau was drawn in: Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Hendrawan alias Gembrot alias Idris. He had been involved in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in Pekanbaru and was a natural choice to help, albeit in a relatively minor role: transporting the explosives yet again.

In May, two tried and trusted team members returned. Toni Togar, whose reluctance to keep the explosives set the whole plot in motion, robbed a bank in Medan on 6 May to raise funds for the project. Ismail, the Luqmanul Hakiem alumnus who had worked with Rais and Noordin in the shock absorber repair shop in Bukittinggi, got an email from Noordin asking him to pick up some packages from a man in Dumai. Ismail did so, and the packages turned out to be cash in Australian dollars, sent by Hambali via a courier.¹⁴ Ismail then got a series of instructions from

Noordin on how to bring the cash from Dumai to Lampung.¹⁵

Table 1 summarises the school ties of the operatives:

Table 1: Education of Marriott Bombers (names in bold are those most commonly used)

Noordin Moh. Top	Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998-2002
Azhari Husin	Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998-2002
Indrawarman alias Toni Togar	Ngruki, 1987-1990
Mohammed Rais	Ngruki, 1991-1995; Luqmanul Hakiem, 1996-1999, 2001-2002
Asmar Latin Sani	Ngruki, 1991-1995
Ismail alias Mohamed Ikhwan	Luqmanul Hakiem, 1991-1998
Sardona Siliwangi	Ngruki, 1993-1997; Universitas an-Nur, 2000-2002
Masrizal bin Ali Umar alias Tohir	Ngruki, 1990-1994; Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998, 2000
Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Hendrawan alias Idris	Ngruki, 1989-1993

D. THE FINAL TEAM

On 4 June 2003, in Lampung, the final team was put together: Noordin, Azhari, Ismail, Asmar Latin Sani, and Tohir. Noordin assigned the tasks. He explained that he was in charge, with Azhari as field commander and Ismail his assistant. Asmar and Tohir would rent the house, buy the vehicles and get the explosives to Jakarta. Asmar had agreed to be the martyr.

When they got to Jakarta, they split into two teams to survey four possible targets. Azhari and Ismail examined the Marriott and a Citibank branch; Noordin and Tohir looked at the Jakarta International School and the Australian International School. Eventually they decided on the hotel because of the American brand name and the fact that it was easy to reach. The bombing took place on 5 August.

¹² Interrogation deposition of Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona Bin Azwar, 28 August 2003.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ A book that appears based in part on transcripts of Hambali's interrogation says Hambali arranged for \$25,000 to be sent: \$15,000 for operational expenses, \$10,000 for Bali bomber families. Conboy, op. cit., p. 229. Hambali's younger brother, Gungun, who was arrested in Karachi in September 2003, testified Hambali had secured a promise of \$50,000 from an

Arab in Pakistan, which was sent via couriers to Thailand and on to Malaysia where some was to support families of arrested KMM members. The money that reached Indonesia may have been from the same source. See interrogation deposition of Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan alias Abdul Hadi, 20 January 2004 in case dossier of Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan alias Abdul Hadi, No. Pol BP/04/III/2004 Den Sus 88 Anti Teror.

¹⁵ Interrogation deposition of Ismail alias Muhamad Ikhwan alias Agus alias Iwan, 28 January 2004 in case dossier of Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan, op.cit.

Noordin used only JI members – in fact, a subset of JI members who were Sumatra-based alumni of either Ngruki, Luqmanul Hakiem or both. The question is whether the Marriott bombing was JI-endorsed. That members of the central command were apprised is clear: on 7 June, according to Ismail's testimony, Noordin met the secretary of the central command, Abu Dujanah (an Indonesian national who had taught at Luqmanul Hakiem), and Qotadah alias Basyir, a senior member of Mantiqi II who had been involved in the post-Bali military refresher course. (He appears to have been the only JI person involved in that program who went over to Noordin.) That evening, Noordin, Azhari and the two visitors talked in a hotel, then Ismail escorted them back to Jakarta. In late August, after the bombing, Noordin and Azhari met them again in Bandung and talked late into the evening.

Noordin and Abu Dujanah remain at large, Qotadah's whereabouts are unknown and Azhari is dead, so the substance of their conversation remains unknown. Either Noordin asked Abu Dujanah, as secretary of the central command, to get the command's endorsement for the operation, or he simply approached Abu Dujanah, as part of the Luqmanul Hakiem circle, believing he would be sympathetic to the go-it-alone approach and might be in a position to assist. His argument would almost certainly have been the one he had tried with Sardona earlier, "Our enemies will destroy us if we don't destroy them first".¹⁶

As noted, this argument was unacceptable to many JI members, who believed the Bali bombing had been a disastrous misstep. But Abu Dujanah, according to one source, gave highest priority to protecting fellow JI members and whatever he thought of the Marriott operation, he tried to mobilise the JI network to protect the perpetrators.¹⁷

III. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY BOMBING

For the embassy attack, Noordin put his team together using three networks: JI's East Java division; the informal alumni association of JI schools in and around Solo, Central Java; and an offshoot of the old Darul Islam organisation based in Banten and West Java provinces.

Once identified, one or two men from each of these networks went through their personal networks to mobilise others, relying as often on family, business, neighbourhood, professional, or school ties as on organisational affiliation, though it is sometimes difficult to make the distinction. Affiliation with JI or DI often leads to intermarriage and joint business operations among members. But these ties above and beyond the organisational structure mean the networks can be activated and loyalties invoked whether or not the organisation is functioning or an action is endorsed by a particular leader.

For this mission, the most interesting question is how the East/Central Java and West Java networks merged, and here, it seems, Ambon experience may have been key. It came down to Noordin asking a young follower in Solo in April 2004 where he could find additional operatives with a proven commitment to jihad, and the young man replying, in effect, "I know someone in Bandung who might be able to help..." That person was Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois, who took charge of the logistics and finding the suicide bomber for the 9 September 2004 operation. Before examining how Noordin established contact with Rois, it is worth looking at how the three networks functioned.

A. THE EAST JAVA NETWORK

By late 2003, in the aftermath of the Marriott bombing and the intensified police activity, Noordin and Azhari needed sanctuary. Through October, they hid in the Bandung area, but by November had made their way back to Solo, where they made contact with Usman bin Sef alias Fahim, the head of the JI *wakalah* for East Java. Fahim was wanted by the police for a range of JI-related activities and was hiding in the Solo area. But as a respected Islamic teacher (*ustadz*); as head of Darussalam Foundation, the JI front in Surabaya, East Java's capital; and as the *wakalah* leader, he could issue instructions to JI members in Surabaya and expect to be obeyed.

In November, Fahim summoned a man named Son Hadi from Surabaya to Solo. A 1991 Ngruki graduate, Son Hadi had worked alongside Fahim in the Darussalam Foundation since 1997. Fahim told him that hiding Noordin and Azhari was a good deed and instructed him to find a place for them in Surabaya.

¹⁶ Interrogation deposition of Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona bin Azwar, 28 August 2003.

¹⁷ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, March 2006. There has been much press speculation about whether Abu Dujanah has assumed the role of JI amir. Crisis Group sources say he has not. But he is one member of the central command who since 2003 has remained in a position to take decisions and, when necessary, communicate with others. Zulkarnaen was out of contact; Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abu Rusdan, Ahmad Roichan and Mustofa were under arrest; Ustadz Arif was weak. A source suggested Abu Dujanah, if left to his own devices, would probably not use JI resources for Noordin-style bombings but there is no evidence that he tried to stop his colleague.

Son Hadi returned home and contacted three friends, who knew each other through religious study but who were also likely fellow members of JI.¹⁸ On 18 November, he rented a minivan with money collected as *infaq* (contributions) from the Muslim community in Surabaya.¹⁹ He and a friend drove to Mojoagung, a town about an hour and half from Surabaya, to meet Fahim, Noordin and Azhari. All drove to a pre-arranged spot in the city, where the other two friends, one named Ismail, were waiting with motorcycles. They took Noordin and Azhari to Ismail's house, and everything was fine for about a month.

Then Ismail's father decided to visit, and Ismail said the men would have to move. Son Hadi contacted another friend, Achmad Hasan, who lived in Blitar, also in East Java. Hasan had been inducted into JI by Fahim in 1996 but he also had a commercial connection to Son Hadi: their wives ran a business making and selling Muslim headscarves (*jilbab*).²⁰

In January 2004, another operative entered the picture. Heri Sigu Samboja alias Ilyasa was a 22-year-old Ngruki graduate and religious teacher at the Darul Fitroh *pesantren* in Sukaharjo, outside Solo. His father, Khumaidi, was an Afghan veteran and friend of Fahim's.²¹ Fahim apparently contacted Khumaidi about sending his son to study with Azhari in Blitar. According to Heri's statement to police, his father came to the *pesantren* where he was teaching and offered to send him to study computers and learn how to make viruses that would wreck American data systems. Heri was not particularly interested; he preferred, he said, to go for jihad to Poso or Mindanao. His father said it was

very difficult because surveillance was tight and asked him to go instead to Solo to see about the computer study. Heri left the following day, went to a designated meeting place at the house of a religious teacher where he met another young man. The teacher then took the two of them to see Fahim.²²

"Do you know why you've come here?", Fahim asked.

"To study computers", Heri replied.

"Well, actually to study electronics", Fahim said. "Are you prepared to do this?"²³

They said they were. It must have been clear to both young men that they would be engaged in clandestine activity but they may not have known, nor did Heri's father necessarily know, what lay in store.

Heri went back to his *pesantren* and asked leave from the director, telling him, as Fahim had instructed, that he was going to Poso to teach. A few days later, his father picked him up and sent him to Blitar, giving a number to call when they arrived. The number turned out to be Hasan's, who took them from the bus terminal to his house. They were introduced to Noordin and Azhari, both using false names, and told that they were there to study bomb-making.

Heri and his fellow student embarked on a month-long, seven-hours-a-day course with Azhari in Hasan's home. A few weeks after they arrived, Fahim called Hasan and instructed him to go to the main mosque in Kediri, a city about two hours away. Fahim was waiting there with two other men – Adung, an old associate of Hambali's from Malaysia who replaced him as head of Mantiqi I and became a member of the JI central command, and Qotadah, the man who, with Abu Dujanah, met Noordin before and after the Marriott bombing.

They all drove back to Blitar, and it turned out that the visitors had come bearing gifts: 25 kilograms of potassium chlorate and ten kilos of sulphur for bomb making, as well as a pistol and ammunition. Not long afterwards, another visitor delivered about 30 kilograms of TNT.

Sometime in early February 2004, Heri and his fellow bomb-making apprentice were deemed to have completed their studies and were sent home. Adung and Qotadah

¹⁸ The three were Ustadz Anton alias Pak Lik, Ismail, and Jauhari. Anton was a fellow participant in a religious study circle at the al-Ikhsan mosque in Surabaya, where Son Hadi was a regular preacher (*khatib*) and which also appears to have been a centre of JI activities. Son Hadi told the police Ismail, who agreed to put the men up, was also a frequent participant in his study sessions, meaning he was also likely active in the JI *wakalah*. Jauhari was part of the same circle, but his exact relationship with Son Hadi is not clear.

¹⁹ Interrogation deposition of Son Hadi in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005.

²⁰ JI women appear to be important in supporting the activities of the organisation through making and selling Muslim clothing. The wife of Agus Dwikarna (a member of Laskar Jundullah, not JI) was also active in this business, selling in the southern Philippines as well as Indonesia. One factory outside Solo reportedly had difficulties when the woman who ran it, the wife of a Ngruki teacher, was accused by her employees of paying sweatshop wages.

²¹ Fahim was in the 1987 intake of Afghanistan trainees but he made a visit to Mindanao in November 1987; it is not clear when Khumaidi was in Afghanistan but they may have been there at the same time.

²² The teacher was Ustadz Hasbi. The second young man was Ilyas alias Tukiadi.

²³ Interrogation deposition of Heri Sigu Samboja alias Nery Anshori alias Mohamad al Ansori alias Mohammad Nuruddin alias Ilyasa als Akhi Shogir alias Jamaluddin alias Azmi als Ma'ruf alias Abdul Fatah, 12 November 2004, in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005.

accompanied Heri to Solo. At least at this stage, Noordin seemed still to have the backing of the members of the central command most associated with Mantiqi I.

Heri informed his father the next day that he had joined for jihad with Noordin and Dr Azhari. Under the circumstances, this was unlikely to have come as a surprise. He returned to teaching at the Darul Fitroh *pesantren* but stayed in touch with Adung.

Shortly thereafter, Hasan called Son Hadi to tell him that Noordin and Azhari would have to leave his house and take their lethal materials with them. At that point, Son Hadi called an old friend, Chandra alias Farouk, who lived in Pasuruan, East Java, and asked if he could put up two guests. Chandra and Son Hadi had known each other since 1996 when both were studying in Bangil, East Java, and had subsequently become partners in a business to collect and sell used cloth for industrial purposes – another example of *JI* business ties.²⁴

After Noordin and Azhari moved to Pasuruan, Son Hadi got a call summoning him to Solo to meet with Adung. He was told to bring the respected teacher Abu Fida, another member of *JI*'s East Java *wakalah* and the son of the director of the mosque where many *JI* activities took place. The meeting was apparently tense. Son Hadi reported that he had moved the two fugitives. This was the first Adung knew of this, and he demanded to know who Chandra was. He told Son Hadi that henceforth, he, Adung, and not Fahim, Son Hadi's superior in the *JI* structure, was responsible for safeguarding the men, and Abu Fida, not Son Hadi, would be the local man in charge. He ordered Son Hadi to give Chandra's telephone number to Abu Fida and then sent him back to Surabaya.

Abu Fida took over responsibility for the two men and in April 2004 ordered Hasan to go to Chandra's house in Pasuruan, pick up Azhari and take him back to Hasan's house in Blitar. Heri, the young religious teacher, moved in with him. Noordin, who seems to have stayed in the Surabaya area, visited him there twice in May and June.

In May, Noordin asked Hasan's help in meeting Munfiatun, a young woman who had expressed interest in marrying a *mujahid* – a warrior for Islam. She would be his second

wife; he was still married to Mohamed Rais's sister from Riau. Noordin had heard about Munfiatun through Hasan, since she was a friend and former roommate of Hasan's wife when they were university students in Malang.²⁵ Adung performed the wedding ceremony, with Hasan and Abu Fida in attendance. Abu Fida then gave Hasan a long detonating cord to take back to Azhari in Blitar.

By mid-June, Azhari had another bomb-making student, Gempur Budi Angkoro alias Jabir, a Ngruki graduate and cousin of the legendary Faturrahman al-Ghozi, the *JI* operative and Hambali associate killed in the Philippines in 2003. Jabir was one of the two killed in the April 2006 raid in Wonosobo. He stayed with Azhari until 5 July 2004 and later became an important member of Noordin's inner circle, reportedly helping recruit the Bali II suicide bombers.

The next day, Adung and Fahim were arrested in Solo. When Hasan heard, he immediately took Azhari, Heri, and all the bomb-making materials back to Pasuruan, where Chandra found them another place to stay. Jabir and Noordin joined them a few days later, and they all stayed there until they left together for Jakarta on 22 July.

B. THE *JI* SCHOOL NETWORK IN CENTRAL JAVA

The second network that came into play was the web of *JI* schools across Indonesia, with three of the most important in the Solo area: al-Mukmin in Ngruki; Darusysyahada in Boyolali; and Mahad Aly, otherwise known as Universitas an-Nur, in Solo itself. Many involved in the embassy bombing were alumni of these three schools.

Table 2: Education of Embassy Bombers

Son Hadi	Ngruki 1988-1991
Syaifuddin Umar alias Abu Fida	Lecturer, Universitas an-Nur 2000-2002
Gempur Budi Angkoro alias Jabir	Ngruki 1993-1996; Darusysyahada 1996-1998, taught 99-04
Suramto alias Muhammad Faiz alias Deni	Ngruki 1992-1995; al-Husein (Indramayu, also <i>JI</i> school) 1995-1997; an-Nur 2000-2003
Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah	al-Muttaqien (Jepara, also <i>JI</i> school) 1990-1996; an-Nur 2000-2003
Lutfi Haidaroh alias Ubeid	Ngruki 1992-1995; Darusysyahada 1995-1998; an-Nur 2000-2003

²⁴ Son Hadi told police Chandra was known as an NII (Darul Islam) activist when they were in Bangil, so he may not have been a *JI* member. Interrogation deposition of Son Hadi bin Muhadjir, 15 December 2004 in case dossier of Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. Another connection to Bangil comes up below: Joni Achmad Fauzan, a man who helped hide Noordin in early 2005 and joined him, went to school in Bangil around the same time as Chandra and Son Hadi, and was a Ngruki alumnus, so may have known Son Hadi there.

²⁵ Interrogation deposition of Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo, 9 December 2004, in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. Munfiatun had been a student at Brawijaya University in Malang.

Heri alias Umar (Ubeid's brother)	an-Nur
Heri Sigu Samboja alias al-Anshori	Ngruki 2002-2003

Urwah, Ubeid, and Deni in the above table were all classmates at an-Nur, and Abu Fida had been their teacher. In March 2004, according to Urwah, he and Ubeid were summoned from Solo to Surabaya by Abu Fida on the pretext of helping develop a concept for the construction of a new *pesantren*. They left immediately and at the designated meeting place, a house owned by Abu Fida, they found their old classmate Deni.²⁶ (Deni was a preacher for the Darussalam Foundation in Surabaya from 1997 to 2000, meaning he would have been part of the *JI wakalah* under Fahim. He was also known as Abu Dujanah's courier.²⁷) Abu Fida introduced Urwah and Ubeid to Noordin.

Sometime in April 2004, Urwah and Ubeid moved to the house in Surabaya and over the next three months engaged in long discussions with Noordin about the need to make war on *kafirs* (infidels, understood by many salafi Muslims as meaning all non-Muslims) in general, the U.S. and its allies in Indonesia in particular.²⁸ There was no need to go to Iraq or Afghanistan; the jihad could be waged at home.²⁹ Noordin stressed that for the jihad to succeed, groups had to work together, and one person he wanted to draw in was Abdullah Sunata of KOMPAK, who probably knew more experienced veterans of the Ambon and Poso conflicts than anyone else in Indonesia.³⁰

It was at this point that Noordin's ties to the *JI* institutional structure began to weaken. Once he began actively

recruiting his own people, he further alienated the leadership of the *JI* mainstream.³¹

As Noordin, Urwah and Ubeid discussed the need to find committed mujahidin, Urwah mentioned Iwan alias Rois from Bandung, a Darul Islam fighter whom he had known at least since 2002, when Rois came to Universitas an-Nur about enrolling his brother.³² Noordin apparently had met Rois earlier, in Ambon or Mindanao.³³ He ordered Urwah to reestablish contact and explore how far he would be willing to take part in a jihad. Urwah called Rois in early May, and they arranged to meet in Solo.

Two days later, at the mosque on the an-Nur campus, Urwah drew him out on his attitudes toward the U.S and its allies and their interests in Indonesia. He concluded Rois had both sufficient religious knowledge and the proper spirit for jihad that would make him a good member of the team.

Urwah returned to Surabaya and reported the conversation to Noordin, who made no comment but a week later told Urwah to meet Rois again and to deliver a letter. At the same mosque in Solo, Urwah handed over the letter; Rois read it, and sent back a response via Urwah.

We do not know the contents of the letter, but it appears to have led Rois, within weeks at the end of May, to set up a new military training camp in Gunung Peti, Cisolok, Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java, specifically designed to select suicide bombers. Most participants had undergone earlier training that Rois conducted in 2003, among them Heri Golun, who later detonated the bomb in front of the Australian embassy. Two weeks into the new training, Ubeid's younger brother, Heri alias Umar, and other men from outside West Java arrived. Deni was already there, having been sent by Urwah shortly after his meeting with Rois in Solo.³⁴ Deni and Umar – who was arrested in

²⁶ Interrogation deposition of Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah, 21 September 2004, in case dossier of Irun Hidayat, Polri Daerah Metro Jakarta dan Sekitarnya, Direktorat Reserse Kriminal Umum, 2005.

²⁷ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006.

²⁸ Interrogation deposition of Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah, op. cit.

²⁹ Interrogation deposition of Purnama Putra alias Usman alias Usamah alias Ipung alias Risqy alias Uus alias Tikus, 14 July 2005, p. 19, in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias Arnold, Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, Detasemen Khusus 88 Anti-Terror. It may not be a coincidence that around this time a pamphlet was circulating in jihadist groups that was a translation from Arabic into Indonesian of an article that first appeared in the al-Qaeda on-line magazine Sawt al-Jihad. Entitled "You Don't Need to Go to Iraq for Jihad", it was written in 2003 by a Saudi jihadist, Muhammad bin Ahmad as-Salim.

³⁰ Interrogation deposition of Purnama Putra, op. cit., p. 19. Noordin did not meet Sunata until after the embassy bombing but Sunata appears to have authorised his followers to secure materials for the bomb, including the detonating cord Abu Fida provided after Noordin's wedding. Ibid, p. 20.

³¹ The *JI* administrative manual, known as PUPJI, authorises working with other organisations but not to the point of ignoring the *JI* hierarchy.

³² All Urwah says is that he first met Iwan alias Rois in Solo in 2002, when the latter came to his dormitory at Universitas an-Nur and left his card, with the name and telephone of the Sajira courier company. Ubaid and Rois were in Mindanao doing training at the same time but in different camps and may not have met.

³³ A source said Ambon but could not remember when Noordin was there. Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006. Urwah's testimony suggests Mindanao.

³⁴ Deni says Urwah told him he was needed as a religious instructor for a month but did not give any details, only that Rois would explain when he got to Bandung. See deposition of Surampto alias Muhammad Faiz alias Deni alias Ahmad in case dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. The men who joined the training in

early 2006 for withholding information about Noordin's whereabouts – provided the religious instruction, and Rois and his wife's uncle, Saptono, led the military drills. The training focused on *fa'i* (robbing non-Muslims to raise funds for jihad), and included simulated robbing of a house. Deni said he did not know who organized or paid for the training, although Rois testified in late 2004 that the funds came from his uncle, himself, and the income from unlicensed gold mining in the area.³⁵

During the training, Ubeid and Urwah visited to see how it was going. Urwah gave Rois a mini-revolver with four 2.2 caliber bullets as a gift from Noordin.

C. THE NETWORK THUS FAR

Noordin had thus far drawn on Fahim and his East Java network, where one link, from Fahim to Son Hadi, brought in at least five and probably six people involved in hiding the two fugitives: Anton, Ismail, Jauhari, Chandra, Hasan and Deni. All except for Chandra would have known both Fahim and Son Hadi through the JI's East Java *wakalah* and the Darussalam Foundation in Surabaya, although there were other bonds, such as that between the wives of Son Hadi and Hasan. Chandra was a friend and business partner of Son Hadi's, but it is not clear whether he moved in the same jihadist circles.

The recruitment of bomb-makers appears to have been a much more personal process. Fahim appears to have used his Afghan connections to get to Heri Sigu Samboja's father and then the son. Jabir had a blue-blood jihadist lineage, but he also seems to have been recruited individually.

The friendship among three graduates of Universitas an-Nur, Urwah, Ubaid, and Deni and their loyalty to their former instructor, Abu Fida, were instrumental to setting up the most critical part of the operation, recruitment of the field operatives from West Java. This link depended on one critical tie, from Urwah and Ubaid to Rois, and we still do not know exactly where it was forged. But the personal links among the West Java operatives are the most interesting.

D. FAMILY AND BUSINESS IN WEST JAVA

When Urwah contacted Iwan alias Rois, he probably had no idea that he was tapping into a whole clan of Darul Islam members. Two families proved particularly important for the embassy bombing. One was that of

Rois's wife, Wiwit. Her father, Awal Purnomo, was born in Cianjur, the eldest of nine children. Two of his brothers, Kang Jaja alias Aqdam and Saptono, became involved in Darul Islam in the 1980s. Awal himself was inducted as a member only in 1993, at the age of 39. Kang Jaja was the most committed of the three brothers, and it was he who began military training of DI members in West Java with the help of some Afghan veterans.³⁶

In 1998, Kang Jaja founded the CV Sajira courier company as a three-man partnership between himself, his brother Awal, and a third Darul Islam fighter, Heri Hafidin, with the idea that the company would both live up to the ideals of Darul Islam and provide wherewithal for its struggle.³⁷ He personally financed training for his cadres in Mindanao and in late 1999 sent a group of nine, including his nephew, Rois, and his brother, Saptono.

Another in that batch was Rosihin Noor, who became one of the most militant of the group and the shooting instructor in Kang Jaja's military training sessions. Rosihin married into the second big family involved in the Kuningan bomb. The patriarch, Engkos Kosasih alias Pak Kamal, was a former Darul Islam fighter and commander for the Banten area in the early 1960s before Darul Islam surrendered to the Indonesian government. He had seven children, four of whom died. The three who survived all became involved in Kang Jaja's group. His son, Agus Ahmad, was inducted into Darul Islam in 1993 by one of his father's protégés and became an employee of CV Sajira in 1999. His daughter, Iis, married Rosihin, also a Sajira employee. The youngest son, Iwan Sujai, also joined DI and the Sajira company.

In addition to the players linked to the company, there were the three candidate suicide bombers, childhood friends from the same village in Cigarung, Sukabumi, whose fathers were Darul Islam members.

Irun Hidayat was also a central figure. Inducted into Darul Islam by Kang Jaja in 1987 at fifteen, he was in the same class at Serang Islamic High School as Imam Samudra and Heri Hafidin, one of the three owners of CV Sajira. He became a close friend of Rois, and the two went to Ambon in January 2002. Irun became a martial arts instructor in the military training sessions run by Kang Jaja and Rois. Since 1999, Irun also had been the local head of the religious council of the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union (Perserikatan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia, PPIM). He was to call on a fellow unionist to put up the bombers the night before they struck the embassy.

addition to Ubeid's brother were Dirman, Ade Bahru, Abu Roiroh, and Deny Nugraha.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ For a discussion of Kang Jaja's involvement in Darul Islam, see Crisis Group Report, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia*, op. cit., pp. 27-30.

³⁷ Kang Jaja had a 34 per cent share, Awal and Hafidin 33 per cent each.

E. MOBILISING THE NETWORK

As noted, when Rois was approached by Noordin through Urwah, he almost immediately set in motion a new training camp to select suicide bombers as a way of striking at what he called American and Jewish interests.

On 22 June, Urwah accompanied Rois and his uncle, Saptono, to Surabaya where Rois met with Noordin. Noordin asked about the readiness of the suicide bombers, and Rois said three candidates had been selected. Noordin said they would have to be “ripened” through additional religious instruction, and designated a teacher, Baharudin Soleh, for the job. Soleh, who used the alias Abdul Hadi, may have been used to “ripen” the suicide bombers in Bali II as well. He was killed in the April 2006 police raid. He and Jabir – the other man killed in that raid – were classmates at Ngruki in 1993-1994.

On 25 June, Abdul Hadi accompanied Rois back to Bandung. An immediate objective was to find a *pesantren* where the three would-be martyrs could get additional religious instruction under trusted teachers. In a plan apparently orchestrated by Noordin, the *pesantren* would have to take in not only Abdul Hadi and Ubeid's younger brother as unpaid teachers, but also the three candidate martyrs – Apuy alias Epul, Didi alias Rijal, and Heri Golun – as students. Rois asked Irun Hidayat if he knew a likely one. Irun suggested Miftahul Huda in Cikampek, the *pesantren* director agreed, and instruction began on 3 July.³⁸

Whatever the plans had been, they were disrupted by the arrests of Fahim, Adung and others three days later. On 15 July Urwah came to Bandung and told Rois that Noordin and Azhari's whereabouts were now known and they needed his help to find a new place. Rois went to Surabaya the next day to consult with Noordin, and the new priority came to be finding a place for the Malaysians and their followers in the Jakarta area. On 22 July, Noordin, Azhari and entourage, including Hasan from East Java and Heri Sigu Samboja, the young bomb-making apprentice, arrived in the capital, with all the explosive materials.

Rois got Agus Ahmad to put up the group at his house in Cianjur for a few nights. While they were there, word came through that Urwah and Ubeid had been arrested in Solo on 26 July. Noordin ordered his group to move again, putting Rois in charge of the escape. Rois drove Noordin and Azhari to the main mosque in Banten and left them there while he went to see a fellow member of

the Ring Banten group, Pujata, who had been arrested and detained briefly in November 2002 for helping dispose of leftover explosives from the Bali bombs. Pujata was understandably reluctant to get involved again when asked to help find a place for the fugitives, so Rois went to see another member of the Banten group, Fathurrochman alias Rochman. He had been detained with Pujata in the same case but agreed to help. As it happened, Rosihin Noor was at Rochman's house when Rois came by, and Rois told him to see that the explosives were moved and that the group at Pesantren Miftahul Huda left immediately.

Rochman found a house in the Anyer area of Banten, and from then on, Noordin and Azhari moved constantly, rarely staying more than four nights in the same place.

On 5 August, at Noordin's instructions, Rois set off to retrieve Heri Golun, who had been selected as the suicide bomber, and buy the Daihatsu vehicle that was used in the bombing. He enlisted the help of Irun Hidayat in both tasks. From then until 17 August, frantic activity – moving the principals, purchasing additional materials for the bombs and raising funds – alternated with lulls, when the operatives went to Internet cafes to pass the time.

On 17 August, Noordin asked Rois to check on Heri Golun's state of mind. When Heri said he was ready, he moved into the house where Noordin and Azhari were and slept in their room at night, so they could give him additional religious counselling.

On 23 August, Rois started to teach Heri Golun how to drive, and on 9 September, the new driver blew himself up in front of the Australian embassy.

F. THE CONNECTION TO CONFLICT AREAS

As noted above, how Urwah and Ubeid, the JI operatives in Solo, knew Iwan alias Rois and that he likely would be able to produce the suicide bombers Noordin sought is an unanswered question. There were already well-established links between JI and the Banten group before Rois came into the picture:

- ❑ Kang Jaja and others in the group had been active in Darul Islam before a faction split off and formed Jemaah Islamiyah, so many leaders would have known each other;
- ❑ Imam Samudra was reportedly a member of both the Banten group and JI, and maintained ties with his old classmate Heri Hafidin, a leading *ustadz* in the Banten group and part owner of CV Sajira;
- ❑ several Banten members were Ngruki alumni, including Abdul Rauf and Andri Octavia, two of those arrested in connection with a robbery to raise funds for the Bali bombing; and

³⁸ Deposition of Iwan Dharmawan Mutho alias Rois alias Fajar alias Abdul Fatah alias Dharma alias Yadi alias Muhammad Taufik alias Rdho alias Hendi in case dossier of Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005.

- ❑ Iqbal, the Bali suicide bomber, was a Banten, not a JI member, and left a will saying he hoped his martyrdom would help inspire others to restore the glory of the Indonesian Islamic State as founded by Kartosoewirjo.

But why did Urwah single out Rois by name when Noordin asked him about committed mujahidin? Rois's military record provides some initial answers.

In mid-1999, Rois became head of the Pandeglang, Banten battalion for Region IX of Darul Islam. From sometime in 1999 to February 2000, he trained in Mindanao as one of nine Darul Islam members from the Banten area funded by Kang Jaja. From August to September 2001, in preparation for going to "either Ambon or Poso" (his phrase, suggesting they were of equal importance for jihad), he and Kang Jaja initiated a training course for twelve members of the Banten group, to which they invited a JI-Malaysian as an instructor. The police broke up the course and arrested most of the participants but detained them only briefly. He held another training course, late 2001 to early 2002, in the hills of Ujung Kulon, West Java. In late January-early February, he went to Ambon for two weeks with Irun Hidayat to visit Banten members who had been inserted into Laskar Jihad forces there. From June 2002 until February 2003, he was in Poso.

Eight months in a conflict setting would have been ample time for Rois to demonstrate his leadership capacity, training skills and commitment to jihad. His name would have been known in JI circles. Equally, JI's reputation in Poso as having the cadres most steeped in religious knowledge would likely have impressed Rois; it may have been the desire to deepen his religious knowledge that led him to want to enrol his brother in Universitas an-Nur. But the meeting must have made a mutual impression, because it was Rois, the individual fighter, rather than Ring Banten, his organisation, that Urwah suggested for the job.

IV. NOORDIN REACHES OUT TO KOMPAK AND DARUL ISLAM

There is little indication that Noordin's band of diehard followers had any particular structure at this stage. All those closest to him – Ubeid, Jabir, Abdul Hadi and Azhari – were JI members, and he continued to draw heavily on JI networks. But it was clear that resources were dwindling. As noted, since as early as April 2004, Noordin had been trying to get KOMPAK leader Abdullah Sunata and DI leader Akram to join him for good reasons:

- ❑ both were known as strong, charismatic leaders and salafi Muslims;
- ❑ neither was JI but they had significant numbers of militarily-trained followers, almost all veterans of Ambon, Poso, or both;
- ❑ they had routes to the Philippines and training camps in Mindanao that were independent of JI and were actively engaged in finding new recruits;
- ❑ they had access to weapons and supplies, from the conflict areas and Mindanao; and
- ❑ at least Sunata seemed to have access to funds.

It was clear that if Noordin could draw in either or both, but particularly Sunata, his forces would be considerably strengthened. The problem was that neither had shown any interest in al-Qaeda-style bombing operations. (Sunata's supply of materials to Noordin seems to have been due to pride in being able to meet the request and showing his superiority as much as anything else.)

Sunata's focus remained the conflict areas. He went to Ambon in 1999, ran the KOMPAK office there at the height of the conflict in 2000-2001, then moved back and forth between Poso and Ambon, recruiting and training new groups of young men to fight in both places. In April 2004, as Noordin was looking for men and material, Sunata was watching Ambon erupt in violence and trying to figure out how to exploit it.³⁹ He reportedly believed the jihads in Ambon and Poso were unfinished, that the *kafirs* there were permanent enemies who if not attacked

³⁹ He arranged to have weapons sent from Umar Patek in the Philippines to a trusted colleague in Ambon and for a military training course, mostly for KOMPAK members, in the hills of West Ceram a few months later, apparently in expectation of ongoing repercussions from the April violence. See interrogation of Abdullah Sunata alias Arman alias Andri, 12 July 2005, p. 8 in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit. For background to the April violence in Ambon, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°32, *Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon*, 17 May 2004.

first, would threaten Muslim lives.⁴⁰ By 2004, after five years of fighting, he may have seen the job of training men for the conflict areas as permanent, and if the conflicts were waning, it was his interest to stir them up. Because of his Ambon role, he had good relations with virtually every jihadist group in Indonesia and seems to have relished the degree to which all sought his help but there was no reason to believe he had any interest in joining Noordin's very different kind of war.

Akram is more of an enigma. An Afghan veteran from the same class as Mukhlas (1985), his real name is Muhammad Taufiqurrahman. From Temanggung, Central Java, he was known by fellow Afghan alumni as Shamsuddin. He lived in Sabah for a few years before going to Mindanao in 1987 to set up training for Darul Islam, five years before JI did so – although Fahim, later to become the JI East Java leader, accompanied him on the visit. His elder brother, Abdul Malik, a tobacco entrepreneur, was also deeply involved in sending DI recruits to the Philippines, and both married Filipinas (Akram's wife is an ethnic Tausug). When JI split from Darul Islam in 1993, Akram stayed neutral and eventually allied himself with another DI leader, Aceng Kurnia.

Both Akram's men and his Sabah and Mindanao connections would have attracted Noordin's interest – Tawao, the seedy Sabah port and an Akram stronghold, was a standard transit stop on a route from Indonesia to the Philippines. But like Sunata, Akram had never exhibited any interest in attacking Westerners. If Sunata was more interested in local jihads, Akram, given his background, was almost certainly focused on acquiring the military capacity to build an Islamic state in Indonesia.

A. THE GO-BETWEENS

Each of the three men, Noordin, Sunata and Akram, used subordinates to liaise with the others. Ubeid did this for Noordin until his arrest in late July 2004, about six weeks before the embassy bombing. It is not clear who, if anyone, took his place during the critical period immediately before and after the bombing.

In early October 2004, however, Noordin took on a 29-year-old Ambon veteran, Ali Zein for the job. From his perspective, it was the perfect choice. Ali Zein was a JI member based in Solo with contacts to KOMPAK from his Ambon days. He often visited the Islamic Centre in Solo that was the nerve centre for KOMPAK activities in the conflict areas. He was a friend of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's son, Abdul Rohim, and had impeccable family credentials: he was the younger brother of Fathurrahman al-Ghozi,

and his cousin, Jabir, was already in Noordin's group. When they met for the first time in Pekalongan, Central Java in October 2004, the first task Noordin gave him was to lobby Abdullah Sunata for a revolver.⁴¹

Abdullah Sunata's go-between with JI was Purnama Putra alias Usman, 23, a Solo native who joined KOMPAK and went to Ambon in 2000. Usman was so small and unwarrior-like that one of his many nicknames was Tikus (Mouse), but he knew everyone. He joined KOMPAK at the age of eighteen on the invitation of another friend, Hari Kuncoro, who later married the sister of the JI Bali bomber, Dulmatin. Usman helped produce the KOMPAK magazine *al-Bayan* and some of its many video CDs.

Akram's go-between with Abdullah Sunata was a 32-year old Bandung native, Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias Arnold. He was an original member of the Abu Bakar Battalion and AMIN, the young, disaffected militants who in 1999 broke away from the West Java-Jakarta command of DI out of frustration with their elders' reluctance to wage a jihad in Ambon.⁴² Akram arranged training for Arham in Mindanao. After ten weeks there in 1999, Arham returned to Indonesia and went almost immediately to Ambon.

The go-betweens – Ali Zein, Usman, and Arham – all knew Sunata from Ambon, while Ali Zein and Usman knew each other slightly from the Islamic Centre in Solo and had several friends in common, especially because the JI-KOMPAK bond was long established.⁴³ Arham met Usman through Abdullah Sunata in 2003. Arham and Ali Zein never met but Noordin knew of Arham through many other KOMPAK and JI contacts. Although Darul Islam, KOMPAK, mainstream JI, and Noordin had different goals, they intersected and overlapped through the personal networks of their members.

B. THE PHILIPPINES CONNECTION

The ties of the above organisations to the Bali bombers, Dulmatin and Umar Patek, are an example of the intersection. Several months after the 2002 Bali blasts, the two fugitive JI members came to Jakarta and asked Abdullah Sunata as the former KOMPAK-Ambon head, if he could help contact Ambon veterans known as the

⁴⁰ Crisis Group interview, March 2006.

⁴¹ Interrogation deposition of Ahmad Rofiq Ridho alias Ali Zein alias Allen alias Abu Husna alias Fuad Baraja, 13 July 2005 in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit.

⁴² See Crisis Group Report, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia*, op. cit., for discussion of AMIN.

⁴³ For a description of how that link emerged, see Crisis Group Report, *Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, op. cit. The director of the KOMPAK office in Solo and the Islamic Centre that housed it was Aris Munandar, a JI member.

STAIN group.⁴⁴ Most of that group belonged to Darul Islam but Dulmatin and Patek knew they were also Mindanao alumni, and they wanted to get to the Philippines. The normal JI route to Mindanao through North Sulawesi was apparently too dangerous immediately after Bali I; Nasir Abas, head of JI's Mantiqi III, who normally arranged travel for JI recruits through eastern Malaysia to Zamboanga, was hiding in Poso. Dulmatin and Umar Patek hoped to use the only route left, the DI-controlled channel through East Kalimantan into Tawao in Sabah, Malaysia and across to Mindanao. Sunata agreed to help and found a place for his unexpected visitors to rent.⁴⁵

Ahmed Said Maulana of the STAIN group was a frequent visitor to his house, so Sunata called him, only to find that he was one of the few members without Mindanao experience.⁴⁶ Then Umar Patek remembered another STAIN member, Arham, Akram's go-between, whom he probably met in Mindanao in 1999.⁴⁷ Abdullah Sunata knew Arham well from Ambon and that he and his wife lived in Lampung. After a few calls to learn the address, a Sunata adjutant and Umar Patek left for Lampung to see if Arham could help get him to the Philippines and simultaneously open a new training site for Indonesians. Arham agreed, and by the end of March 2003, had succeeded in getting Dulmatin and Umar Patek and their families to the Philippines.

The consequences were significant:

- ❑ Abdullah Sunata realised that through Arham's contacts, he could send KOMPAK recruits to train with Dulmatin and Umar Patek, both Afghan alumni with extensive experience. The fact that they had been involved in bombing operations of the kind Sunata rejected did not matter; they were still expert trainers. He began, therefore, to send small groups of three or four, and he himself went

in July 2003 for a month at Umar Patek's invitation, with a KOMPAK associate, Muhammed Faiz.

- ❑ Dulmatin and Umar Patek set themselves up completely outside the JI network in the Philippines. They settled in Pawas, outside Cotabato, where DI trained, not in Jabal Quba, where the JI training camp was, and they had almost nothing to do with Wakalah Hudaibiyah, the JI administrative subdivision in Mindanao. They did join with at least two others linked to Mantiqi I, Marwan, a Malaysian, and Darwin, who had fled to Mindanao two years earlier.⁴⁸ They were later joined by Hari Kuncoro, Dulmatin's brother-in-law.
- ❑ Because Noordin was also part of Mantiqi I, he saw Umar Patek and Dulmatin as natural allies.

The result was that the presence of the two fugitives in the Philippines strengthened the triangular relationship between KOMPAK, Akram's faction of Darul Islam, and Noordin, although the first two had serious differences with the third. It also probably strengthened Noordin's desire to get Akram and Sunata on board.

C. THE MALUKU CONNECTION

The final piece that strengthened bonds among the actors leading up to Bali II was the Maluku connection. As a prelude to looking at how all these bonds were activated across organisational lines, we can examine three activities: the first military training course run by KOMPAK on Buru island, Maluku in 1999; the KOMPAK office in Ambon in 2000-2001; and a 2004 training course in West Ceram. These help explain how lasting personal networks are formed but also suggest that once one network member is tapped for an operation, it may become easier to get others.

1. Training in Waimurat, Buru, October 1999

Buru is known primarily as the island that served as the penal colony for suspected members of the Indonesian Communist Party during the first half of Soeharto's tenure. But in October 1999, Aris Munandar of KOMPAK's Solo office organised and financed a military training course near Waimurat for some 30 people, including many recruits from Java. At least four JI leaders were instructors: Zulkarnaen, JI's chief of military operations; Umar Wayan alias Abdul Ghoni and Ali Imron, both to play important roles in the first Bali bombing; and Muchtar

⁴⁴ STAIN is an acronym for State Islamic Institute (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri). The STAIN group rented a house near this institute in Batu Merah, Ambon, at the height of the conflict. Most eventually returned to Java.

⁴⁵ Interrogation deposition of Abdullah Sunata, 12 July 2005, in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit. At the time, Sunata says, they were using funds from the sale of Dulmatin's relative's car.

⁴⁶ Ibid. Crisis Group wrongly stated in the report *Recycling Militants in Indonesia*, op. cit., that Maulana accompanied Dulmatin and Umar Patek to Mindanao. He was asked but did not go at the time. He went to Mindanao later in 2003 with Sunata.

⁴⁷ Sunata asserts that Umar Patek and Arham knew each other in Mindanao in 1999; Arham says he saw Patek for the first time when he showed up at his house in March 2003 and that Patek asked his help not in getting out of Indonesia but in opening a new training facility in Mindanao.

⁴⁸ Marwan alias Zulkifli bin Hir is the elder brother of Dani alias Taufik, arrested in connection with the Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta of September 2001. He is said to be a KMM founder. Asep alias Darwin is an Indonesian JI member.

alias Ilyas. All were Afghan veterans. KOMPAK, JI, and Darul Islam sent young men for training.

The Darul Islam group included a West Java man, Hilman, reportedly close to Akram; and two men known as Umar and Ali. The KOMPAK trainees included Abdullah Sunata; Asep Jaja alias Dahlan, sentenced to life imprisonment for the May 2005 attack on paramilitary police in Ceram; Salman alias Apud, arrested in Malaysia in September 2003 returning from training in Mindanao; Mohamed Saifuddin alais Faiz, who later helped produce the Sunata-Noordin meeting and was arrested in December 2004 in Mindanao; Hari Kuncoro; Dani Chandra, arrested in mid-2005 for helping hide Noordin; and several others.

2. The KOMPAK office, Ambon 2000-2001

All these and many more maintained contact with each other throughout the Ambon fighting, with the KOMPAK office in the area known as Waihong serving as the nerve centre. Sunata became head of the office in 2000 and was responsible for distributing food and funds to mujahidin and displaced Muslims; in 2004 Asep Jaja, a Buru trainee and high school classmate of Sunata's, took on the same role informally.⁴⁹

In his role as chief quartermaster for the mujahidin at the height of the conflict, Sunata came to know virtually everyone in JI and DI and many of the local recruited Muslims as well. There were three centres in Ambon at the time:

- ❑ The KOMPAK office in Waihong. Sunata frequently returned to Java, bringing new recruits back each time.
- ❑ The JI house in Air Kuning. A Bali bomber, Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarak, was based there. Ali Zein, later Noordin's go-between, arrived in May 2001. He first met Sunata during a second tour in 2002 and Asep Jaja during a 2003 stint.
- ❑ The Darul Islam house near the STAIN complex in Kebon Cengkeh, Batu Merah. The DI contingents in Ambon included people sent by a DI elder, Gaos Taufik; men from the more militant Abu Bakar Battalion (AMIN); and those loyal to Ajengan Masduki. It may have been here that Akram, who fell in the last category, developed a stronger following. One who arrived in June 2000 for his first "tour of duty" was Enceng Kurnia alias Arham, later Akram's courier.

The ethic of mutual assistance forged among these groups in Ambon later had direct practical results. In 2004, when Sunata (KOMPAK) in Jakarta wanted to get a weapon to Asep (KOMPAK) in Ambon, after violence erupted there in April, he contacted Umar Patek (JI) in the Philippines, and got Ali Zein (JI) to collect it from Manado, North Sulawesi.⁵⁰

3. Training in West Ceram, July 2004

Perhaps because he was so bound to Ambon, Sunata believed the jihad there was not finished. After violence broke out there again in April 2004, he resolved to prepare more mujahidin to continue it. He organised and financed a training course in the hills outside Olas, West Ceram – a site used before for KOMPAK-JI training. Many instructors were familiar, including at least two alumni of the 1999 Buru training, Asep Jaja and Moh Faiz. Two of the go-betweens, Usman the Mouse from KOMPAK and Arham from Darul Islam, were present. Sunata also brought three people from an organisation he had worked with in Poso, and a Darul Islam man, Harun, whom he knew from Ambon and Poso (and who had worked with Ring Banten in West Java). A few locals and "leftover mujahidin" – men who came to Ambon to fight but stayed on – rounded out the training team. Sunata sent about twenty recruits.

Three features of this training are worth noting: they used posters of then Indonesian presidential candidate Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his running mate Jusuf Kalla as target practice; their funding, whatever its source, was inadequate to cover the planned two weeks; and many of the instructors took part in the attack on the police post in the same village in May 2005. But for this report, the most important aspect of the training is how it emerged out of bonds created more than five years before when the first Buru camp was set up.

D. NOORDIN'S EFFORTS TO BUILD ALLIANCES

All the strands came together in Noordin Mohammed Top's efforts to get Sunata and Akram on board.

In April 2004, Usman the Mouse went to Surabaya in connection with a small trading business he had with Asep Jaja's in-laws.⁵¹ He called Abu Fida – the instructor at Universitas an-Nur, East Java JI member, and mentor

⁴⁹ Sometime in 2003, after the Bali I bombings, the KOMPAK offices in Ambon, East Kalimantan (Samarinda) and South Sulawesi closed, leaving only the offices in Jakarta and Solo still functioning.

⁵⁰ Interrogation deposition of Ahmad Rofiq Ridho alias Ali Zein in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op.cit.

⁵¹ Asep Jaja married a woman from al-Islam *pesantren* in Lamongan, the school associated with the three brothers involved in the Bali bombs, Mukhlis, Ali Imron, and Amrozi.

of several of Noordin's young Central Java followers – for a place to stay. Abu Fida put him up but the next day invited him to meet a guest – Noordin – who asked him to be his bridge to Sunata and to tell Sunata that he needed TNT, a detonating cord and Rp 500,000 to find possible suicide bombers. Usman relayed the request to Sunata by email.

A few weeks later Usman went back to Surabaya and told Noordin that he and Sunata were willing to look for the material. Noordin, however, also wanted aluminium powder and more weaponry from the Philippines, including M-16s and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs). Usman again relayed this to Sunata by email.

In the meantime, he surveyed his KOMPAK friends for explosives and eventually secured ten kg of TNT left over from Ambon from his former high school classmate, Hari Kuncoro, Dulmatin's brother-in-law. Usman stored this at the room he was renting in Solo, and Ubeid, Noordin's then-adjutant, picked it up at the KOMPAK-Solo office.

In June, Hari Kuncoro secured the detonating cord and gave it to Iqbal Huseini, a Sunata man, for Usman. Just before Usman left for the military training in West Ceram, he gave the cord to Ubeid in Surabaya, at a mosque near Airlangga University. The police arrested Ubeid and several others in late July 2004, and Noordin was minus a chief assistant.

Plans for the Kuningan bombing went ahead nonetheless, and afterwards the immediate need was for place to hide. In early October Ali Zein was called by a friend in Solo, Iwan, asking him to look for a place to rent in Pekalongan, a town on the north coast of central Java famed for batik.

The choice of Pekalongan would have been linked directly or indirectly to Said Sungkar, a key figure for anyone involved in jihadist activities in the area. Contrary to many assertions, he was not and reportedly had never been a JI member, despite family ties to its founder, Abdullah Sungkar. He reportedly had been a major contributor to activities in Maluku. Ali Zein used Sungkar's contacts to collect donations in Pekalongan for the Ambon jihad, including from two men who were instrumental in hiding Noordin in late 2004, Imam Bukhori and Ustadz Fathurrahman, both members of the Pekalongan branch of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). The connection to FPI, more known for attacks on brothels, casinos, karaoke bars and the like – than for terrorism, is probably less significant than that the men were part of a hardline *pengajian* (religious study circle) in Pekalongan that Noordin could rely on. It also included Abdul Aziz, a high school computer teacher later found to be the

webmaster of a site set up for Noordin and his followers, www.anshar.net.⁵²

Upon the request to find a place in Pekalongan, Ali Zein called Imam Bukhori, asking if a friend could stay at his house. Bukhori agreed, and Ali Zein relayed the message. Three days later, Ali Zein was called to a meeting at Bukhori's house and found his cousin, Jabir, Iwan, and two other men, Zuber and Aiman – better known as Azhari and Noordin.

A week later Ali Zein told Usman the Mouse at the KOMPAK-Solo office he had replaced Ubeid as Noordin's assistant. He asked Usman to lobby Sunata to get an automatic pistol for Noordin, who had only an old revolver. Coincidentally, when Usman contacted Sunata, the go-between from Darul Islam, Arham, had just returned from Ambon with a Baretta. Shortly thereafter Arham went to Solo and gave a small carton in a plastic bag to Usman. Usman gave it to Ali Zein, who gave it to Noordin. The contents were the Baretta and 35 bullets.

Ali Zein and Usman met to try to arrange a meeting between Noordin and Abdullah Sunata in Pekalongan, at the home of another FPI member

1. Approaching Sunata and Akram

At the beginning of Ramadan, mid-October 2004, Usman, Sunata, Ali Zein and Noordin gathered in Pekalongan.⁵³ Sunata and Noordin went off in a room together. According to Sunata, they discussed their similar perceptions about jihad as a pillar of the faith, and Noordin explained his plans for further bombings, asking Sunata to work with him.⁵⁴ Sunata said he had to discuss it with others. The next day, Usman and Sunata returned to Solo.

Not long afterward, Noordin, Ali Zein, Usman, and Faiz, the veteran from KOMPAK of the 1999 Buru training, met in Pekalongan to discuss a program of cooperation. Noordin told Faiz to lobby Akram, Arham's boss, and Usman to lobby Sunata. He gave Usman a slip of paper with an email address and password, told him to memorise them, then to open the email once he was in a different city. He then took the slip of paper back.

⁵² One question is whether the group described as a *pengajian* was in fact an organisational cell, since JI members under questioning occasionally have used the idea of a religious study group to divert attention from more formal structural ties. But in this case it may well have been more of an ad hoc group, because it is hard to imagine any organisation that could embrace Said Sungkar, FPI and militant JI members at the same time.

⁵³ The material in this section is taken from interrogations of Usman, Ali Zein and Abdullah Sunata included in the case dossier of Enceng Kurnia. op. cit.

⁵⁴ Sunata testimony in *ibid*.

In the next few days, Faiz apparently met Akram in Yogyakarta. When he and Usman then went back to Pekalongan, he told Noordin that Akram did not want to be involved; his priority was getting his own organisation in order. Noordin had suggested that all three organisations – his, DI, and KOMPAK – conduct a bomb-making training, but Akram said no one from DI could take part. Usman delivered a message from Sunata that he was ready to send people but needed to know when and for how long. The next day, Faiz and Usman returned to Solo. The training never took place.

2. Moving to Semarang and Solo

Noordin by this time was getting nervous about staying in Pekalongan and ordered Ali Zein to look for a new place in Semarang, Central Java. Ali Zein telephoned a friend from the KOMPAK-Solo office, who said Noordin could use his parents' house in nearby Ungaran. Then Ali Zein, Noordin, Azhari and Jabir drove to Semarang, together with Iwan. Noordin and Azhari split up a few days later because Noordin was convinced there were spies around.

At this stage, Usman called Ustadz Zaenal at Pesantren Isykarima in Tawangmangu, Solo, which had been founded in 2000, apparently as a Ngruki satellite. Zaenal said the group could use a room at the school reserved for patients affected by *djinn* (evil spirits), so Ali Zein, Faiz, Noordin and Usman moved in. They told Zaenal that they would take care of all food; Noordin was continuing to supply expenses.

For the first two days, Faiz and Usman stayed with Noordin so Ali Zein could run an errand. When he returned, the first two returned to Solo, where they were editing a video CD of the training in West Ceram that they hoped to use for fund-raising. They returned after another two days when Ali Zein had to run another errand for Noordin. The end of Ramadan was approaching, so Usman, Faiz, and Noordin mostly sat in their rooms reading the Koran. When Ali Zein returned, Usman and Faiz asked Noordin's permission to continue editing the video.

At this point, Abdullah Sunata told Usman and Faiz – both KOMPAK people who should have been reporting to him – to break off contact with Noordin, so they turned off their mobile phones and never returned to the *pesantren*. About a week after Ramadan ended (16 November), Usman and Faiz left for Jakarta to give the finished video to Sunata. Shortly later, Faiz left for the Philippines, with the aid of the Darul Islam go-between, Arham, but was arrested on arrival in Zamboanga in December 2004.

In early January 2005, Usman the Mouse, back in Solo, was asked by Ali Zein to meet Noordin again, this time in

nearby Kartosuro where he was holed up in a furniture factory, worried too many people were around. Ali Zein needed Usman's help to find him a new place to stay and suggested Usman ask a KOMPAK friend, Joko Harun. Throughout Usman's meetings with Ali Zein and Noordin, he had either borrowed Joko's motorcycle or asked for a lift, so Ali Zein had come to know Joko in the process.⁵⁵ Joko agreed, and Noordin moved to Joko's house in Solo.

That evening, Usman met Noordin in Joko's house, and Noordin asked him to look for people who could carry out *fa'i* (robbing of non-Muslims in the interests of jihad) – an indication that Noordin was running low on funds. Usman told him the "Poso kids" were usually up for that sort of thing but he had to get permission from Sunata to contact them.

The Poso reference is important. Until then, Noordin's post-Marriott network had been centred exclusively in Java. JI unquestionably still had people in Poso but those around Noordin in early 2005 who had contacts there were from KOMPAK, like Usman. The seeds of the idea to bring in the KOMPAK-linked Poso mujahidin rather than just Java-based Poso veterans may have originated then.

3. Sunata refuses

At the same meeting in Joko's house, Usman mentioned to Noordin that Sunata was in town. The next day, through messages passed by Usman, Noordin and Sunata met again, and Sunata refused Noordin's original request to join forces. That night, according to Usman, Sunata got angry at him for continuing communications with Noordin, in violation of his earlier instructions.⁵⁶

The next day, after Joko went to work, Usman met Noordin again. Noordin began by talking about why he contacted Sunata, the need to manage operations, allocate money and train personnel. Usman told him that Sunata had ordered him to break off contact from the time that he, Faiz and Noordin were last together, but that he and Faiz had not known how to tell him – and he asked permission to leave

⁵⁵ Usman and Joko knew each other from the KOMPAK-Solo office; both were friends with Hari Kuncoro, and Joko spent four months with the latter in Ambon in 2002.

⁵⁶ Interrogation of Purnama Putra, op. cit.

V. THE LEAD-UP TO BALI II

From this point, the documentary record of Noordin's movements begins to peter out. We will not have a full account until the men arrested after the second Bali bombs testify (several are on trial).

We know Noordin stayed a week in Joko Harun's house in Solo in January 2005. Azhari appears to have been in Solo then, in the Laweyan area. Sometime in February, Noordin made his way to Pacet, Mojokerto, East Java,⁵⁷ where another Ngruki alumnus, Joni Ahmad Fauzan, a classmate of Ali Zein's, put him up.

While there, Noordin ordered Joko, Joni and Ali Zein to survey possible bomb or kidnap targets in East Java, including: the Christian University of Malang; Americans at an electrical plant, PLTU Paiton near Banyuwangi; a synagogue in Surabaya; the owner of a mushroom processing company suspected of being Chinese or Korean (he was a Chinese Christian from Manado); consulates in Surabaya; and the Novotel hotel in Surabaya, whose manager was suspected of being Australian.⁵⁸

Because of the need to keep moving and stay one step ahead of the police, Noordin was not able to go beyond the initial surveillance and he seems to have moved back to Indramayu, in West Java, where he and Azhari rejoined forces. They appear to have been in West Java for several months before returning to Central Java.

It may have been during their stay in West Java that recruitment of the Bali II suicide bombers began, through the efforts of Jabir, the al-Ghozi cousin who was instrumental from the beginning in helping Noordin evade arrest. Just as Ubeid helped bring in Rois of the Banten group for the embassy bombing, Jabir seems to have been responsible for recruiting the man who blew himself up at Café Nyoman in Jimbaran, Bali on 1 October 2005. Jabir, as noted, had graduated from and taught at the Darusysyahada *pesantren* in Boyolali, outside Solo, a JI school. One of his students in 1999-2000 was Salik Firdaus, from Cikijing, Majalengka, West Java. Salik was in teacher training, a program that in schools like Darusyahadah is often a direct line to JI induction, but he did not finish.⁵⁹ Police believe Jabir recruited him, and

Salik then brought in the other two suicide bombers.⁶⁰ Salik has the classic JI recruit educational pedigree: he not only attended Darusysyahada, but also taught at another JI school, al-Mutaqien in Indramayu – where one of those arrested in the 29 April raid was also a teacher.⁶¹

Another Darul Islam man who appears to have come into the network before May 2005 is Agus Puryanto alias Arman. Born in Ngawi, he studied at STAIN in Solo. He was an avid supporter of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, reportedly taking part in demonstrations in support of the detained JI leader in Solo and Jakarta.⁶² In June, he rented a house on the outskirts of the city, in Kartosura, Sukoharjo, that he shared with another person, almost certainly Azhari, then suddenly left in August before the lease had run out. Arman blew himself up when he and Azhari were surrounded by police in Malang, East Java in November 2005.

In May, Cholily, a university student from Malang, reportedly met Noordin and Azhari for the first time, apparently in Solo. Police said he had been a JI member since 1999.⁶³ A press report suggests Cholily was recruited by Ahmad Basyir, a Surabaya-based KOMPAK member arrested in March 2006, but this is not verified.⁶⁴ Police, however, said Cholily became Azhari's apprentice after attending a course in Solo with Noordin, Arman – the DI man above – and Basyir.⁶⁵ This may have been the

Darusysyahadah di Boyolali", Antara, 1 November 2005; "Pamit ke Batam, Terus Menghilang", Suara Merdeka, 11 November 2005.

⁶⁰ "Keluarga Akui Foto Salik", Pikiran Rakyat, 11 November 2005.

⁶¹ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, February 2006. The man arrested is Solahudin, who comes from a JI family: his brothers, Farihin alias Ibnu, Abdul Jabar, and Mohamed Islam have all served time in prison for jihadist activity. Abdul Jabar was involved in the 2000 bombing in Jakarta of the Philippines ambassador's residence and is serving a twenty-year sentence. Solahudin himself is suspected of involvement in the bombings of the Atrium shopping mall and several churches in Jakarta in 2001.

⁶² "Arman alias Agus Puryanto Pernah ajak Teman Kuliah Jihad ke Ambon", detik.com, 21 November 2005.

⁶³ "Cholily Terus Diperiksa", Kompas, 23 November 2005. If the report of his JI involvement is true, he would be one of the few who joined JI from a Nahdatul Ulama background. He was a student at Universitas Negeri Malang, formerly the teacher training institute IKIP Malang, one of Indonesia's top tertiary schools.

⁶⁴ ABC newsonline, 7 March 2006. For police claims that Basyir was a KOMPAK member, see Eddy Chua, "Fugitive Noordin gives Indon cops the slip again", The Star (Malaysia), 13 March 2006.

⁶⁵ "Berkas Kasus Bom Bali II Dilimpahkan ke Kejaksaan", tempo.interaktif.com, 24 February 2006.

⁵⁷ Testimony of Joko Triharmanto alias Harun alias Jek in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit.

⁵⁸ Indictment of Ahmad Rafiq Ridho alias Ali Zein alias Allen alias Jamal alias Saiful, No.Reg Perk: PDM2618/JKTSL/12/2005, 15 December 2005.

⁵⁹ The program is known as Kuliyyatul Mu'alimin al-Islamiyah (KMI), and is usually followed by a year of practice teaching at a like-minded institution. See "Salik Firdaus Jebolan Ponpes

bomb-making tutorial Noordin had been trying to arrange when he asked Akram and Sunata to take part.

In June or July 2005, Noordin and Azhari returned to Pekalongan. Abdul Aziz, the computer teacher there, told police he was called by Abdul Hadi, the man responsible for “ripening” the Australian embassy bomber, asking him to look for a house for Noordin to rent sometime in July. Noordin told Abdul Aziz to use the house to develop the website, but to work with Misno, who became a Bali II bomber.

From July to September, Abdul Aziz worked to develop the site on his computer in the al-Irsyad high school, Pekalongan. Noordin apparently supervised content, which included a long section of “advice” to fellow mujahidin from Mukhlis, clearly written after he was imprisoned. Abdul Aziz met Misno frequently over the two months and reported that the young would-be martyr told him not to say anything about the site to Said Sungkar, suggesting, indeed, that for all his logistic aid, he was not in the inner circle.⁶⁶

Sometime in September, Noordin, Azhari and the selected suicide bombers apparently returned to Semarang, a few hours’ drive from Pekalongan, where they could find refuge and more recruits. At the height of JI’s existence, the Central Java *wakalah* based in Semarang was far and away the best organised, and despite periodic police sweeps, most notably in July 2003, a solid base still existed. It included Subur Sugiarto, who became Noordin’s courier in the role Ubeid and Ali Zein had played earlier.⁶⁷ He also appears to have brought Semarang-based friends into the network, most of them apparently new recruits, not ex-members of the old *wakalah*.⁶⁸ Subur and three of these robbed a mobile phone store in Pekalongan in September to get fourteen telephones for the group’s use.

As plans for Bali II advanced, Noordin conducted training on the second floor of the “Selera” restaurant in Semarang for the three suicide bombers and Anif Solchanudin.⁶⁹ Anif was originally to have been a fourth “bridegroom” – the code word for suicide bomber – but he was an Ambon veteran, and Azhari reportedly decided he was needed to train others.

On 1 October, Salik Firdaus, Misro, and Aip Hidayat strolled into three cafes in Bali and blew themselves up, killing another twenty in the process. From a base in East Java, Azhari seems to have supervised construction of the bombing backpacks, while Noordin stayed in Semarang.

Over the next few weeks, Subur led a short military training course for five members of the group on the slopes of Mount Unggaran, just south of Semarang; all of the participants paid their own way.⁷⁰

On 9 November, police arrested Cholily in Semarang as he was bringing an Azhari-made bomb from Malang for Noordin via Tedi, a member of the Semarang group who is still at large. From Cholily police learned of Azhari’s hideout in Batu, Malang, and immediately surrounded it. During the ensuing gunbattle, Azhari was killed; Arman blew himself up.

Noordin eluded capture in Semarang. He has since been traced to Solo; Rengasdengklok and Krawang, West Java; Surabaya; and Wonosobo, Central Java.

⁶⁶ “Azis carikan Noordin rumah kontrakan”, Bali Pos, 6 December 2005.

⁶⁷ “Diduga Terkait Dr Azahari”, Sinar Harapan.

⁶⁸ These included Dwi Wdiyarto alias Wiwid, 30; Anif Solchanudin alias Pendek (“Shorty”), 24; Ardi Wibowo alias Dedi, 30; Aditya Tri Yoga, 29; Wawan Suprihatin, 35; Hari Seti Rahmadi; Sri Puji Mulyono; Joko Suroso; and Reno alias Tedi. All but the latter were arrested after Bali II; Aditya Tri Yoga was later released.

⁶⁹ “Police nab four suspected terrorists in Central Java”, *Jakarta Post*, 10 January 2003

⁷⁰ “Teroris Ditempa di Gunung Unggaran”, Bali Post, 8 December 2005.

VI. CONCLUSION

Noordin clearly aspires to head a tightly organised military machine with cells across South East Asia, designed to mount terror attacks on the U.S. and its allies, *kafirs*, anti-Islamic governments including Indonesia, and other enemies of Islam. He is a long way from that now. That said:

- ❑ He can draw on a JI base in Surabaya, Solo, and Semarang. In each he has been able to find reliable couriers who can reach out to other networks for assistance.
- ❑ The JI school network remains important, particularly for his inner circle, which is probably still linked to the old Mantiqi I; it included Jabir and Abdul Hadi, the two killed in the April 2006 raid. A critical question is whether it also includes Abu Dujanah and Zulkarnaen or whether JI has fragmented further.
- ❑ Whatever his ambitions, Noordin's "organisation" still seems largely ad hoc but this could be changing. Paradoxically, his constant movement may enhance his ability to set up cells, even as it militates against direct supervision of operations.
- ❑ He may be reaching out to other organisations more with Sunata and Akram in jail. There is some indication he is attracting their followers. For access to experienced mujahidin, weapons and funds, contacts in those networks are vital.
- ❑ He will be searching for new couriers to the Philippines in particular, and for this he may look to Akram's older brother, Malik.
- ❑ The role of the older JI leaders from Mantiqi II will be critical in restraining younger, more militant members from joining Noordin.
- ❑ Since Noordin operates on the principle that going it alone with a small group is a necessary response to the political situation, he may be encouraging like-minded groups to do the same, which may have ramifications for Poso, in particular.
- ❑ More than ever, controls are needed on what goes in and out of Indonesian prisons so Mukhlas, Imam Samudra and others cannot give Noordin's group materials, encouragement or radical legitimacy.

There are numerous indications the capacity of Noordin's group remains limited. Anif Solchanudin, the "fourth" suicide bomber, was kept from martyrdom because as an Ambon veteran, he was needed to train recruits. If Noordin could rely on JI veterans from Ambon, Poso, and Mindanao – totalling in the hundreds – he should not have to be so concerned about one not overly experienced trainer.

There appears to be no one in Noordin's circle with the in-depth religious knowledge that traditionally distinguished JI from KOMPAK and DI, and there is no hint in any of the materials that have come out of any attention to *daawa* (religious outreach). That may explain the reliance on Mukhlas's writings and sermons but also suggests limited capacity to attract JI *ustadz*.

For the Mount Unggaran training in October 2005, Noordin's courier, Subur, could marshal only eight participants, who had to pay for themselves. By contrast, KOMPAK's Abdullah Sunata got twenty to West Ceram in 2004, and he financed them all. Reliance on *fa'i* – armed robbery – suggests not enough funds are coming from outside or through *infaq* (member contributions) to sustain activities.

The efforts to survey possible targets in East Java in early 2005 suggest extraordinary determination to move forward with attacks even while under deep cover and the subject of one of the largest manhunts in Indonesian history. That he had to abort all plans because of the need to keep moving, however, indicates there was not sufficient strength in East Java to go forward without him.

All this notwithstanding, the troubling thing is that there seems to be no shortage of new recruits, and recruiters like Subur Sugiarto or Jabir appear to have had little difficulty tapping into their personal networks to find new people as needed. We do not yet have a clear idea of the recruitment arguments, except that Abdul Aziz, the computer teacher, said he joined not because he approved of bombing but because he shared Noordin's hatred of the U.S. and its allies.

It also remains true that while very few KOMPAK- or JI-trained bomb-makers seem to have joined Noordin, it only takes one or two to teach others. Jabir, who apprenticed himself to Azhari in 2004, is now dead but the Semarang fugitive, Reno alias Tedi, appears in a Noordin-sponsored video teaching bomb-making step by step.

A final note: strengthening networks in Malaysia, the Philippines, and perhaps Thailand are going to be more important for Noordin, as a Malaysian, than they would be for an Indonesian; that he has reiterated the old Mantiqi I goal of an archipelagic South East Asian operation should not be a surprise. If he can ever again think beyond his own survival, this may mean more efforts to communicate with Malaysian JI members in the Philippines, reach out to the DI members in Sabah, and reactivate old links in Thailand. Noordin's ambitions are too big to stay focused on Indonesia but the Indonesian police are likely to get to him first.

Jakarta/Brussels, 5 May 2006

APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA



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Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin

APPENDIX B

MAP OF CENTRAL JAVA



APPENDIX C

INDEX OF NAMES

Abdul Ghoni

See Umar Wayan

Abdul Hadi

See Baharudin Soleh

Abdul Malik

Darul Islam (DI) member; tobacco entrepreneur from Wonosobo; involved in sending DI recruits to the Philippines; older brother of Akram; married to a Filipina.

Abdul Rauf alias Sam

Member of Darul Islam (DI) faction called Ring Banten group arrested after the 2002 Bali bombing in connection with robbing of a gold store, the proceeds of which went toward the bombing. Serving sixteen-year sentence in Bali. Grandson of DI member, Ngruki alumnus.

Abdul Rohim

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's son; active in producing video CDs of conflict; frequent traveler to Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2000-2001.

Abdullah Sunata alias Nata alias Arman alias Andri

Head of KOMPAK office in Ambon 2000-2001, sentenced to seven years in prison in April 2006 for withholding information about Noordin's whereabouts and illegal possession of weapons. Noordin tried to get him to join forces in 2004 but he refused.

Abdullah Sungkar

Founder of Jemaah Islamiyah, co-founder of al-Mukmin *pesantren* in Ngruki, outside Solo, Central Java. Born 1937 to well-known family of batik traders of Yemeni descent; inducted into Darul Islam in 1976, detained briefly in 1977, then again with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 1978; fled to Malaysia with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 1985, died in Bogor in 1999.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir

Succeeded Abdullah Sungkar as *amir* of Jemaah Islamiyah, 1999; head of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, 2000. Born 1938 in Jombang, East Java, attended Gontor *pesantren*, active in al-Irsyad; co-founder with Sungkar of Pesantren al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki. Inducted into Darul Islam 1976, arrested 1978, released 1982, fled to Malaysia 1985, returned to Indonesia 1999. Arrested October 2002, sentenced to four years on rebellion and immigration charges September 2003; rebellion charges thrown out on appeal, sentence reduced by Supreme Court to one year six months, March 2004; on eve of release, charged with terrorism April 2004, sentenced to 30 months, due for release June 2006.

Abu Dujanah

Real name Ainul Bahri; native of Cianjur, Indonesia; secretary of Mantiqi II, secretary of central command; taught at Luqmanul Hakiem; helped protect Azhari and Noordin Mohammed Top after August 2003 Marriott bombing; Afghan veteran.

Abu Fida

Instructor at Mahad Aly in Solo, also known as Universitas an-Nur; member of Jemaah Islamiyah's East Java wakah; mentor of several of Noordin's young Central Java followers. Arrested August 2004 for harbouring terrorists, later released. Real name Syaifuddin Umar.

Aceng Kurnia

Native of Garut; head of Kartosoewirjo's private guard, arrested June 1962; headed effort to revive Darul Islam in 1969. Installed as commander I for West Java division of DI, 1975. Mentor of Akram.

Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo

Born 1971, lived in Blitar, East Java; BA in economics; inducted into Jemaah Islamiyah by Fahim in 1996; arrested 2004, sentenced to death 2005 for role in Australian embassy bombing.

Adung

Real name: Sunarto bin Kartodihardjo; member of Jemaah Islamiyah central command, formerly driver of Sungkar in Malaysia, then succeeded Mukhlas as head of Mantiqi I. Ngruki graduate, detained 1979-1981 in connection with Komando Jihad. Arrested Solo 2004 for withholding information about Noordin, sentenced to seven years.

Agus Ahmad

First major figure arrested in connection with September 2004 Australian embassy bombing. Born 1973, Cianjur, West Java. Recruited by Iwan alias Rois. Sentenced to four years, July 2005.

Ahmad Rofiq Ridho alias Ali Zein alias Allen alias Abu Husna alias Fuad Baraja

Courier for Noordin, 2004. Ngruki alumnus, brother of Fathurrahman al-Ghozi, cousin of Jabir; veteran of Ambon; Jemaah Islamiyah member. Arrested July 2005, sentenced to seven years, April 2006.

Ahmad Sayid Maulana

Member of AMIN. Leader of Darul Islam in Maluku. Arrested in Sabah, Malaysia in September 2003; detained under Internal Security Act.

Ajengan Masduki

Darul Islam leader whose break with Abdullah Sungkar led latter to form Jemaah Islamiyah in 1993. Died Cianjur, West Java November 2003.

Akram alias Shamsuddin alias Muhammad Taufiqurrahman

Darul Islam leader whom Noordin approached in 2004. Born Temanggung, Central Java; Afghan veteran; lived in Sabah before going to Mindanao in 1987 to set up Mindanao training for DI members. Loyal to DI leader Aceng Kurnia. Younger brother of Abdul Malik. Arrested June 2005 for involvement in mosque bombing in Yogyakarta in 2000; sentenced to three years, January 2006.

Ali Ghufron (sometimes written Aly Ghufron) alias Mukhlas

First director of Luqmanul Hakiem *pesantren*, Malaysia; Jemaah Islamiyah leader; Afghan veteran; Bali bomber; prolific writer of jihadist literature; brother of Ali Imron and Amrozi; sentenced to death October 2003, currently detained Nusakambangan prison, Central Java.

Ali Zein

See Ahmad Rofiq Ridho

Anif Solchanudin

Recruited as fourth suicide bomber for Bali Bomb II (along with Salik Firdaus, Misro, and Aip Hidayat). Ambon veteran. Arrested November 2005, accused of sheltering Noordin.

Apuy

Alias of Syaiful Bahri; Ring Banten member from Cigarung, Sukabumi, involved in 2004 Australian embassy bombing. Initially selected as possible suicide bomber. Arrested November 2004 in Bogor, sentenced to ten years in prison, September 2005.

Arham

See Enceng Kurnia

Aris Munandar

Head of KOMPAK-Solo office that provided major funding for jihadist activities in Ambon and Poso. In October 1999, organised and financed a military training course near Waimurat, Buru.

Asep Jaja alias Dahlan

KOMPAK fighter, high school classmate of Abdullah Sunata; trained in Waimurat, Buru 1999, West Ceram, July 2004; sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in a May 2005 attack on paramilitary police in West Ceram, Maluku; married to woman from al-Islam *pesantren* in Lamongan.

Asmar Latin Sani

The suicide bomber for the 2003 Marriott bombing, Jakarta; Ngruki graduate 1995.

Azhari Husin alias Zubair alias Zuber

Malaysian national; Jemaah Islamiyah member; master bomb technician. Killed in police stakeout in Batu, Malang, East Java, November 2005. Involved in Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Batam as well as Bali I and II, Marriott, and Australian embassy bombings. Mechanical engineering student, Adelaide University, Australia; 1979-1984, studied at University of Technology, Malaysia (UTM); PhD, Reading University, UK, 1990 in property valuation; professor at UTM, 1991. Lived in Jakarta 1996; board of Jemaah Islamiyah's Lukmanul Hakiem *pesantren*, Johor; instructor in Mindanao, 1999; explosives training, Afghanistan, 2000.

Bagus Budi Pranoto

See Urwah

Baharudin Soleh alias Abdul Hadi

Close associate of Noordin killed in 29 April 2006 raid in Wonosobo, Central Java. Selected by Noordin to "ripen" the young men selected as possible suicide bombers for the Australian embassy bombing (Apu alias Epul, Didi alias Rijal, and Heri Golun), through giving them additional religious instruction. May have done same for Bali II. Married to sister of Ali Zein.

Basyir

See Qotadah

Bukhori

See Imam Bukhori

Chandra alias Farouk

Sheltered Noordin for twelve days prior to embassy bombing, still at large. Studied in Bangil, business partner with Son Hadi. From Pasuruan, East Java, may have been recruited as possible suicide bomber. Not clear whether Jemaah Islamiyah or Darul Islam.

Cholily

Courier for Noordin, whose arrest in Semarang on 9 November 2005 led to the police stakeout of Azhari's hideout in Batu, Malang, the same day.

Dani Chandra alias Yusuf

KOMPAK member, arrested in June 2005 in Wonogiri for helping hide Noordin; trained in Waimurat, Buru 1999; two time veteran of Ambon, also went to North Maluku and Morotai during conflict. D-3 degree from Bogor Agricultural University.

Deni

See Suramto

Dulmatin

Real name Joko Pitono. Born in Pemalang, Central Java; Afghan veteran; Jemaah Islamiyah member, taught at Luqmanul Hakiem *pesantren* in Johor, Malaysia; one of most-wanted Bali bombers; in Philippines since 2003, target of Philippines Armed Forces bombing raids, November 2004 and January 2005.

Engkos Kosasih alias Kamal

Former Darul Islam fighter, commander for the Banten area in the early 1960s. Three of his children became involved in Ring Banten, including Agus Ahmad.

Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias Arnold

Bandung native; Darul Islam member; Akram's go-between with Abdullah Sunata. Trained in Mindanao 1999, went to Ambon in early 2000. Involved in KOMPAK-led military training in West Ceram, July 2004.

Fahim

See Usman bin Sef

Faiz

See Mohamed Saifuddin

Fathurrahman al-Ghozi

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member; born Madiun, son of Darul Islam member Zainuri; brother of Ali Zein, cousin of Jabir; Pondok Ngruki graduate; Afghan veteran, class of 1990; instructor in JI's Camp Hudaibiyah, Mindanao from 1995; involved in several JI bombings including attack on Philippines ambassador to Jakarta 2000, Rizal Day bombing in Manila 30 December 2000; arrested Jan 2002 in Manila; escaped July 2003 from Camp Crame, Manila. Shot and killed in October 2003.

Fathurrochman alias Rochman

Member of Ring Banten, detained with Pujata in the same case. But unlike Pujata, he agreed to help Iwan find a house in the Anyer area of Banten for the fugitives (Noordin and Azhari).

Gembrot

See Mohamed Ihsan

Gempur Budi Angkoro

See Jabir

Hambali

Former head of Jemaah Islamiyah's Mantiqi I; former GPI member from Cianjur; arrested in Thailand, August 2003, implicated in virtually every major bombing undertaken by Jemaah Islamiyah. In U.S. custody at undisclosed location since 2003.

Hari Kuncoro

Dulmatin's brother-in-law; KOMPAK and JI member; Ambon veteran; now believed to be in Philippines.

Harun alias Syaiful alias Fathurrobi

Explosives instructor for Cimanggis group, March 2004; worked with Ring Banten, helped recruit youths who took part in September 2004 bombing. Born Cilacap, Central Java. Took part in July 2004 training in West Ceram; helped hide perpetrators of May 2005 attack on police in West Ceram. Previous experience in Ambon and Poso as mujahid. Sentenced to nine years by Maluku District Court, February 2006.

Hence Malewa

Born Poso 1979; member of Mujahidin Kayamanya, Poso; took part in July 2004 training in West Ceram; arrested Yogyakarta on suspicion of involvement in murder of Palu prosecutor Fery Silalahi; sentenced to twenty months for weapons possession in April 2006.

Heri Golun

Suicide bomber in September 2004 Australian embassy bombing; member of Ring Banten.

Heri Sigu Samboja alias Ilyasa alias Nery Anshori alias Mohamad al Ansori alias Mohammad Nuruddin alias Akhi Shogir alias Jamaluddin alias Azmi alias Ma'ruf alias Abduf Fatah

Born Solo 1982; studied bomb-making with Azhari, helped assemble embassy bomb, sentenced to seven years, September 2005. Father was Darul Islam Afghan veteran.

Idris

See Mohamed Ihsan

Imam Bukhori

Member of (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) in Pekalongan; friend of Said Sungkar, Jabir, Noordin and Azhari in 2004. Arrested November 2005.

Imam Samudra

Bali bomber, member of both Jemaah Islamiyah and Ring Banten. Sentenced to death 2003.

Iqbal alias Arnasan alias Lacong

Suicide bomber in the 2002 Bali bombings, member of the Banten group, not Jemaah Islamiyah, and left a will saying he hoped his martyrdom would help inspire others to restore the glory of the Indonesian Islamic State as founded by Kartosoewirjo.

Iqbal Huseini alias Ramly alias Rambo

KOMPAK member, loyal to Abdullah Sunata, involved in getting the detonating cord used in embassy bombing. Sentenced to four years in prison, April 2006.

Irun Hidayat

Ring Banten member; high school classmate of Imam Samudra, friend of Iwan alias Rois, went to Ambon briefly; martial arts instructor in military training sessions run by Kang Jaja and Rois, teaching martial arts. Since 1999, local head of the religious council of the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union (Perserikatan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia, PPIM). Sentenced to three years, July 2005.

Ismail (Muhamad Ikhwan)

Luqmanul Hakiem alumnus, worked with Noordin and Azhari in Marriott bombing 2003. Sentenced to twelve years, October 2004.

Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois

Ring Banten member, field commander of September 2004 embassy bombing; nephew by marriage of Kang Jaja; graduate of state high school, Sukabumi. Trained in Camp Jabal Quba in Mindanao 1999-2000. Ambon and Poso veteran. Set up a military training camp at Noordin's request in Gunung Peti, Cisolok, Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java, specifically designed to select suicide bombers. Arrested November 2004 in Bogor. Sentenced to death, July 2005.

Jabir (real name: Gempur Budi Angkoro)

Killed in police raid 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java. JI member from Madiun, cousin of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, attended Ngruki 1993-1996, graduated from and taught at Darusysyaha *pesantren*. He was instrumental from the beginning in helping Noordin evade arrest. May have been responsible for recruitment of Salik Firdaus, suicide bomber in Bali II.

Jhoni Hendrawan

See Mohamed Ihsan

Joko Triharmanto alias Harun (Joko Harun)

Helped hide Noordin in early 2005. Ambon and Poso veteran. Probably KOMPAK member. Sentenced to six years in prison, January 2006.

Joni Achmad Fauzan

From Mojokerto, helped hide Noordin in early 2005 at a Muhammadiyah orphanage there; classmate of Ali Zein's at Ngruki; undertook survey of possible targets in East Java with Ali Zein and Joko Harun at Noordin's instruction in early 2005. Sentenced to six years in prison, April 2006.

Lutfi Haidaroh

See Ubeid

Marwan (real name: Zulkifli bin Hir)

Brother-in-law of Dani alias Taufik (arrested in connection with the 2001 Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta). In Mindanao with Dulmatin and Umar Patek. Malaysian national, said to be one of the founders of the KMM.

Misno

Suicide bomber in Café Manega, Jimbaran, Bali 1 October 2005. Son of sharecroppers in Cilacap, elementary school education. 23-years old when killed.

Mohammad al Ansori

See Heri Sigu Samboja

Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Indrawan alias Gembrot alias Idris

Jemaah Islamiyah member from Riau; Ngruki member, involved in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in Pekanbaru, minor roles in Bali 2002, Marriott bombings. Sentenced to ten years in prison, July 2004.

Mohamed Rais

Noordin's brother in law, a Luqmanul Hakiem graduate; Indonesian national Malaysian resident. Inducted into Jemaah Islamiyah in 1995; Ngruki graduate; Luqmanul Hakiem instructor; member of Johor *wakalah* of JI's Mantiqi I. Moved to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra early 2002 with Noordin. Helped in early stages of Marriott bombing; arrested in late April 2003, sentenced to seven yrs May 2004.

Mohamed Saifuddin alias Faiz

KOMPAK member, Ambon veteran, took part in 1999 Waimurat, Buru training, July 2004 training in West Ceram, helped bring about Sunata-Noordin meeting. Left for the Philippines late 2004, arrested on arrival in Zamboanga in December 2004. Currently detained in Philippines.

Mukhlis

See Ali Ghufon

Muchtar alias Ilyas

Afghan veteran, a Jemaah Islamiyah leader. Instructor at 1999 military training in Waimurat, Buru.

Mukhlis

See Ali Ghufon

Muhamad Ikhwan

See Ismail

Munfiatun

Second wife (2004) of Noordin, friend and former roommate of Achmad Hasan's wife as students at Brawijaya University in Malang. Sentenced to three years, 2005, detained in Malang.

Mus'ab Sahidi

Friend of Ali Zein who helped him to find a hiding place for Noordin.

Muzayin Abdul Wahab (also spelled Muzain, Mujayin)

Elder brother of Aris Munandar, *ustadz* and imam of mosque in Cipayung, East Jakarta, mentor of Abdullah Sunata.

Nasir Abas

Former head of Jemaah Islamiyah's Mantiqi III.

Noordin Mohammed Top

Malaysian Jemaah Islamiyah member, former director of Luqmanul Hakiem *pesantren* Johor; graduate of Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. Chief strategist in 2003 Marriott bombing, 2004 embassy bombing and October 2005 Bali bombings. No Afghan experience but trained in Mindanao, went to Ambon.

Purnama Putra alias Usman alias Usamah alias Ipung alias Uus alias Tikus

Born Sukorharjo 1981; Abdullah Sunata's go-between with Jemaah Islamiyah, met Noordin twelve times, helped arrange Noordin-Sunata meeting. KOMPAK member; went to Ambon in 2000; helped produce the KOMPAK magazine al-Bayan and some of KOMPAK's many video CDs as well. Sentenced to seven years, April 2006.

Qotadah alias Basyir

A senior member of Mantiqi II involved in the post-Bali refresher training, also the man who with Abu Dujanah met Noordin before and after the Marriott bombing.

Rois

See Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois

Rosihin Noor

One of the most militant members of Ring Banten, shooting instructor in Kang Jaja's military training sessions.

Said Sungkar

A relative of Jemaah Islamiyah's founder, Abdullah Sungkar, but never a member; based in Pekalongan.

Salik Firdaus

Suicide bomber in Café Nyoman, Jimbaran, Bali 1 October 2005. Born 1981, Cikijing, Majalengka, West Java. Went to Darusyahadah, taught at al-Mutaqien *pesantren* Cirebon.

Salman alias Apud

KOMPAK trainee, arrested in Malaysia in September 2003 returning from training in Mindanao.

Saptono

Uncle of Iwan Dharmawan's wife, instructor in military training camp set up by Rois in Gunung Peti, Cisolok, Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java.

Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona bin Azwar

Jemaah Islamiyah member, Ngruki graduate from Bengkulu; house there was used to store the explosives for Marriott bombing. Opened a bank account in March 2003 to facilitate financial transactions for Noordin. Arrested in May 2003, sentenced to ten years, February 2004, reduced to eight on appeal.

Son Hadi

Born 1977, Pasuruan, east Java; Ngruki graduate, worked alongside Fahim in the Darussalam Foundation – and thus presumably as a member of the Jemaah Islamiyah *wakalah* – since 1997. Sentenced to four years, May 2005.

Subur Sugiarto

Arrested January 2006, suspected of having made video of Bali II suicide bombers' last testaments. Became Noordin's courier and Semarang coordinator in 2005, after arrest of Ali Zein. Robbed a mobile phone store in Pekalongan in September 2005 and made off with fourteen telephones for group's use. After bombing, led a short

military training course on the slopes of Mount Ungaran, just south of Semarang. Reportedly Jemaah Islamiyah since 1999.

Sunata

See Abdullah Sunata

Suranto alias Mohammad Faiz alias Deni alias Ahmad

Born Sukoharjo 1979. Courier for Abu Dujanah, graduate of Ngruki, Pesantren al-Husein, Indramayu (also a Jemaah Islamiyah school); and Universitas an-Nur. Worked as a preacher for the Darussalam Foundation in Surabaya 1997-2000.

Syaifuddin Umar

See Abu Fida

Taufikurrahman

See Akram

Tohir (Real name: Masrizal bin Ali Umar)

Attended Ngruki 1990-1994, inducted into Jemaah Islamiyah upon graduation, went to Luqmanul Hakiem as teacher 1998, sent for military training to Mindanao, returned to Luqmanul Hakiem in 2000. Sentenced to ten years in September 2004 for role in Marriott bombing.

Toni Togar alias Indrawarman

Jemaah Islamiyah member based in Medan, North Sumatra, involved in Christmas Eve 2000 bombings. His nervousness about storing leftover explosives from that operation led Noordin to plot the Marriott bombing. Ngruki graduate, 1987-1990. Sentenced to twelve years, May 2004.

Ubeid (real name: Lutfi Hudaeroh)

Courier for Noordin; arrested in July 2004; Ngruki, Darusyahadah, and An-Nur graduate. Born 1979, Ngawi, East Java. Jemaah Islamiyah member, Mindanao veteran. Fluent in Arabic. Sentenced three and a half years, May 2005.

Umar alias Heri

Younger brother of Ubeid, above. Helped with military training of embassy bombing suspects. Jemaah Islamiyah member, arrested January 2006.

Umar Patek

Bali bomber, Jemaah Islamiyah member, working with Dulmatin in Mindanao; married to a Balik Islam Filipina.

Umar Wayan alias Abdul Ghoni

Jemaah Islamiyah, Afghan veteran, an instructor for military training course near Waimurat, Buru, Maluku 1999; involved in the first Bali bombing, sentenced to life imprisonment, 2004.

Urwah (real name: Bagus Budi Pranoto)

Helped bring Iwan alias Rois on board for Noordin-led embassy bombing operation, 2004. Attended al-Mutaqien *pesantren*, Jepara, Mahad Aly (Universitas an-Nur, Solo). Sentenced to three and a half years, May 2005.

Usman (the Mouse)

See Purnama Putra

Usman bin Sef alias Fahim

Head of Jemaah Islamiyah's East Java *wakalah*, helped protect Noordin after Marriott, got him additional explosives.

Zulkarnaen (real name: Aris Sumarsono)

Head of Jemaah Islamiyah's military operations, member of central command; in hiding since 2002 Bali bombs. Afghan veteran, served as instructor at military training course near Waimurat, Buru. Ngruki student 1975-1980, originally from Sragen, Central Java.

Zulkifli bin Hir

See Marwan

APPENDIX D

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The Attachment #5: The *Piagam Jakarta*

PIAGAM JAKARTA

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Dan perjuangan pergerakan kemerdekaan Indonesia telah sampailah kepada saat yang berbahagia, dengan selamat sentosa mengantarkan rakyat Indonesia ke depan pintu gerbang negara Indonesia, yang merdeka, bersatu, berdaulat, adil dan makmur.

Atas berkat rahmat Allah Yang Maha Kuasa, dan dengan didorongkan oleh keinginan luhur, supaya berkehidupan kebangsaan yang bebas, maka rakyat Indonesia menyatakan dengan ini kemerdekaannya.

Kemudian daripada itu untuk membentuk suatu pemerintah negara Indonesia Merdeka yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia, dan untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial, maka disusunlah kemerdekaan kebangsaan Indonesia itu dalam suatu susunan negara Republik Indonesia, yang berkedaulatan rakyat, dengan berdasarkan kepada: **Ketuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya**, menurut dasar kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab, persatuan Indonesia, dan kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan-perwakilan serta dengan mewujudkan suatu keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia.

Jakarta, 22 Juni 1945

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The Attachment #6: The Elaborate Information on the Most Influential Modern Radical Leaders

1. The Founders¹

	Hasan al-Banna	Abul ala Mawdudi	Sayyid Qutb
Birth - Death	1906 - 1949	1903 - 1979	1906 - 1965
Nationality	Egyptian	Indian	Egyptian
Education	Studied to be an elementary school Arabic language teacher; memorized the Quran by age 10.	Religious education focused on Islamic languages: Arabic and Farsi. His native language is Urdu.	Religious education at Al-Azhar; memorized Quran by age 10.
Name of Group	Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the first modern Muslim radical group, 1928	Founder of Jema'at e-Islami, 1941	Member of the Muslim Brotherhood, 1950
Key Publication	<i>Al Aqaa'id</i> (The Principles), <i>Our Message</i>	150 books, including <i>Understanding the Quran, Toward, Understanding Islam, Let Us Be Muslims</i>	<i>Milestone Along the Road</i> (1964, written from prison) and many others.
Crime	Assassinations of enemies of the Muslim Brotherhood, culminating in the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha, 1949	Leading rebellion against secular leaders of Pakistan in order to establish Islamic government	Attempted overthrow of Egyptian government, author of <i>Milestone Along the Road</i>
Type of Death	Assassination, presumably by Egyptian secret service, 1949	Old age	Execution by Egyptian government, 1965
Age of Death	43	76	59
Status of Group Today	Still working to establish Islamic government and law but have abandoned violence and use preaching and politics instead.	Supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Killed journalist Daniel Pearl	Still working to establish Islamic government and law but have abandoned violence and use preaching and politics instead.

Source: Gabriel (2006, 18)

¹ These men were scholars of Islam, and through great organization skills and deeply inspirational writing, they spread a return to Islamic fundamentalism starting in the late 1920s. Their call for jihad was clear but sophisticated. Many conservative Muslim Web sites make their writings available in Arabic, English, and other languages.

2. The Evangelists²

	Dr. Salah Sariah	Shokri Mustafa	Abdul Salam Faraj
Birth/death	1933 - 1975	1942 - 1978	1954 - 1982
Nationality	Palestinian	Egyptian	Egyptian
Education	Doctorate in scientific education	Studied agricultural sciences	Electrical engineer
Name of Group	Started Egyptian branch of <i>Hizb al-Tahrir</i> (Islamic Liberation Movement), 1974	Founded <i>al-Takfir wal-Hijra</i> (Emigration and Flight), 1971	Helped to start <i>Egyptian Al-Jihad</i> (branch of <i>Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah</i>), 1979
Key Publication	<i>The Message of Faith</i> , 1973	<i>Al Kalafa</i> (The Leader); transcript of legal defense, 1978	<i>The Abandoned Duty</i> , 1981
Unique Message	Detailed argument that Muslims in general have fallen into apostasy	Separation from infidel Muslim society; intolerant of anyone not involved in <i>al-Takfir wal-Hijra</i>	Detailed argument that jihad is the only effective way to establish Islamic government and law
Crime	Invaded military training school in Cairo, 1974	Kidnapped and killed moderate Muslim preacher, 1977	Helped to plan assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, 1981
Type of Death	Executed by Egyptian government	Handed by Egyptian government	Executed by Egyptian government
Age of Death	41	36	28
Status of Group Today	Banned in Egypt, legal in England. Arabic Web site in 2005 called for "physical battle against the infidel rulers in the Islamic world." British branch claims to reject violence.	Active in most Arab nations. <i>Al-Qaeda</i> leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Iraqi terrorist leader al-Zarqawi are thought to be linked to these sects. Considered extreme.	<i>Egyptian Al-Jihad</i> merged with <i>Al-Qaeda</i> under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Source: Gabriel (2006, 28)

² These men took the writings of the founders to heart and gave their lives to put them into practice during the 1970s and 1980s. The life cycle of these writers was to become committed to radical Islam, found their own radical group, write a manifesto of their position, carry out an attack against the government, get captured, go on trial, and be executed. These writings are rarely available in English or analyzed in depth, but they are fueling the next generation of radicals (so-called the evangelists).

3. The Prisoners³

	Abod Zoummar	Karam Zohdy	Assim Abdul Maghed
Birth	1946	1952	Unknown
Nationality	Egyptian	Egyptian	Egyptian
Education	Military	Agricultural engineer	Civil engineer
Group Affiliation	<i>Al-Jihad, Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah</i>	<i>Al-Jihad, Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah</i>	<i>Al-Jihad, Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah</i>
Key Publication	Author of <i>the Strategy of Al-Jihad</i> ; coauthor of <i>the Constitution of Al-Jihad</i> , 1986	Coauthor of <i>the Constitution of Al-Jihad</i> , 1986	Coauthor of <i>the Constitution of Al-Jihad</i> , 1986
Original Message	Overturn immoral ruler; fig those who oppose <i>Shari'a Law</i> ; establish caliphate	Overturn immoral ruler; fig those who oppose <i>Shari'a Law</i> ; establish caliphate	Overturn immoral ruler; fig those who oppose <i>Shari'a Law</i> ; establish caliphate
Crime	Planning assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat; acts of terrorism	Planning assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat; acts of terrorism	Planning assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat; acts of terrorism
Length of Incarceration	1981 – 2011 (30 years). He was released right after the Egyptian revolution.	1981 – 2003 (22 years). He was 51 years old when he was released.	1981 – 2003 (22 years)
Current Philosophy	Ran for president of Egypt on a 50-point program; still committed to original goals	Leading <i>Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah</i> to reject violence in favor of nonviolent persuasion; still committed to original goals	Leading <i>Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah</i> to reject violence in favor of nonviolent persuasion; still committed to original goals

Source: Gabriel (2006, 38)

³ This group is different from the evangelists because they were not executed for their attacks against government. Instead, they were kept in prison, where they wrote two manuscripts in the 1980s defending their jihad against Egyptian authority.

4. The Aristocrats⁴

	Osama bin Laden	Ayman al-Zawahiri
Birth	1957, the 17 th of 52 brothers and sisters borne by multiple wives	1951
Birth Place	Saudi Arabia	Egypt
Family Background	His father came from Yemen to Saudi Arabia around 1930 as a laborer. From that beginning, the bin Laden family built the largest construction company in the kingdom and was awarded contracts to renovate the three holiest mosques in the Islamic world.	Zawahiri's family was distinguished both on his father's and mother's side. His grandfather was the imam of Al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo, and his father was a professor of pharmacology. His maternal grandfather was president of Cairo University and ambassador for the Egyptian government.
Education	Public administration degree from King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 1981	MD degree from Cairo University, cum laude
Name of Group	Founded <i>Al-Qaeda</i> in 1988 to channel fighters and funds to jihad in Afghanistan	Second in command of <i>Al-Qaeda</i> ; leader of Egyptian <i>Al-Jihad</i> , which began to merge with <i>Al-Qaeda</i> in 1998
Imprisonment	None	Arrested and imprisoned in 1981 after assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Released in 1984. He was hardened and radicalized by torture and poor conditions in prison.
Key Publication	<i>Fatwa Against Jews and Crusaders</i> , 1998 <i>Letter to America</i> , 2000 (These documents were authorized by bin Laden but not necessarily written by him entirely)	<i>Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet</i> (his memoirs, 2001) <i>Healing the Chest of the Believer</i> (1986) <i>The Prohibiting Word</i>
Unique Message	Attack the far enemy instead of the near enemy	Use of suicide bombers as a primary method of attack
Jihad Activity	Started at the age of 22 in Afghanistan; total of 26 years to date.	Started at the age of 16 in Egypt, total of 38 years to date.
Personal Life	Three of four wives; at least fifteen children	One wife; daughters and a son

Source: Gabriel (2006, 42)

⁴ In the late 1980s, two new leaders became prominent in radical Islam. Unlike their predecessors, they were men of privilege and means. After successfully pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan, they turned their sites toward a new target and masterminded the attacks of 9/11.

Reference:

Gabriel, Ph.D., Mark A. 2006. *Journey Into the Mind of an Islamic Terrorist: Why They Hate Us and How We Can Change Their Minds*. Lake Mary, FL: Front Line.

The Attachment #7: The Four Major Caliphates of Islamic History

A.H. 11 – 40 (A.D. 632 – 661)	<p>The Four Rightly Guided Caliphs</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Abu Bakr 2. Umar ibn Al-Khattib 3. Uthman bin-Affan 4. Ali ibn Abu Talib <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Ali and the governor of Syria, Muawiyya had different arguments about punishing a rebel group called the Kharijites who killed the third caliph. b. Islam torn into two parts (the Sunni led by Muawiyya and the Shiite led by Ali). c. They fought many battles, but in the end, Ali was killed and Muawiyya took control of the empire, beginning the Umayyad Dynasty. 	29 years
A.H. 41 – 132 (A.D. 661 – 751)	<p>Umayyad Dynasty</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Muawiyya passed the throne to his son Yazid. b. Yazid defeated a rebel group led by Al-Hussein ibn Ali, who was prophet Muhammad's grandson (from Fatima, prophet Muhammad's daughter). c. Yazid beheaded Al-Hussein ibn Ali. d. The merciless tactics of the Umayyad family created powerful opposition against them all, ending with the last caliph, who was assassinated in southern Egypt by the Abbasids, a rebel group loyal to prophet Muhammad's family. The dynasty lasted ninety years. 	90 years
A.H. 132 – 656 (A.D. 750 – 1258)	<p>Abbasid State (defeated by Mongols in A.H. 656/A.D. 1258)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. The house of prophet Muhammad, known as the Abbasid State, made the complete destruction of the Muawiyya line their top priority after the Abbasid State took over the empire. b. Under the fifth caliph of Abbasid State, Harun al-Rashid, the Abbasid established the House of Wisdom (<i>Bayt al-Hikma</i>) in Baghdad in present-day Iraq, and during his rule Baghdad began to flourish as a 	508 years

	<p>center of knowledge, culture and trade. The House of Wisdom also collected the works produced by Judeo-Christian-Greek cultures. Al-Rashid ruled from 786 to 809, during the peak of the Islamic Golden Age. His time was marked by scientific, cultural, and religious prosperity. Islamic art and music also flourished significantly during his reign.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. During the Abbasids, the Islamic empire experienced many internal divisions that developed into independent states, such as the Fatimites and Mamluks in Egypt and the Jobians in Egypt, Syria, and northern Iraq. d. While the internal struggle produced divisions, the external pressure of the Crusades produced powerful feelings of unity. e. The weakened Abbasid State finally succumbed to an invasion by the Mongols and dissolved in A.D. 1258. As the Muslims lived for the first time under foreign authority, the call to return to the roots of Islam continued. f. Ten years after the Mongols took over, Ibn Taymiyyah was born (A.H. 661/A.D. 1268). Later in his life after working as a teacher, scholar, imam, preacher, and writer he became outspoken on two topics (the Sufism theology and Mongols accepting of Islam). Consequently, it caused him at odds with everyone (the Sufi Muslims, the Sunni Muslims, and the Mongol rulers). One of his fundamental arguments is if a government refuses any part of Islamic law, then that government has chosen to follow man instead of Allah. Therefore, whether that government claims to be Muslim or not, it must be fought. For a radical Muslim, Ibn Taymiyyah is a role model because he did not do things to make people or leaders happy. Within the bounded rationality of a radical Muslim, Ibn Taymiyyah was not politically correct. He merely stood upon the Quran and the life of prophet Muhammad alone. 	
(A.D. 1301 – 1924)	Ottoman Empire (dismantled by Kamil Attaturk in 1924)	623 years

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">a. The Ottoman Empire was established during the life of Ibn Taymiyyah.b. This empire destroyed the Eastern Roman Empire and took control of its capital, Constantinople (which is modern-day Istanbul) and converting one of the world's largest Christian cathedrals (Aya Sophia) into a mosque.c. Employed thirty-six caliphs.d. As the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1924, from the mind of some segments of Islamic world it was caused by the Western attack of weakening Ottoman Empire with intellectual weapons, preaching freedom, democracy, and human rights.e. This environment produced the Great Awakening of Islam, led by the Founders, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and Abul ala Mawdudi in India. The intellectual works of these founders are then developed by the next generations of Islamist radical leaders with global influence in the second half of 20th century and in the early 21st century.	
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Source: Adapted from Gabriel (2006)

Reference:

Gabriel, Ph.D., Mark A. 2006. *Journey Into the Mind of an Islamic Terrorist: Why They Hate Us and How We Can Change Their Minds*. Lake Mary, FL: Front Line.